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JAMES P. SCANLAN

NIKOLAJ ČERNYŠEVSKIJ AND SOVIET PHILOSOPHY*

It surprised no one when Soviet philosophers long ago awarded to Vladimir Il'ič Lenin the title of world's greatest philosopher after Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels; from the standpoint of the Marxist dialectical materialism which rules Soviet thought, this conveniently nationalistic assessment is not without foundation. Within recent years, however, a much more debatable, even heroic contention has been added to the Soviet view of the history of world philosophy: Soviet scholars have concluded that the greatest philosopher *before* Marx and Engels was also a Russian.

The honor has gone to Nikolaj Gavrilovič Černyševskij (1828–1889), critic and revolutionary, who in the 1850's and 1860's, before his long and crushing exile, headed the more extreme, 'nihilist' wing of the disaffected Russian intelligentsia. Černyševskij wrote few strictly philosophical works; but the philosophical material in his total, voluminous corpus, Soviet scholars maintain, is sufficient to show that he carried both materialism and dialectics to their highest point short of their explicit combination and full formulation by Marx and Engels. "The materialist philosophy of Černyševskij", writes V. G. Baskakov, author of the most substantial recent study of his thought, "was the summit of the development of Russian and world philosophy in the pre-Marxist period."[1]

This evaluation is repeated in work after work by Soviet scholars, and it is applied not simply to Černyševskij's philosophical outlook as a whole but to each of its aspects in particular. "Of all the utopian socialists", proclaimed A. A. Ždanov, Stalin's ideological watchdog under whose aegis the glorification of Černyševskij (and of Russia's 'materialist' philosophical heritage in general) began in 1946, "Černyševskij came closest to scientific Socialism."[2] It was Černyševskij, other Soviet writers

* Earlier versions of this paper were read before the Department of the History of Philosophy of the Peoples of the U.S.S.R., Moscow State University, on March 12, 1965; and before the Soviet Studies Colloquium of Cornell University on March 8, 1966.

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have subsequently discovered, who did more to construct a materialist dialectical method than "any other thinker of the pre-Marxist period"[3]; Černyševskij who came closest of all pre-Marxists to the materialist explanation of history[4]; Černyševskij who first made materialism revolutionary and who, before Marx, originated the thesis that "truth can be confirmed and verified only through the practice of real life"[5]; Černyševskij who had no peer before Marx in understanding "the organic connection between politics and philosophy"[6]; Černyševskij who advanced ethical theory to its highest stage before Marx[7]; Černyševskij who anticipated Marx in aesthetics, who fought idealism more vigorously than any of the master's other predecessors, and whose intellectual services to the revolutionary cause have "no equal in the history of the revolutionary movement before Marx"[8]; Černyševskij who came closest to the Marxist treatment of happiness.[9] All the major questions of social order and social development were approached by Černyševskij "with a profundity which philosophy did not know before Marx".[10]

In short, in the Soviet pantheon Černyševskij has become, after Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the most significant figure in world philosophy. The end of the *ždanovščina* has not noticeably weakened this estimate, which remains unquestioned not only in current Soviet works in the history of philosophy, but in such standard philosophical manuals as the *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii*.[11]

Moreover, this exaltation of Černyševskij has become part of Soviet academic and popular culture on an extremely broad scale. The house in Saratov in which he was born has been made a museum. Černyševskij streets, squares, and monuments are common in Soviet towns. Paintings, prints, and busts of the great revolutionary thinker abound in schools and other public buildings. His works are required reading for all students, beginning in secondary school. There is a complete scholarly edition of his writings, letters, diaries, and marginalia in 16 thick volumes, published in a printing of 15000 sets.[12] A three-volume edition of selected philosophical works has been published in a printing of 50000 sets.[13] An estimated 400 graduate dissertations on Černyševskij have been produced at Soviet universities – so many that often five or six have identical or nearly identical titles.[14] Numerous books, monographs, and articles on Černyševskij are published annually, aimed at all segments of the reading public from school children to academicians.

In this sea of scholarly research and popularization, one might expect to find, if not clear proof of Černyševskij's philosophical pre-eminence, at least the fullest presentation of whatever philosophical merits he had. But if so one would be disappointed. For a survey of the Soviet literature on Černyševskij shows, on the contrary, that Soviet scholarship in this area not only fails to prove its case but actually ignores some of the philosophical contributions which do entitle Černyševskij to more attention than he is usually accorded by non-Soviet philosophers. Under the spell of certain familiar preconceptions inherent in the practice of philosophy in the Soviet Union, Soviet scholarship has created a stereotyped picture of Černyševskij, which both exaggerates his philosophical significance and at the same time does him little justice. The present paper seeks to identify and show the operation of the preconceptions which produce this distorted picture of Černyševskij.

Francis Bacon centuries ago presented a now-classic catalogue of the 'idols and false notions' to which thinkers of every age and nation are subject – recurring prejudices which, in Bacon's words, "so beset men's minds that truth can hardly find entrance". The preconceptions which characterize Soviet scholarship in the history of philosophy may be regarded as specific varieties of some of the general types of idols which Bacon distinguished. As they apply to the interpretation of Černyševskij, we may, with apologies to Bacon for adapting his terminology to the present case, identify three of them, as follows. First, the *idol of the flag*, or the power of Russian chauvinism. Second, the *idol of the scriptures*, or the demand to adhere to the canonical writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Finally, the *idol of the status quo*, or a conservative impulse which results in the ritualistic, formalized perpetuation of an established view, even apart from the question of whether the view is authorized by considerations of patriotism or Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy.

THE IDOL OF THE FLAG

No doubt the most obvious influence of the idol of the flag is seen in the very significance attributed to Černyševskij as the greatest pre-Marxist philosopher. For, as will appear below, examination of Černyševskij's views hardly supports the claim that in all areas of his philosophical thinking he was significantly closer to Marx than was, say, the German

Ludwig Feuerbach, or even the Englishman John Stuart Mill. But there are other ways as well in which the Soviet view of Černyševskij is governed by nationalistic consideration.

Tangential but symptomatic is the Soviet interpretation of the role of patriotism in Černyševskij's own thought. It has become traditional among Soviet interpreters to include patriotism, in the sense of an exuberant expression of love of Russia, among the chief categories of Černyševskij's moral philosophy. "In speaking of the most important traits of morality", writes I. S. Kon, "Černyševskij gives the first place to love of country."[15] Patriotism is thus considered an essential, structural element, both theoretically and practically, in Černyševskij's philosophical thought. A. A. Aznaurov writes, in the most recent monograph on Černyševskij's ethics:

> An inseparable component part of the ethical views ... of Černyševskij are his patriotic views....
>
> Ardent, passionate patriotism was the inspiring, moving force in Černyševskij's exceptionally wide-ranging scientific and literary activity, in all his revolutionary activity dedicated to the cause of the emancipation of the people. Love of country was for him ... the inspiring force of all activity, the source of its power and might.
>
> From the very beginning of his conscious life, Černyševskij was imbued with a profound faith in the mighty creative powers of the Russian people.[16]

Unquestionably Černyševskij did harbor strong patriotic feelings, though the above expression of them is considerably overstated. But the fact is that there is nothing whatever in any of his theoretical works to justify connecting his patriotic feelings with the categories either of his ethical theory or of any other area of his philosophy. To call them "an inseparable component part" of his philosophy is simply unfounded. The only evidence Kon offers for the statement quoted above, for example, is a passage drawn not from Černyševskij's philosophical writings but from an inspirational letter he wrote at the age of 18 to his 13-year-old cousin Aleksandr Pypin, in which he asks rhetorically: "What could be loftier and more ardently desired than to contribute not to the transitory but to the eternal glory of one's country and to the welfare of mankind?"[17] Obviously this youthful effusion, even if philosophical significance could be attributed to it, makes service to mankind at least as important as

service to country, and thus hardly "gives the first place to love of country" among moral traits.

To the extent that Soviet students elicit a strictly nationalistic thesis from Černyševskij's patriotic sentiments, their interpretation is directly contradicted by the explicit principles of his ethical theory. M. Grigoryan, for example, in an essay on Černyševskij's philosophical outlook, asserts that "the interests of his country were always more important to him than everything else".[18] But in his chief philosophical work, *The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy*, Černyševskij not only affirms but develops at some length the thesis that "the interests of mankind as a whole stand higher than the interests of an individual nation".[19] In sum, Černyševskij himself was philosophically free from the idol of the flag, and the Soviet attempt to attribute it to "the greatest pre-Marxist philosopher" can only be viewed as an indication of the extent to which this idol has captured the philosophical attitudes of Soviet thinkers.

More significant as an application of the idol of the flag in producing the Soviet picture of Černyševskij is the question of his intellectual ancestry. To give greater substance to the claim that reaching the highest stage of pre-Marxist thought was a *Russian* achievement, Soviet scholars must argue that Černyševskij's contributions did not merely reflect the ideas of alien, Western European thinkers, but arose as the natural product of an intellectual and social evolution which occurred on native soil. Soviet historians do not baldly deny the influence on Černyševskij of such Western thinkers as Helvétius, Hegel, and Feuerbach; indeed in certain respects they may overestimate it, as we shall see. But they seek by all means to disclose and to emphasize specifically Russian influences. "First and foremost", writes I. Ja. Ščipanov, one of the Soviet Union's leading authorities in the history of Russian philosophy, "Černyševskij's world-view was shaped by Russian reality and by the ideological struggle in Russian society."[20] Černyševskij is presented as the culmination of a native Russian materialist tradition in philosophy initiated by Mixail Lomonosov and Aleksandr Radiščev in the 18th century, and nurtured by Aleksandr Herzen and Vissarion Belinskij in the earlier 19th century. Great emphasis is placed on "the continuity of ideas between previous Russian materialists and N. G. Černyševskij".[21]

Unfortunately for this interpretation, however, the evidence of Černyševskij's debt to his Russian predecessors is not nearly so great as

the evidence of his debt to Western thinkers. *No* evidence of any sort has been presented to show that Černyševskij knew the philosophical writings of Lomonosov and Radiščev. Baskakov states that as a youth Černyševskij read their works "with great enthusiasm", but neither Baskakov nor any other Soviet scholar has presented evidence to substantiate even the first part of this claim.[22] Failing to find support in this quarter, Soviet scholars have concentrated on stressing Černyševskij's debt to Herzen and Belinskij, the transmitters of the Russian materialist heritage. A unanimous chorus asserts that Herzen and Belinskij constituted "an enormous factor" in Černyševskij's intellectual development, that they were his "chief teachers".[23]

It can, of course, be shown that Černyševskij knew and admired their work. He wrote in 1850 that he respected Herzen "more than any other Russian".[24] Belinskij he called "a genius", and of the movement in Russian literary criticism led by Belinskij in the 1840's he wrote that "we are all attached to it with the ardent love of devoted and grateful disciples".[25] But there is no basis for asserting that the impact of either Herzen or Belinskij even approximated the influence of Western thinkers on Černyševskij. To neither Herzen nor Belinskij does he ever explicitly give credit for forming his particular views; he does not even mention them frequently in his early letters or in the detailed diary which he kept during his formative university years.[26] Hence, there is little evidence to show that Herzen and Belinskij exerted specific or profound influence on the development of his views, captured the young thinker's imagination, or frequently occupied his thoughts. To suggest that Černyševskij knew a given work by Herzen or Belinskij, Soviet scholars have resorted to presenting evidence that Černyševskij was familiar with (or had occasion to be familiar with) the journal in which the work appeared.[27] But since no precise influence by the earlier Russian thinkers can be substantiated, Soviet scholars are forced either to limit themselves to general observations concerning the 'materialism' and 'revolutionary democratism' which Černyševskij is said to have absorbed from his Russian forebears, or to indulge in fantasies concerning his supposed early encounters with them.[28]

On the other hand Černyševskij does give credit for forming his views to a number of Western thinkers, and the evidence of his diary and early letters shows that it was these thinkers who most engaged his attention

and gave substance to his youthful reflections. In 1846, the first year for which there is clear evidence of his literary interests, the 18-year-old Černyševskij is enthralled with the novels of Eugene Sue – particularly with Sue's accounts of the degrading effects of poverty in the lower classes and his "sacred love of humanity".[29] He is also reading George Sand, and soon begins to praise Sand more highly than Sue. By 1848 his mind is a whirlpool of social and political ideas derived from Western European writers; his diary and letters center on his reading of Dickens and Sand; Chateaubriand; Fourier, Proudhon, and Leroux; Guizot, Blanc, and Ledru-Rollin; Hegel and Comte. In 1849 Ludwig Feuerbach becomes the focus of his reflections. In 1850 he writes that Blanc, Proudhon, and Feuerbach are "the chief objects of my adoration".[30] A similar list drawn up in 1851 consists of the same names plus those of Dickens, Sand, and Lessing.[31] Černyševskij's first philosophical work, *The Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality* (1853) was, in his words, "an attempt to apply Feuerbach's ideas to the solution of the fundamental problems of aesthetics".[32] In his most important philosophical work, *The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy* (1860) he praises the Russian philosopher P. L. Lavrov for seeking inspiration from "the really great thinkers of the present day", "the truly great thinkers of Western Europe", and asserts that Lavrov deserves all the more credit since "no one in our society pointed out this road to him".[33] Reviewing his own intellectual development from his Siberian exile in 1877, Černyševskij recounts that in his youth he knew whole pages of Feuerbach's writings by heart, calls Feuerbach "the only thinker of our century whose conceptions of things were, in my opinion, perfectly correct", and asserts that "I remain his faithful follower".[34] Surely no one would be more surprised than Černyševskij to hear that his "chief teachers" were Aleksandr Herzen and Vissarion Belinskij!

THE IDOL OF THE SCRIPTURES

While nationalistic motives have a clear role in forming the Soviet view of Černyševskij's intellectual significance, beyond question it is preconceptions stemming from rigid adherence to the dogmatic tenets of Marxism-Leninism which account for the greatest number and the most serious of the distortions of Černyševskij's thought in Soviet philosophy. In essence, Soviet scholars utilize arguments based on the methods and principles of

Marxism-Leninism in order to show that Černyševskij accepted (in embryonic form, at least) the methods and principles of Marxism-Leninism. A good illustration of this procedure is provided by the Soviet interpretation of Černyševskij's ethical theory.

In the Soviet view, Černyševskij (like Herzen, Belinskij, Nikolas Dobroljubov, and Dmitri Pisarev) was a 'revolutionary democrat', whose philosophy represented the interests of the oppressed Russian peasantry. The low level of economic development in Russia at the time – in particular the absence of a proletariat – prevented Černyševskij from enunciating fully the true philosophy of the working class; this task was left to Marx and Engels. Nonetheless Černyševskij's philosophy, in addition to being strongly materialistic and embodying significant dialectical elements, was advanced in clear recognition of the class struggle and the need for revolution. It was advanced as a class weapon, to benefit the downtrodden workers as he knew them – the peasantry.

Černyševskij's ethical theory, it is held, is fully governed by this outlook. It is a class-oriented, revolutionary ethical theory, which both expresses and promotes the interests of the peasantry, an ethical theory "adapted to the interests of the revolutionary struggle for the emancipation of the oppressed masses from the chains of serfdom and the affirmation of the right of the laboring man to freedom and happiness".[35] As such it is sharply distinguished from the theories of such bourgeois apologists as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. The contrast with the British utilitarians is strongly stressed by Soviet scholars. No substantial points of similarity are ever acknowledged between their moral philosophy and Černyševskij's. Thus V. G. Evsjukov, in a recent study, writes that Černyševskij's concept of moral value must be distinguished from those of Helvétius, Holbach, and "especially" the British utilitarians.[36] To call Černyševskij a utilitarian, writes another observer, is to exhibit "subjective arbitrariness".[37] The position is stated most strongly by Aznaurov: "As concerns the relationship of Černyševskij's ethics ... to the utilitarian ethics of Bentham and others, not only do they have nothing in common, they are directly antithetical."[38]

The chief difficulty which must be faced by Soviet scholars in maintaining this interpretation is that Černyševskij's own explicit pronouncements on ethical theory, taken at face value, clearly contradict it. In both *The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy*, in which his moral theory is

expounded in its most general terms, and in his novel, *What Is to Be Done?* (1863), in which that theory is elaborated most concretely, Černyševskij treats questions of ethics in perfect harmony with the British utilitarians, with no reference to the peasantry, revolution, or the class struggle.

The utilitarian theory of morality received its classic formulation at the hands of John Stuart Mill. "Actions are right", Mill wrote, "in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure."[39] In *The Anthropological Principle* Černyševskij similarly defines moral value in terms of usefulness in promoting pleasure. The concept of good can only be understood in relation to utility, he writes: "The concept of good is by no means weakened, but on the contrary is strengthened, is defined in the sharpest and most exact manner, when we reveal its true nature, when we find that good is utility".[40] To act correctly – i.e., to do what in any given situation is best – is simply to do "that which is most useful", affirms Lopuxov in *What Is to Be Done?*.[41] And in the last analysis "useful" can only mean productive of pleasure, since "the goal of all human strivings is the acquisition of pleasure".[42] The only difference between "good" and "useful", Černyševskij writes, in a convenient summary of the hedonistic utilitarianism he seems to share with Mill, is that in ordinary usage the former is the superlative of the latter:

> If we call useful that which serves as a source of many pleasures, and good simply that which is very useful, there no longer remains any doubt at all concerning the goal which is dictated to man ... dictated simply by reason, by common sense, by the need for pleasure: that goal is the good. ... When a man is not good, he is simply an improvident spendthrift, who squanders a thousand rubles on something of little worth; who expends, to acquire little pleasure, moral and material forces which would suffice him to acquire incomparably greater pleasure.[43]

Furthermore, the apparent agreement of Černyševskij with the British utilitarians is not confined to a bare statement of the nature of moral value. On a number of more specific theoretical questions as well, Černyševskij's *Anthropological Principle* reads more like an anticipation of Mill's *Utilitarianism* (published just a year after Černyševskij's work) than an anticipation of Marx. Černyševskij, like Mill, emphasizes firm

and lasting sources of pleasure. Like Mill he stresses internal rather than external sources, the benefits (including social benefits) to be derived from moral and intellectual cultivation: "The only real source of perfectly durable benefit to people from the actions of other people", Černyševskij writes, "is the useful qualities that lie within the human organism itself."[44] Like Mill he deplores the presence of grave obstacles to the maximization of pleasure (happiness) in contemporary society. Most important, like Mill he makes it clear that the ultimate moral standard is not individual but universal – not how much pleasure is brought to the individual or to his group or class, but how much is brought to society in general, to the totality of individuals. The criterion of utilitarian morality, Mill wrote, is "not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether".[45] As Černyševskij formulates it: "Only what is useful to man in general is recognized as true good."[46] In fact he explicitly subordinates class interests to "the common interests of a whole nation", and these in turn, as we have seen, to "the interests of mankind as a whole".[47] It would seem that for Černyševskij, as for Mill, the good of "man in general" is always the supreme ethical consideration.

On what grounds, then, can Soviet scholars maintain that Černyševskij advances a class morality, and one which is "directly antithetical" to British utilitarianism? It is at this point that Soviet devotion to the idol of the scriptures begins to make its appearance. For according to Marxist-Leninist dogma, in a class society *all* philosophical theories are expressions of class interest, advanced in conscious or unconscious support of one economic group against another. The blandest philosophical statement conceals somewhere the impulse of economic class interests, and its genuine *substance* is to be seen in its particular orientation within the omnipresent class struggle. And so must it be with Černyševskij's ethical doctrines. The literal convergence of his views with those of the British utilitarians, Soviet scholars maintain, is merely verbal and formal. The substance of their views must differ, for they represent divergent economic interests. Such "abstract reasonings" as the statements of Černyševskij quoted above, writes I. S. Kon, do not make up the "content" of Černyševskij's ethical theory.[48] Its "content" is revolutionary and class-oriented in favor of the peasantry. The insignificance of the utilitarian form in which Černyševskij cloaks the substance of his views is depicted graphically by M. Rozental': "The abstract, idealistic discussions of 'good

in general' ... the Enlightment, utopian views of social relations and the like are shattered, like a dam bursting under great force, by a living, revolutionary content, by the exalted and noble morality of the fighters for a better life for laboring mankind."[49]

Such an account, in terms of a distinction between the literal form and the actual class content of a philosophical view, can be applied to any thinker from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism. In the case of Černyševskij, however, the Soviet thesis is stronger. To establish his role as the creator of the highest stage of ethical theorizing before Marx, Soviet interpreters maintain that Černyševskij *consciously* advanced an ethics with class content. Despite the verbal evidence of a supraclass ethics in his own writings, they assert, Černyševskij in fact recognized the class orientation of all systems of morality. "He well understood", writes Aznaurov, "that in a society founded on the oppression of man by man there cannot be a single, universal morality for all men, common principles and norms of behavior for the oppressors and the oppressed."[50] His own ethical theory, then, is *deliberately* class oriented, since it was framed in full awareness of the class character of all morality.

Now let us consider the ways in which Soviet scholars attempt to support this thesis. The simplest and by all odds the most common attempt to justify it in the Soviet literature on Černyševskij consists in a direct appeal to the Marxist-Leninist scriptures. Lenin, in a brief work on the Russian radical press written in 1914, asserted that Černyševskij's works "breathe the spirit of the class struggle"[51], and this statement is cited as canonical and apparently as decisive in work after work by Soviet scholars. No Soviet study of Černyševskij in recent years has failed to quote it, and in briefer discussions it is sometimes the only 'evidence' presented to support the class interpretation of Černyševskij's philosophical views.[52] As in an argument in revealed theology, a passage from the scriptures provides an unquestioned major premise. (A model for this mode of argumentation, as applied to Černyševskij, is the following passage from *Kul'tura i žizn'*: "In M. Rozental"s *Philosophical Views of N. G. Černyševskij* there are serious errors. ... The book speaks very little, and only in the most general terms, about Černyševskij as a revolutionary democrat, whereas it is well known that V. I. Lenin stressed the revolutionary democratism of Černyševskij as the most powerful and valuable aspect of his teachings."[53] In the present case, however, it seems clear that even if Lenin could be

taken as an unimpeachable authority, his observation that Černyševskij's works "breathe the spirit of the class struggle" is far too broad to constitute evidence for the class character of Černyševskij's *ethical theory*. There is no denying that Černyševskij's writings are studded with references to classes and to collisions among them. As early as 1849, still in his student days, he discussed class interests and argued that they are sometimes more powerful than individual interests.[54] But this does not entail that his *ethical theory* is grounded on class considerations or includes the concept of class as an essential theoretical element. Clearly this appeal to the scriptures is inadequate.

Another attempt to justify the class interpretation of Černyševskij's ethical theory consists in arguing that Černyševskij recognized that *all* philosophical theories are class oriented – a key thesis in the Soviet case for his anticipation of Marx. This thesis is supported by a *locus classicus*, a passage from Černyševskij which is cited almost as frequently as Lenin's statement above. Found near the beginning of *The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy*, the passage reads as follows: "Political theories, and in general all philosophical doctrines, have always been created under the most potent influence of the social setting to which they have belonged, and every philosopher has been a representative of one of the political parties which was fighting in his time for dominance over the society to which he belonged."[55] Viewed from a Marxist standpoint, this passage is certainly suggestive. But when it is examined critically, in its context, it hardly seems capable of bearing the weight assigned to it by Soviet scholars. For, first, it is asserted in a strongly polemical context (Černyševskij is ridiculing a statement by Jules Simon) and is never repeated in Černyševskij's entire corpus. Second, it is highly general, offering no indication of what sort of influence or how extensive or fundamental the influence which Černyševskij might have had in mind. Third and most important, the assertion connects philosophical views not with economic classes but with *political parties*. This is made even clearer by the instances which Černyševskij proceeds to cite: Hobbes was an absolutist, Locke a Whig, Montesquieu "a Liberal after the English taste", Kant a member of "the party that wanted to establish liberty in Germany through revolution, but disdained terroristic methods".[56] Consequently, the assertion cannot be taken as evidence that Černyševskij held a *class* interpretation of philosophical doctrines without another appeal to the

Marxist scriptures – specifically, to the doctrine that political parties are themselves class products, manifestations of economic class interests. Such is the assumption employed, generally implicitly, by the Soviet interpreters of Černyševskij. In rare cases the assumption is openly stated; Rozental', for example, employs the following statement with the implication that Černyševskij held to it: "The class division of society is the basis of its division into political parties: each political party expresses the material and social interests of its class."[57] But Rozental' does not and cannot substantiate the point by reference to Černyševskij's writings, for Černyševskij never asserts such a connection between political parties and economic class interests.

No better, finally, is the most concrete evidence offered by Soviet scholars to show that ethical theories, in particular, were given a class interpretation by Černyševskij. Černyševskij did assert that moral concepts vary with men's circumstances: "Forms of life", he wrote, "influence the moral traits of men; with change in the form of life these traits change."[58] In the margin of his copy of Buckle's *History of Civilization in England* he penned the following note: "Morality is only a cloak for the advantage of those who formulate it."[59] And on one occasion he suggested that the underlying "form of life" or the "advantage" which causes variation in moral as well as other concepts has to do with the economic situation of the individual: "The Portuguese noble, in his mode of life and in his concepts", he wrote in 1888, "is much more similar to the Swedish noble than to the agriculturalist of his own nation; the Portuguese agriculturalist is in these respects more similar to the Scotch or Norwegian agriculturalist than to the rich Lisbon merchant."[60] Such statements are seized upon by Soviet scholars, who see in them proof of the class orientation of Černyševskij's view of ethics.[61] Actually, however, such statements of the *de facto* variability of moral standards in no way establish the belief that ethical *theories* necessarily express class interests or are founded on the concept of class. For Černyševskij gives no indication that he means such observations to apply to *his own* normative ethical theory. From the earliest days of philosophy, ethical theorists who have advanced absolutist or at least supraclass moral doctrines have never hesitated to acknowledge the *de facto* diversity of moral opinions, or to admit that men frequently employ moral doctrines to rationalize their own self-interested actions; Plato is a case in point. Statements of this

type by Černyševskij, then, cannot be used as evidence for the Soviet interpretation unless Černyševskij somewhere adds that no ethical theorist, himself included, can escape such class determination of his moral concepts. But this he does not do.

Indeed the fact remains that he explicitly asserts the contradictory. In *The Anthropological Principle* Černyševskij makes a statement which is sometimes quoted by Soviet scholars in support of their interpretation: "It has long been noted that different people in the same society call 'good' things that are quite different and even opposite." But the continuation of this passage, in the same paragraph, is never quoted in the Soviet studies:

> For a very long time the conclusion drawn from this was that the concept of good has no constant, independent content which can be given a common definition. ... But when we examine more accurately the relation of the acts that are called good to the people who give them that designation, we find that this relation always has one common, indispensable feature, in virtue of which the act is assigned to the category of the good.[62]

This "common, indispensable feature" is of course *utility* – the supra-class core of meaning which value terms always have for Černyševskij. And he adds that when there is disagreement among individuals or groups as to whether an action or an institution is good or bad, "it is very easy to decide on which side theoretical truth lies": that action or institution is better which benefits the greater number – the nation, for example, rather than the class – since "the whole is greater than the part".[63]

Where, then, is Černyševskij's recognition that ethics *must* be class oriented, and where is the class content of his own ethical theory – the "living, revolutionary content" which bursts the dam of his merely 'formal' references to mankind as a whole? In fact no real evidence is ever offered by Soviet scholars to show that the so-called 'abstract reasonings' of Černyševskij's *Anthropological Principle* are *not* themselves the substantial content of his ethical theory. Soviet interpreters *assert* that in his 'substantial' ethical theory he placed the interests of the peasantry above all other interests, that in his most fundamental view "the greatest happiness" consists in "revolutionary struggle"[64], that his 'true' ethical doctrine "took as its goal the education of staunch revolutionaries".[65] But in none of these cases was any such assertion actually made by Černyševskij.

In the last analysis the supraclass, utilitarian pronouncements Černyševskij *did* make are simply *interpreted* in such a way as to render their literal meaning nugatory. Reduced to its simplest elements, such interpretation has taken two related forms in the Soviet literature. In the first, the critic assumes that since all philosophical theories are expressions of class interest, the same must be true of Černyševskij's ethical theory. Consequently Černyševskij's actual theoretical statements must *have* a class meaning, above and beyond their direct literal sense. This approach is taken most ingeniously by Aznaurov, who writes as follows:

> When Černyševskij speaks of "man in general" *he means by this* the man of the people, the simple working man, the laborer, above all the peasant. The moral qualities of "man in general" – these are the moral qualities of the simple working man, the laborer, and not of the exploiter (landowner or capitalist). Therefore the criterion of morality for Černyševskij consists in the good of this same laboring man, and, on the whole, the people.[66]

Needless to say, no evidence is offered to prove that this *is* what Černyševskij means. The second approach, followed by a considerable number of Soviet scholars, consists in rejecting outright the supraclass statements of *The Anthropological Principle* as remnants of an idealistic, Feuerbachian 'anthropologism' which Černyševskij did not completely overcome. Černyševskij did not, after all, rise completely to the Marxist level of the understanding of ethical theory as class-bound, it is said; he reached only the highest pre-Marxist stage, the nearest approximation. Hence, it is not surprising that certain of his statements suffer from 'abstraction' and reveal their 'anthropological' origin. His 'true' ethical theory, however, is not contained in these propositions but is rather *implicit* in his advocacy of revolution, his championing the cause of the peasantry, and so on.[67] But to regard this view critically, even if we assume that there are in Černyševskij's writings *two* distinct ethical theories – a supraclass theory presented explicitly in *The Anthropological Principle* and a class-oriented theory not openly stated but implicit in other writings – on what basis can it be asserted that the *latter* is the true 'content' of Černyševskij's ethical attitudes, the genuine, 'substantial' ethical theory of Černyševskij? Beyond the fact that such a conclusion is required by the idol of the flag, it can be justified theoretically only on the basis of another assumption drawn from the armory of Marxism-Leninism: that in the natural evolution of thought, true, living content is represented by

growing approximation to Marxist conceptions. The 'old', supraclass ideas were at this historical juncture outmoded, 'unreal', in the process of being dialectically surpassed. Černyševskij was struggling to give expression to the true ideas of the time, to discard the old intellectual framework which, as a champion of the oppressed, he *could not* seriously have accepted.

Clearly, both of the approaches just examined show the power of the idol of the scriptures in producing the Soviet interpretation of Černyševskij's ethical theory.

Reading Černyševskij solely in the light of the dogmatic tenets of dialectical materialism, Soviet scholars in effect present not Černyševskij himself but a Marxist construct as the 'summit of pre-Marxist philosophy'. What is more, however, their devotion to the idol of the scriptures does Černyševskij a double injustice: for while attributing to him views he did not express, they ignore his genuine theoretical contributions, which are not relevant to the Marxist construct. There is, for example, a feature of Černyševskij's explicit ethical theorizing which represents an advance over other thinkers of his time and is important for a full understanding of his philosophy, but which is overlooked in Soviet studies because it pertains to the 'abstract' or formal, utilitarian dimension of his thought. To complete this examination of the role played by the idol of the scriptures in the Soviet interpretation of Černyševskij's philosophy, this aspect of his ethical thought may be briefly described.

Like other utilitarian theorists of the Bentham-Mill school, Černyševskij tended to equate pleasure – and hence 'the good' – with the satisfaction of desire. But at the same time, again like other utilitarian thinkers, he was unwilling to sanction any and every desire as legitimate, or as genuinely productive of pleasure and hence good: he and his fellow utilitarians have typically wished to reject certain of the actual desires of men as somehow unworthy of satisfaction. John Stuart Mill, in his arguments for creativity and individuality in *On Liberty*, refused to accept the desire to conform, the desire to be unoriginal, as a genuine pleasure-producing desire, despite the fact that this desire *does* characterize (in Mill's own opinion) not merely some but masses of people. But if such desires do exist, and if pleasure is produced by the satisfaction of desire, on what ground can these desires be rejected? The views which Mill expressed in *On Liberty* require a distinction between legitimate and illegiti-

mate desires; but Mill himself did not clearly recognize the need for such a distinction, much less provide the theoretical machinery for making it.[68] Černyševskij's contribution has to do precisely with this distinction: he lays great stress on it from the beginning of his literary career, and develops the conceptual apparatus for dealing with it.

As Černyševskij utilizes the distinction in his first philosophical work, *The Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality*, it is an opposition between some desires (wishes, needs) which are "real, earnest, and true" and others which are "imaginary, fantastic, and idle".[69] The two groups of desires are distinguished principally and basically by their origin. The former are natural products of natural needs. The latter, on the other hand, have no roots in the nature of man but are gratuitously created by his imagination or imposed upon him by his environment; hence they are 'artificial' as opposed to natural. But the two types differ also in their dynamics, Černyševskij points out. The 'real' or natural desires are essentially limited and moderate. Products of nature, they are satisfiable within the natural order and are never characterized by endless, unquenchable striving. Contrariwise, man's artificial desires may be insatiable, like the perverted desire of the drug addict, who continually craves more stimulation but receives no genuine satisfaction: "An artificially developed man", Černyševskij writes, "has many artificial requirements, so distorted as to be false and fantastic, which cannot be fully satisfied because in essence they are not requirements of nature but the dreams of a perverted imagination."[70]

In work after work Černyševskij returns to this distinction, describing the opposition further and utilizing it in his own moral judgments. Real desires, he finds, are more potent and urgent than artificial or 'false' desires: "Some of our desires rush joyously to meet satisfaction ... these are the true needs of our nature. Other desires, on the contrary, fear contact with real life ... these are the imaginary, false desires which do not need fulfillment."[71] To the class of unreal desires he adds those which contradict "laws of nature", such as the desire to remain eternally youthful, or the desire that men should cease to be egoists.[72] Thus true desires not only have their origin in the requirements of human nature, but are adjusted to the inherent possibilities of the broader natural reality of which man is a part. "Only those desires which have reality as their foundation have serious significance", he writes; "success can be expected only in

those hopes which are aroused by reality, and only in those matters which are carried out with the help of the forces and circumstances which reality presents."[73] But the environing 'reality' to which desire must be accommodated to be genuine by no means includes all existing social institutions and attitudes. Indeed Černyševskij continually emphasizes that the social environment is the chief source of illegitimate desires: "A man in a false environment has many false desires."[74] It is only as a result of social custom, for example, that a man with an already ample income desires to increase it. There will be no noticeable difference in pleasure from the increase, Černyševskij argues; one rejoices in it solely because of "socially accepted routine."[75]

The culmination of Černyševskij's concern with the distinction between genuine and artificial desires was reached with his novel *What Is to Be Done?* – the book which became the gospel of the Russian 'nihilists' of the 1860's. In their philosophical discussions the young rebels of the novel concern themselves, as the author points out, "with the importance of distinguishing real desires, which seek and find satisfaction, from whimsical desires, which it is impossible and unnecessary to satisfy".[76] The distinction is in some way involved in all of the many moral problems with which these earnest 'new people' grapple, and indeed the narrative line of the entire novel is one in which personal relationships based on unnatural and perverted desires, produced by the 'false', distorted environment of contemporary society, are transformed into natural and healthy relationships. The dramatic turning point of the story comes when Vera Pavlovna and Lopuxov recognize that their 'love' for one another is not genuine but was produced by certain unnatural features of their relationship. For a time Vera tries desperately to maintain the illusion that she feels a true love for Lopuxov. But of course the attempt is bound to fail, for the inclination is not "given by nature".[77]

Černyševskij's treatment of this distinction among desires, for all the attention he gives it, is not worked out as fully as it might be, and the points he makes are by no means free from theoretical difficulties; nor, of course, are his observations unparalleled in the history of thought. But in the context of 19th-century utilitarian ethical theory, his discussion represents a significant attempt to discriminate a genuine desire from a whim or a conditioned response, and hence to establish what forms of satisfaction must be considered seriously in any attempt to calculate the means

of producing "the greatest happiness of the greatest number". And even if this discussion had no real originality or lasting value philosophically, it occupies so significant a place in Černyševskij's ethical thinking that it would seem impossible to discuss or understand his ethical views without examining it. Yet it goes unexamined in even the most complete and scholarly treatments of Černyševskij's philosophy and ethical theory among Soviet interpreters.[78] Their categories of analysis, following criteria of relevance imposed by Marxism-Leninism, provide no place for such supraclass considerations in the study of the thinker who reached the summit of pre-Marxist philosophy. Intent on the idol of the scriptures, they overlook the philosophical problems with which Černyševskij himself was concerned.

THE IDOL OF THE 'STATUS QUO'

The last of the three idols which function most prominently in producing the Soviet picture of Černyševskij may be dealt with more briefly. It is the *idol of the status quo*, defined above as a conservative impulse which tends to perpetuate, in ritualistic fashion, any view which has once become established.

From its inception Soviet philosophy has bred a particular attitude toward philosophical scholarship, an attitude which discourages innovation. For Soviet philosophy is based on a body of accepted doctrine, laid down and even developed in considerable detail by its founders. This doctrine, moreover, is deliberately institutionalized on the broadest scale in both society and state. To the purely intellectual (and quasi-religious) power of the revealed doctrine is added the inertia of two intertwined bureaucracies – the cultural bureaucracy which preserves and disseminates the truth and the political bureaucracy which implements and enforces it. In such a situation sheer inertia becomes a force contributing to the continued vitality of every established view, for every change in outlook may require not only intellectual adjustment but bureaucratic adjustment of a potentially threatening sort. Established doctrine, based in the first instance on revealed truth or on the pronouncement of an authoritative interpreter of revealed truth, is thus further sanctified by long and pious usage. The result in many areas of philosophical study has been that there is little incentive for original investigation. Existing interpretations, together with the canonical texts on which they are based, are repeated until

the canon is altered by some higher authority, less subject to the winds of bureaucratic fortune.

But this phenomenon is familiar to all students of Soviet thought. Less obvious, perhaps, is the fact that such institutionalization of an accepted view, resulting in its ritual repetition and promulgation, can operate independently of such forces as the idol of the flag and the idol of the scriptures, and can actually perpetuate a view not in harmony with those other forces. A clear example is presented in the case of Černyševskij.

Insistent as Soviet scholars are upon the significance, in Černyševskij's intellectual evolution, of the influence of his Russian forebears, they have never denied that the German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach did play a significant part in the development of Černyševskij's thought, at least by helping to furnish him with some of the atheistic and materialistic 'abstractions' to which he gave 'revolutionary content'. Feuerbach's role, they maintain, was secondary; but acknowledgment of it has become *de rigueur*. Impetus for this usage may have been provided by the idol of the scriptures, for Lenin in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (1909) did call Černyševskij "a disciple of Feuerbach".[79] But mention of Feuerbach continues now that this statement of Lenin's is not often quoted (since emphasis is placed instead on Lenin's suggestions of the new heights attained by Černyševskij).

In two areas in particular Feuerbach's influence is ritually cited by Soviet interpreters: Černyševskij's abandonment of traditional religious conceptions, and his espousement of the 'anthropological principle' – the view that man is an integral part of nature and an integral being in whom there is no opposition of alien elements, such as soul and body. Concerning the former area, before the *ždanovščina* it was not unusual for Černyševskij's atheistic convictions to be attributed solely to the influence of Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity*. I. Novič, for example, writing in 1939, dramatizes Černyševskij's 'conversion' in this fashion:

> The young Černyševskij excitedly borrowed Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity* from Xanykov. On the way home he brooded over it: would he be convinced of its correctness, or would he remain true to his former idealistic and religious convictions?
>
> Having read the book through, Černyševskij noted in his diary that he liked "its nobility, its directness, its frankness, its acuity". He learned of the essence of man as Feuerbach understood it, in the spirit of natural-science materialism; learned that ... in nature there is nothing higher than man, that the supreme law is love for man..... To the young Černyševskij these were real revelations.[80]

In more recent years Černyševskij's dependence upon the *Essence of Christianity* is not stated so simply; but it is never overlooked, and an authoritative work such as the current Soviet *History of Philosophy* still suggests that Černyševskij's "adoption of the materialistic and atheistic ideas of Feuerbach's book" was the final, decisive factor in his conversion.[81] Concerning the 'anthropological principle', everything connected with it is attributed more or less explicitly to the influence of Feuerbach. Černyševskij, in the words of the most recent recent Soviet history of Russian philosophy, "based himself on Feuerbach, whose anthropological principle he applied to the explanation of man and his consciousness".[82] In both these cases the influence of Feuerbach is accepted by Soviet scholars, however grudgingly, with little real attention to the evidence which might confirm or disconfirm it.

Now there seems little doubt that Feuerbach *was* the most important single influence in Černyševskij's intellectual development, as Černyševskij's own testimony, quoted above, indicates. Nonetheless the traditional and uncritical obeisances which Soviet scholars do make to the role of Feuerbach, despite the idol of the flag and despite the current scriptural injunction to emphasize native sources, require considerable qualification when we examine the actual evidence of that development in Černyševskij's letters and diaries – evidence that suggests greater independence of Feuerbach than Soviet scholars customarily claim.

First, it becomes clear that Černyševskij's conversion to atheism was a gradual development in his intellectual biography which was well under way before he read the *Essence of Christianity* in February, 1849, and in which his reading of Feuerbach played no dramatic role. Surveying his own views in his diary in early August, 1848, under the heading 'Theology and Christianity' he wrote:

> I can say nothing positive. It seems that in essence I hold to the old creed more through force of habit. Somehow it has little connection with my other concepts and views, and consequently I give it little thought. It has extremely little influence on my life and mind.[83]

And just before reading Feuerbach he writes of his religious views: "All this is extremely shaky in my mind."[84] Upon reading the book he is impressed by it, as Novič indicates; but contrary to what Novič and even the current *History of Philosophy* suggest, he is by no means convinced

by it. In July, 1849 he still writes, under the heading 'Religion': "I know nothing. Out of habit ... I believe in God and on important occasions I pray to Him; but is this conviction? God only knows."[85] In January, 1850 he writes: "In religion I do not know what to say. I do not know whether I believe in the existence of God, in the immortality of the soul, and so on."[86] Soon Černyševskij does come to adopt views on religion comparable to Feuerbach's; but to suggest that Feuerbach was the principle or the final determining factor in Černyševskij's conversion is to oversimplify the former's influence and underestimate the independence of thought shown by Černyševskij.[87]

Second, concerning Černyševskij's 'anthropological' orientation, supposedly derived from his acquaintance with Feuerbach's writings in 1849 and later, the evidence overlooked by Soviet scholars is even more striking. Černyševskij stated the 'anthropological principle' in his chief philosophical work in 1860 in the following words: "Man must be viewed as a single being having only one nature, so that human life is not cut into different halves, belonging to different natures; so that every aspect of man's activity is regarded either as the activity of his whole organism, from head to toe inclusively, or as the specific functioning of some particular organ which is viewed in its natural connection with the whole human organism."[88] Compare this statement with the following entry in Černyševskij's diary for October 23, 1848 – several months before his first reading of Feuerbach:

> Gave some thought yesterday to my thesis (the one I argued with Nikitenko about) that man, throughout the whole course of his life and in all spheres of his activity, is always absolutely the same in all his acts, and that there are in him no opposing properties. ... Of course among the many principles which guide a man's concepts and actions there is much variety. ... But we say that all these principles flow from one common principle and hence are in some degree harmonious with one another, as parts of a single system; they can never be contradictory, or even diverse. In every fact, if we examine it carefully and thoroughly (more carefully and thoroughly, perhaps, than is possible), we will find everywhere the whole man (just as the whole world is reflected in each part of the material world). ... A man's whole nature is reflected in each of his acts.[89]

Clearly these thoughts prefigure the central theme of Černyševskij's mature 'anthropological principle' – the organic relationship of human activity with an integral human nature. Hence the core of the 'anthro-

pological' approach was actually expressed by him before his direct acquaintance with the works of Feuerbach. Of course Feuerbachian conceptions were already part of the intellectual atmosphere of the circles in which Černyševskij moved in 1848, so that this diary entry, like his disenchantment with religion, may be indirectly attributable, after all, to the German thinker's influence. Still it is noteworthy that Černyševskij himself claims credit for the view, calling it "my thesis", and noteworthy that in any event Černyševskij formed this central Feuerbachian attitude without the immediate assistance of Feuerbach. Yet no Soviet commentator has pointed out these facts. Soviet scholars, while insisting that Feuerbach was not the most potent influence on Černyševskij, have rested content with the traditional view that everything specifically 'anthropological' in the latter's outlook was imbibed from the former.

The idol of the status quo in this case results in neglect of the basic research which can show that Černyševskij may not have been so dependent on Feuerbach as is assumed. Together, the idols operative in Soviet work in the history of philosophy create a mythical Černyševskij who is at once more Marxist and less creative than the flesh and blood thinker. What possible philosophical originality Černyševskij exhibited is largely ignored by Soviet scholars. On the other hand the anticipations of Marxism attributed to him, on the strength of which he is accounted one of the greatest of the world's philosophers, are largely invented by his patriotic and dedicated Marxist interpreters. While the real Černyševskij was not a major figure in the history of philosophy, he was a complex and significant thinker. But his significance does not lie in a struggle to rise from the 'abstractions' of Feuerbach to the 'truth' of Marx.

REFERENCES

[1] V. G. Baskakov, *Mirovozzrenie Černyševskogo* [Černyševskij's World-View], Moscow 1956, p. 9. This book is the longest (756 pages) and most detailed account of Černyševskij's intellectual and political career, and it surpasses all other works in glorification of his philosophical achievements. Essentially similar statements, however, almost all employing the word 'summit' (*veršina*), may be found in any number of contemporary Soviet works. See, for example, M. Grigoryan, *N. G. Chernyshevsky's World Outlook*, Moscow 1954, p. 61; I. Ja. Ščipanov (ed.), *Protiv sovremennyx fal'sifikatorov istorii russkoj filosofii* [Against the Contemporary Falsifiers of the History of Russian Philosophy], Moscow 1960, p. 257. In Soviet usage the 'pre-Marxist period' in Russia is taken to extend into the 1870's; the first volume of *Das Kapital* was published in Russian translation in 1872. Though Marx and Černyševskij were con-

temporaries, Černyševskij gives no indication that he knew Marx's work. Marx, on the other hand, who had taken up the study of the Russian language in order to read Černyševskij and other Russian radicals, knew and admired Černyševskij's economic writings.

[2] A. A. Ždanov, *Doklad o žurnalax* "Zvezda" i "Leningrad" [Report on the Journals "Star" and "Leningrad"], Moscow 1952, p. 18. The first Russian Marxist to emphasize the philosophical proximity of Černyševskij to Marx was Juri Steklov, who argued that Černyševskij's materialist thinking followed the same course as Marx's but was not as rigorous or systematic; see Ju. M. Steklov, *N. G. Černyševskij, ego žizn' i dejatel'nost'* [N. G. Černyševskij, His Life and Activity], St. Petersburg 1909, pp. 125, 175–176. Lenin did not go this far, though he praised Černyševskij for formulating "an integral philosophical materialism"; see V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Moscow n.d., p. 377. In the early Soviet period evaluations of Černyševskij were similarly tempered, but as early as 1939 views prefiguring Ždanov's pronouncement were being suggested; see, for example, I. Novič, *Žizn' Černyševskogo* [The Life of Černyševskij], Moscow 1939, pp. 6, 11.

[3] *Bol'šaja sovetskaja enciklopedija* [Great Soviet Encyclopedia], Vol. XLVII, Moscow 1957, p. 207.

[4] Ščipanov, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

[5] M. T. Iovčuk, 'N. G. Černyševskij – velikij russkij učënyj i revoljucioner' [N. G. Černyševskij – Great Russian Scholar and Revolutionary], *Kommunist* [Communist], 1953, 11, 93, 97.

[6] M. Rozental', *Filosofskie vzgljady N. G. Černyševskogo* [Philosophical Views of N. G. Černyševskij], Moscow 1948, p. 307.

[7] I. S. Kon, 'Etičeskie vozzrenija N. G. Černyševskogo' [Ethical Views of N. G. Černyševskij], *Voprosy filosofii* [Questions of Philosophy], 1950, 2, 149.

[8] Grigoryan, *op.cit.*, pp. 14, 39, 65.

[9] V. G. Evsjukov, *Problema sčast'ja v etike N. G. Černyševskogo* [The Problem of Happiness in the Ethics of N. G. Černyševskij], Novosibirsk 1964, p. 15.

[10] Ščipanov, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

[11] F. V. Konstantinov, *et al.* (eds.), *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* [Principles of Marxist Philosophy], Moscow 1960, pp. 78, 80.

[12] N. G. Černyševskij, *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij* [Complete Works], ed. V. Ja. Kirpotin *et al.*, 16 vols., Moscow 1939–1953. Cited hereafter as *Works*.

[13] N. G. Černyševskij, *Izbrannye filosofskie sočinenija* [Selected Philosophical Works], ed. M. M. Grigor'jan, 3 vols., Moscow 1950–1951. Cited hereafter as *Philosophical Works*.

[14] The following dissertations on Černyševskij's ethical theory, for example, are in the collection of the Lenin Library in Moscow: 'The Ethical Doctrine (*učenie*) of Černyševskij' (1948); 'The Ethical Outlook (*vozzrenie*) of Černyševskij' (1952); 'The Ethical Views (*vzgljady*) of Černyševskij' 1954); 'The Ethical Outlook (*vozzrenie*) of Černyševskij' (1955); 'The Ethical Views (*vzgljady*) of Černyševskij' (1958).

[15] Kon, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

[16] A. A. Aznaurov, *Etičeskie učenie N. G. Černyševskogo* [The Ethical Doctrine of N. G. Černyševskij], Moscow 1960, p. 61.

[17] *Works*, Vol. XIV, p. 48. Cf. Grigoryan, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

[18] Grigoryan, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

[19] *Philosophical Works*, Vol. III, p. 244.

[20] Ščipanov, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

[21] *Loc. cit.*

[22] Baskakov, *op.cit.*, p. 17.
[23] Grigoryan, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–21; Baskakov, *op. cit.*, p. 338. See also, for example, Kon, *op. cit.*, p. 149; A. Galaktionov and P. Nikandrov, *Istorija russkoj filosofii* [A History of Russian Philosophy], Moscow 1961, p. 317.
[24] *Works*, Vol. I, p. 381.
[25] *Philosophical Works*, Vol. I, pp. 574, 578.
[26] The fact that their names do not appear in Černyševskij's published works is, of course, attributable to the Tsarist censorship; mention of such 'seditious' figures in print was prohibited. Baskakov attributes their infrequent mention in the diary to a fear on the part of Černyševskij that the diary might fall into the hands of the university authorities. But this flies in the face of the facts that (1) the names *are* mentioned in a few places; (2) other forbidden names, such as those of Feuerbach and Louis Blanc, are freely mentioned; and (3) the diary was written in a shorthand which Černyševskij devised to ensure privacy, and which subsequently proved extremely difficult to decipher (see *Philosophical Works*, Vol. III, pp. 841–842, 892).
[27] See, for example, Baskakov, *op. cit.*, p. 338; N. M. Černyševskaja, *Letopis' žizni i dejatel'nosti N. G. Černyševskogo* [Chronicle of the Life and Activity of N. G. Černyševskij], Moscow 1953, p. 16; V. Ja. Zevin, *Političeskie vzgljady i političeskaja programma N. G. Černyševskogo* [The Political Views and the Political Program of N. G. Černyševskij], Moscow 1953, pp. 39–40.
[28] The imaginative construction of Černyševskij's intellectual development by Soviet scholars reaches a height in the following passage, in which Baskakov is speaking of Černyševskij as a schoolboy in the mid-'forties: "With great excitement he reads Herzen's 'Letters on the Study of Nature' and the works of Belinskij. ... Now he clearly sees his path. Belinskij and Herzen show the young thinker the life of the people, and his surroundings are presented to him in a new light. ... Černyševskij resolutely takes the side of Belinskij and Herzen" (Baskakov, *op. cit.*, p. 18; cf. Aznaurov, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–10). The only possible basis for such a fabrication is Černyševskij's statement (*Works*, Vol. I, p. 84) that he was "reared on" *Otečestvennye zapiski* [Annals of the Fatherland], the journal in which a number of articles by Herzen and Belinskij appeared in 1844–1846; but it is more likely, in view of other evidence (see the next paragraph in the text) that what attracted Černyševskij most in those journals were the translations from the novels of Charles Dickens and George Sand which also appeared in them (see Černyševskaja, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–14). As late as 1847 Černyševskij showed himself unsympathetic to Belinskij (see *Works*, Vol. XIV, pp. 105–106).
[29] *Works*, Vol. XIV, pp. 44–45, 50–51.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 198.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 216.
[32] *Philosophical Works*, Vol. I, p. 204.
[33] *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 168.
[34] *Works*, Vol. XV, p. 23.
[35] Aznaurov, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
[36] Evsjukov, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
[37] Ščipanov, *op. cit.*, p. 245.
[38] Aznaurov, *op. cit.*, p. 56. See also Kon, *op. cit.*, p. 155.
[39] J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, New York 1957, p. 10.
[40] *Philosophical Works*, Vol. III, p. 246.
[41] N. G. Chernyshevsky, *What Is to Be Done?*, transl. Benjamin J. Tucker, revised and abridged by Ludmilla B. Turkevich, New York 1961, p. 82.

[42] *Philosophical Works*, Vol. III, p. 247.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 249.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 251.
[45] Mill, *op. cit.*, pp. 15–16.
[46] *Philosophical Works*, Vol. III, p. 246.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 244. As is evident from these passages, the epithet 'rational egoism' for Černyševskij's ethical theory is somewhat misleading.
[48] Kon, *op. cit.*, p. 154. See also Evsjukov, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
[49] Rozental', *op. cit.*, p. 259.
[50] Aznaurov, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
[51] V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij* [Complete Works] 5th ed., 55 vols., Moscow 1958–1965, Vol. XXV, p. 94.
[52] See, for example, Rozental', *op. cit.*, p. 172; M. A. Dynnik *et al.* (eds.), *Istorija filosofii* [History of Philosophy], Vol. II, Moscow 1957, pp. 339, 364; M. M. Rozental' and P. F. Judin (eds.), *Filosofskij slovar'* [Philosophical Dictionary], Moscow 1963, p. 501; Ščipanov, *op. cit.*, p. 246; Baskakov, *op. cit.*, p. 8. Aznaurov specifically connects the statement with Černyševskij's ethics (*op. cit.*, p. 22).
[53] Quoted in Baskakov, *op. cit.*, p. 742.
[54] *Works*, Vol. XI, p. 672.
[55] *Philosophical Works*, Vol. III, p. 163. For use of this passage by Soviet scholars see, for example, Dynnik, *op. cit.*, pp. 341–342; Ščipanov, *op. cit.*, pp. 249–250; Galaktionov and Nikandrov, *op. cit.*, pp. 325–326.
[56] *Philosophical Works*, Vol. III, pp. 163–164.
[57] Rozental', *Filosofskie vzgljady N. G. Černyševskogo*, p. 174. Cf. Grigoryan, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
[58] *Works*, Vol. X, p. 893. Cf. p. 894.
[59] *Works*, Vol. XVI, p. 550.
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 891.
[61] See, for example, Rozental', *op. cit.*, p. 173; Aznaurov, *op. cit.*, pp. 32–34; Dynnik, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 349, 365.
[62] *Philosophical Works*, Vol. III, p. 243.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 244.
[64] Evsjukov, *op.cit.*, p. 12.
[65] Dynnik, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 364.
[66] Aznaurov, *op. cit.*, p. 54. Italics mine. Cf. V. M. Kločkov, 'Sxodstvo i različija v etičeskix vzgljadax L. Fejerbaxa i N. G. Černyševskogo' [Similarity and Differences in the Ethical Theories of L. Feuerbach and N. G. Černyševskij], *Voprosy filosofii* [Questions of Philosophy], 1957, 6, 51.
[67] See, for example, Kon, *op. cit.*, p. 153; Rozental', *op. cit.*, p. 259; *Bol'šaja sovetskaja enciklopedija*, Vol. XLVII, p. 208.
[68] See James P. Scanlan, 'J. S. Mill and the Definition of Freedom', *Ethics*, 1958, 3, 194–206.
[69] *Philosophical Works*, Vol. I, p. 171.
[70] *Ibid.*, p. 141.
[71] *Ibid.*, p. 179.
[72] *Ibid.*, p. 693.
[73] *Works*, Vol. III, p. 229.
[74] *Philosophical Works*, Vol. I, p. 171.
[75] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 224.

[76] *What Is to Be Done?*, p. 144.
[77] *Ibid.*, p. 201.
[78] Evsjukov notes the distinction briefly (*op. cit.*, pp. 22–23), but none of the other studies of Černyševskij's ethics, including Aznaurov's monograph and Kon's long essay, mentions it.
[79] Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. XVIII, p. 381.
[80] Novič, *op. cit.*, pp. 83–84. Cf. Dynnik, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 335; Aznaurov, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
[81] Dynnik, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 335. Cf. Aznaurov, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
[82] Galaktionov and Nikandrov, *op. cit.*, p. 325. See also, for example, Rozental', *op. cit.*, pp. 47–48; *Bol'šaja sovetskaja enciklopedija*, Vol. XLVII, p. 205; Dynnik, *op.* cit., Vol. II, pp. 348–349; Evsjukov, *op. cit.*, p. 3; Konstantinov, *op. cit.*, p. 82.
[83] *Works*, Vol. I, p. 66.
[84] *Ibid.*, p. 248.
[85] *Ibid.*, p. 297.
[86] *Ibid.*, p. 358.
[87] It should be noted that some recent Soviet works also make this point. Ščipanov, for example, writes that to attribute Černyševskij's atheistic convictions exclusively to the influence of Feuerbach "would be more than narrow" (*op. cit.*, p. 248; cf. Aznaurov, *op. cit.*, p. 15). But this qualification is not accompanied by actual investigation of the relevant evidence from Černyševskij's diary.
[88] *Philosophical Works*, Vol. III, pp. 251–252.
[89] *Works*, Vol. I, p. 153.

ROBERT D. CRANE

THE STRUCTURE OF SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT

Western scholars have analyzed intensively the specific tenets of Soviet military doctrine. In order to interpret properly these tenets, one must first understand the function or rôle of military doctrine within the hierarchical framework of Soviet military thought. The first recognition that this is a legitimate subject of inquiry is in Dr. Uwe Nerlich's introduction to the German edition of *Voyennaya Strategiya.*[1] Dr. Nerlich explains the interrelationships of the component parts of this hierarchy by the diagram given in Figure 1.



Fig 1.

There are three basically distinct concepts represented in this diagram, but not sufficiently differentiated by its author. The first, military doctrine, is the official *policy* of the state on military matters in general. The second, military art, is often described by the term military *practice.* It is the accepted body of thinking and planning for waging war in accordance with military doctrine. During actual war it would provide guidance for subordinate commanders. The third, military science, is the sum of military *thinking*, of the alternative theories and contingency plans for both deterring and waging war either now or in the near and distant future.

The diagram brings out graphically the relationship between these three concepts. Military doctrine has no direct influence over military science, but does provide directives, at least in peacetime, for military art. Military art occupies a rôle subordinate to both military doctrine and military science. Military science is independent of both military doctrine and

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military art, and is the only area of military thought that represents the versatility of thought at the highest military and political echelons. The broken line between political directives and military science indicates that the relationship is in constant flux and that neither is strongly dependent on the other. A more accurate representation might picture the arrow going both ways.

The above diagram also brings out the subordinate rôle of military strategy as a component part of military art. The Soviet concept of military strategy was borrowed from European usage in the 19th century, when military strategy was merely a technical art of defeating a hostile military force. In response to new conditions of armed and unarmed conflict in the nuclear age and to American usage of the term, military strategy in Soviet thinking is gradually expanding beyond the confines of military art. A recent Soviet analysis suggests that the theory of Soviet strategy, presumably as distinct from military strategy itself, is a component part of military science.[2]

Although the above diagram does indicate a critical distinction between military doctrine and military science, this diagram does not indicate what makes this distinction really meaningful for the analysis of Soviet military thought. The diagram does not indicate that a still more basic source of authority guides both political directives and military science, and that this basic source of authority guides military science directly but military doctrine only indirectly. This most basic source of authority is dialectical materialism. Dialectical materialism, referred to in Russian as *Diamat*, is important because it provides the principles and premises of Soviet military thinking that form the Soviet philosophy of strategy. This aspect of the relationship between Soviet military doctrine and Soviet military science is indicated by the diagram of Figure 2.

The emphasis on *Diamat* as a direct source for guidance in military thinking is relatively recent, though it was not completely eclipsed even during the depths of the Stalin era. This recent emphasis, particularly since the Cuban missile crisis, may represent in part a self-serving attempt by the newer generation of military theorists, supported by the top military commanders, to create an authority independent of the Party to which they can appeal for support of creative, flexible, and realistic thinking in military affairs. On the other hand, the emphasis on *Diamat* is evident in both military and non-military journals, and in both types of



Fig. 2.

literature the elements of *Diamat* to which the Soviet theoreticians appeal are those which support modern trends in Soviet thinking. Subject to further analysis of the relevant Soviet writings, the hypothesis seems reasonable that the newer generation of Soviet intellectuals, both military and political, have equal need for an 'independent' ally in their battle for the freedom of thought necessary for high-quality professional work.

One might legitimately ask how an appeal to ideology can give additional freedom to professionals already constricted by dogmatic ideological precepts. The Soviet theorists accomplish this by emphasising that the principles or laws of Communist ideology fall into three categories: the universal (*vseobščij*), the general (*obščij*), and the specific (*častnyj*). These three categories of laws are distinguished by their degree of generalisation and their degree of applicability. The universal laws apply with 100 percent probability to all events and processes at all times, past, present, and future.[3] Laws of the other two categories are more limited both in subject matter and in the degree of repetitiveness or probability of reoccurrence which they express. Thus, in the field of military affairs, the middle category of laws consists of generalizations about what happens in all wars. These laws are synonymous with the laws contained in military art and military doctrine. The lowest level of laws in the field of military affairs express only generalizations about what happened in a specific battle or in a specific war. The probability of these laws applying in other

factual situations is either low or not quantifiable. Although the terminology varies among military writers, the concepts they use and the conclusions they draw for the development of military science are nearly identical.[4]

The Soviet military theorists appeal primarily to the universal laws. They do so in two ways: first, as direct procedural guarantees for their own freedom of thought, and, second, as sources of guidance in their substantive analysis of military problems.

The first systematic discussion of these universal laws, particularly as procedural guides for the development of military science, appeared in the writings of two officers, both holders of degrees in philosophy, Colonel S. A. Tjuškevič and Major D. Kazakov, in 1962 and 1963.[5] According to these and other Soviet theorists, there are three laws that operate universally and eternally. The first is the law that change is inevitable in all aspects of life, and that change takes place in relatively infrequent jumps rather than in a constant evolutionary process. Nevertheless, a slow evolutionary process must take place between jumps in order to prepare the way for each qualitatively distinct breakthrough in the developmental process. The Soviets advance as an example of this law the development of Soviet military doctrine. According to Soviet military historians and theoreticians, Soviet military doctrine has changed only three times since 1917, each time as a result of conscious, creative preparatory work in the field of military science.[6]

The second universal law is that the inherent contradictions in every aspect of life constitute the basic impetus, cause, or instrument of developmental change, and that progress can come only from overcoming the contradictions by permitting and promoting competition and conflict between the contradictory forces. The implications of this law for the professional work of Soviet military intellectuals are clearly stated by Major Kazakov:

> The process of overcoming contradictions by means of the struggle of opposites is also a necessary element in the development of military science. The competition of opinions, the critique of old, inflexible views and theses, and the bold formulation and systematic consideration of the problems posed by reality, are one of the most important conditions for the development of Soviet military thought.[7]

The third universal law, termed the negation of negation, follows from the second law. If progress comes only from one idea or force

overcoming a contradictory one, then in the process of development this victorious idea or force eventually will itself be overtaken by one that is still newer and advanced. Whereas the second universal law applies to a single event in the developmental process, the third law refers to the process itself. One of the many implications of this law in the field of military science is that military theoreticians must be future oriented; and they must not 'absolutize' or turn any new finding or theory into a dogma, because this would prevent the further development of military science.[8]

Soviet military theorists appeal to the universal laws of dialectical materialism, secondly, as sources of guidance in their substantive analysis of military problems. It is debatable to what extent these universal laws control the substantive thinking of Soviet military theoreticians and to what extent they are merely used as necessary ideological props for independent strategic analysis. Soviet discussion of the guidelines provided by the universal laws for the application and development of the general doctrinal laws on war is meaningful in either case as an indication of Soviet military thinking.

Soviet military theorists repeatedly emphasise that the laws of *Diamat* do not prescribe any specific solutions to military problems, but only provide a philosophy of strategy or framework for understanding reality[9]; nor can they make possible more than an approximate, as distinct from a complete, understanding.[10] These theorists list at least two and sometimes three principal ways in which this framework is important for the development of military science. First, the dialectical approach facilitates appreciation of the many possibilities inherent in a constantly changing situation. Second, the dialectical approach makes it possible to understand the processes of change, so that military science can stay ahead of mere empirical analysis of past developments. Third, the dialectical approach brings out the revolutionary or liberating nature of Soviet military science by making clear the element of conflict between capitalism and Communism both in the general historical process and, more specifically, in the development of military theories and strategic concepts. These are the principal premises of the Soviet philosophy of strategy and the principal guidelines for the development of Soviet military science. Consequently they may be considered to be important long-range indicators of future developments in Soviet military thought.

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[2] Marshal Vasily D. Sokolovskij and Major General M. Čeredničenko, 'On Modern Military Strategy', *Kommunist Vooružennyx Sil*, No. 7, April 1966, 66. As yet, however, even the 'theory of military strategy' has little in common with the broad American concept of strategy or the British concept of grand strategy, which have come to be nearly synonymous with long-range global foreign policy. Within the strictly political context, however, the Communist term 'strategy' is perhaps even more extensive than the Western concept. In the authoritative manual, *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism*, 2nd ed., rev., 1963, p. 345, the following definition is given: "The term tactics often implies a political line for a relatively short period of time determined by particular concrete conditions, whereas strategy refers to the line for a whole historical stage."

[3] Even the universal laws are flexible when sufficiently refined. For example, the law that weapons development is constant and proceeds in qualitative jumps permits the repetition of past phases of development, though usually at a qualitatively different level. Thus rocketry was developed in China in the 12th century and was redeveloped in the West many centuries later. Colonel I. Kuz'min, 'The Conflict of the New and the Old in the Development of Military Affairs', *Kommunist Vooružennyx Sil*, No. 8, April 1964, 42.

[4] The higher two categories of laws are sometimes referred to as general (*obščij*) laws without differentiation between them, because both are general in relation to the lowest category. Similarly, the lower two categories are specific in relation to the highest category of generality. In order to keep this distinction clear, and perhaps also to avoid overtones of dogmatism, many Soviet military theoreticians prefer to use the term 'particular' (*osobenyj*) rather than 'general' (*obščij*) when referring to the middle category, and 'singular' (*yediničnyj* or *otdel'nyj*) rather than 'specific' (*častnyj* or *specifičeskij*) when referring to the lowest category.
Thus Tjuškevič states in his article, 'The Laws of Nature and Society as Sources of Rational Action', *Kommunist Vooružennyx Sil*, No. 4, February 1963, that the usual terminology is 'universal', 'general' and 'specific', Colonel I. Grudinin, in his article, 'The Specific and the General in Military Affairs', *Kommunist Vooružennyx Sil*, No. 23, December 1963, explains why he prefers the terms 'universal', 'particular' and 'singular'. The distinction between the two lower categories may be brought out by the qualitative shift in the laws governing the use of nuclear weapons. Thus the use of nuclear weapons in the Second World War was governed by a 'singular' law, but the law governing their use in a Third World War would be 'particular' (Grudinin) or 'general' (Tjuškevič). Presumably the law governing the use of biological warfare would be 'singular' in both cases.

[5] Colonel S. A. Tjuškevič, *Neobxodimost' i Slučajnost' v Vojne* [Inevitability and Chance in War], Voenizdat, Moscow, 1962, which was very favorably reviewed by Lt. General N. Sbytov and Colonel K. Spirov in *Kommunist Vooružennyx Sil*, No. 19, October 1963, as a pioneering work in the field of Marxism-Leninism; Tjuškevič, 'The Laws of Nature and Society as Sources of Rational Action', *Kommunist Vooružennyx Sil*, No. 4, February 1963; and Major D. Kazakov, 'The Theoretical and Methodological Sources of Soviet Military Science', *ibid.*, No. 10, May 1963.

[6] See Major General S. Kozlov, 'Military Doctrine and Military Science', *Kommunist Vooružennyx Sil*, No. 5, March 1964, 13. These three stages (*étapy*) run from the beginning of the civil war to the establishment of a standing cadre army, from the beginning of 'technological rearmament' in the first five-year plan to the introduction of nuclear weapons, and from the creation of the strategic missile troops as an independent branch of the Soviet armed forces to the present. Major General A. A. Proxorov, 'On the Nature and Contents of Soviet Military Doctrine', abstracted in the article 'Conference on Soviet Military Doctrine', *Voenno-Istoričeskij Žurnal*, October 1963, 121–123.

[7] Kazakov, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

[8] Lt. Col. E. Rybkin, 'The Application of the Laws of Dialectical Materialism in Military Affairs', *Kommunist Vooružennyx Sil*, No. 7, April 1964, p. 51.

[9] Kazakov, *op. cit.*, p. 13. The term 'philosophy of strategy' is expressed in Russian by the term 'philosophy of war' (*filosofija vojny*). The prototype and epitome of the philosopher of strategy is Clausewitz. Soviet historians compare his philosophical influence on Soviet military theory with Hegel's philosophical influence on Marxism-Leninism. See Colonel V. Cvetkov, 'Outstanding Military Thinker of the 19th Century', *Voenno-Istoričeskij Žurnal*, January 1964, 58.

[10] Tjuškevič, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

ARNOLD BUCHHOLZ

DIE ROLLE DER NATURWISSENSCHAFT IM HISTORISCHEN MATERIALISMUS

EINLEITUNG

Im sowjetischen Parteiprogramm des Jahres 1961 findet sich im Kapitel über den wirtschaftlichen Aufbau des Kommunismus die Formulierung, daß die Wissenschaft "in vollem Maße zu einer unmittelbaren Produktivkraft" wird.[1] Übersetzt man diesen Satz in eine geläufigere Sprache, so besagt er zunächst, daß die Wissenschaft eine grundlegende Bedeutung für den wirtschaftlichen Fortschritt hat.

Diese Feststellung kann man trivial nennen. Für die Theorie des Marxismus aber war die Formulierung von der 'Wissenschaft als Produktivkraft' insofern neuartig, als man in der vorangegangenen Zeit zu den Produktivkräften der Gesellschaft nur die Produktionsmittel, also zum Beispiel Fabriken und Maschinen sowie die materielle Güter produzierenden Arbeiter zählte. Die Wissenschaft aber gehörte in der Stufenleiter der marxistischen Theorie zum 'Überbau' oder zum 'gesellschaftlichen Bewußtsein', also zu einem geistigen Bereich der sich über der ökonomischen Gesellschaftsformation erhebt und von ihr geprägt wird.

Es ist einsichtig, daß es für die marxistische Theorie einen erheblichen Unterschied bedeutet, ob ein so wichtiger Bereich wie die moderne Wissenschaft im sekundären Bereich der geistigen Ausdrucksformen oder in den tiefsten 'materiellen' Grundlagen der Gesellschaftsentwicklung eingeordnet wird. Letzten Endes geht es hierbei um die Frage inwieweit materielle oder inwieweit geistige Kräfte die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung vorantreiben.

Um die heutige Interpretation der materialistischen Geschichtstheorie und den Wandel der in den letzten Jahren erfolgt ist, zu verdeutlichen, sei zunächst ein Überblick über die Auffassungen vor 1961 gegeben.

I. AUFFASSUNGEN VOR 1961

Allgemein sei vorweggeschickt, daß man sich bis zum Jahre 1961 in der Sowjetphilosophie kaum mit dem Verhältnis von Wissenschaft und Pro-

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duktivkräften beschäftigt hat. Für die marxistischen Theoretiker existierte in dieser Zeit die ganze später offenbar werdende Problematik noch gar nicht. Erst wenn sie auf Ausführungen stießen welche der damals vorherrschenden Interpretation in dieser Frage zuwiderliefen, sahen sie sich zu differenzierteren Stellungnahmen veranlaßt.

Am deutlichsten werden die traditionellen Auffassungen der Sowjetphilosophie über das Verhältnis von Wissenschaft und Produktivkräften bei der Auseinandersetzung mit den Auffassungen von Karl Kautsky, dessen Hauptwerk *Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung* im Jahre 1927 erschien.[2] Ein Grundgedanke dieses Werkes läuft darauf hinaus, daß dem naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisprozeß eine primäre Rolle in der Entwicklung der gesellschaftlichen Produktivkräfte zukommt. Kautsky war der Ansicht, daß Marx dem Prozeß der Naturerkenntnis bei der Untersuchung des wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Fortschritts nicht genügend Beachtung geschenkt hat und wollte deshalb den Marxismus in dieser Frage ergänzen. Wörtlich heißt es bei ihm:

> Die Entwicklung der 'materiellen Produktivkräfte' ist also im Grunde nur ein anderer Name für die Entwicklung des Wissens von der Natur. Als die tiefste Grundlage der 'realen Basis', des 'materiellen Unterbaus' der menschlichen Ideologie, erscheint demnach ein geistiger Prozeß, der des Erkennens der Natur.[3]

Man muß die orthodoxen Auffassungen der stalinistischen und ersten nachstalinistischen Jahre kennen, um zu verstehen daß diese Darlegungen von Kautsky als eine totale Revision des Marxismus angesehen werden mußten. Wenn das Primat der Entwicklung einem geistigen Prozeß gehören soll, dann bedeutet dies, daß der Marxismus von den "Füßen" wieder auf den "Kopf" gestellt wird. Entsprechend ist auch die Reaktion von F. V. Konstantinov, einem der namhaftesten Vertreter der Sowjetphilosophie, auf die Ansichten Kautskys. Nach einer kurzen Darstellung der Auffassungen Kautskys schreibt er:

> Diese Antwort [Kautskys – A. B.] fällt mit den Anschauungen der bürgerlichen Soziologen und Idealisten zusammen, die sagen, sie seien damit einverstanden, die gewaltige Rolle der Produktion im Leben der Gesellschaft anzuerkennen, die Produktion selbst, ihr Zustand, hänge jedoch ganz und gar vom Zustand der Wissenschaft, das heißt vom Stand der Erkenntnis, von den Ideen ab. Es ergibt sich, daß die Aufklärer des 18. Jahrhunderts recht gehabt hätten, als sie behaupteten, daß der Verstand die Welt, darunter auch die Produktion, regiere.[4]

Hier wird also deutlich, weshalb man der Wissenschaft keine primäre Rolle in der Entwicklung der Produktivkräfte zuschreiben konnte. Dies würde bedeuten daß nicht die 'materiellen' Kräfte, sondern geistige 'Ideen' das entscheidende Fortschrittselement in der Entwicklung von Produktion und Gesellschaft sind. Zwar räumt Konstantinov ein daß die Wissenschaft eine wichtige Bedeutung für die Produktion hat, jedoch nur im Sinne einer Möglichkeit. "Aber diese Möglichkeit zur Wirklichkeit zu machen, hängt von der Natur der Produktionsverhältnisse ab."[5] Damit will Konstantinov sagen, daß nicht die Wissenschaft die Produktion vorantreibt, sondern daß, umgekehrt, erst die geeigneten wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse, also die sozialistischen, die Entfaltung der Wissenschaft ermöglichen. Im Kapitalismus dagegen werde die Entwicklung der Wissenschaft gehemmt oder in den Dienst der Kriegsvorbereitungen gestellt. Konstantinov kommt nach entsprechenden Ausführungen zu der Folgerung:

> Man kann zahlreiche Tatsachen anführen, die die verlogene, unsinnige Anschauung widerlegen, wonach die Hauptquelle der Entwicklung der Produktivkräfte in der Wissenschaft, im Stand der Erkentnnis zu suchen sei.[6]

Allerdings gab es bereits Anfang der fünfziger Jahre in der Sowjetunion zumindest einen namhaften Vertreter, welcher eine grundsätzlich andere Auffassung über die Rolle der Naturwissenschaft im historischen Materialismus vertreten hat. Bezeichnenderweise aber handelte es sich nicht um einen Philosophen, sondern um den bekannten Wirtschaftswissenschaftler S. G. Strumilin. Seine Ansichten trug er erstmalig im Jahre 1951 in einer Versammlung der Abteilung für Wirtschaft und Recht der Akademie der Wissenschaften vor. In seinem Referat mit dem Titel 'Die Wissenschaft im Lichte der Lehre I. V. Stalins über Basis und Überbau'[7] knüpfte er an die gerade erschienenen Linguistik-Briefe Stalins an, in denen dargelegt worden ist, daß die Sprache entgegen früheren Vorstellungen weder zur gesellschaftlichen Basis noch zum Überbau gehört, sondern eine Erscheinung außerhalb dieser Kategorien darstellt.[8] In ähnlicher Weise, so meinte Strumilin, müsse auch die Rolle der Naturwissenschaft im historischen Materialismus neu überdacht werden. Ähnlich wie die Sprache überdauere auch die Wissenschaft, und insbesondere die Naturwissenschaft, den Wandel der gesellschaftlichen Formationen und könne deshalb nicht zum Überbau gehören, wenn man von bestimmten ideologi-

schen Verformungen absieht. Ihren wahren Ort habe die Wissenschaft wegen ihrer elementaren Bedeutung für den wirtschaftlichen Fortschritt bei den Produktivkräften der Gesellschaft. In der Diskussion dieses Referats haben sich alle Teilnehmer, von denen im Konferenzbericht Stellungnahmen abgedruckt sind (L. M. Gatovskij, Galkina, F. V. Konstantinov, M. S. Strogovič, K. V. Ostrovitjanov) gegen die Ansichten von Strumilin gewandt. Insbesondere wurde seine Auffassung zurückgewiesen daß die Naturwissenschaft zu den Produktivkräften gehöre. Zwar hat man anerkannt daß die Naturwissenschaft eine Wirkung auf die Produktivkräfte ausübe, aber diese Wirkung sei nur mittelbar und könne deshalb nicht zum Anlaß genommen werden, die Wissenschaft bei den Produktivkräften einzuordnen.

Auch später wurde gelegentlich gegen Strumilins Ansichten polemisiert. Als Beispiel seien folgende Ausführungen von G. E. Glezerman in seinem Buch 'Basis und Überbau in der sowjetischen Gesellschaft' angeführt:

> Das materialistische Verständnis der Geschichte ist unvereinbar mit allen Versuchen, die Wissenschaft zu einer bestimmenden Kraft der Gesellschaft zu machen, darunter auch mit Versuchen, eine solche Ansicht unter der Flagge einer Eingliederung der Wissenschaft bei den Produktivkräften vorzutragen. Unter der Begründung, daß zu den Produktivkräften die Produktionserfahrung und die Arbeitsfertigkeiten der Menschen gehören, versuchten einige Autoren, die Wissenschaft unmittelbar in die Produktivkräfte einzugliedern. Aber solche Ansichten sind völlig unhaltbar, da die Wissenschaft eine Erscheinung des geistigen Lebens der Gesellschaft ist, welche in keiner Weise unmittelbar zu den Produktivkräften gezählt werden kann.[9]

Zu diesem Text findet sich bei Glezerman ferner eine längere Fußnote, in welcher es abschließend heißt:

> So verwandelt S. G. Strumilin die Wissenschaft in eine Kraft, welche selbst den Wandel der Formen von Basis und Überbau bestimmt! Einer solchen Folgerung würde sich jeder Idealist anschließen.

S. G. Strumilin hat seine Ansichten 1954 in noch differenzierterer Form in der Zeitschrift 'Fragen der Philosophie' dargelegt[10], jedoch fand er für sie keine Anerkennung, und auch die Diskussion über diesen Fragenkomplex kam nicht in Gang.

Die in der fünfziger Jahren richtungweisenden theoretischen Ansichten fanden ihren Niederschlag in der 1958 vom Philosophischen Institut der

Akademie der Wissenschaften herausgegebenen Kollektivarbeit 'Grundlagen der marxistischen Philosophie' (1. Aufl. 250000).[11] Die Produktivkräfte werden dort in einem von P. N. Fedoseev verfaßten Kapitel in der traditionellen Weise abgehandelt, wobei von einer Zugehörigkeit der Wissenschaft zu den Produktivkräften nirgends die Rede ist. Wohl aber wird gegen die 'idealistische' Auffassung von Kautsky polemisiert.[12] Systematisch eingeordnet findet man die Wissenschaft dann im Kapitel über das 'gesellschaftliche Bewußtsein'. Dort heißt es, daß zum gesellschaftlichen Bewußtsein bzw. den ideologischen Formen die gesellschaftlichen Theorien, die Religion, Philosophie, Wissenschaft, Kunst und Moral gehören. In einer Fußnote wird allerdings darauf hingewiesen, daß die Naturwissenschaft hinsichtlich ihrer Naturbeschreibung nicht zu den 'ideologischen Formen' gehört[13], ohne daß erläutert wird wo ihre Einordnung erfolgen soll. Nachdem jedoch bereits durch Stalin die Sprache aus dem 'Überbau' herausgenommen worden ist und später entsprechende Folgerungen auch für die Logik gezogen wurden[14], ist es naheliegend, daß man der Naturwissenschaft in ähnlicher Weise eine Sonderstellung einräumen wollte. Aber die Tatsache daß die Bemerkung über die Naturwissenschaft in einer Fußnote angeführt ist, kann als deutliches Zeichen dafür angesehen werden, daß man sich in den Kreisen der Sowjetphilosophen über diese Frage zur damaligen Zeit nur beiläufige Gedanken gemacht hat.

Weitaus progressiver aber waren einige nichtsowjetische marxistische Autoren. 1954 veröffentlichte J. D. Bernal in London das umfangreiche Werk, *Die Wissenschaft in der Geschichte*, in welchem er die Bedeutung der Wissenschaft für den Fortschritt von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im marxistischen Sinne in vielfältigen Aspekten herausgearbeitet hat.[15] Noch unmittelbarer auf die theoretischen Grundlagen des Marxismus aber zielte das in Ost-Berlin erschienene Buch von G. Kosel mit dem Titel *Produktivkraft Wissenschaft* ab[16], in welchem viele der Gedanken vorweggenommen sind, die später auch in der Sowjetunion vertreten wurden. Allerdings konnte zur damaligen Zeit keine direkte Rückwirkung dieser Publikationen auf die Gedankenführungen in der Sowjetunion festgestellt werden.

II. ENTWICKLUNG NACH DEM XXII. PARTEIKONGRESS

Die Situation änderte sich schlagartig nach dem XXII. Kongreß der KPdSU im Jahre 1961, als im Parteiprogramm die Wissenschaft als 'un-

mittelbare Produktivkraft' bezeichnet wurde. Es läßt sich freilich nicht nachweisen, aber dennoch deutet manches darauf hin daß die neue Formulierung nicht durch die Philosophen, sondern durch S. G. Strumilin in das Parteiprogramm hineingekommen ist, denn er war der einzig sichtbare Vertreter dieser These in der Sowjetunion und hat in der Zeit der Aufstellung des Parteiprogramms eine rege Aktivität entfaltet. Die Philosophen dagegen dürften ziemlich überrascht gewesen sein und begannen erst nach dem Parteikongreß mit der Diskussion und Interpretation der neuen Situation.

Die Formulierung von der Wissenschaft als unmittelbarer Produktivkraft stammt von Marx. Sie findet sich allerdings nicht in der Gesamtausgabe der Werke von Marx und Engels (*MEGA*), sondern in den erst 1939 vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus herausgegebenen Manuskripten 'Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie (Rohentwurf) 1857 bis 1858'. Wörtlich heißt es dort:

> Die Entwicklung des capital fixe zeigt an, bis zu welchem Grade das allgemeine gesellschaftliche Wissen, knowledge, zur *unmittelbaren Produktivkraft* geworden ist, und daher die Bedingungen des gesellschaftlichen Lebensprozesses selbst unter die Kontrolle des general intellect gekommen, und ihm gemäß umgeschaffen sind.[17]

Insbesondere in den *Grundrissen* finden sich weitere Stellen, in welchen auf die Verflechtung von Wissenschaft und Ökonomie Bezug genommen wird.[18] Ansonsten aber sind in dem umfangreichen Werk von Marx die Stellungnahmen zu dieser Frage recht spärlich, was von sowjetischen Autoren als Entschuldigung dafür angegeben wird, daß die Hinweise von Marx über die 'Wissenschaft als Produktivkraft' nicht beachtet wurden. Liest man die in Betracht kommenden Stellen bei Marx nach, so gewinnt man den Eindruck, daß er in der Frage der Einordnung der Wissenschaft in der Tat realistischer und flexibler gedacht hat als dies bis vor kurzem in der Sowjetunion der Fall war.

Es ist nicht leicht, die heutigen sowjetischen Interpretationen der Wissenschaft im Rahmen des historischen Materialismus darzustellen. Da die Sowjetphilosophie immer mehr darauf verzichtet, gemeinsame Standpunkte herauszuarbeiten, findet man im neueren Schrifttum so vielfältige Ansichten wiedergegeben, daß im Grunde jede einzelne angeführt werden müßte um die tatsächliche Situation zu kennzeichnen. Wenn nachstehend

dennoch verschiedene Stellungnahmen zum Zweck einer besseren Übersicht in Gruppen zusammengefaßt werden, so sei einschränkend darauf hingewiesen, daß die Übergänge fließend sind und die Ausführungen mancher Autoren gleichzeitig mehreren Gruppen angehören, auch wenn sie nur in einer aufgeführt sind.

Eine *erste Gruppe* von Stellungnahmen ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß in ihnen versucht wird, möglichst nahe an der traditionellen Auffassung der Produktivkräfte zu bleiben.

Als typisch für eine solche Interpretation kann die Darstellung von P. A. Račkov in dem Buch 'Die Wissenschaft und der gesellschaftliche Fortschritt' (1963) angesehen werden.[19] Er hebt die große Bedeutung der Wissenschaft für den wirtschaftlichen Fortschritt hervor, warnt aber zugleich davor der Wissenschaft eine 'bestimmende Rolle' in der Entwicklung der Produktion und der gesamten Gesellschaft beizumessen.[20] Zusammenfassend kommt er zu der Folgerung:

> Die Wissenschaft wandelt sich in eine *unmittelbare* Produktivkraft nur dann um, wenn sie sich in den Produktionswerkzeugen und Erkenntnissen der Arbeiter sowie in den neuen ökonomischen Beziehungen der Menschen realisiert. ... Folglich kann man die Wissenschaft ungeachtet ihrer engen Verbindung mit der Produktion nicht als einen besonderen Teil oder eine Seite von ihr betrachten. Die praktische Rolle der Wissenschaft ist immer durch die Produktion vermittelt, durch die Anwendung ihrer Ergebnisse in der Arbeitstätigkeit.[21]

Dies soll also dem Sinn nach besagen, daß nur die in der Produktion 'materialisierte' Wissenschaft zu den Produktivkräften gehört. Die Wissenschaft als Erkenntnisprozeß steht demnach außerhalb der Produktivkräfte und verbleibt im 'Überbau' oder im 'gesellschaftlichen Bewußtsein'.

In ähnlicher Weise warnt P. E. Sivokon' davor, Produktivkräfte und Wissenschaft gleichzusetzen, da dies eine Revision des Marxismus im Sinne von Kautsky bedeuten würde.[22] Die Produktivkräfte behalten stets ihren materiellen Charakter, während die Wissenschaft als ein sekundäres Produkt der menschlichen Tätigkeit stets einen ideellen und geistigen Charakter trägt. Zwar wird eine Wechselwirkung zwischen beiden Bereichen anerkannt, aber im Grunde wird damit doch das alte Schema aufrechterhalten.

Wie man aus dem recht eindeutigen Satz "Die Wissenschaft wird zur unmittelbaren Produktivkraft" einen traditionellen Standpunkt ableiten kann, zeigt V. Ja. El'meev in einem Buch mit dem Titel 'Der Kommunismus und die Entwicklung des Menschen als Produktivkraft der Gesellschaft'.[23] Er zählt die Wissenschaft insofern unmittelbar zur Produktivkraft, als auch der arbeitende und geistig tätige Mensch dazugehört. Zugleich aber grenzt er die materiellen Elemente der Produktivkraft gegen die Wissenschaft ab und legt das ganze Gewicht auf die Formulierung, daß die Wissenschaft zur Produktivkraft *wird*. Er setzt das Wort 'wird' (*stanovitsja*) in Kursivschrift und erläutert dieses 'werden' mit dem Nachsatz daß sich die Wissenschaft in eine Produktivkraft 'verwandelt' (gleichfalls in Kursivschrift).[24] Deutlich wird sein Standpunkt auch in dem Satz: "In dem Maße, wie sich die Wissenschaft in den Arbeitswerkzeugen realisiert, verwandelt sie sich aus einer potentiellen geistigen Kraft in eine materielle Kraft der gesellschaftlichen Produktion."[25] Praktisch heißt dies, daß die Wissenschaft selbst, die ja primär eine geistige Tätigkeit ist, nicht 'unmittelbar' zur Produktivkraft gehört.

Recht unreflektiert und zugleich ein Zeichen dafür daß die Philosophen auf die neue Begriffsbestimmung der Wissenschaft nicht vorbereitet waren, sind die Ausführungen der zweiten Auflage des Standardwerks *Grundlagen der marxistischen Philosophie*, welche ein halbes Jahr nach dem Parteikongreß des Jahres 1961 fertiggestellt wurde.[26] Darin findet man im Kapitel über die Produktivkräfte und Produktionsverhältnisse eine bemerkenswerte Veränderung: An jener Stelle, an welcher in der ersten Auflage eine Anprangerung von Kautsky zu finden war, sind nunmehr einige Absätze über die Wissenschaftsentwicklung eingefügt. Dort heißt es zunächst daß die Wissenschaft dank ihrer Verbindung mit der Produktion und ihrer Anwendung in der Technik zur unmittelbaren Produktivkraft wird, und danach heißt es unter Anführung eines Zitats aus dem Parteiprogramm, daß "die Anwendung der Erkenntnisse der Wissenschaft" zu einem entscheidenden Faktor der Produktionssteigerung wird.[27] Geht man dem Sinn dieser Ausführungen nach, dann ergibt sich, daß die Wissenschaft trotz ihrer Bezeichnung als 'unmittelbarer' Produktivkraft in Wirklichkeit nur 'mittelbar' in diese eingeht.

In einer *zweiten Gruppe* von Stellungnahmen wird der Ansatz für die Interpretation der Formulierung der 'Wissenschaft als Produktivkraft' beim

Menschen gesucht. Der arbeitende Mensch gehört ja nach der traditionellen Definition zusammen mit den Arbeitsmitteln und Produktionsinstrumenten zu den Produktivkräften.

Von diesem Ansatz geht z.B. F. V. Konstantinov aus[28] (an dessen Ausführungen aus dem Jahre 1954 hier erinnert sei). Er legt dar, daß früher meist nur die Arbeiter und Bauern zu den Produktivkräften gezählt wurden, nicht aber das ingenieur-technische und höhere Personal. Nachdem aber die Wissenschaft eine immer größere Bedeutung für die Produktion erlangt und auf dem Wege zum Kommunismus der Gegensatz von körperlicher und geistiger Arbeit immer mehr abgebaut werden soll, müssen nunmehr auch die wissenschaftlichen Qualifikationen der arbeitenden Menschen zu den Produktivkräften gezählt werden.[29] (Unter einem anderen Gesichtspunkt vertritt Konstantinov die Ansicht, daß die Wissenschaft nur über die materialisierte Technik in die Produktivkräfte eingeht.)

Ganz ähnliche Gedankengänge entwickelt I. A. Majzel' in zwei Beiträgen zu diesem Thema.[30] Auch für ihn gehört die auf die Produktion gerichtete geistige Tätigkeit des Menschen zu den Produktivkräften, wozu er auf folgendes bekannte Zitat von Marx hinweist:

> Eine Spinne verrichtet Operationen, die denen des Webers ähneln, und eine Biene beschämt durch den Bau ihrer Wachszellen manchen menschlichen Baumeister. Was aber von vornherein den schlechtesten Baumeister vor der besten Biene auszeichnet, ist, daß er die Zelle in seinem Kopf gebaut hat, bevor er sie in Wachs baut.[31]

Mit einer Reihe weiterer Zitate von Marx weist er auf die Einheit von geistiger und körperlicher Arbeit hin, womit auch die Wissenschaft im Produktionsprozeß Eingang findet.

Gleichfalls über den Menschen, und zwar direkt über den Wissenschaftler, führt V. Žamin die Wissenschaft in die Produktivkräfte ein.[32] Sie ist dabei keine selbständige Komponente der Produktivkräfte, sondern unmittelbar mit allen ihren Elementen verschmolzen. In ähnlicher Weise wird bei A. Verbin und A. Furman die wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis direkt in die Produktivkräfte einbezogen, ohne daß sie jedoch ein selbständiges Element neben Produktionsmitteln und Arbeitskräften darstellen soll.[33]

In einer *dritten Gruppe* von Stellungnahmen liefert das dialektische Prinzip den Schlüssel für die Argumentationen. Auch dabei spielt die Einheit

von körperlicher und geistiger Arbeit bei der Hervorbringung materieller Produkte eine wichtige Rolle, aber zugleich wird diese Wechselbeziehung stärker entpersönlicht und auf die übergeordnete Dialektik von Materiellem und Geistigem bezogen.

Einen recht differenzierten Beitrag mit diesem Ansatz, welcher dem Sinngehalt des historischen Materialismus vielleicht am nächsten kommt, verfaßte V. Stoljarow, der als Tätigkeitsort Ost-Berlin angegeben hat.[34] Er polemisiert gegen die einseitig materielle Auffassung der Produktivkräfte und deutet sie in der Dialektik von Ideellem und Materiellem indem er schreibt:

> Die von Marx und Engels entwickelte materialistische Geschichtsauffassung stützt sich auf die Erkenntnis der wahren Dialektik von Ideellem und Materiellem, die in der gesellschaftlichen Praxis zutage tritt. In der Praxis verändert der Mensch die Naturbedingungen entsprechend seinen Ideen und auf der Grundlage seiner Kenntnisse, d.h., er *materialisiert* seine Ideen.[35]

Er führt dann zwei Zitate Lenins über die Umwandlung des Ideellen in das Reale an und legt dar, wie aus der Wechselwirkung beider Komponenten die Produktivkräfte hervorgehen. Nimmt man noch das Zitat von Marx hinzu, wonach der Baumeister ein Bauwerk zuerst im Kopfe baut, dann kommt man trotz aller Wechselwirkungen letzten Endes zu einem Primat des Geistigen vor der materiellen Entwicklung. Diese Folgerung aber fängt Stoljarow mit einem neu aufgefundenen Zitat von Engels ab, wo es u.a. heißt:

> Der menschliche Intellekt einer historischen Epoche ist gleichermaßen ein Produktionsinstrument und ein *historisches Produkt*.[36]

Stoljarow erläutert dieses Zitat in der Weise, daß er das Bewußtsein als ein historisches Gesamtprodukt ansieht, welches in diesem umfassenden Sinne sekundär zur materiellen Entwicklung ist. Im konkreten Produktionsprozeß aber kann und muß die geistige Zielsetzung durchaus der materiellen Realisierung vorausgehen. Allerdings erfolgt dann durch die materielle Praxis wieder eine Korrektur im geistigen Bereich. Er sieht deshalb die Dialektik zwischen Materiellem und Ideellem bei der Entstehung der Produktivkräfte in der Art einer Rückinformation oder eines Rückkopplungsvorgangs.

In ähnlicher Weise wie Stoljarow geht auch M. N. Rutkevič an das Verhältnis von Wissenschaft und Produktivkraft 'dialektisch' heran.[37] In

Ergänzung zu den Ausführungen von Stoljarow ist dabei seine Polemik gegen die Ausgangsbasis von Interesse, welche Stalin 1938 in seinen Ausführungen über den dialektischen und historischen Materialismus entwickelt hat. Hiergegen erhebt Rutkevič folgende Einwände: Erstens hat Stalin im Gegensatz zu Marx die geistigen Kräfte des produzierenden Menschen nicht als selbständiges Element herausgehoben und zweitens kann man bei der von Stalin gegebenen Bestimmung der Produktivkräfte nur die geistige Tätigkeit der körperlich Arbeitenden berücksichtigen, nicht aber die von Konstrukteuren oder Wissenschaftlern. Insofern sieht Rutkevič in der neuen Definition des Parteiprogramms "vor allem eine Wiederherstellung der unverdient vergessenen und zutiefst wahren Formel von Marx".[38]

Während und nach der im April 1965 veranstalteten Unions-Konferenz über die materialistische Dialektik hat auch P. N. Fedoseev, der langjährige Direktor des Philosophischen Instituts der Akademie der Wissenschaften und einer der Vizepräsidenten der Akademie, zu diesen Fragen Stellung genommen.[39] Allerdings behandelt er die Gesellschaftsentwicklung nicht direkt in Verbindung mit der Wissenschaft, sondern unter dem Gesichtspunkt objektiver und subjektiver Gestaltungsfaktoren in der Geschichte. Er wendet sich dabei gegen Ansichten, denen zufolge alles das was die Menschen denken und tun, dem subjektiven Faktor zugerechnet wird, während als objektiver Faktor nur die Produktionsmittel übrigbleiben. Fedoseev legt dar, daß die Produktivkräfte, auch dann wenn in ihnen geistige Elemente enthalten sind, ganz zu den objektiven Faktoren der Gesellschaftsentwicklung gehören.

An sich sind diese Ausführungen Fedoseevs nicht neu. Es ist aber denkbar, daß im Zuge einer fortschreitenden 'Vergeistigung' der 'materiellen' Grundlage des Histomat künftig mehr die Dialektik von objektiven und subjektiven Faktoren als die des Materiellen und Geistigen in den Vordergrund gestellt wird. Auch folgende Ausführungen Fedoseevs verdienen Beachtung:

> Man soll nicht nur vom Primat des Seins ausgehen, sondern von der Einheit und der Wechselwirkung des Seins und Bewußtseins. Man darf nicht die Gefahren des Idealismus und Subjektivismus vergessen, aber ebenso gefährlich wäre es, nicht den Schaden des ökonomischen, mechanischen Materialismus zu bemerken.[40]

In diesem Zitat sei besonders auf das Schlagwort des 'ökonomischen, mechanischen Materialismus' hingewiesen, welches für die dialektische Ein-

führung geistiger Elemente in die Grundlagen des historischen Materialismus weite Möglichkeiten eröffnet.

In einer *vierten Gruppe* seien Beispiele für jene Interpreten angeführt, welche die Wissenschaft ohne besondere Vorbehalte und mit großem Gewicht in die Produktivkräfte einbeziehen. Als Leitmotiv für diese Auffassung kann die oft zitierte Formulierung des Chemie-Nobelpreisträgers N. N. Semenov gelten:

> Und so ist die wichtigste Besonderheit der Wissenschaft des 20. Jahrhunderts der Umstand, daß sie aufgehört hat, eine Magd der Produktion zu sein und sich zur Mutter der Produktion verwandelt hat.[41]

Mit diesem Satz wird der Wissenschaft faktisch eine Pionierstellung in der Fortschrittsentwicklung eingeräumt. Insbesondere Naturwissenschaftler und Wirtschaftler weisen darauf hin, daß seit dem 19. Jahrhundert tiefgreifende Strukturänderungen im Produktionsprozeß eingetreten sind. Während früher Technik und Produktion noch weitgehend mit handwerklichen Fertigkeiten weiterentwickelt wurden, ist heute jeder Fortschritt auf die Wissenschaft angewiesen. Dies gilt in besonderem Maße für die Grundlagenforschung, da die Erkenntnis eines neuen Naturphänomens ganze Industriezweige neu erschließen kann. Da diese Zusammenhänge in der Sowjetunion – wie auch in anderen Industriestaaten – hinreichend erkannt worden sind, wird die Wissenschaft in der Praxis seit langem als die 'Mutter der Produktion' betrachtet und entsprechend gefördert.

Ein besonders lebhaftes Plädoyer für die vorbehaltlose Einordnung der Wissenschaft bei den Produktivkräften und ihre Anerkennung als Haupttriebkraft der technischen Fortschrittsentwicklung findet sich in einem Beitrag von G. Volkov in der Zeitschrift *Neue Welt* vom März 1965.[42] Auch Volkov polemisiert gegen jene Interpreten welche die tiefgreifenden Veränderungen im Verhältnis von Wissenschaft und Technik nicht sehen und nach wie vor den technischen Bedürfnissen ein Primat in der Entwicklung der Produktivkräfte zuschreiben. Volkov hält ihnen entgegen, daß man schwerlich behaupten könne, die Geometrie von Lobačevskij, die Relativitätstheorie, die Quantentheorie, die Entdeckung der Antimaterie und viele andere große Errungenschaften wären aus technischen Bedürfnissen hervorgegangen. Umgekehrt aber läßt sich mit hinreichen-

der Bestimmtheit sagen, daß jede dieser Entdeckungen einen gewaltigen Anstoß für den technischen Fortschritt gegeben hat. Zwar gibt es in der Tat viele Rückwirkungen von der Technik auf die Wissenschaft, aber zugleich kann kein Zweifel daran bestehen daß sich die Wissenschaft zumindest zu einem Teil ihre Aufgaben selbst stellt. In der Tatsache, daß damit geistige Faktoren eine entscheidende Bedeutung für den Fortschritt der Produktivkräfte erlangen, ist nach Volkov keinerlei Idealismus zu sehen: "Das wäre ebenso unsinnig, als wolle man etwa einen Idealismus in der Tatsache sehen, daß in der Tätigkeit der heutigen Arbeiter die geistigen Funktionen zu überwiegen beginnen!"[43] Volkov aber geht noch einen Schritt weiter: Er sieht in der wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeit primär einen geistig-schöpferischen Akt. Er weist darauf hin, daß in der schöpferischen Wissenschaft der sogenannte 'gesunde Menschenverstand' nicht genügt, sondern Vorstellungsvermögen, Phantasie und nicht zuletzt Gefühlsleben und sogar das Unterbewußtsein oft eine entscheidende Rolle spielen. Als Beispiele führt er an, daß Louis de Broglie "gefährliche plötzliche Gedankensprünge" als notwendiges Element der Erkenntnis betrachtete und Einstein das wissenschaftliche Denken mit der Poesie und Musik verglichen hat.[44] Hier also ist man schon fast so weit, den geistigen, ja 'irrationalen' Faktoren eine Pionierstellung in der Fortschrittsentwicklung einzuräumen.

In einer *fünften Gruppe* sei schließlich auf Arbeiten hingewiesen, in welchen die Wissenschaftsentwicklung als ein Prozeß mit relativer Eigenständigkeit erscheint. Die Wissenschaft wirkt dabei in den Produktivkräften nicht mehr allein über die 'materialisierte' Technik oder die geistige Tätigkeit der produzierenden Menschen, sondern zeigt sich als ein nach bestimmten geistigen Prinzipien relativ autonom voranschreitendes Gefüge. Ein äußeres Kennzeichen dieser eigenständigen Entwicklung ist das Phänomen der Beschleunigung des naturwissenschaftlich-technischen Entwicklungsprozeßes. So hat man z.B. gezeigt, daß die ersten wissenschaftlichen Zeitschriften um 1665 gegründet wurden, um 1800 betrug ihre Zahl etwa 100, um 1850 etwa 1000, um 1900 etwa 10000, in der Mitte unseres Jahrhunderts etwa 100000. Ähnliche Beschleunigungskurven hat man für die Zahl der Bücher, die Referate in Referatenblättern, die Zahl der Wissenschaftler, die finanziellen Aufwendungen für die Wissenschaft und ähnliche quantifizierbare Faktoren festgestellt. Andere Untersuchun-

gen sind wiederum auf die innere Struktur der Wissenschaftsentwicklung gerichtet, wo man gezeigt hat daß durch die experimentelle und mathematische Methode starke innere Determinanten in der Entfaltung des Wissens wirksam sind, so daß man von einer 'Logik des naturwissenschaftlich-technischen Fortschritts' spricht. Ein wichtiger Hinweis auf die innere Determiniertheit der naturwissenschaftlich-technischen Entwicklung ist z.B. in der Tatsache zu sehen, daß an fast allen großen Erfindungen und Entdeckungen mehrere Forscher unabhängig voneinander beteiligt waren. Alle diese Einsichten, auf welche hier nur summarisch hingewiesen werden kann (eine eingehendere Darstellung ist zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt vorgesehen), sind das Ergebnis einer Wissenschaftsrichtung welche sich seit einigen Jahren vor allem in den Vereinigten Staaten und England unter der Bezeichnung 'Science of Science' und in der Sowjetunion (*nauka o nauke*) rasch entwickelt. Die Bedeutung der dabei gewonnenen Erkenntnisse für das Verhältnis von Wissenschaft und Produktivkraft ist darin zu sehen, daß dadurch ein prozeßartiges geistiges Geschehen eine Pionierstellung oder zumindest ein großes Gewicht in der Entwicklung der Produktivkräfte erhält. Allerdings ist die 'Wissenschaft von der Wissenschaft' noch in einer Aufbauphase, so daß daraus bislang kaum Folgerungen auf die Theorie des historischen Materialismus gezogen worden sind. Manches aber deutet darauf hin, daß man auf weitere Sicht gerade aus diesem Bereich eine weitere 'Vergeistigung' der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung erwarten kann.

ZUSAMMENFASSENDE ÜBERLEGUNGEN

Wer den historischen Materialismus nur aus den Standardwerken kennt, müßte die hier geschilderte Entwicklung eigentlich als sensationell empfinden, da sie fast als eine 'Umkehr' der Grundlagen der marxistischen Geschichtslehre gedeutet werden kann. Während früher der historische Materialismus in seinem Unterbau wie ein materielles Wachstum dargestellt wurde, haben heute geistige Faktoren im historischen Primärprozeß ein außerordentliches Gewicht erhalten.

Nicht weniger verwunderlich wie die inhaltliche Entwicklung ist die Form in der sich diese Wandlung vollzogen hat. Zwar ist im Fachschrifttum die Thematik vielschichtig und ausführlich behandelt worden, aber man kann nicht sagen daß darüber leidenschaftlich debattiert wurde oder

gar ein Kampf um die 'wahre' Interpretation der neuen Situation stattgefunden hätte. Auch die Publizistik und Presse hat von diesen Entwicklungen kaum Notiz genommen, obwohl es immerhin um erhebliche Uminterpretationen in den Grundlagen des historischen Materialismus ging.

Diese an einem speziellen Thema gemachten Beobachtungen scheinen eine gewisse Allgemeingültigkeit für die heutige ideologische Situation in der Sowjetunion zu haben. In vielen Bereichen der Ideologie vollziehen sich lautlos und in kleinen Schriften zahlreiche Wandlungen, die das ideologische Gesamtbild wesentlich verändern. Während früher bestimmte unantastbare Strukturelemente das Bild der Ideologie beherrschten, ist es heute das hochdifferenzierte, ineinander verschachtelte, oft widersprüchliche und sich zugleich rasch weiter entwickelnde Geflecht verschiedener Aussagen, welches den Gesamteindruck bestimmt.

Diese neue Sachlage ist zu berücksichtigen, wenn man sich mit der Ideologie auseinandersetzen will. Es ist heute wenig damit gewonnen, Einzelaussagen aus dem ideologischen Schrifttum herauszugreifen und an ihnen die Systemkritik aufzuzäumen. Ähnliche Eigenkritiken wird man bei genügendem Suchen auch innerhalb des kommunistischen Schrifttums finden, oder man muß damit rechnen, daß sie in der Ideologie über kurz oder lang berücksichtigt werden. Deshalb wird sich eine weiterführende Auseinandersetzung mit dem Marxismus immer mehr von der analytischen Aussagekritik auf die Prüfung von Sinngehalten ganzer ideologischer Bereiche oder der Gesamtideologie verlagern müssen. Dies aber erfordert zugleich ein verstärktes eigenes Bemühen um zeitgemäße Ausdrucksformen für den Verlauf und den Sinn der heutigen Weltentwicklung.

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SURVEY:
RELEVANT RECENT BOOKS

In 1965, the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences published, for the first time as far as is known, a survey of philosophical research in the Soviet Union.[1] This survey (which has already been used by, among others, Dr. Fleischer in his recent works[2]) contains a list of books, published mainly during the period between 1957 and 1964, which seem to be considered relevant by the Institute itself. This should not be construed as an approval of all the works listed, as several among them are criticized, but since what is given here is only a subclass of all the philosophical books, one is justified in concluding that, good or bad, these books are considered to be the important ones. Thus, it was thought that re-publication of the list in the present journal might be of some use to workers in Soviet philosophy.

The list has been divided into sections, the titles of which are supplied by the author of the present note; but the order of the survey has, on the whole, been followed. In each section the titles have been ordered alphabetically. Let it be noted that the titles have not been checked against any source other than the survey.

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NOTES AND COMMENTS

ACADEMICIAN MITIN ON THE INSTITUTE OF EAST-EUROPEAN STUDIES

Professor M. B. Mitin, Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, etc., writes in *Nekotoroe napravlenija sovremennoj buržuaznoj ideologii i ix kritika* (Moskva, 'Znanie', 1966, p. 5f.): "In Western Germany there is, supported by the Rockefeller Foundation *(Fond Rokefellera)* an East-European Institute, which has extensions *(otdelenija)* in Munich, Cologne, Stuttgart, Bonn; its center is in Fribourg. Joseph Bocheński, a dominican Father, is its leader. He considers himself as founder of a new science 'Sovietology', which should deal with the 'study of the Russian Communist Party, of Leninism and its development after Lenin'. Since 1958 a philosophical journal *Sovietica* is published, which illustrates, under the so-called banner of 'objectivism', the philosophical life in the Soviet Union. The author of the present pamphlet and his colleagues just had the opportunity to talk to this Bocheński at the International Congress of Philosophy in Mexico, in 1963. He speaks well Russian; he has in Fribourg a specialized team of aspirants who study Soviet philosophical literature."

The context of the above is concerned with the militant anti-Communist views of every 'bourgeois' philosophy and science. The mention of the 'Fond Rockefellera' is probably meant to strengthen the impression that all Sovietology is a capitalist enterprise aiming at the destruction of 'peace-loving Communism'.

I must confess that I feel very much flattered but also a little confused by the compliments implicitly bestowed on me by Mr. Mitin. For: (1) there is no such thing as *one* Institute of East-European Studies in Germany, but a dozen of independent Institutes; (2) while the Fribourg Institute was receiving a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation during some years, it did not receive a penny from that source since 1963 – and most of the similar Institutes in Germany are financed by other sources;

I would also like to stress that the Rockefeller Foundation supports exclusively pacific projects of study and has nothing to do with any sort of cold war; (3) Fribourg, where this Institute is located, is not in Germany but in Switzerland; the confusion arises because of the existence of the German town Freiburg; (4) the German Institutes cited by professor Mitin are not extensions of the Fribourg Institute; (5) the Fribourg Institute specializes in philosophy – it seems to be the only Institute of its kind as far as this specialization is concerned; (6) I wrote some time ago a paper on Sovietology, but I did not establish this discipline; (7) the *Sovietica* is not a journal but a series of books – some of them rather voluminous (21 published so far); (8) the journal published by this Institute is called *Studies in Soviet Thought* and was started in 1960; (9) my command of the Russian language, while adequate for reading without difficulties, is unfortunately, very imperfect; (10) finally I would like to stress that, while hoping to make some contribution to the better knowledge of Communism by politicians, we are primarily interested in Soviet philosophy for its own sake, as a means of increasing our own knowledge of philosophy. I repeatedly stated this in articles published in *SST*, e.g. in 'Why Studies in Soviet Philosophy?', 'On Philosophical Dialogue', and others.

I am sorry to say that a student of the Institute of East-European Studies at Fribourg would be mercilessly flunked in his first examination if he would commit half as many errors in a statement about any Soviet center of studies as Mr. Mitin committed about ours. That is the way *we* understand 'objectivism'.

J. M. Bocheński

MAN AND THE WORLD

The *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1966,7, contains an interesting extract from an unpublished manuscript by the eminent Soviet psychologist and philosopher Sergej Leonidovič Rubinštejn. The original manuscript apparently consisted of notes for a general work on the place of man in the world. The manuscript was composed of some 20 printed pages, of which only a small extract has been reproduced in the *Voprosy*. It was apparently Rubinštejn's intention to produce a comprehensive work covering the ontological, epistemological, ethical, etc., aspects

of the problem of man and of his place in the world. According to the introduction by R. A. Slavskaja, Rubinštejn first conceived the idea for the book in 1956, but did not begin work on the manuscript until two years later. He was apparently working on the manuscript right up to his death in 1960.

It is interesting to recall that in the period 1956–1960 Rubinštejn produced two major works: *Being and Consciousness* (1957) and *Principles and Paths of Development of Psychology* (1958). Both of these books were concerned with the problem of the relationship of consciousness to the material world.

The projected work, *Man and the World*, was intended as a continuation of the theme of the two above-mentioned books. It was apparently Rubinštejn's intention to discuss the wider implications of the problem of being and consciousness, which he had come to see as only one aspect of the more fundamental problem of man's place in the world. A large portion of the projected work was therefore to have been devoted to an analysis of the concepts of matter and being. Besides an introductory section discussing the general plan of the book, the extracts from the manuscript contain three other sections: on matter, on time, and on man. As the *Voprosy Filosofii* only reproduces an extract from what were, originally, merely notes for a book, it is impossible to form a complete picture of Rubinštejn's ideas on the problems discussed. However, even the short extract reproduced offers some interesting clues to the direction in which Rubinštejn's thought was developing in his later years.

The section on matter, for example, contains two interesting remarks which are unusual in the general context of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. In one place Rubinštejn maintains that though the world is basically material one cannot equate being with matter. Not only matter exists but also consciousness, which is no less real than matter; in the course of its evolution, being takes on new forms which can only be called 'matter' by extension. (Compare this with Engels' statement that the real unity of the world consists in its materiality.) Moreover, Rubinštejn, unlike Engels, clearly states that the problems 'thought and being' and 'spirit and nature' are distinct problems, the one epistemological, the other ontological.

The section on man contains some suggestive remarks on the problem

of subject and object. Rubinštejn seems to have been tending towards the identification of the meaning of 'subject' and 'general'. Not only does he state that the subject of scientific thought is the social (*obščestvennyj*) subject – an idea found in his later published works – but also that " 'I' signifies the individual, but it itself does not have a singular, particular signification relating to one, single 'I', but a general [signification]. 'I' is a general formula expressing the structure of the real (*suščix*) as persons, subjects." Rubinštejn goes on to interpret this primacy of the collective in what seems to be a new humanistic way; it is not so much a question of the subordination of the individual to the collective but the interpenetration of individuals: "The distinct, concrete, empirical 'I's necessarily coexist, mutually imply and presuppose one another."

The short extract which has been reproduced in the *Voprosy* is full of interesting ideas. How these ideas would have been developed in the finished work we can only guess. It is to be hoped, however, that the complete text of the manuscript will be published at some future date.

T.R.P.

ON 'PRAXIS'

The Journal *Praxis* edited in Zagreb by Gajo Petrović and R. Supek is probably the best philosophical journal appearing in the East-European countries. It has two editions, one which is called 'Yugoslav' and is published in Serbo-Croatian, and a second called 'international' which publishes the most relevant papers from the first, in French, German or English translation.

Even a superficial reading of the international edition would convince anyone that the 'Marxism' represented by the editors and collaborators of *Praxis* has, indeed, but little in common with that of the *Voprosy Filosofii* or of similar journals. The main differences seem to be the following:

(1) While the *VF*, and Soviet philosophers in general, tends to call 'Marxism' the result of the interfusion of Marx, Engels, Černyševskij, Belinskij, Buxarin, Lenin *plus* the newest decrees of the CPSU, the philosophers from *Praxis* are obviously trying to disengage Marx's thought from the Engelsian and post-Engelsian (especially Russian) tradition.

(2) Probably because of the first difference, a second, even more fundamental difference is apparent: while in the Soviet Union the method of philosophising may be called 'cosmocentric' – the dialectical materialism being laid down as a basis and anthropology deduced from it – the philosophical method used in *Praxis* could perhaps be qualified as 'anthropocentric'. There is relatively little interest for speculative, cosmological theories, and most of the speculations are devoted to ethics. For example, the last (1966,4) issue of *Praxis* contains the following articles and notes: 'Sozialismus und Ethik', 'Is Equality a Moral Value of our Society?', 'The Personal Integrity in Socialist Society', 'L'homme sans mesure sociale', 'Philosophie der Heimat', 'Le prolétariat et la bureaucratie', 'Douze thèses lacunaires sur le problème de la praxis révolutionnaire', 'Einige Gedanken über Humanität in der Theorie und der geschichtlichen Praxis'. The title of the journal, *'Praxis'*, speaks for itself.

(3) The attitude toward philosophers who have other opinions is also radically different. In the *VF* practically everyone who dares not recognize that the Russians discovered everything including bananas and that they and they alone are in possession of philosophical wisdom (established once and for all by the CPSU) is a falsifier and a stupid fellow, whereas the writers in *Praxis*, while remaining convinced partisans of their own views, seem to be prepared to consider the opinions of others.

These differences should not be taken as absolute. There are different tendencies in the SU, and all philosophers in Yugoslavia are not members of the *Praxis* circle. Nevertheless, it seems correct to state that *on the whole* we are witnessing the rise of two divergent attitudes within 'Marxism': the Soviet and the 'other' one. That 'other' attitude includes, besides the *Praxis* group, some philosophers who are living (with some difficulties) in, e.g., Czechoslovakia and Poland.

This seems to be a major historical fact, by which the present situation differs from that found in the Soviet Bloc even just a few years ago. A tempting task would be that of formulating a prognosis about the future. We shall refrain from doing so, as prognoses are always very dangerous in philosophy. On the other hand a sort of evaluation, which might also serve as a warning, will be attempted here.

Many – one would say too many – students of Communist philosophy

quite naturally delight in seeing some of the Communists become pleasant partners in discussion (the modern word for it is 'dialogue'). Since they have vividly in memory the crude sort of philosophy offered ten years ago in the SU – and still put forward in some 'Osnovy' and similar works – they feel a natural sympathy toward thinkers who explicitly reject this mode of philosophizing. This sympathy is still re-inforced by the fact that so many West-European philosophers are anthropologists themselves.

Such philosophers would, of course, consider the work of the *Praxis* group as a considerable improvement on Soviet philosophy which would appear to them just a more primitive phase of the development, a phase doomed to disappear under the pressure of 'modern' thinking, meaning Heidegger, Sartre and perhaps even Camus and Kafka. To them, Soviet thought would seem irrelevant, the only relevant type (in the Communist countries) being that represented by *Praxis*.

It is suggested that this would be a mistake, stemming from a sort of parochialism which this journal was always trying to combat. That parochialism consists in identifying philosophy with one's *own* philosophy, which means, in the case of many West-European thinkers, with some sort of existentialism. It is, however, the historian of philosophy who is alone competent to determine what is and what is not philosophy. For it is the History of Philosophy and it alone which is able to show what, in the long run, is relevant or irrelevant.

The History of Philosophy teaches us that there have always been several anthropocentric and several cosmocentric approaches to philosophical problems – and, whatever one's views might be, it is of no use to condemn one sort of thought and to recognize only the other as being important. *Both* are important, at least if they are applied honestly and with a sufficient amount of knowledge, both methodological and material.

But contemporary Soviet philosophy – or at least a part of it – *is* characterized both by the said decency of attitude and level of knowledge. We have in the SU a number of thinkers who, while denying the main consequences of the *Critique* – namely anthropocentrism – are well-informed and do work with considerable knowledge of the state of the doctrines. That is why, it is submitted, Western philosophers should not be so fascinated by the novel phenomenon of the *Praxis* group –

sympathetic as it might be – that they forget that powerful and interesting developments are taking place in Soviet philosophy.

Of course, many people would say that only such a brand of philosophy as that represented by *Praxis* is favorable for the 'dialogue' and the mutual understanding between 'East and West'. It might be so; but such political considerations, it is suggested, are completely outside the sphere of philosophy. A philosopher as such is not interested in any sort of 'dialogue' unless it can help him in his own speculations. And it is surmised that precisely the study of a *quite different* attitude towards philosophy may be most rewarding here. That means, however, that we should expect at least as much profit from the study of cosmocentric doctrines as from that of the friends of young Marx and of an interpretation of nature centered on man.

J. M. B.

SOVIET MARXISM AND MARXISM

Ivan Babič, of Zagreb University, recently published in *The Journal of Philosophy* (**63**,7, 1966, 169–178) a sharp critique of a previous article in the same journal by Brand Blanshard ('Reflections on Economic Determinism', *ibid.*, **63**,23, 1966, 745–756). In his critique, entitled 'Blanshard's Reduction of Materialism', Babič writes (p. 747):

"... Soviet philosophers make no distinction between their own model of Marxism and Marxist philosophy in general. ... Soviet philosophers sometimes act as if they spoke in the name of Marxism in its totality, and in an aggressive and arrogant manner answer every objection to the effect that their version of Marxism does exhaust Marxism as a whole. Such reactions on the part of the Soviet colleagues were exhibited in Boston when Dr. Novakovic from Belgrad read his paper dealing with different conceptions of metaphysics in Marx."

Well, and what did professor Babič expect from those colleagues? They believe and have said so many times that (1) in general their knowledge is superior to that of all other philosophers: Soviet philosophy is, as everybody is aware, the 'only scientific philosophy'; (2) they have an *a priori* perfect insight into the thought of Marx; the fact that Marxian studies in the Soviet Union are rather poor as compared with those done abroad is irrelevant as long as such insight is granted; (3) they

also often think that the above-noted aggressive and arrogant manner of speaking conveniently replaces arguments where such are lacking.

Fortunately enough, as the author himself suggests, not *all* Soviet philosophers behave in this way. And it is hoped that repeated statements of the kind quoted above will help make clear that those who behave so are wrong.

But once again the suggestion made many times in this journal merits repetition: Soviet philosophy should *not* be called 'Marxism' but 'Marxism-Leninism'.

J. M. B.

SOF'JA ALEKSANDROVNA JANOVSKAJA

On October 24, 1966, Mrs. S. A. Janovskaja, a well-known Soviet logician and historian of mathematics and logic, died in Moscow. Born on January 31, 1896 in Pružany, she studied mathematics in Odessa. Between 1917 and 1923 she devoted herself to political activities (being a member of the CP since 1918); during this period she was the editor of the daily *Kommunist* and a political commissar in the Red Army. Then she returned to her studies. From 1936 she lectured at MGU, where, in 1943, she became director of the seminar for mathematical logic. In 1959, when, mostly thanks to her, a chair of mathematical logic was established, she became the first titular of the new *kafedra*. She received the Order of Lenin in 1951.

Mrs. Janovskaja published numerous papers and books. She was responsible for the edition of Marx's mathematical manuscripts. In 1947 she edited and commented upon Hilbert and Ackermann's *Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik*, which played an important role in the development of Soviet logical thought. Among her systematic works, the study on definitions by abstraction (*O tak nazyvaemyx 'opredelenijax čerez abstrakciju'*) might be mentioned. However, her thorough-going and erudite history of mathematical logic in the SU (*Matematika v SSSR za sorok let 1917–1957*, 1959) is the work for which she most merited the gratitude of all those working in the field of formal logic.

Mrs. Janovskaja did not have an easy task when she attempted to persuade her colleagues that, dialectics or no dialectics, there is only one scientific logic – mathematical logic. She became the object of

irresponsible attacks by people who understood nothing about the subject, and she had to recant (to perform 'self-criticism') some of her most legitimate views, as, for example, those concerning the theory of truth values. Yet she never capitulated and always persevered in her work of training young logicians. In the end she succeeded: mathematical logic is now better known and more correctly appreciated by most Soviet philosophers than by the majority of the philosophers in the Western world.

Her death is surely a great loss to Soviet logic and to formal logic and its history in general. But her work did not die with her, and there is every reason to hope that it will continue to develop in the Soviet Union.

J. M. B.

PHILOSOPHICAL DISSERTATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION

In *VF* 1966,2 (140–141) M. F. Ovsjannikov and Ju. A. Petrov present data on philosophical dissertations in the Soviet Union for 1964–65, which allows us to fill out the picture presented in *SST* **4** (1964), 48–56.

Philosophical Dissertations in the Soviet Union 1947–54, 1959–65: Growth

	Doctoral	*Candidate*	*Total*
1947			66
1948–51			240
1951–52			203
1953–54			469
–			–
1959–60	6	90	96
1961–62	9	109	118
1963–64	41	224	265
1964–65	54	286	340

Thus, from 1947 to 1954 the rise was in almost perfect geometrical progression. The lack of data for 1955 to 1958 and the marked drop in number of dissertations between 1954 and 1959 are both to be attributed to the 'de-Stalinization' which caused the elimination or fundamental revision of all dissertation themes.

Philosophical Dissertations in the Soviet Union 1947–54 and 1964–65: Themes

	1947	1948–51	1951–52	1953–54	1964–65
Diamat	2	6	2	12	18
Epistemology	2	17	10	43	23
Philosophy of science		17	5	16	21
Histomat	22	58	52	157	98
Art		5	9	14	39
Ethics		1	4	5	46
Atheism and religion		3	1	1	30
History of Philosophy	39	132	113	193	65
Miscellaneous	1	1	7	28	

The big gains were in Art, Ethics, and Atheism. However, it should be noted that the breakdown for 1947–54 is our own while that for 1964–65 was done by the Soviets. It could be that many titles we would have put under 'Histophil' were put under Art, Ethics and Atheism by the Soviets.

Philosophical Dissertations in the Soviet Union 1947–54 and 1964–65: Geographical Distribution

	1947	1948–51	1951–52	1953–54	1964–65
Alma-Ata			1	2	9
Baku		2	1	8	10
Erevan				6	4
Gor'kij				2	2
Kazan'				2	1
Kiev		1	11	42	26
Leningrad		8	25	56	12
Minsk			2	10	7
Moscow	66	226	149	300	210
Sverdlovsk			2	14	3
Taškent			1	3	20
Tbilisi		3	4	16	10
Tomsk			1	2	2
Miscellaneous			6	6	24
Moscow	100%	94%	73%	64%	61%

Moscow's share has thus continued to decline but the rate of decline has slowed.

Ovsjannikov and Petrov deplore what they call 'spontaneity' in the choice of themes and recommend that some 'regulatory' measures be taken. They also mention qualitative deficiencies in the dissertations. For example, the philosophical treatment of questions on the practice of Communist construction has been 'too theoretical'. Not enough attention is being given to the history of contemporary bourgeois philosophy. In theory of knowledge, old material is being hashed over and little attention is paid to modern advances in logic, psychology, etc.

T. B.

A NEW PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Readers of *Studies in Soviet Thought* will be interested to learn of the announcement of a new philosophical quarterly, *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, edited at the University of Akron, Ohio, U.S.A. While not specifically a Sovietological publication, the policy of the journal will be to stimulate and communicate current thought in the general area of value theory, without prior restrictions of any kind. It will give serious consideration to value theory in the Soviet Union and other East-European countries. The new journal will be edited by James Wilbur, Bernd Magnus, David Rayfield, and Ervin Laszlo (from *Studies in Soviet Thought*). The first issue will appear in April, 1967.

GESELLSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFTLICHE PFLICHTFÄCHER AN DEN SOWJETISCHEN HOCHSCHULEN

Alle sowjetischen Studenten müssen Pflichtvorlesungen und Seminare in den sogenannten 'Gesellschaftswissenschaften' absolvieren. Je nach Studienrichtung entfallen etwa 10 bis 15 Prozent der Ausbildungszeit auf die gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Disziplinen.

In einer Anordnung des Ministeriums für Hochschulwesen und höhere Fachschulausbildung der UdSSR vom 23. September 1966 wird der Stundenplan der gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Pflichtfächer an den Hochschulen neu geregelt.[1] Die Vorlesungen und Seminare in den Fächern 'Geschichte der KPdSU', 'marxistisch-leninistische Philosophie',

'politische Ökonomie', und 'wissenschaftlicher Kommunismus' sind nach dieser Anordnung in den verschiedenen Fachrichtungen folgendermaßen aufgegliedert:

Lehrfächer	Zahl der Stunden	davon:	
		Vorlesungen	Seminare
(1) *Fachrichtungen der Universitäten und pädagogischen Hochschulen mit 5-jähriger Ausbildungszeit*			
Geschichte der KPdSU*	170	84	86
Marxistisch-leninistische Philosophie	140	80	60
Politische Ökonomie	140	70	70
Wissenschaftl. Kommunismus	70	30	40
	520	264	256
(2) *Pädagogische Hochschulen und Hochschulen für Körperkultur mit 4-jähriger Ausbildungszeit*			
Geschichte der KPdSU	170	60	60
Marxistisch-leninistische Philosophie	140	80	60
Politische Ökonomie	100	50	50
Wissenschaftl. Kommunismus	70	30	40
	430	220	210
(3) *Technische Hochschulen*			
Geschichte der KPdSU	120	60	60
Marxistisch-leninistische Philosophie	90	50	40
Politische Ökonomie	140	70	70
Wissenschaftl. Kommunismus	70	30	40
	420	210	210

* In den historischen Fakultäten entfallen auf die Geschichte der KPdSU 200 Stunden.

Lehrfächer	Zahl der Stunden	davon:	
		Vorlesungen	Seminare
(4) *Landwirtschaftliche Hochschulen*			
Geschichte der KPdSU	120	60	60
Marxistisch-leninistische Philosophie	90	50	40
Politische Ökonomie	140	70	70
Wissenschaftlicher Kommunismus	70	30	40
	420	210	210
(5) *Medizinische Hochschulen*			
Geschichte der KPdSU	120	60	60
Marxistisch-leninistische Philosophie	140	80	60
Politische Ökonomie	100	50	50
Wissenschaftlicher Kommunismus	70	30	40
	430	220	210
(6) *Kunst-Hochschulen*			
Geschichte der KPdSU	120	60	60
Marxistisch-leninistische Philosophie	140	80	60
Politische Ökonomie	100	50	50
Wissenschaftlicher Kommunismus	70	30	40
	430	220	210

Lehrfächer	Zahl der Stunden	davon: Vorlesungen	davon: Seminare
(7) *Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Hochschulen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultäten, Technisch-wirtschaftliche Fakultäten technischer und landwirtschaftlicher Hochschulen*			
Geschichte der KPdSU	170	84	86
Marxistisch-leninistische Philosophie	90	50	40
Politische Ökonomie	300	150	150
Wissenschaftlicher Kommunismus	70	30	40
	630	314	316
(8) *Juristische Hochschulen*			
Geschichte der KPdSU	170	84	86
Marxistisch-leninistische Philosophie	140	80	60
Politische Ökonomie	250	110	140
Wissenschaftlicher Kommunismus	70	30	40
	630	304	326

Vergleicht man die hier angeführten Stundenpläne mit den Lehrplänen früherer Jahre, so ergibt sich, daß die Zahl der Unterrichtsstunden in den gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Disziplinen geringfügig erhöht worden ist. Nachfolgend wird die Stundenverteilung der Gesellschaftswissenschaften in der Fachrichtung 'Physik' (welche dem unter Punkt 1 genannten Stundenplan entspricht) und in der Fachrichtung 'Wirtschaftsingenieur' (welche dem unter Punkt 7 genannten Stundenplan entspricht) für frühere Jahre angeführt[2]:

Gesellschaftswissenschaften im Universitätslehrplan 'Physik' (5½ Studienjahre)

Lehrfach	1955 Zahl der Stunden*	1959 Zahl der Stunden*
(A) Geschichte der KPdSU	–	224 (120 + 104)
(B) Grundlagen des Marxismus-Leninismus	224 (144 + 80)	–
Politische Ökonomie	140 (100 + 40)	150 (80 + 70)
Diamat und Histomat	140 (80 + 60)	140 (70 + 70)
	504 (324 + 180)	514 (270 + 70)

* In Klammern ist jeweils zunächst die Zahl der Vorlesungsstunden und danach die Zahl der Seminarstunden angegeben.

Gesellschaftswissenschaften im Lehrplan für Wirtschaftsingenieure der Fachrichtung 'Wirtschaft und Organisation der Maschinenbauindustrie'

Lehrfach	1955 (5 Jahre Studium)	1959 (5½ Jahre Studium)
(A) Geschichte der KPdSU	–	220 (120 + 100)
(B) Grundlagen des Marxismus-Leninismus	230 (140 + 90)	–
Politische Ökonomie	300 (200 + 100)	300 (180 + 120)
Diamat und Histomat	80 (60 + 20)	90 (50 + 40)
	610 (400 + 210)	610 (350 + 260)

Auch an den technischen Hochschulen ist eine leichte Erhöhung der Stundenzahl in den gesellschaftlichen Fächern festzustellen (insgesamt 420 Stunden gegenüber 390 Stunden in früheren Jahren)[3], obwohl die Gesamtstudienzeit in den meisten Fachrichtungen verkürzt wurde. Zu erwähnen ist ferner, daß in den neuen Lehrplänen das Lehrfach 'Wissenschaftlicher Kommunismus' hinzugekommen ist. Dieses Lehrfach ist

nach dem XXII. Parteikongress (1961), auf welchem die Epoche des 'Übergangs zum Kommunismus' proklamiert wurde, gebildet worden.

Arnold Buchholz

ANMERKUNGEN

[1] *Über die Bestätigung der Lehrprogramme und der neuen Verteilung der Unterrichtsstunden für die Kurse der Gesellschaftswissenschaften an den Hochschulen der UdSSR.* Anordnung des Ministeriums für Hochschulwesen und höhere Fachschulbildung der UdSSR vom 23. September 1966, Nr. 367 (russ.). In: *Bjulleten' Ministerstva vyssego i srednego special'nogo obrazovanija SSSR*, 1966, November, Nr. 11, S. 2–4.
[2] Nicholas DeWitt, *Education and Professional Employment in the U.S.S.R.*, National Science Foundation, Washington, 1961, S. 713 und S. 734.
[3] *Osteuropa-Naturwissenschaft*, 1957/58, S. 162–164.

REVIEWS

J. Wolfgang Görlich, *Zur Problematik der materialistisch-dialektischen Analyse und Interpretation physikalischer Forschungsergebnisse* (Osteuropa-Institut an der freien Universität Berlin – Philosophische und soziologische Veröffentlichungen). Berlin 1965. 133 S.

Allgemein geht es in dieser Studie um den Anspruch des dialektischen Materialismus, er sei das gesetzmäßige Resultat der gesamten Entwicklung des fortschrittlichen philosophischen und wissenschaftlichen Denkens, im besonderen um die Behauptungen, die Physik stelle eine 'glänzende Bestätigung' des dialektischen Materialismus dar, Physik beinhalte in ihrem Gegenstand und auch – zumindest spontan und unbewußt – in ihrer Methode dialektische und materialistische Elemente (9).* Die These Görlichs ist, daß dieser traditionelle Anspruch des dialektischen Materialismus nur mit Hilfe von Äquivokationen, Zirkelschlüssen und unstatthaften Verallgemeinerungen, deshalb nur 'terminologisch' aufrechterhalten werden könne (120). Die Problematik dialektisch-materialistischer Interpretation der Physik untersucht er vor allem an Hand quantenfeldtheoretischer Aussagen, da dialektisch-materialistische Philosophen gerade für sie besonderes Interesse zeigen. Eingehender analysiert werden dabei in der Hauptsache Interpretationen ostdeutscher Philosophen.

Der eigentlichen Untersuchung gehen zwei vorbereitende Kapitel voran. Erstens stellt Görlich die Hauptthesen des dialektischen Materialismus sowie einige Folgesätze zusammen. Wichtig für das Spätere ist dabei eine Liste verschiedener Bedeutungen des Ausdrucks 'materialistische Dialektik' im Bereich der Naturwissenschaften (16, 17). Zweitens gibt er auch einen Überblick über das Interpretationsmaterial in Form von Thesen zur Quantenfeldtheorie, zur Unbestimmtheitsrelation und zur physikalischen Methode (20-25), die zum Teil den zu untersuchenden philosophischen Interpretationen selbst entnommen sind. Görlich betont dabei, daß die Unschärferelation die Verwendung der klassischen Begriffe Welle und Korpuskel begrenze, Welle und Korpuskel makrophysikalische, von der jeweiligen Meßeinrichtung abhängige Projektionen von Mikroobjekten seien (22). An der physikalischen Methode hebt er hervor, daß physikalische Größen und Formeln keine eidetische, sondern operationale Bedeutung besäßen, daß ferner eine physikalische Theorie jeweils einen schöpferischen Entwurf darstelle, ihr Zusammenhang

* Alle Zahlen in Klammern sind Seitenzahlen des Buches.

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mit den Experimenten ein logisch-reduktiver sei, weshalb Experimente eine Theorie nie eindeutig bestimmten (24).

Der erste Hauptteil befaßt sich mit dialektischen Interpretationen im wirklichkeitstheoretischen Bereich. Görlich weist eine angebliche Realdialektik, die etwa in der 'Widersprüchlichkeit der Bewegung' (26ff.), in dem Verhältnis von Korpuskel und Welle oder in der Dialektik von Diskretheit und Kontinuierlichkeit liegen soll (30ff., 58ff.), mit dem Argument zurück, es handle sich dabei je um eine 'Dialektik' oder Dualität auf erkenntnistheoretischer Ebene (29, 30, 41, 61) oder – etwa bei der 'Dialektik von Notwendigkeit und Zufälligkeit' – um ein Verhältnis von abstrakter Widerspiegelung und objektiver Realität (64ff.). Darüberhinaus fehle in den Beispielen für eine 'objektive Naturdialektik' wie der Teilchenvernichtung (32ff.), den Wechselwirkungsvorgängen (43ff.), dynamischen Gleichgewichtszuständen (47ff.) oder strukturellen Gesetzen (51) das für die Dialektik wesentliche progressive Element, die 'Aufhebung des Alten und der Sieg des Neuen' (insbes. 45-47). Dies heißt, in den Interpretationen werden verschiedene Bedeutungen von Dialektik wie bloße Veränderungsdialektik, zirkuläre Wechselwirkungseinheit, strukturelle Stufendialektik nicht auseinandergehalten und das Vorhandensein eines dieser Typen als Beleg für das Vorhandensein einer Fortschrittsdialektik angesehen (55).

Görlich kritisiert die dialektisch-materialistischen Philosophen außerdem deshalb, weil sie in Argumenten gegen einen mechanischen Materialismus sogleich Argumente zugunsten des dialektischen Materialismus sehen, beispielsweise bei der Analyse des dynamischen Gleichgewichts (56) oder der Wechselwirkung (61ff.), aber auch in den Versuchen, den dialektischen Materialismus als eine 'ars inveniendi' der Physik nachzuweisen (71). Der letzte Punkt gehört schon in den zweiten Hauptteil, der von den dialektisch-materialistischen Interpretationen im erkenntnistheoretischen und methodologischen Bereich handelt. Hier geht der Autor auf Schwächen der dialektisch-materialistischen Erkenntnistheorie ein wie diejenige, die Induktion auf genetisch-empiristische Weise zu erklären (81ff.), oder die, der physikalischen Theoriebildung mit einer sensualistischen Abstraktionstheorie gerecht zu werden (102ff.), also die relativ selbständige mathematische Seite der Physik und – auch mit dem neuerdings oft verwendeten Begriff der Homomorphie – die nur operative Bedeutung physikalischer Formeln adäquat zu fassen.

Aus diesen, an den Argumenten Görlichs aufgezeigten Problemen der dialektisch-materialistischen Interpretation der Physik ist ersichtlich, daß das Buch über die speziellen Analysen hinaus von allgemeinerem Interesse ist. Zu bemerken ist vielleicht noch, daß der Verfasser seine eigene Kritik mehrfach durch Äußerungen aus dem Bereich des dialektischen Materialismus bestätigt sehen kann.

P. Kirschenmann

Samuel Kotz, *Dictionary and Reader in the Cybernetical Sciences.* Academic Press, Inc., New York, 1966. 214 pp.

This is a particularly useful book for those interested in reading and translating Russian publications in cybernetics. It is divided into three parts: (1) The most essential part of the book is a Russian-English dictionary containing more than 8000 technical terms and expressions covering the chief fields of this new scientific discipline. (2) A special section is added which consists of a number of short Russian passages with interlinear English translation, selected from recent Russian publications in various fields in cybernetics. This will be helpful for those who need practice in reading Russian texts in general. It is worth mentioning here that eight of these passages are more or less philosophical, whereas the dictionary as a whole does not contain terms of particular philosophical significance. (3) The last part is a selected bibliography of Russian publications on cybernetics. A 'Foreword', written by A. Porter, deals with the development of cybernetics in general and some implications.

P. Kirschenmann

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A. R. Lurija, *Mozg čeloveka i psixičeskie processy* [Human Brain and Mental Processes]. Izd. ApedN RSFSR, Moscow, 1963. 480 str.

A. A. Smirnov, *Problemy psixologii pamjati* [Psychological Problems of Memory]. Izd. "Prosvesveščenie", Moscow, 1966. 424 str.

Experimental work in Soviet psychology has generally tended to be concentrated on two particular fields – physiological psychology and those problems which are directly relevant to education. Other branches of psychology, such as the psychology of the emotions and psychotherapy have received less attention from Soviet psychologists than from their counterparts in Europe and North-America. The reasons for this uneven development are many. Two of the most important are, on the one hand, the long tradition of brilliant work in physiological psychology going back to Pavlov and Sečenov, and, on the other, the insistence on immediate practical relevance which is characteristic of Soviet scientific research in general.

Two works which have appeared recently give an interesting cross-section of the type of work being done by Soviet psychologists in the branches of experimental psychology mentioned above. Both are by eminent Soviet psychologists and both are collections of scientific papers relating to experiments carried out by the authors over a period of some twenty-five years.

The first, by A. R. Lurija, *Human Brain and Mental Processes*, deals with problems of neuro-psychology, in particular with that of the cerebral foundations of psychic activity. The most interesting section of Lurija's work is a long paper on cerebral localisation, which bears the same title as the book. In it Lurija claims that the older 'psycho-morphological' theory of localisation, which related specific psychic functions to clearly defined areas of the brain, must be revised in the light of recent clinical observations. The clinical facts which are discussed here lead, according to Lurija, to the conclusion that the brain cannot be divided into zones in which specific psychic functions are localised. So-called psychic processes are the result of a series of mutually related cerebral processes involving, simultaneously, a number of different areas of the brain. Damage to a limited area of the brain therefore produces, not the suppression of a clearly defined function, but also a more generalised disturbance of its total function. This, it is claimed, explains why damage to a particular area of the cortex often results in the suppression of two or more disparate functions.

A. A. Smirnov's *Psychological Problems of Memory* is a collection of four scientific papers published by the author over the last twenty-five years: 'The Psychology of Memorizing', 'On the Conditions of Retroactive Inhibition', 'The Interrelations of Image and Word in Memory Development', and 'On Certain Memory Correlations'. Only the last-mentioned is here published for the first time. A résumé in English is included after each paper.

Though the author states that the experiments recorded have been inspired by two fundamental propositions, common to Soviet psychology – the unity

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of knowledge and activity and cognition as a specific type of human activity – the book unfortunately contains no real discussion of the philosophical aspects of these propositions.

Apart from its interest as an example of the practical direction which the above-mentioned principles lend to experimental work, the book contains an interesting historical survey of pre-Revolutionary and Soviet work on the psychology of memory.

Though these two works will be chiefly of interest to psychologists, they are of interest to philosophers as examples of the influence of basic Marxist-Leninist premises on Soviet psychological research.

T. R. P.

REPORT FROM THE INSTITUTE

Personal: Professor Bocheński completed in October 1966 his term as Rector (President) of the University and will be able to devote himself more completely to the work of the Institute. A new law, which raises the retirement age to 70, will allow him to continue this work for a number of years. Dr. T. J. Blakeley has completed his studies in Africa and will return to Boston College in June. Ervin Laszlo spent several months at Yale University engaged in lecturing and research.

Lectures: Besides the regular lectures, an intensive course in Russian was offered in the Fall of 1966.

Radio-Program: The Institute assumed for Radio Bern the 'University Hour' (in German), which consists of 12 weekly broadcasts of 45 minutes each. The following lectures and/or seminars were recorded during 1966: J. Bocheński: Studies in Soviet Philosophy, The development of Soviet Philosophy; Discussion group (Nasov): The State of Western literature on Soviet Philosophy; R. Kemball: Russian History and Thought; W. Boeselager: Dialectics, Soviet Methodology of Science; J. Hänggi: Soviet Logic.

Publications: The sbornik of professor Tavanec: *Problemy logiki naučnogo poznanija* has been translated by Dr. T. J. Blakeley and has already been given to the publisher.

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UZNADZE, D. N., *Psixologičeskie issledovanija* [Psychological research], AN, Druzuzinskoj SSR, M., Nauka, 1966, 451 str.

ERRATA

The following corrections are to be made in the previous issue of *Studies in Soviet Thought*: on p. 253, lines 5 and 12, the Russian word printed as "*peredovae*" should read "*peredovye*"; on p. 254, 10th line from the bottom, "the categorical problem" should read "the categorial problem".

The author mentioned on p. 286 of Volume VI of *SST* should be Tamás Földesi, not György Tamás. Consequently note 34 (p. 289) should read: "*Az akaratszabadság problémája,* Budapest 1960", and note 35 (p. 290): "Tamás Földesi, 'És mi van a fejekben?', *Valóság* 1966/11".

LABIN, SUZANNE, *Il est moins cinq. Propagande et infiltration soviétiques*, 2e éd., Paris, Berger-Levraut, 1960, 131 pp.

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THE 'BRAIN-PSYCHE' PROBLEM IN SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY

A Survey of its Development and Perspectives

In recent years Soviet psychologists and philosophers have devoted considerable attention to the problem of consciousness, and in particular to what might be termed the problem of its ontological status. The point at issue was summed up in a question submitted in 1954 by a group of students to the editors of the *Voprosy Filosofii*: "Is it correct to say that consciousness is material?" V. N. Kol'banovskij, who answered in the name of the editors, replied categorically: "No, it is not correct", and went on to complain that "those who maintain it, confuse the material base of consciousness with the very essence of consciousness and thinking, which are not material".[1] If the vast majority of Soviet psychologists today agree with Kol'banovskij, this has not always been the case, and there have been occasions when the answer given to the question was not so categorically negative. In this article we shall attempt to give a short historical account of the development of Soviet thinking on the problem of consciousness and to examine critically some of the most important theories put forward.

For the sake of clarity a few distinctions, mainly of terminology, must be introduced. In the first place, it must be kept in mind that Soviet writers usually distinguish clearly between consciousness (*soznanie*) and the psychic (*psixičeskoe*), reserving the former term for the specifically human form of cognition. In this article, however, these terms are for the most part used interchangeably; with few exceptions what is said of one applies equally to the other.

In the second place, Soviet literature on the nature of consciousness usually distinguishes three different aspects of the problem: (a) the *epistemological aspect*, i.e. the relationship of consciousness to the external world; (b) the *social aspect*, that of its relation to society; (c) the *natural-science aspect*, i.e. the problem of the relationship of consciousness to the brain. Writing in 1964[2], N. V. Medvedev complained that while

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there was general agreement among Marxist-Leninist scientists on the first two aspects, the most divergent views were being expressed on the third aspect of the problem, namely, that of the relationship of consciousness to the brain. It is with this last-mentioned problem that the present article deals. Little or nothing will be said about the social and epistemological aspects.

Soviet views on the nature of consciousness are, of course, directly inspired by the writings of the 'Classics' of Marxism-Leninism. Though neither Marx, Engels, nor Lenin wrote explicitly on the nature of consciousness, their works contain a number of passing references to the question which have served to delimit the area within which a solution to the problem must be sought. To begin with, the thoroughgoing materialism of Engels and Lenin requires that any solution to the problem must be compatible with a materialistic ontology; no recourse to non-material substances is possible. However, beginning with Marx, the 'Classics' have continually insisted that there are non-material phenomena in nature and society. Marx' description of the superstructure of society clearly endows it with non-material properties, while Lenin, for example, in a well-known passage asserts that "to say that thought is material is to make a false step towards confusing materialism with idealism".[3]

Where they refer to psychological problems the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin steer a middle course between animism on the one hand and mechanism or reductionism on the other. But their first concern is with materialism and with the avoidance of idealism in all its forms. Their opposition to mechanism is less pronounced and they nowhere make any sustained attempt to reconcile the two standpoints. Consequently, their anti-mechanism can easily be overlooked, particularly since there are a number of elements in the teaching of the 'Classics' which lend themselves to a positivistic and even mechanistic interpretation.

Small wonder then that Soviet philosophers and scientists have frequently been tempted to overlook the anti-reductionist elements in the writings of the 'Classics' and to concentrate on their more obvious materialism, giving it a mechanistic interpretation.

This in fact was especially the case in the nineteen-twenties when the predominant scientific *ethos* in the Soviet-Union was one of pronounced mechanism. It must be remembered that from the beginning there had been wide disagreement among Marxists themselves over the philosophic

premises of Marxism, and that there was considerable support for the view that Marxism was not a philosophy at all, but rather a positive science. Even within the Bolshevik party Lenin's philosophical ideas were only partially accepted and the prevailing philosophy among its members was closer to mechanistic materialism than to anything else.

Though it was strenuously opposed in the name of mechanism by a small group of philosophers associated with A. M. Deborin, mechanism in one form or another remained the dominant trend in Soviet philosophy in the decade which followed the Revolution. The details of the Mechanist-Deborinist controversy have been described elsewhere.[4] What interests us here is the rôle played by mechanism in Soviet psychology.

During the whole of the nineteen-twenties Soviet psychologists were preoccupied with the problem of constructing a new 'Marxist' psychology to replace the older 'bourgeois-idealist' schools. In the years immediately prior to the Revolution, psychology in Russia did not differ to any considerable degree from psychology in, say, Western Europe. All the schools of psychology current in Western Europe and America found their adherents in Russia, existing alongside the more indigenous schools of Pavlov and Bexterev. Early in the nineteen-twenties many of these schools came under attack from the new generation of Marxist psychologists. Marxism, all were agreed, meant materialism, and any theory that did not pass the test of materialism must be eradicated. Consequently, by 1924 almost all of the older schools of psychology had ceased to exist, their members having been forced to resign their academic positions and, in many cases, to go into exile.

In January 1924, G. I. Čelpanov, a psychologist with an international reputation, was replaced as director of the Moscow Psychological Institute, his place being taken by one of his former pupils, K. N. Kornilov. This event marks the end of non-Marxist psychology in the Soviet-Union. With the elimination of the older, introspectionist-oriented schools a wave of mechanism swept Soviet psychology. Its success was due chiefly to the predominance of mechanist thought in Soviet philosophy and science generally, but contributing factors were the presence in Russia, since the end of the 19th century, of behaviorist-oriented schools (in particular those of Pavlov and Bexterev) and the influence of the strong behaviorist currents in world psychology generally.

Though voices like Kornilov's were raised in protest against the trend

taken by Soviet psychology, the emphasis during the whole of that period was on objective methods, quantitative analysis, and determinism. As Kornilov pointed out in an article published in 1924[5], many psychologists believed that consciousness and subjective factors generally could have no place in a genuinely Marxist psychology; any suggestion that psychology should in any sense be a study of consciousness was tantamount to idealism.

In consequence, the scientific atmosphere of the nineteen-twenties was far from favorable to the study of consciousness. In fact the very possibility of psychology as a science was called into question. Pavlov's sceptical attitude to psychology is well known, and though Pavlov himself held aloof from public debate some of his pupils were openly asserting that psychology should be replaced entirely by Pavlovian physiology.[6] V. M. Bexterev, whose ideas, at this time, enjoyed wide popularity both within and beyond the Soviet-Union, was openly militant in his opposition to psychology; not only did he reject the methodology of experimental psychology but refused even to use the name, which he considered designated a more primitive stage in the study of man, a stage which had been superseded by his own science, 'Reflexology'. In these circumstances the problem of consciousness tended to become a non-problem. Even psychologists like K. N. Kornilov who opposed the extreme behaviorism of the reflexologists relegated the study of consciousness to a very secondary place in their systems. Kornilov repeatedly insisted that the primary object of psychological investigation was behavior (man's reactions to the demands of his environment; hence the name 'Reactology' which he gave to his system) even though he considered that, in the study of behavior, subjective states should be taken into account.

Owing to the fact that works from this period are not readily available, it is difficult to determine precisely what ontological status was attributed to consciousness by those who defended its place in psychology. (For the Reflexologists, the problem, as we have seen, for all practical purposes did not exist.) It is probable that psychologists like Kornilov did not consider the problem very closely; but a statement in an article published by Kornilov in 1923 is highly significant. "The psyche", he wrote, "is not something opposed to matter, but is only an aspect of the most highly organized form of matter."[7] The statement that the psyche is "not opposed to matter" in itself suggests that Kornilov looked upon the psyche as

material; but the further statement that it is an *aspect* of matter, places it beyond doubt. The very imprecision of Kornilov's language suggests not only that he had not considered the problem very closely, but even that he had not studied the remarks of the 'Classics' on this precise point. The use of the word 'aspect' to designate the relationship between the psyche and the brain implies that they are not really distinct and that the psyche is therefore not only *material* but *matter*!

Early in the nineteen-thirties the problem of consciousness suddenly became the focus of attention for Soviet psychologists. There were special reasons for this. In April 1929 the Second All-Union Conference of Marxist-Leninist Scientific Institutions condemned mechanism as a "clear deviation from the Marxist-Leninist philosophical position" and accused the Mechanists of "hindering the penetration of dialectical-materialist methodology into natural science". This condemnation, coupled with the more authoritative decree issued by the Central Committee of the Party on January 25, 1931, effectively removed mechanism, for the time being, from the philosophical scene. The implications for psychology of the decree of 1931 were immediate and evident, even though it was, admittedly, some years before these implications were fully worked out. The most immediate effect of mechanism's fall from grace was the universal recognition of the validity of the laws of the dialectic for all areas of science. In virtue of the first law (after Engels[8]), material reality appears as hierarchically organized into a number of different levels, each level having its own specific laws, which laws cannot be reduced to the laws of a lower level. In the light of this principle the reflexological view of man is clearly untenable: Engels' 'first law' clearly implies the 'reality of the psyche' and its irreducibility to the laws of physiology. Moreover, it was no longer possible to consider man merely as a highly complex automaton reacting to the stimuli of the surrounding world. The model of man which emerged in the nineteen-thirties was of the conscious builder of Socialism.

The theoretical basis of this new concept of man found its clearest expression in the principle of the unity of consciousness and behavior, first formulated by S. L. Rubinštejn in an article published in 1934.[9] At the time of its publication Rubinštejn's article did not attract the attention it deserved, but in it Rubinštejn had already outlined the main points of what was later to become the generally accepted formulation of Soviet psychological theory in the nineteen-thirties and forties. Starting with the

'fact of consciousness' and its transcendence over the laws of physiology, Rubinštejn went on to show that consciousness reveals its structure and content in human behavior and that behavior, in its turn, is structured and directed by consciousness. This brief summary of the principle of the unity of consciousness and behavior does less than justice to the complexity and depth of Rubinštejn's thought. Rubinštejn went on to develop the ideas put forward in 1934 in a series of books and articles, the most important of which was his *Fundamentals of General Psychology*. The publication of this last-mentioned work in 1940 placed Rubinštejn in the fore-front of Soviet psychology, and the ideas contained in the *Fundamentals* dominated the Soviet psychological scene right up until 1950.

For all the insistence on the study of consciousness during the nineteen-thirties and forties, surprisingly little attention seems to have been paid to the problem of its ontological status. Rubinštejn, for example, in his monumental *Fundamentals of General Psychology*, only touches on the problem briefly, when discussing the psycho-physical problem. Even here Rubinštejn does not discuss whether the term 'material' can be predicated of consciousness. However, it is quite clear what Rubinštejn's mind on the question is, for he is insistent that "psychic processes can in no way be reduced to neurophysiological processes".

Rubinštejn seeks a solution to the psycho-physical problem in terms of what he calls "the principle of psycho-physical unity":

> In contrast both to dualism which opposes the psychic to the physical and to the doctrine of the identity of psychic and physical, whether in the form of mechanistic materialism or of spiritualism, Soviet psychology begins with the unity of psychic and physical, a unity within which both psychic and physical retain their specific properties.[10]

According to the principle of psycho-physical unity, psychic and physical form two distinct, though united, principles. It is a unity within which each component principle retains its own specific character and obeys its own specific laws. The specific property or characteristic of consciousness, and of psychic events in general, Rubinštejn sees in their ability to reflect material reality: "Because it is a reflection of the world the psychic transcends the limits of pure interorganic relations." These and similar statements leave no doubt whatever that Rubinštejn did not consider it possible to speak of consciousness or of the psychic as material. More than this, the principle of psycho-physical unity implies a degree of opposition and

distinction between consciousness and matter which was later felt to be exaggerated, and Rubinštejn was accordingly forced to modify his views.

In 1950 an event occurred which radically changed the face of Soviet psychology. In late June and early July of that year, the Scientific Session on the 'Physiological Teaching of Academician I. P. Pavlov' was held in Moscow for the purpose of evaluating the significance of Pavlov's ideas for Soviet science. As S. I. Vavilov, president of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR expressed it in his inaugural address, the purpose of the Conference was to undertake a "critical and self-critical examination of how things stand with regard to the development of Pavlov's legacy in the Soviet-Union".[11] Vavilov went on to declare that Pavlov's theories "provide a scientific basis for the creative development of physiology, medicine and psychology, of rational dietetics, physical culture and spa-therapy"; while the resolutions adopted at the end of the Conference added veterinary science to the long list of sciences which would benefit by the application of Pavlov's ideas.

Considering the importance subsequently attributed to the Conference as marking a turning point in the development of Soviet psychology, psychologists played a surprisingly small part in the discussions. Only three psychologists addressed the Conference and these for the most part confined themselves to making general statements on the significance of Pavlov's ideas for psychology.[12] The psychologists were clearly on the defensive and indeed many of the statements made by the physiologists present seemed to imply that psychology as a science had no right to exist. V. M. Kol'banovskij's paper was a long apology for psychology and all the psychologists were united in calling for greater cooperation between psychologists and physiologists in exploiting the riches of their common Pavlovian heritage.

Rubinštejn alone among the psychologists seems to have been aware of the full implications of 'pavlovism' for psychology. In a short address to the Congress[13] he pin-pointed those areas of psychological theory which have to be revised if psychology were to conform to Pavlov's teaching and methodology. Pavlov's ideas, he said, were relevant primarily for the problem 'brain and psyche' i.e. to the problem of the relationship of the psyche to the brain. In the light of Pavlov's theories, he went on, the dialectical-materialist principle that the psyche is a function of the brain, receives a new content. In detail, this means that (a) psychic functions

could no longer be related to the anatomical structure of the brain as to their material substrate, but must rather be related to its physiological activity; (b) the 'two-factor theory' was no longer tenable. This last point is the most important, as it is precisely here that the new insistence on Pavlov's ideas marks a decisive break with the immediate past. By the 'two-factor theory' Rubinštejn is primarily referring to the theory of psycho-physical unity as expounded in the *Fundamentals of General Psychology*. According to the 'two-factor theory' the organism and its environment form two separate factors determining psychic phenomena. But if the physiological activity of the brain forms the 'immediate material substrate' of consciousness, then, since this activity is reflex activity, the ultimate determinant of the psychic is one, namely, the outer world or the 'conditions of life' of the organism. In the light of Pavlov's teaching, therefore, the 'two-factor theory' and with it the principle of psycho-physical unity, must be replaced by what Rubinštejn calls 'materialistic monism'. What is meant by 'materialistic monism' only becomes clear in Rubinštejn's later writings and need not detain us here. Briefly, it means that there is only one principle in man, the material, in relation to which the psychic is derived. The important point is that his address to the Conference shows that Rubinštejn clearly saw that the application of Pavlov's ideas to psychology implies a closer connection between psychic and physiological than his earlier theories had allowed. How close that connection is, is a problem which has occupied Soviet philosophers and psychologists since 1950.

Some of the most important statements on psychology were made by the physiologists attending the Conference. Ivanov-Smolenskij's paper[14] deserves special mention as it set the tone for much of the Conference. Towards the end of his opening address, Ivanov-Smolenskij dealt at some length with the question of the relation between subjective and objective. He obviously considered this to be primarily a physiological problem, for he calls it "one of the most important problems of the physiology and patho-physiology of higher nervous activity". For Pavlov, he stated, mental activity is higher nervous activity and must, in consequence, be studied by purely objective methods. This is the reason why Pavlov called for the amalgamation (*slitie*) of psychology and physiology, conceiving the higher functioning of the brain, which he called mental activity, as the unity of subjective and objective. It is therefore erroneous, he con-

tinued, "to endeavor to employ at one and the same time, Pavlov's strictly objective method and the subjective psychological method, an endeavor which in fact springs from the conception of psycho-physical parallelism". It is clear that Ivanov-Smolenskij was advocating the subordination of psychology to physiology or even the abolition of the former. If mental activity is higher nervous activity, then it is difficult to see how one can speak of psychology as distinct from the physiology of higher nervous activity.

As Ivanov-Smolenskij himself pointed out, the views he expressed were those of Pavlov, and the most obvious interpretation of the 'pavlovization' of psychology decreed by the Congress was that it implied the repudiation of 'dialectical psychology' and a return to the mechanism of the nineteen-twenties. Even though statements on the nature of the psychic which would have been branded as vulgar materialism in the nineteen-thirties and forties were expressed in the years immediately following the Conference, the majority of Soviet psychologists felt that the principles of 'dialectical psychology' should be supplemented, rather than replaced, by Pavlovian physiology. Hence, ever since the Conference, Soviet psychologists have been faced with the well-nigh impossible task of reconciling Pavlovian physiology with dialectical materialism. After the relative calm of the late thirties and forties, the Pavlov Conference ushered in a period of discussion on the nature of the psychic and the vast majority of Soviet works on the nature of consciousness – particularly on its ontological status – date from this period. It is to these discussions that we must now turn our attention.

The prolonged debate which followed the Conference of 1950 centered around the problem of the relationship between psychic events and neurophysiological processes. The question was: do these events form one or two processes? If they form merely one process, then how can one avoid falling into mechanism and reductionism, for to say that they are one process seems to exclude the possibility of distinguishing between psychic and physiological; in which case one is forced to say that psyche and consciousness are material. If on the other hand they are two processes, then it would seem to follow that Pavlov's theories are only valid for the physiological processes and not for the psychic ones. In this case Pavlov's ideas are only indirectly relevant for psychology. These and similar problems have been the subject of lively discussion since 1950.

It is not possible within the limits of this article to give a complete account of the various opinions on the nature of the psychic put forward in the course of the debate precipitated by the Pavlov Conference. We shall, therefore, limit ourselves to presenting a summary of the most important solutions proposed. These can be divided into three groups: those who deny any distinction between psychic and physiological events; those who conceive them as two distinct processes; and those who hold that they form one process but try to distinguish psychic and physiological as 'aspects' or 'sides' of the single process.

An extreme mechanist interpretation of psychic phenomena was proposed by V. M. Arxipov in an article published in *Sovetskaja Pedagogika* in 1954.[15] In this article Arxipov criticized the opinion that the psychic is immaterial. The concept 'immaterial', he said, is logically the contradiction of 'material'. Hence, to say that the psychic is immaterial means that it possesses properties which are the opposite of those possessed by matter, i.e. it is not sensible, not in space, etc. But according to the 'Classics', the psychic is a property of matter, a form of material motion; hence it too must be sensible, spatial, etc. Since the psychic possesses the properties of matter, it must be material. The only distinction between matter and consciousness is that between matter and one of its forms, or between the whole and its part. To those who object that, according to Lenin, "sensation is the subjective image of the objective world" and that, while the neural processes which produce the image are material, the image itself is not, Arxipov replies that the nervous process *is* the subjective form. Subjective image and neural process are two aspects of the same phenomenon. It follows, then, that the laws of higher nervous activity are the laws of psychology. To the further objection that such a view effectively reduces psychology to physiology, Arxipov replies that in fact psychology is a branch of physiology; the only difference between them is that between the general and the particular. The physiology of higher nervous activity studies behavior without specially considering subjective factors while psychology studies these very subjective factors as a particular form of higher nervous activity, using physiological methods.

Arxipov's theory amounts to 'vulgar materialism', and his opponents were quick to point this out. Though Arxipov was not the only one to put forward the opinion that the psychic is material, this view found few supporters among Soviet psychologists. As Arxipov himself relates, the

'All-Union Conference on Problems of Psychology' agreed that the reconstruction of psychology on the basis of Pavlovism did not mean the reduction psychology to the physiology of higher nervous activity. In the same year (1956) the *Voprosy Filosofii*[16] published an editorial, attacking those who attempted to reduce psychology to physiology, and the same issue also published Kol'banovskij's reply to the question 'Is it true to say that consciousness is material?' referred to at the beginning of this article. In this reply Kol'banovskij stated that such a view contradicts the writings of the 'Classics' and confuses consciousness with its material substrate.

The opposite extreme in the debate was represented by the article of I. P. Antonov published in the *Voprosy Filosofii* in 1953.[17] According to Antonov, the psychic cannot be equated with higher nervous activity; psychic activity and higher nervous activity form two series of phenomena or processes, the psychic being an ideal series, the neurophysiological a material one. Higher nervous activity constitutes the material, physiological basis apart from which psychic activity cannot exist. The two series of phenomena are inseparably connected but are not identified. Consequently, Pavlov's principles only apply to the material basis but cannot explain the specific laws of the psyche since it is an ideal reflection of the external world.

Antonov's views received almost as little support as Arxipov's. Antonov, it was felt, had gone too far in emphasizing the special irreducible nature of the psychic and was sailing too close to psycho-physical parallelism. Moreover, by claiming that Pavlov's principles were not directly applicable to psychic phenomena, Antonov's theory could not be reconciled with the 'pavlovization" of psychology decreed in 1950. Most of the participants in the discussion tried to steer a middle course between the two extremes represented by Antonov and Arxipov; while holding that psychic activity and higher nervous activity do not form two distinct processes, they tried to find a formula which would safeguard the special nature of the psychic.

A. I. Rozov[18] put forward the view that the psychic act is made up of a multiplicity of physiological processes. Hence, he said, one should speak, not of the physiological *basis* of the psychic (a term which smacks of parallelism) but rather of its physiological *components*. The psychic act, however, is more than its physiological components and cannot be described in purely physiological terms. As Rozov pointed out, a simple

phenomenon such as pain cannot be described in purely physiological terms; *a fortiori* such terms are inadequate to explain more complicated phenomena such as interest, understanding, thought, etc. The specific distinguishing quality of the psychic is its subjective character. In Rozov's theory, the subjective character of psychic events would seem to depend on the organization of the physiological components. Rozov uses the example of a house to illustrate the relationship between the psychic act and its physio-components: the bricks are the necessary components from which the house is built, but the specific quality of the architecture cannot be described or explained in terms of an analysis of the specific nature of the individual bricks.

The most commonly shared view was that the psychic and the physiological are two sides (*storony*) of the one process. This opinion was expressed with slight variations by K. M. Dedov, V. M. Teplov, A. V. Petrovskij, P. V. Simonov, N. A. Xromov, etc.[19] Seen from the point of view of the 'mechanism', i.e., as a process taking place in the brain, higher nervous activity is a material, physiological process; considered from the point of view of the product of that activity, i.e. as an image or reflection of the external world, this same activity appears as ideal and immaterial. It should be noted that it is not a question of a material process producing an immaterial, ideal image distinct from the process itself. According to the above theory, the process *is* the image. Ideal image and material process are two sides or aspects of the one phenomenon. As A. V. Petrovskij expressed it:

> Higher nervous activity (the psyche) can be considered from the side (*so storony*) of its mechanism, i.e. the processes of central nervous activity or cortical activity; and their study is the task of physiology. Higher nervous activity (the psyche) can in the second place be considered from the side of the result of cortical activity, as a cerebral function; and its study is the task of materialistic psychology. ... The doctrine of I. P. Pavlov which considers psychic activity as the result of physiological activity not only lays bare the material basis of the psyche but also brings to light the specific regularities of the psyche as a reflection of the objective world.[20]

The 'two-sides' theory was vigorously attacked by a number of Soviet psychologists, particularly after the publication in 1957 of F. F. Kal'cin's *Basic Problems of Theory of Knowledge*.[21] Kal'cin proposed to distinguish between the *epistemological* and *ontological* aspects of the psyche. The former designates the relationship of the psyche to the external world, the

latter its relationship to the brain. In relation to the outer world the psyche or consciousness appears as an ideal reflection, while in relation to the brain it appears as a form of the motion of matter. Under the second aspect, Kal'cin describes it as a "corporeal (*tel'esnaja*) material activity taking place in the brain".

Kal'cin's ideas were attacked in two lengthy reviews in the *Filosofskie nauki*[22] and in *Kommunist*[23] where Kal'cin was accused reducing the psyche to matter and of proposing 'vulgar materialism'. F. N. Georgiev, in an article in the *Filosofskie nauki*, rejected the distinction between the epistemological and the ontological aspects of the psyche, on the grounds that the psyche was always the same whether it was considered in relation to the brain or to the external world. The essence of the psyche, he said, does not depend on the point of view of the observer.

The last-mentioned objection of F. N. Georgiev was neatly avoided by S. L. Rubinštejn, who also proposed a solution to the problem in terms of two aspects of the psyche. In *Being and Consciousness* he wrote:

> Psychic phenomena, like all other phenomena, are joined to all the phenomena of life and to all sides and properties of the material world. In different relationships they appear in different qualities, now as reflex higher nervous activity, now as the ideal in opposition to the material, now as the subjective in opposition to the objective.[24]

For Rubinštejn the relationship of the psychic to the material is twofold: to the inner matter of the brain – this relation constitutes the psychic in the quality of higher nervous activity – and to the outer matter of the external world, in which relationship the psychic takes on the qualities of ideal and subjective. The first aspect Rubinštejn calls the *ontological* aspect; the second he calls the *epistemological*. Though this distinction is fundamentally the same as F. F. Kal'cin's, it is not vulnerable to Georgiev's objection. For Rubinštejn, the distinction of aspects of the psyche does not depend on the point of view of the observer: they are *objectively* different qualities which the psyche possesses independently of the observer, in virtue of the objective system of relations into which the psyche is incorporated. To explain how different systems of relations can give rise to different objective qualities, Rubinštejn has recourse to the theory of constitutive relationism adopted by Lenin in the *Philosophical Notebooks*. There Lenin writes:

Every concrete thing, every concrete something, stands in multifarious and often contradictory relations to everything; ergo it is itself and some other.[25]

Rubinštejn is plainly referring to this text of Lenin's when he writes:

The key to solving the problem is to be found in the fact – to use an expression of Hegel on which Lenin placed great importance – that one and the same thing is both itself and something else according as it appears in different systems of connections and relationships. Concretely speaking, then, psychic phenomena – like all other phenomena – appear in different qualities in different systems of connections and relationships which are essential for them.[26]

Though Rubinštejn was careful to point out that consciousness, while obeying all the laws of neuro-physiology, is also governed by specifically psychological laws, some Soviet authors like V. V. Orlov felt that Rubinštejn's pronounced monism too closely resembled vulgar materialism. V. V. Orlov proposed that psychic and physiological were related as superstructure and basis.

These then are the main solutions to the 'brain-psyche' problem proposed by Soviet psychologists and philosophers. The above account does not give an adequate picture of the intensity of the debate which has been carried on in the pages of the leading Soviet scientific journals, in numerous books, and at scientific conferences. Even now, some 17 years after the Pavlov Conference, the debate is still continuing and a definitive end is nowhere in sight.

Reviewing the course of Soviet psychological theory since 1917, one can observe elements of continuity and elements of evolution. In the first place, the development of a 'Marxist' psychology, that is to say a psychology guided and inspired by the principles of Marxism-Leninism, has remained the ideal of Soviet psychologists. However, the requirements for a 'Marxist' psychology have changed over the years. During the early nineteen-twenties the chief requirement was that it be materialist, while in the nineteen-thirties dialectics were added. After 1950 a new and extrinsic element was further added, namely Pavlovian physiology. The insistence that Soviet psychology must not only be 'Marxist' but also 'Pavlovian' strikes a discordant note since there is no obvious connection between the two. In fact, as we have tried to show elsewhere[27], Pavlovian theory and Marxist-Leninist philosophy are in open opposition on many points, the most important being Pavlov's pronounced mechanism. Yet Soviet writers see (or claim to see) the addition of Pavlovian ideas an aid

to the development of a genuinely 'Marxist' psychology. Pavlov's ideas, it is claimed, provide the scientific foundation for 'Marxist' psychology and so complement Marxism-Leninism which provides the philosophical under-pinnings. So close is the connection which Soviet psychologists see between Pavlov and Marxism-Leninism that Rubinštejn does not hesitate to refer to Pavlov's theories as "the dialectical-materialist teaching on higher nervous activity".[28] The 'pavlovization' of psychology is therefore considered as a means to its 'Marxification'. As Rubinštejn expresses it:

> The fundamental task involved in the reconstruction of psychology is above all the creative and consistant realization of Marxism in psychology. The Pavlovian teaching on higher nervous activity is the natural-science path to the fulfilment of that task.[29]

It is not, therefore, a question of founding psychology on 'Marxism' and Pavlovism, but of making psychology 'Marxist' by making it 'Pavlovian'.

However, the protracted debate on the nature of consciousness leaves little doubt that in attempting to form a synthesis of Pavlov's theories and Marxist-Leninist philosophy, Soviet psychologists are facing an impossible task. After reading the various solutions proposed since 1950, one is left with the impression that Soviet psychologists are turning around in circles. All the possible solutions to the problem of the relationship between consciousness and higher nervous activity were formulated during the first half of the nineteen-fifties, and since then Soviet writers have done little more than repeat them in slightly modified form. There are, in fact, only three possible solutions to the problem, and each of them raises almost as many problems as it solves: One can deny, like Arxipov, that psychic activity is distinct from neurophysical processes or higher nervous activity and so make consciousness material; but this is vulgar materialism. Or else one can say that while there is only one process in the brain – higher nervous activity – that it has two 'sides' – one psychic and ideal, the other physiological and material. But in this case it is difficult to make of this anything more than a merely verbal solution, and secondly one is faced with the problem of explaining how the same process can have two opposite characteristics or qualities. Rubinštejn alone has produced a convincing explanation by appealing to the Hegelian doctrine of constitutive relationism, but surprisingly enough, this explanation has

not been generally accepted by his colleagues, many of whom are reluctant to admit that psychic events are in any sense material. The third solution, namely that of Antonov, is in many respects the most satisfactory. It asserts that the psychic and the physiological form two distinct processes. Antonov's theory, however, closely resembles the theory of psycho-physical unity proposed by Rubinštejn in the *Fundamentals of General Psychology*. Rubinštejn, as we saw, abandoned that theory in the aftermath of the Pavlov Conference, and it must be admitted that it is not evident how it can be reconciled with the spirit of that Conference; for if Antonov is correct, then it is hard to see how Pavlov's ideas are directly relevant for psychology, since psychic activity is distinct from higher nervous activity. One is therefore almost compelled to conclude that the reconstruction of psychology on the basis of Pavlovian theories was a set-back for psychological theory, at least as far as the 'brain-psyche' problem is concerned. The principle of psycho-physical unity formulated by Rubinštejn in 1940 struck a nice balance between Marxism-Leninism's materialist-monist ontology and its transcendentalist epistemology. The Pavlov Conference upset that balance, and since then, Soviet psychologists have been side-tracked into debating what must seem to the outside observer to be pseudo-problems.

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[3] V. I. Lenin, 'Materializm i émpiriokriticizm' [Materialism and Empiriocriticism], *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij*, T. 18, Izd. 5, str. 257.

[4] Cf. David Joravsky, *Soviet Marxism and Natural Science 1917–1932*, London 1961.

[5] K. N. Kornilov, 'Sovremennaja psixologija i marksizm' [Contemporary Psychology and Marxism], *Pod znamenem marksizma*, 1923,1, 41.

[6] Cf. G. D. Frolov, 'The Study of Conditioned Reflexes'. Quoted in *Psychological Abstracts*, 1930, vol. 4, no. 1345. There is at least one instance in which this was actually tried; R. A. Bauer in *The New Man in Soviet Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952, p. 57) mentions that the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education decreed that Reflexology replace psychology as the scientific basis of pedagogy and for a time did away with psychology altogether.

[7] K. N. Kornilov, *op. cit.*, p. 43. In 'Psychology in the Light of Dialectical Materialism' (in C. Murchison, ed., *Psychologies of 1930*, Worchester, Mass., 1930, p. 264) Kornilov wrote, quoting Buxarin's *Attaka*: "We regard psychic phenomena as one but not

identical with the physiological processes conditioning them. It is not without reason, therefore, that the school of dialectics regards psychic phenomena not as something supernatural, but simply as the *other side* of physiological processes showing peculiar qualitative features." The difference between the two statements may be due to the fact that Kornilov changed his opinion, but the more likely explanation is, as stated in the text, that he had not considered the question in any great detail.

[8] Cf. Frederick Engels, 'Dialektik der Natur', *MEW*, Bd. 20, S. 348.

[9] S. L. Rubinštejn, 'Problemy psixologii v trudax K. Marksa' [Problems of Psychology in the Works of K. Marx], *Sovetskaja psixotexnika*, 1934, t. 7, no. 1, 3–20.

[10] Rubinštejn, *Osnovy obščej psixologii* [Fundamentals of General Psychology], M. 1940, str. 20.

[11] *Naučnaja sessija posvjaščennaja fiziologičeskogo učenija Akademika I. P. Pavlov. Stenografičeskij otčet* [Scientific Session on the Physiological Teaching of Academician I. P. Pavlov. Stenographic Report], M. 1951, str. 5.

[12] These were: B. M. Teplov, S. L. Rubinštejn, and V. N. Kol'banovskij, A paper by A. R. Lurija, not read at the Conference, was included in the published report. This reticence on the part of the psychologists drew from Ivanov-Smolskij the caustic remark: "In the speech of Professor Teplov, besides self-criticism there was, unfortunately, nothing else." Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 511.

[13] *Ibid.*, 310–315.

[14] *Ibid.*, 44–81.

[15] V. M. Arxipov, 'O material'nosti psixiki i predmete psixologii' [On the Materiality of the Psyche and the Object of Psychology], *Sovetskaja pedagogika*, 1954,7, 67–73.

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[17] I. P. Antonov, 'Dialektičeskij materializm – teoretičeskaja osnova psixologii' [Dialectical Materialism is the Theoretical Foundation of Psychology], *VF*, 1953,1, 195–202.

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[20] Petrovskij, *Op. cit.*, p. 176.

[21] F. F. Kal'cin, *Osnovnye voprosy teorii poznanija* [Basic Questions of Theory of Knowledge], Gorki 1957.

[22] *FN*, 1960,2, 173–180.

[23] *Kommunist*, 1959,17, 113–118.

[24] Rubinštejn, *Bytie i soznanie. O meste psixičeskogo vo vseobščej vzaimosvjazi javlenij material'nogo mira* [Being and Consciousness. On the Place of the Psychic in the General Interconnection of the Phenomena of the Material World], M. 1957, str. 4.

[25] V. I. Lenin, *Op. cit.*, p. 91.

[26] Rubinštejn, *Principi i puti razvitija psixologii* [The Principles and Paths of Development of Psychology], M. 1959, str. 9.

[27] Cf. T. R. Payne, 'On the Theoretical Foundations of Soviet Psychology', *SST* VI,2 (June 1966), 124–134.
[28] Rubinštejn, 'Učenie I. P. Pavlova i nekotorye voprosy perestrojki psixologii' [The Teaching of I. P. Pavlov and Some Problems of the Reconstruction of Psychology], *VF*, 1952,5, 197.
[29] *Ibid.*, 198.

F. RAPP

DAS KATEGORIENSYSTEM DES DIALEKTISCHEN MATERIALISMUS: ARGUMENTE UND PERSPEKTIVEN

I. ALLGEMEINES

Innerhalb der zeitgenössischen Sowjetphilosophie lassen sich thematisch drei Schwerpunkte unterscheiden:

(1) Charakteristisch für die sowjetische Philosophie ist vor allem die Forderung nach der praktischen *Umgestaltung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse.* Diese These vom Vorrang der praktischen Verwirklichung philosophischer Gedanken gegenüber einem bloß kontemplativen Konstatieren von Sachverhalten hat in Marx' elfter Feuerbachthese ihren klassischen Ausdruck gefunden.[1] Für Lenin steht dann bei allen philosophischen Überlegungen stets die Dialektik als "Algebra der Revolution" im Blickpunkt.[2]

(2) Neben der Bezogenheit auf die praktische Umgestaltung der Gesellschaft zeichnet sich der sowjetische Marxismus-Leninismus aber auch durch die theoretische *Reflexion auf konkrete Einzelprobleme* aus. Die philosophischen Untersuchungen beziehen sich dabei auf solche Fragen, die die Kompetenz der einschlägigen Fachwissenschaften überschreiten. Charakteristische Beispiele dafür sind wissenschaftstheoretische Untersuchungen[3] und die besonders in jüngster Zeit stärker thematisierte Frage nach der Existenz und dem Ethos des Individuums.[4]

(3) Schließlich finden sich in der zeitgenössischen Sowjetphilosophie aber auch *Untersuchungen über die allgemeine Struktur der Wirklichkeit.* Solche ontologischen Reflexionen werden stets im Zusammenhang mit der materialistischen Dialektik abgehandelt. Da aber im dialektischen Materialismus sowohl jede Art von natürlicher Theologie als auch alle transzendentalphilosophischen Fragestellungen von vornherein abgelehnt werden, bleibt dabei für die spekulative Verarbeitung ontologischer Thesen kein großer Spielraum.

Es ist nun bemerkenswert, daß das Kategoriensystem hierbei eine Ausnahme bildet. Denn gerade in der Frage des Kategoriensystems begeben sich die Sowjetphilosophen auf den Weg der gedanklichen Ausweitung

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empirischer Befunde. Die meisten sowjetischen Philosophen vertreten nämlich die Auffassung, daß die Kategorien des dialektischen Materialismus nach dem Vorbild von Hegels 'Wissenschaft der Logik' derart auseinander abgeleitet werden müssen, daß sie insgesamt ein streng begründetes und innerlich zusammenhängendes System bilden. Es gibt aber auch Vertreter des dialektischen Materialismus welche dieser Ansicht energisch widersprechen. Die Hauptargumente die bei dieser Diskussion vorgebracht wurden, sollen im folgenden kurz dargelegt werden. Über die spezielle Frage nach den Kategorien hinausgehend, ergeben sich dabei auch interessante Einblicke in die allgemeine philosophische Grundkonzeption des dialektischen Materialismus.

II. GEGNER DES KATEGORIENSYSTEMS

V. P. Tugarinov berichtet davon, daß in früherer Zeit gewisse Vertreter des dialektischen Materialismus nach Art des *Neopositivismus* die Berechtigung aller allgemeinen philosophischen Aussagen in Abrede stellten.[5] Diese 'Konkretisatoren' bezeichneten jede Beschäftigung mit allgemeinen philosophischen Begriffen als 'scholastisch'. Ihrer Ansicht nach gibt es z.B. gar keine allgemeinen Gesetze, sondern nur die speziellen Gesetze die in den Einzelwissenschaften auftreten. Weil es keine allgemeinen Gesetze und dementsprechend auch keine allgemeinen Kategorien gibt, hat es dieser Anschauung zufolge gar keinen Sinn, über ein System aus solchen Allgemeinbegriffen zu diskutieren.[6]

P. O. Gropp (Leipzig) verurteilt in einem Aufsatz in *Voprosy Filosofii* jeden Versuch zum Aufbau eines Kategoriensystems als Verfälschung des dialektischen Materialismus zu einer *idealistischen Weltschematik*. Seiner Ansicht nach gilt es, die konkrete Funktion zu untersuchen, welche den philosophischen Kategorien bei der dialektisch-materialistischen Lösung der Grundfrage der Philosophie und bei der Gewinnung neuer Erkenntnisse zukommt. Darüber hinaus aber kann es nicht die Aufgabe des dialektischen Materialismus sein, auf Grund eines willkürlich erdachten künstlichen Systems die philosophischen Kategorien auseinander abzuleiten.[7] Nur wenn man von dem apriorischen Hegelschen Schema ausgeht, daß die Wirklichkeit die Entfaltung des Weltgeistes darstellt, ist es möglich, die Philosophie als Logik zu betrachten, bei der sich die Kategorien auseinander entwickeln und schließlich zu einem abgeschlossenen System führen.[8]

Nach Gropps Ansicht gehört es zu den Grundfehlern von Hegels Denkansatz, daß er die Kategorien der objektiven Realität mit denjenigen des Denkens gleichsetzt.[9] In Wirklichkeit sind jedoch die subjektiven Denkformen nicht identisch mit den Zusammenhängen und Gesetzmäßigkeiten die in der objektiven Realität vorliegen.[10] Ferner hat Hegel die philosophischen Kategorien in seiner Logik verabsolutiert, indem er ihre Bedeutung und ihre Funktion ausschließlich durch die Rolle bestimmte, die ihnen im System der absoluten Idee zukommt. Dadurch wird aber der eigentliche Sinn der Kategorien verfälscht, der nach dem Verständnis des dialektischen Materialismus gerade in ihrem jeweiligen gegenständlichen Inhalt liegt.[11]

Für den Versuch zum Aufbau eines Kategoriensystems zeigt das Hegelsche Beispiel nach P. O. Gropp deutlich, daß innerhalb eines solchen Systems nur dann eine Subordination der Kategorien möglich ist, wenn dabei eine schlechthin absolute höchste Instanz vorausgesetzt wird. Denn bei Hegel vollzieht sich ja die innere Entwicklung der absoluten Idee, welche die Basis für die Unterordnung der Kategorien bildet, in einem zielgerichteten Prozeß, der vom unbestimmten Sein zum höchsten Begriff des absoluten Wissens führt. Die Annahme eines solchen letzten 'Gipfelpunktes' der Welt steht aber im Gegensatz zu den Anschauungen des dialektischen Materialismus.[12]

Ferner legt Gropp im einzelnen dar, warum seiner Ansicht nach weder die Ansichbeschaffenheit der Wirklichkeit noch der Erkenntnisprozeß der Menschheit als Kriterien für eine Subordination der philosophischen Kategorien in Frage kommen. Zunächst stellt er fest, daß sich in der tatsächlichen Welt nicht bestimmte Seiten oder Momente der Wirklichkeit auseinander entwickeln: Deshalb können auch die diesen Bestimmungen entsprechenden Kategorien nicht in einem Abhängigkeitsverhältnis stehen. In Wirklichkeit existieren nämlich unzählige verschiedene Zusammenhänge und Gesetze gleichzeitig nebeneinander. Diese Bestimmungen stehen in vielfachen Beziehungen, sie überschneiden und durchdringen einander wechselseitig, aber sie stehen in keinerlei Subordinations- oder Ableitungsverhältnis. Nur durch die zergliedernde Tätigkeit von Seiten des Menschen werden sowohl im Verlauf der Erkenntnisgeschichte als auch bei logischen Analysen verschiedene Seiten und Momente aus diesem allgemeinen Zusammenhang herausgehoben und durch Kategorien fixiert.[13]

Darüber hinaus bietet aber nach Ansicht Gropps auch die zeitliche Veränderung der Welt als ganzer keinerlei Anhaltspunkte für eine Subordination der Kategorien. Denn das Universum stellt keinen in einer bestimmten Richtung verlaufenden Gesamtprozeß dar, der an einem bestimmten Punkt beginnt und zu einem letzten Ziel strebt, wie das Hegel bei seiner teleologischen Weltkonstruktion voraussetzte. Nach materialistischer Auffassung muß vielmehr die Welt in ihrem ganzen Reichtum, in der Vielfalt ihrer Beziehungen und in dem ewigen Prozeß ihres Entstehens und Vergehens gesehen werden.[14]

Ebensowenig wie die vom Menschen unabhängige objektive Struktur der Welt liefert nach Gropp aber auch der Prozeß der menschlichen Erkenntnisgeschichte eine stichhaltige Begründung für eine Subordination der philosophischen Kategorien. Die an Hand der These der 'Einheit von Logischem und Historischem' vertretene Auffassung, daß die Aufeinanderfolge der Kategorien dem Verlauf der menschlichen Erkenntnis entsprechen muß, ist aus verschiedenen Gründen nicht haltbar. Vor allem muß beachtet werden, daß für den Materialismus in der objektiven Realität und nicht im menschlichen Denken das entscheidende Wahrheitskriterium liegt. Für Hegel fiel allerdings die Entwicklung des Denkens mit derjenigen der objektiven Realität zusammen. Doch diese Einheit von Subjektivem und Objektivem läßt sich eben nur auf idealistischer Basis aufrechterhalten.[15]

Nach der Auffassung des dialektischen Materialismus kann dagegen die Geschichte der Erkenntnis nicht mit der Entwicklung der Wirklichkeit selbst gleichgesetzt werden. Denn der Weg und die Erfolge des Erkenntnisfortschritts liefern keineswegs auch einen Maßstab für die in der Wirklichkeit vorliegenden Verhältnisse. So wäre es z.B. absurd, aus der Tatsache daß in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte zuerst die Kategorie der Qualität im Vordergrund stand und erst danach die Quantität untersucht wurde, zu schließen, daß deshalb auch die quantitative Bestimmtheit der Dinge sich aus ihrer qualitativen Beschaffenheit entwickelt habe. In Wirklichkeit existieren natürlich die qualitativen und quantitativen Merkmale der Dinge gleichzeitig nebeneinander und deshalb kann die Kategorie der Quantität auch nicht aus derjenigen der Qualität abgeleitet werden. Die menschliche Erkenntnis schreitet im Verlauf ihrer Geschichte eben deshalb ständig zu neuen Einsichten fort, weil sie die objektive Wirklichkeit vollständiger und adäquater erfaßt. Aber die Geschichte des Denkens ist keine objektive Weltschematik.[16]

Ferner weist Gropp darauf hin, daß über das Auseinanderfallen von Erkenntnisgeschichte und wirklichem Geschehen hinaus auch die Geschichte des Denkens sich keineswegs auf eine bloße Abfolge von Kategorien reduzieren läßt. Denn neben den Kategorien sind für den Denkprozeß auch ganz bestimmte Methoden und Gesetze kennzeichnend, mit deren Hilfe die Wirklichkeit in ihrer Ansichbeschaffenheit erkannt wird. Infolgedessen bedeutet es eine völlig willkürliche Konstruktion, wenn die Geschichte der Erkenntnis mit einem System subordinierter Kategorien gleichgesetzt wird.[17] Die dialektisch-materialistische These der 'Einheit von Logischem und Historischem' besagt also nicht daß der Gang der Erkenntnisgeschichte mit der ontologischen Struktur der Wirklichkeit zusammenfällt. Vielmehr ist damit nur gemeint, daß die Geschichte der Erkenntnis in ihrer jeweiligen konkreten Wechselbeziehung mit der objektiven Realität untersucht werden muß.[18]

III. BEFÜRWORTER EINES KATEGORIENSYSTEMS

Für den Aufbau eines Kategoriensystems spricht sich die überwiegende Mehrzahl der Sowjetphilosophen aus. Da aber außer Lenins Exzerpten und Anmerkungen bei seiner Hegellektüre keine ausdrücklichen Hinweise der Klassiker für den Aufbau eines solchen Systems vorliegen, bietet sich hier ein weiter Spielraum für philosophische Spekulationen, von dem denn auch ein ausgiebiger Gebrauch gemacht wird. Trotz ihrer im einzelnen divergierenden Auffassungen stimmen jedoch alle sowjetischen Philosophen darin überein, daß die Ausarbeitung des Systems der Kategorien des dialektischen Materialismus bisher noch nicht befriedigend gelöst ist.[19] Man ist vielmehr weit von einem vollständig ausgebauten Kategoriensystem entfernt, wie es beispielweise bei Aristoteles und Hegel vorliegt.[20]

Um den Ausführungen der sowjetischen Autoren zum Thema des Kategoriensystems ganz gerecht zu werden, wäre es eigentlich erforderlich, die Gedankenführung jedes einzelnen Philosophen in ihrem jeweiligen inneren Zusammenhang darzustellen. Im folgenden wird jedoch zugunsten eines umfassenden Überblicks über die in der sowjetischen Literatur vertretenen Auffassungen auf diese zusammenhängende Darstellung der Einzelpositionen verzichtet. An die Stelle des Referats der Autoren tritt so die sachbezogene Gliederung nach einzelnen Themen-

kreisen. In diesem Sinne lassen sich die Überlegungen der sowjetischen Philosophen, die für den Aufbau eines Kategoriensystems eintreten, in fünf Abschnitte einteilen: (1) die Argumente für das Kategoriensystem, (2) der Ausgangspunkt für den Aufbau des Systems, (3) das Prinzip für die Entwicklung des Kategoriensystems, (4) die Vielfalt der Kategoriensysteme, und (5) die systematische Tafel der Kategorien.

(1) Bezüglich der *Argumente für ein Kategoriensystem* ist man vor allem bemüht, bestimmte irreführende Ansichten von vornherein auszuschalten, die bei dem Versuch auftreten könnten, die Hegelsche Idee eines innerlich zusammenhängenden Kategoriensystems mit der materialistischen Weltauffassung zu verknüpfen. So wird einerseits betont, daß es sich nicht nur darum handelt, die Kategorien zwecks vollständiger Aufzählung in einer Tabelle zusammenzustellen, zu definieren und durch Beispiele zu erläutern.[21] Das Ziel ist vielmehr, über die bloß formale Koordination hinaus den notwendigen inneren Zusammenhang aufzuweisen der zwischen den Kategorien besteht.[22] Auf der anderen Seite aber soll das gesuchte Kategoriensystem auch nicht den Bedürfnissen eines auf Grund willkürlicher subjektiver Anschauungen konzipierten Gedankengebäudes angepaßt werden.[23] Schließlich darf die erstrebte Subordination der Kategorien auch nicht im Sinne von Hegels absoluter Wahrheit zu einem in sich abgeschlossenen System führen, durch das alle philosophischen Probleme endgültig gelöst werden.[24]

Nach Ansicht vieler Sowjetphilosophen ist aber für das Verständnis des dialektischen Materialismus ein System subordinierter Kategorien unerläßlich, weil nur in ihm der unaufhebbare innere Zusammenhang und der ganze inhaltliche Reichtum der philosophischen Kategorien zum Ausdruck kommen kann.[25] Das Kategoriensystem zeigt also den dialektischen Materialismus in seiner Ganzheit und Abgeschlossenheit.[26] Ohne eine solche innerlich zusammenhängende und damit zwangsläufige Darlegung besteht nämlich stets die Gefahr von willkürlichen und subjektiven Interpretationen.[27] Dabei ist jedoch stets zu bedenken, daß diese Vollkommenheit nur relativer Art sein kann, weil die systematische Darlegung der Philosophie immer von dem jeweiligen historischen Stand des Wissens abhängig ist.[28]

Die Verfechter eines Kategoriensystems machen geltend, daß eine zusammenhängende und innerlich begründete Darlegung der philosophi-

schen Kategorien auch deshalb erforderlich sei, weil nur auf diese Weise die Zusammenhänge und Übergänge der objektiven Realität adäquat erfaßt werden können.[29] Den Maßstab für die Subordination der Kategorien muß dabei die gesetzmäßige Struktur der Wirklichkeit selbst bilden.[30] Diese objektive Struktur kann aber nur durch ein ganzheitliches System dargestellt werden, weil auch die Welt ein innerlich zusammenhängendes einheitliches Gebilde aus gesetzmäßig verknüpften Ereignissen darstellt. Da die Welt ein zusammenhängendes Ganzes ist, müssen also auch die Kategorien welche die Struktur der Welt zum Ausdruck bringen ein einheitliches System bilden.[31] Der dialektische Materialismus, der ja ein wissenschaftliches System darstellt, besteht demnach wie jede einzelwissenschaftliche Disziplin aus einer Gesamtheit theoretischer Begriffe (Kategorien), die miteinander zusammenhängen und sich in ihrer Bedeutung gegenseitig erhellen.[32] Die Aufgabe dieses Kategoriensystems, in dem die bisherigen Ergebnisse der Wissenschaft zusammengefaßt sind, sieht P. V. Kopnin insbesondere darin, daß mit seiner Hilfe neue Wege für die wissenschaftliche Forschung aufgezeigt werden.[33]

Das Ziel ist es also, die Kategorien des dialektischen Materialismus in einem in sich abgeschlossenen und mit strenger innerer Folgerichtigkeit entwickelten System darzustellen, bei dem jede Kategorie sich völlig zwangsläufig aus der vorhergehenden ergibt und der Ort jeder einzelnen Kategorie innerhalb des Ganzen durch die Entwicklung des Systems mit logischer Notwendigkeit festgelegt ist.[34] Der Inhalt einer Kategorie wird dabei durch ihren Ort innerhalb des Systems und ihre Beziehung zu den anderen Kategorien angegeben.[35] Ein solches System ist für das Verständnis der Kategorien unerläßlich, weil nur in ihm die elastische Anpassungsfähigkeit (*gibkost'*) und der wechselseitige Zusammenhang der Kategorien deutlich wird.[36] Ferner liefert nur ein derartiges streng begründetes System durch die in ihm auftretenden Kategorien ein Kriterium dafür, ob ein von den Einzelwissenschaften neu eingeführter Begriff wirklich eine philosophische Kategorie darstellt oder nicht.[37]

(2) Über den *Ausgangspunkt für den Aufbau des Kategoriensystems* herrschen unter den Sowjetphilosophen sehr verschiedene Ansichten.[38] So legt I. D. Andreev besonderen Nachdruck auf den allgemeinen Zusammenhang und die wechselseitige Bedingtheit aller Ereignisse. Die dadurch bestimmte Konzeption des dialektischen Materialismus von der Verän-

derung und Entwicklung der Wirklichkeit, die in den drei Grundgesetzen der Dialektik[39] ihren Ausdruck findet, muß deshalb seiner Ansicht nach auch die Grundlage für den systematischen Aufbau des Kategoriensystems bilden.[40]

Ebenso wie Andreev sieht auch V. P. Čertkov die Basis für das System des dialektischen Materialismus in den Aussagen welche die gesetzmäßige Struktur der Wirklichkeit wiedergeben. Diese Struktur wird seiner Ansicht nach aber nicht durch die drei Grundgesetze der Dialektik in ihrer Gesamtheit, sondern schon durch eines dieser Gesetze bestimmt. Entscheidend ist allein das Gesetz der Einheit und des Kampfes der Gegensätze, weil es die in sich widersprüchliche Natur aller Dinge zum Ausdruck bringt und so den eigentlichen Kern des dialektischen Weltverständnisses ausmacht. Deshalb kann nur dieses Prinzip die Grundlage für das Kategoriensystem des dialektischen Materialismus bilden.[41]

Gegen die grundlegende Bedeutung des Gesetzes der Einheit und des Kampfes der Gegensätze wendet sich jedoch A. P. Šeptulin. Er macht geltend, daß dieses Gesetz deshalb keine zwingende Begründung für den Aufbau des Kategoriensystems liefert, weil nicht zwischen jeder Kombination von zwei Kategorien ein polares Gegensatzverhältnis besteht. Mit Hilfe dieses Gesetzes kann also nur im Falle eines echten Kategorienpaares aus einer Kategorie die ihr polar entgegengesetzte abgeleitet werden. Darüber hinaus gestattet es das Gesetz der Einheit und des Kampfes der Gegensätze auch nicht, die Beziehung zwischen verschiedenen Paaren von Kategorien zu begründen, und der Übergang von einem Kategorienpaar auf ein anderes bliebe so ohne Erklärung.[42]

P. V. Kopnin dagegen meint, daß es unzureichend ist, den Aufbau des Kategoriensystems von den Grundgesetzen der Dialektik her zu beginnen, weil auf diese Weise die vielfältige Bedeutung der Kategorien nicht hinreichend erfaßt werden kann.[43] Dazu ist es vielmehr erforderlich, von dem Leninschen Prinzip auszugehen, daß Dialektik, Logik und Erkenntnistheorie zusammenfallen. Nur so ist es möglich, den untrennbaren Zusammenhang zwischen der ontologischen, logischen und erkenntnistheoretischen Bedeutung der Kategorien aufzuzeigen. Insbesondere wäre es völlig verfehlt, beim Aufbau des Kategoriensystems Ontologie und Erkenntnistheorie als getrennte Disziplinen zu behandeln, und einen Unterschied zu machen zwischen den Gesetzmäßigkeiten welche für die Welt in ihrem Ansichsein gelten, und solchen die für den Erkenntnisprozeß

maßgebend sind. In Wirklichkeit ist nämlich jede Gesetzmäßigkeit des Seins zugleich auch Gesetzmäßigkeit des Erkenntnisprozesses.[44] Dementsprechend haben alle Kategorien gleichzeitig mit ihrem objektiven Inhalt auch eine erkenntnistheoretische Funktion, die dadurch gegeben ist, daß sie die Art und Weise bestimmen wie im Erkenntnisprozeß neue Einsichten gewonnen werden.[45]

Im Gegensatz zu den geschilderten Auffassungen, die an die Lehre der Klassiker anknüpfen, werden auch Vorschläge gemacht, die stärker durch selbständige Überlegungen bestimmt sind. So erklärt V. S. Bibler, daß die materielle Welt als Ganzes den Ausgangspunkt für den Aufbau des Kategoriensystems bilden müsse.[46] Dieser Ansicht widerspricht aber A. P. Šeptulin mit der Begründung, daß die Erkenntnis historisch gesehen keinesfalls mit der Welt als ganzer beginnt, sondern mit den Einzeldingen sowie deren Beziehungen untereinander und zum Menschen.[47] E. P. Sitkovskij hält gleichsam die mittlere Linie zwischen diesen beiden Extremen für die richtige Lösung: Unsere Kenntnis von der Wirklichkeit basiert auf der Analyse derjenigen Phänomene, die unserer Erfahrung zugänglich sind. Deshalb ist es zwar nicht möglich, die Subordination der Kategorien aus der *sub specie aeternitatis* betrachteten Welt im ganzen zu bestimmen.[48] Aber die Welt als Ganzes, in der ja alle Kategorien gleichzeitig auftreten, kann an Hand der Analyse ihrer Strukturen durch die Wissenschaften in ihrer wahren Beschaffenheit erkannt werden. Auf diese Weise ist es dann doch möglich, die Welt als konkretes Ganzes in ihrem Aufbau begrifflich zu erfassen.[49] Das Verfahren ist hier ganz analog zu Hegels *Wissenschaft der Logik* und Marx' *Kapital*. Beide beginnen und enden mit der Untersuchung eines strukturierten ganzheitlichen Gebildes, nämlich der absoluten Idee bzw. der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Nach der detaillierten Analyse, die ein abstraktes Bild des untersuchten Gegenstandes liefert, wird dabei schließlich zu einer gedanklichen Synthese übergegangen, welche dann die eigentliche und umfassende konkrete Beschaffenheit wiedergibt. Entsprechend bildet die materielle Welt als konkretes Ganzes sowohl den Ausgangspunkt als auch das Endergebnis für das Kategoriensystem des dialektischen Materialismus.[50]

Nach I. Levko ist das Wesen diejenige Kategorie, mit welcher der Aufbau des Kategoriensystems beginnen muß.[51] Gegen diese Auffassung wendet sich jedoch A. P. Šeptulin. Denn da der Begriff des Wesens die dialektische Einheit von vielfältigen miteinander verknüpften Merkmalen und

Zusammenhängen beinhaltet, läßt sich die Bedeutung des Wesens nur unter Benutzung einer ganzen Reihe anderer Kategorien aufzeigen. In Wirklichkeit muß deshalb das Wesen nicht am Anfang, sondern am Ende des Kategoriensystems stehen, weil ja die Erkenntnis gerade in der gedanklichen Rekonstruktion der wesentlichen Merkmale des untersuchten Gegenstandes gipfelt.[52]

A. Losev sieht dagegen im Werden die Grundkategorie des dialektischen Materialismus. Denn entsprechend der in sich widersprüchlichen Struktur der Welt trennt sich ein ursprüngliches Ganzes stets in Gegensätze, die dann in einer höheren Einheit wieder zusammenfallen. Deshalb ist das Werden das entscheidende Merkmal sowohl für die sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Zusammenhänge als auch für die logischen Beziehungen.[53]

Schließlich wenden sich eine ganze Reihe von Autoren bei der Frage nach der grundlegenden Kategorie der Materie zu. Dabei knüpfen P. D. Puzikov und A. P. Šeptulin ausdrücklich an die Grundfrage der Philosophie an, in welcher nach dem Vorrang von Materie oder Geist, bzw. von Sein oder Denken gefragt wird. Sie betrachten demgemäß die Materie zusammen mit ihrer Gegenkategorie, dem Bewußtsein, als grundlegend.[54] In diesen beiden Kategorien zeigen sich nämlich die bestimmenden Faktoren der Wirklichkeit.[55] Alles was überhaupt existiert fällt unter eine der beiden Kategorien des Paares Materie und Denken, denn die außerhalb unseres Bewußtseins existierende und sinnlich erfahrbare Wirklichkeit ist Materie, und dasjenige wodurch diese Materie begrifflich erfaßt wird, ist Denken.[56]

V. P. Rožin erklärt, den Beginn des Kategoriensystems müsse das Allgemeinste bilden das es überhaupt gibt, und das sei die Materie in ihrer ständigen Veränderung und Entwicklung.[57] A. M. Minasjan dagegen betrachtet das Sein als den Ausgangspunkt. Diese Kategorie, welche die Grundlage für die Ableitung aller übrigen Kategorien des Systems bilden soll, muß aber das abstrakte, reine Sein, ohne jede weitere Bestimmung zum Ausdruck bringen. Und dieses reine bestimmungslose Sein ist eben gerade die Materie.[58] Für V. P. Tugarinov ist ebenfalls die Materie die grundlegende Kategorie. Er leitet diesen fundierenden Charakter der Materie aber nicht aus einer allgemein begrifflichen Bestimmung ab, sondern daraus, daß die Materie oder die Natur als die Gesamtheit aller stofflichen Körper die eigentliche Trägersubstanz bildet, auf der alle übrigen Zusammenhänge der Wirklichkeit aufruhen. Diese Gesamtheit aller mate-

riellen Gebilde, die ein zusammenhängendes, strukturiertes Ganzes darstellt, bildet daher auch die in der Wirklichkeit selbst begründete Basis für eine Subordination der Kategorien.[59]

(3) Während die Kategorien als die allgemeinsten philosophischen Begriffe gleichsam die Elemente des systematisch aufgebauten dialektischen Materialismus bilden, handelt es sich bei der Frage des *Entwicklungsprinzips* darum, nun die Verknüpfung abzuleiten, die zwischen diesen Elementen besteht.[60]
Diese Herleitung des inneren Zusammenhangs des Systems soll in der Weise geschehen, daß beginnend mit einer bestimmten Grundkategorie die übrigen Kategorien der Reihe nach auseinander entwickelt werden.[61] Dabei bestehen ebenso wie in der Frage nach dem Ausgangspunkt auch hinsichtlich des anzuwendenden Entwicklungsprinzips zwischen den sowjetischen Philosophen sehr verschiedene Auffassungen.[62] Ja, gerade bei dem Versuch die Kategorien auseinander abzuleiten, tritt die Spannung zwischen dem von Hegel übernommenen Vorrang der dialektischen Begriffsentwicklung einerseits und dem materialistischen Primat der Ansichbeschaffenheit der Wirklichkeit andererseits besonders deutlich zutage.[63]

V. P. Tugarinov leitet die Subordination der Kategorien des dialektischen Materialismus aus der ontologischen Struktur der materiellen Wirklichkeit ab. Dabei betrachtet er die Welt nicht in ihrer Veränderung, sondern er untersucht gleichsam in einem zeitlichen Querschnitt die ontologischen Fundierungsverhältnisse. Die Grundlage seiner Analyse bildet die Welt als ein zusammenhängendes System von materiellen Körpern, die gewisse Eigenschaften besitzen und durch bestimmte Relationen miteinander verknüpft sind.[64] Die in der objektiven Wirklichkeit selbst begründete Subordination der Kategorien ist nun dadurch gegeben, daß die Materie das Substrat oder die Trägersubstanz gewisser Eigenschaften ist, und daß darüber hinaus die Relationen nicht ohne diejenigen Dinge und Eigenschaften existieren, die ihre Relata bilden. Die Dinge sind also den Eigenschaften und Relationen vorgeordnet, und die Eigenschaften haben den Vorrang vor den Relationsbeziehungen, die ja die Existenz von Dingen mit bestimmten Eigenschaften voraussetzen.[65] Wegen dieser Abhängigkeitsbeziehungen besteht das Kategoriensystem des dialektischen Materialismus aus den drei Gruppen der Substrat- oder Substanzkategorien,

Eigenschafts- oder Attributionskategorien, und Verhältnis- oder Relationskategorien.[66]

Diese Aufeinanderfolge der Kategorien, die mit der Substanz beginnend über die Eigenschaften zu den Relationen führt, gibt nach Tugarinov im allgemeinen auch die Geschichte der menschlichen Erkenntnis wieder, die ebenfalls von der Welt im ganzen ausgeht, und in deren Verlauf durch das Aufsuchen der Detailzusammenhänge ein immer tieferes Verständnis der Wirklichkeit gewonnen wird. Die Bewegung von der Substanz zu den Eigenschaften und Relationen entspricht deshalb als Konkretisierung des allgemeinen unbestimmten Seins sowohl der objektiven Struktur der Wirklichkeit als auch dem Verlauf der Erkenntnisgeschichte.[67]

Gegen die Auffassungen Tugarinovs nehmen jedoch verschiedene sowjetische Autoren Stellung. So machen V. G. Afanasiev, A. P. Šeptulin und P. V. Kopnin geltend, daß Tugarinovs Einteilung der Kategorien nicht der komplizierten dialektischen Struktur der in der Wirklichkeit vorliegenden Verhältnissen entspricht, wo Dinge, Eigenschaften und Relationen einander oft wechselseitig bestimmen und deshalb nicht streng gegeneinander abgegrenzt werden können.[68] Darüber hinaus sehen P. V. Kopnin und V. S. Bibler den entscheidenden Mangel von Tugarinovs Kategoriensystem darin, daß es lediglich eine formale Zusammenstellung der Kategorien zwecks ihrer vollständigen Aufzählung liefert, ohne daß der Übergang von einer Kategorie zur anderen durch die Entwicklung der Wirklichkeit selbst begründet wäre.[69] Dies ist Kopnins Ansicht nach darauf zurückzuführen, daß Tugarinov die Kategorien ausschließlich in ihrer ontologischen Bedeutung als Bestimmungen der Ansichbeschaffenheit der Wirklichkeit betrachtet, ohne aber dabei ihre erkenntnistheoretische, methodologische und logische Seite zu berücksichtigen.[70] Ferner kritisiert Kopnin Tugarinovs statisch konzipierte begriffliche Trennung zwischen Dingen, Eigenschaften und Relationen. Seiner Ansicht nach muß die Welt vielmehr als ein ständiger Entwicklungsprozeß betrachtet werden, der im Bewußtsein der Menschen gedanklich widergespiegelt wird. Nur auf diese Weise ergibt sich eine objektive Begründung für die Entwicklung der Kategorien auseinander.[71]

Für den Aufbau des Systems der Kategorien des dialektischen Materialismus ergibt sich somit nach Kopnins Ansicht das folgende Dilemma: Entweder wird im Aufbau des Systems der Entwicklungsgedanke nicht berücksichtigt und die Kategorien werden lediglich an Hand bestimmter

Gesichtspunkte aufgezählt und nebeneinandergestellt. Ein Beispiel dafür bietet die von Tugarinov angegebene Einteilung der Kategorien.[72] Oder aber es wird der Standpunkt Hegels vertreten, für den die logische Aufeinanderfolge der Kategorien mit dem in einer bestimmten Richtung verlaufenden Entwicklungsprozeß der Welt zusammenfällt. In dieser Sicht wird dann die Bewegung der Kategorien zur Genese der Wirklichkeit selbst und damit zum Demiurgen der Welt.[73] Eine solche Auffassung ist aber mit dem Materialismus unvereinbar, und alle Argumente die P. O. Gropp[74] gegen ein solches Kategoriensystem vorbringt, sind nach Kopnins Ansicht völlig berechtigt.[75]

Nach Auffassung der überwiegenden Mehrzahl der Philosophen des dialektischen Materialismus gibt es aber eine Möglichkeit, das genannte Dilemma zu lösen. Ihrer Ansicht nach ist es nämlich möglich, sowohl die bloß klassifikatorische Einteilung eines ontologisch begründeten Kategoriensystems zu vermeiden, als auch den Fehler des objektiven Idealismus auszuschalten, bei dem die Kategorienbewegung zugleich die Wirklichkeit selbst hervorbringt. Dieser Ausweg, der zu einer in der objektiven Wirklichkeit selbst begründeten Subordination der Kategorien führt, besteht darin, daß der *Erkenntnisprozeß* als Grundlage für den Aufbau des Kategoriensystems gewählt wird.[76] Trotz dieser These sind die Vertreter des dialektischen Materialismus sich im allgemeinen im klaren, daß der Prozeß der menschlichen Erkenntnis und die Struktur der Welt nicht unmittelbar zusammenfallen.[77] Über die hier vorliegenden Beziehungen wird denn auch im dialektischen Materialismus unter den Stichworten 'die Einheit von Logischem und Historischem'[78] 'das Verhältnis von subjektiver und objektiver Dialektik'[79] und 'das Zusammenfallen (*sovpadenie*) von Dialektik, Erkenntnistheorie und Logik'[80] eine ausführliche Diskussion geführt.

Für das Entwicklungsprinzip des Kategoriensystems ist es nun von entscheidender Bedeutung, wie die materialistische Komponente des dialektischen Materialismus, die den Vorrang der materiellen Welt vor der menschlichen Erkenntnis betont, mit der dialektischen Erkenntnisbewegung, die ja die Grundlage für die Subordination der Kategorien bilden soll, in Übereinstimmung gebracht wird. In dieser Frage besteht P. V. Kopnin darauf, daß die materialistische Lösung der Grundfrage und die dialektische Entwicklungskonzeption im dialektischen Materialismus, oder – was dasselbe bedeutet – in der materialistischen Dialektik, eine

untrennbare organische Einheit bilden müssen.[81] Trotzdem führt aber – wie V. P. Čertkov bemerkt – die Betonung der Erkenntnistheorie zwangsläufig zu einer Vernachlässigung der Ontologie.[82] So ist denn auch nach wie vor ein Teil der sowjetischen Philosophen der Ansicht, daß die Gesetze des Denkens den eigentlichen Gegenstand des dialektischen Materialismus bilden. Für sie spielt die Erkenntnistheorie die Hauptrolle, und die objektive Struktur der Wirklichkeit ist nur von zweitrangiger Bedeutung.[83]

Alle Sowjetphilosophen die in der Geschichte der menschlichen Erkenntnis das Grundprinzip für die Entwicklung des Kategoriensystems sehen, sind bemüht, keinen Widerspruch zu der materialistischen These von der Priorität der Wirklichkeit gegenüber der Erkenntnis aufkommen zu lassen. So erklären P. V. Kopnin und M. M. Rozental', daß ein Unterschied gemacht werden müsse zwischen der historischen Entwicklung des menschlichen Denkens einerseits und der zeitlichen Veränderung der objektiven Welt andererseits. Dabei werden durch das Auftreten bestimmter Kategorien in der Erkenntnisgeschichte keinesfalls auch die diesen Kategorien entsprechenden realen Phänomene hervorgebracht.[84] Grundsätzlich betonen jedoch die Sowjetphilosophen die enge Verknüpfung zwischen der Erkenntnisgeschichte und der objektiven Struktur der Wirklichkeit. Diese Verknüpfung besteht vor allem darin, daß sowohl die gesamte menschliche Erkenntnis als auch die Wirklichkeit selbst, ihrem Wesen nach einen Prozeß darstellen.[85] Zwischen beiden Prozessen existiert nun eine Art von Parallelität, die darin besteht, daß in der Erkenntnisgeschichte die Entwicklung der Wirklichkeit gedanklich widergespiegelt wird.[86]

Die durch die innere Dynamik des Erkenntnisprozesses bedingte dialektische Entwicklung der Kategorien ist deshalb im Prinzip denselben Gesetzmäßigkeiten unterworfen wie die zeitliche Veränderung der realen Einzeldinge.[87] Diese Parallelität zwischen der Erkenntnisgeschichte und den realen Entwicklungsprozessen in der Welt gibt denn auch die Gewähr dafür, daß die an Hand der Geschichte der Erkenntnis aufgestellte Subordination der Kategorien in der Wirklichkeit selbst objektiv begründet ist. Denn entscheidend ist herbei nicht die Erkenntnis als solche, sondern ihr objektiver Inhalt.[88] Einen weiteren Beweis für die objektive Gültigkeit der Kategoriensubordination, wie sie durch die Erkenntnisgeschichte gegeben ist, sehen M. M. Rozental' und E. P. Sitkovskij darin, daß die Geschichte der Erkenntnis nicht nur ein vergangenes Ereignis darstellt,

sondern durch die praktische menschliche Arbeitstätigkeit als erfolgreiche Umgestaltung der Wirklichkeit täglich aufs neue wiederholt wird.[89]

(4) Die *Verschiedenheit der Kategoriensysteme*, die von den Vertretern des dialektischen Materialismus vorgeschlagen werden, bedarf einer Erklärung. Es ist nämlich keineswegs der Fall, daß alle sowjetischen Philosophen dieselbe Subordination der Kategorien vorschlagen. Ja, in überspitzter Formulierung könnte man sogar sagen daß jeder Philosoph sein eigenes Kategoriensystem konstruiert.[90] Dabei bleiben natürlich alle Vorschläge innerhalb des bei geeigneter Interpretation sehr weit gesteckten Rahmens, der durch die Grundpositionen des dialektischen Materialismus gegeben ist.

In der sowjetischen Literatur sind nur wenig Reflexionen über diese Pluralität der Kategoriensysteme zu finden. V. P. Tugarinov erwähnt aber ausdrücklich, daß die von ihm vorgeschlagene Subordination der Kategorien nur eine von verschiedenen Möglichkeiten darstellt.[91] P. V. Kopnin dagegen wendet sich gegen die von manchen Autoren vertretene Ansicht, die Fixierung auf ein einziges Kategoriensystem sei Dogmatismus.[92] Seiner Ansicht nach verbirgt sich gelegentlich hinter solchen Äußerungen nur die irrige Ansicht, es könne im dialektischen Materialismus verschiedene ontologisch, erkenntnistheoretisch und logisch begründete Kategoriensysteme geben. Nach Kopnin ist diese Auffassung aber völlig irreführend, weil jedes Kategoriensystem des dialektischen Materialismus von Lenins These ausgehen muß, daß Dialektik, Logik, und Erkenntnistheorie zusammenfallen.[93] Nur in diesem Sinne kann es dann verschiedene Kategoriensysteme geben, die sämtlich Versuche darstellen, diese Einheit von Dialektik, Logik, und Erkenntnistheorie möglichst adäquat auszudrücken.[94]

P. O. Gropp weist bei seiner Kritik an den Versuchen, ein einheitliches Kategoriensystem des dialektischen Materialismus aufzubauen darauf hin, daß es in Wirklichkeit nicht nur eine einzige, sondern sehr vielfältige Subordinationsmöglichkeiten zwischen den Kategorien gibt. Dabei ist die Art der jeweiligen Subordination abhängig von dem Aspekt, unter dem das jeweilige Objekt betrachtet wird.[95] Dieser Gedanke wird von A. M. Minasjan noch weitergeführt. Er erklärt, daß wegen der Abhängigkeit der Kategoriensubordination von dem gerade betrachteten konkreten Untersuchungsobjekt streng genommen gar nicht von einem allgemein gültigen und unveränderlichen Kategoriensystem gesprochen werden

kann. Eine Unterordnung von Kategorien existiert also eigentlich nur bei der Anwendung der Kategorien in einem ganz bestimmten Erkenntnisprozeß, wobei diese Unterordnung von Fall zu Fall wechselt.[96] Diese Unterordnung ist dadurch bestimmt, daß sich je nach dem gewählten Forschungsgegenstand und der Art und Weise in der er begrifflich erfaßt wird, das wechselseitige Verhältnis der Kategorien verändert. Denn in einem Fall ist eine Kategorie *A* einer anderen Kategorie *B* untergeordnet, weil *A* als Mittel zur Erforschung von *B* dient; in einem anderen Fall vertauschen sich aber die Rollen, und *A* wird mit Hilfe von *B* näher untersucht.[97]

P. D. Puzikov schließlich sieht den Grund für die Aspektabhängigkeit des Verhältnisses zwischen den Kategorien darin, daß stets vielfältige Möglichkeiten bestehen, den jeweils betrachteten Gegenstand in einander ausschließende begriffliche Bestimmungen aufzuspalten. Dabei sind diejenigen Kategorien welche die gegensätzlichen Bestimmungen ausdrücken, dem untersuchten einheitlichen Objekt untergeordnet.[98] Diese triadische Trennung eines Gegenstandes in ein Paar polarer Kategorien kann dann so lange fortgesetzt werden, bis dabei alle philosophischen Kategorien erfaßt sind. Auf diese Weise läßt sich nach Puzikovs Ansicht eine ganz dem untersuchten Gegenstand angepaßte und von Fall zu Fall wechselnde Subordination der Kategorien viel besser angeben, als durch ein starres formales System.[99]

(5) *Die systematische Zusammenstellung der Kategorien* sollte gemäß der Vorstellungen derjenigen Sowjetphilosophen, die für den Aufbau eines Kategoriensystems plädieren, durch immanente Notwendigkeit bestimmt sein. Dementsprechend müßten also in einer durch ihren inneren Zusammenhang zwangsläufig festgelegten Entwicklung die verschiedenen Kategorien der Reihe nach auseinander abgeleitet werden. Von der Verwirklichung dieses hochgesteckten Zieles ist man jedoch weit entfernt, denn von einer durchgehenden immanenten Notwendigkeit der Abfolge der Kategorien kann bei den vorgeschlagenen Systemen nicht die Rede sein. Die Vorschläge der einzelnen Autoren zeigen vielmehr deutlich, daß für den Aufbau eines Systems der Kategorien erhebliche Wahlmöglichkeiten bestehen. So erinnern die Versuche zum Aufbau des Kategoriensystems oft eher an ein Puzzlespiel oder an eine Sammlung von Stichworten als an eine streng festgelegte eindeutige Ableitung.

Neben der engeren Bedeutung für das dialektisch-materialistische Verständnis der Kategorien geben die verschiedenen Vorschläge für den Aufbau eines Kategoriensystems gleichzeitig auch einen guten Überblick über den Bereich, innerhalb dessen sich das spekulative Denken im dialektischen Materialismus bewegt. Im folgenden sollen einige charakteristische Vorschläge zum Aufbau von Kategoriensystemen kurz dargestellt werden.

V. P. Tugarinov geht bei seinen Überlegungen von den ontologischen Fundierungsverhältnissen aus und gelangt so zu einer Einteilung der Kategorien in die drei Gruppen der Substrat-, Eigenschafts- und Relationskategorien. Dabei gibt diese Reihenfolge zugleich das Subordinationsverhältnis wieder das auch für die Unterordnung der Kategorien innerhalb jeder einzelnen Gruppe gilt.[100] Die Substratkategorien welche die Dinghaftigkeit oder Substantialität der Wirklichkeit wiedergeben, sind: Natur, Sein, Materie, Phänomen. Diejenige Gruppe in der die allgemeinen Eigenschaften der Materie zum Ausdruck kommen, besteht aus den Kategorien Bewegung–Veränderung–Entwicklung, Raum–Zeit, Objektives–Subjektives, Bewußtsein–Denken. Zu der umfangreichsten Gruppe der Relationskategorien gehören u.a. Notwendigkeit–Zufall, Inhalt–Form, Kausalität–Zweckmäßigkeit, Möglichkeit-Wirklichkeit, Allgemeines–Besonderes–Einzelnes.[101] Dabei bilden die durch Bindestriche verknüpften eng zusammengehörigen Kategorien Untergruppen oder 'Nester' innerhalb der jeweiligen Hauptgruppen.[102]

Eine ähnliche Einteilung in fünf Arten von Kategorien schlägt V. P. Rožin vor. Er unterscheidet substantielle Kategorien (Sein, Natur, Materie); Kategorien welche die Eigenschaften der Materie ausdrücken (Entwicklung, Raum und Zeit, u.a.); Relationskategorien (Ursache und Wirkung, Notwendigkeit und Zufall, Gesetz und Gesetzmäßigkeit, usw.); Kategorien welche verschiedene Seiten der Materiebewegung ausdrücken (Bewegung und Ruhe, Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit, Evolution und sprunghafte Veränderung) sowie Kategorien des Erkenntnisprozesses (Sinnliches und Logisches, Abstraktes und Konkretes, Absolutes und Relatives).[103]

P. V. Kopnin sieht die Grundlage seines Kategoriensystems in der Geschichte der menschlichen Erkenntnis, da ja die Kategorien als gedankliche Widerspiegelung der objektiven Wirklichkeit in einem bestimmten Stadium der Erkenntnisgeschichte auftreten.[104] Die drei Teile des so entstehenden Systems sind seiner Ansicht nach bestimmt durch die Grund-

frage der Philosophie, die Gesetze der Dialektik und die Struktur des Erkenntnisprozesses.[105] Zum ersten Teil, welcher das in der Grundfrage der Philosophie behandelte Verhältnis von Geist und Materie einerseits und Denken und Sein andererseits betrifft, gehören die Kategorien Materie, Wechselbeziehung, Wechselwirkung, Bewegung, Entwicklung, Raum und Zeit, Widerspiegelung, psychische Schöpfung, und Denken.[106] Die allgemeinen dialektischen Gesetze jedes Geschehens kommen im zweiten Teil des Kategoriensystems zum Ausdruck. Entsprechend der Bewegung der Erkenntnis von einfacheren zu komplizierteren und damit tieferen Einsichten sind hier u.a. die Kategorien Ganzes und Teil, Identität und Unterschied sowie Ursache und Wirkung maßgebend. Am Ende dieses Teiles stehen dann die Grundgesetze der Dialektik, welche das Wesen der dialektischen Entwicklungskonzeption ausdrücken.[107] Der dritte und letzte Teil des Kategoriensystems stellt gleichsam die Synthese der beiden vorhergehenden Abschnitte dar, weil in ihm der Erkenntnisprozeß analysiert wird, der schließlich zu objektiv zutreffenden Einsichten führt. Hierher gehören u.a. die Kategorien Wahrheit, Praxis, Freiheit und Notwendigkeit, Subjekt und Objekt, Empirisches und Theoretisches, Analyse und Synthese, Logisches und Historisches, Abstraktes und Konkretes, Relatives und Absolutes.[108]

In ausdrücklicher Anlehnung an Hegels *Wissenschaft der Logik* entwickelt E. P. Sitkovskij sein Kategoriensystem. Dabei kann er sich zur Begründung seiner Auffassung auf die wohlwollende Einstellung der Klassiker Marx, Engels, und Lenin gegenüber dem Hegelschen Verfahren berufen.[109] Nach Sitkovskij muß die Einteilung der Kategorien vom Sein über das Wesen zum Begriff führen, weil nach dieser Reihenfolge sowohl alle Arten der menschlichen Erkenntnis als auch alle realen Prozesse außerhalb des Menschen ablaufen.[110] Die Kategorien des Seins drücken die unmittelbare Beschaffenheit eines Gegenstandes aus, ohne daß dabei über seine eigentliche Natur schon etwas gesagt wird. Die Seinskategorien sind Quantität, Qualität und Maß. Zu ihnen gehören die Subkategorien Entstehen und Vergehen, Realität und Negation, Grenze und Unbegrenztheit, Endliches und Unendliches, Ansichsein und Fürsichsein, Einzelnes und Vieles sowie Zahl, Größe und Grad.[111] Kraft der inneren Logik jedes einzelnen Objektes vollzieht sich der Übergang vom Sein zum Wesen durch eine qualitativ bestimmte Quantität, d.h. durch ein Maß. Dieser Prozeß ist bedingt durch die Spaltung einer Einheit in Gegensätze

und ihre Aufhebung in einer höheren Einheit. Da der innere Widerspruch die Grundlage für jeden Entwicklungsprozeß ist, geht die Kategorie des Widerspruchs in die Kategorie der Begründung über.[112] Im Zusammenhang mit dem Wesen treten dann die Kategorien Wirklichkeit, Notwendigkeit, Gesetz, und Gesetzmäßigkeit mit ihren entsprechenden Subkategorien auf.[113] Schließlich zeigt sich im Begriff die allgemeine Natur der betrachteten Objekte, die dadurch bestimmt ist, daß alle Gegenstände nur mit Hilfe von Urteilen erfaßt werden können.[114] Hierher gehören dann die Kategorien Begriff, Urteil, Schlußfolgerung, und wissenschaftliche Methode sowie die Kategorien der Praxis (Leben, Arbeit, Einheit von Subjekt und Objekt).[115]

IV. WÜRDIGUNG

Bei dem nicht einschlägig vorgebildeten Leser könnte leicht der Eindruck entstehen, daß die hier dargelegte Diskussion über das Kategoriensystem des Marxismus-Leninismus nur von fachtechnischem Interesse ist. Statt einer echten konkreten Aufgabenstellung würde demnach hier lediglich ein fruchtloser abstrakter Begriffsstreit zwischen Philosophieprofessoren abgehandelt.

Dem ist aber nicht so. Denn beim Aufbau des Kategoriensystems geht es ja um nichts weniger als die systematische Ordnung der philosophischen Grundbegriffe. Und diese Grundbegriffe sind die gedanklichen Werkzeuge, mit deren Hilfe der Mensch die Welt geistig erfaßt. Es ist deshalb ohne weiteres einleuchtend, daß jedem Weltverständnis ein bestimmtes System philosophischer Kategorien entspricht, und daß umgekehrt jedes Kategoriensystem Ausdruck einer ganz spezifischen Weltauffassung ist.

Nur ist eben bei dem isoliert für sich allein betrachteten System der philosophischen Grundbegriffe die Abstraktion so weit getrieben, daß der konkrete Wirklichkeitsbezug nicht mehr direkt ins Auge fällt. Er ist aber gleichwohl vorhanden und durch eine entsprechende Besinnung auch immer aufweisbar. Von der Theorie her gesehen bildet das Kategoriensystem also diejenige Instanz, in welcher die begriffliche Struktur der Wirklichkeit wie in einem Brennpunkt zusammengefaßt wird. Deshalb wird auch durch die für diesen zentralen Punkt maßgebende Grundkonzeption die Lösung der konkreten Detailfragen schon weitgehend vorentschieden.

Im folgenden soll nun in Verbindung mit einer kritischen Würdigung die konkrete Relevanz der Diskussion um das Kategoriensystem an fünf Punkten aufgezeigt werden:

(1) Der unbefangene Betrachter wird vor allem über die *ungewöhnliche Vorstellung* erstaunt sein, daß die philosophischen Grundbegriffe nicht etwa nur zusammengestellt und geordnet, sondern auch mit zwingender innerer Notwendigkeit auseinander abgeleitet werden sollen. Genetisch wird diese Idee von Hegel übernommen, und die Sowjetphilosophen sind sich dessen auch durchaus bewußt. Bemerkenswert bleibt aber die Tatsache, daß man gerade dieses Element des Hegelschen Denkens aufgreift. Da nun die Kategorien als die allgemeinen philosophischen Begriffe das Gerüst jeder begrifflichen Welterklärung bilden, zielt die Idee des Kategoriensystems letzen Endes auf eine umfassende gedankliche Begründung der Wirklichkeit ab. Mit diesem ausgesprochen spekulativen Ansatz soll offensichtlich dem Verlangen nach einem vollständigen und abgeschlossenen Weltbild Rechnung getragen werden. In diesem Verlangen nach gedanklicher Abgeschlossenheit begegneten sich in der abendländischen Geistesgeschichte philosophische Spekulation und natürliche Theologie.

(2) Ferner ist festzustellen, daß bei der Beschäftigung mit dem System der Kategorien die direkte Fragestellung nicht auf einen konkreten Sachverhalt abzielt. Die Blickrichtung ist hier vielmehr gleichsam umgebogen: kein bestimmtes Phänomen wird anvisiert, sondern die Kategorien als das begriffliche Rüstzeug zum Erfassen von Phänomenen sind Gegenstand der Untersuchung. Es handelt sich also um eine Reflexion auf die philosophischen Grundbegriffe und dem Zusammenhang der zwischen ihnen besteht. Man sollte nun erwarten, daß an dieser Stelle in der zeitgenössischen Sowjetphilosophie auch eine *kritische Besinnung* auf die Haltbarkeit der eigenen Position einsetzt. Doch ein solches Sich-selbst-in-Frage-stellen wird nicht geübt. Auch die Vielzahl der vorgeschlagenen Kategoriensysteme und das Wissen um die historische Bedingtheit unserer Einsichten kann dem ungebrochenen Erkenntnisoptimismus der Sowjetphilosophen im Prinzip nichts anhaben. An diesem Beispiel zeigt sich einmal mehr, daß dem dialektischen Materialismus die kritische Reflexion auf die Verbindlichkeit der eigenen Erkenntnis fremd ist.

Eine Auseinandersetzung mit der radikalen Erkenntniskritik, wie sie in der neueren Philosophiegeschichte bei Descartes zum ersten Mal im

Vordergrund steht und in Kant kulminiert, wäre jedoch gerade dann erforderlich, wenn die Gültigkeit der Kategorien und ihres Systems diskutiert wird. Solange eine solche Selbstbesinnung unterbleibt, besteht aber keinerlei Hoffnung, daß der dogmatische Wahrheitsanspruch des dialektischen Materialismus durch immanent philosophische Überlegungen erschüttert wird. Die Situation verschlimmert sich noch dadurch, daß der Marxismus-Leninismus seinem eigenen Selbstverständnis nach eine philosophische Welterklärung ist, und seine Grundkonzeptionen deshalb auch nur auf philosophischer Ebene angreifbar sind.

(3) Ferner zeigt die Diskussion um ein Kategoriensystem deutlich, daß die materialistische Umkehrung von Hegels Dialektik für das Verständnis der Kategorien zu einem fast unüberwindlichen *Dilemma* geführt hat: Einerseits soll entsprechend der materialistischen Antwort auf die Grundfrage der Philosophie nach dem Verhältnis von Denken und Sein die Wirklichkeit in ihrer Ansichbeschaffenheit zugleich Ursprung und Maßstab für jedes Denken und damit insbesondere auch für die Gültigkeit der philosophischen Kategorien sein. Auf der anderen Seite orientieren sich aber die meisten Sowjetphilosophen bei ihren Reflexionen über die Bedeutung der Kategorien an der Hegelianischen Konzeption, derzufolge letzen Endes die Geistesgeschichte in ihrer immanenten begrifflichen Entfaltung den Schlüssel zur Lösung aller spekulativen philosophischen Fragen liefert. Im Zuge dieses Denkens wird denn auch die Idee eines kraft innerer Logik entwickelten zusammenhängenden ganzheitlichen Kategoriensystems vertreten.

Wie die Ausführungen der Theoretiker des dialektischen Materialismus gezeigt haben, gerät man aber bei dem Versuch, die idealistische Konzeption der dialektischen Selbstentfaltung der absoluten Idee im Sinne eines Materialismus umzudeuten, stets zwangsläufig in das Fahrwasser des Idealismus. Dieser Gefahr ist sich z.B. V. S. Bibler auch durchaus bewußt. Er erklärt, auch ein Hegelianer oder Neuhegelianer wäre mit der These einverstanden, daß es eine vom erkennenden Subjekt unabhängige Realität gibt.[116] Der entscheidende Unterschied zwischen der Hegelschen und der materialistischen Konzeption besteht nach Bibler aber darin, daß die Hegelianer unter der Wirklichkeit die absolute Idee verstehen, während für den dialektischen Materialismus das Wesen der Dinge in ihrer körperhaften, sinnlichen Existenz besteht. Die Einheit der Welt ist deshalb durch

die räumlichen und zeitlichen Wechselbeziehungen zwischen den Dingen gegeben und nicht durch eine unabhängig von den Einzeldingen existierende allgemeine Idee.[117]

Diese Abgrenzung gegenüber dem Hegelschen Idealismus kann aber deshalb nicht überzeugen, weil auf der einen Seite Hegels Ansatz zur umfassenden Welterklärung durch die dialektische Entfaltung von Gegensätzen übernommen wird, während auf der anderen Seite die zentrale Vorstellung der absoluten Idee durch die dazu völlig inkommensurable These von der Materialität der Welt ersetzt wird. Hier zeigt sich deshalb unabweisbar, daß die an der bloßen stofflichen Existenz orientierte materialistische Auffassung keine geeignete Basis für eine spekulative Welterklärung bilden kann.

Aus diesem Grunde bleibt den Sowjetphilosophen zum Ausbau einer in sich geschlossenen und nicht idealistisch begründeten Philosophie nur die Wahl, die materialistische Komponente ihres Denkens auf dem Wege spekulativ auszubauen, den Tugarinov beschritten hat. Im Sinne eines solchen am erkenntnistheoretischen Realismus orientierten Denkansatzes ließe sich dann auch die ontologische Bedeutung der Kategorien und das besondere zeitenthobene Gelten kategorialer Zusammenhänge deutlicher herausarbeiten. Schließlich öffnet sich hier gleichsam als Ersatz für die irreführende Überbetonung des Erkenntnisprozesses auch die Möglichkeit, die Potentialität der 'Materie' mit ihrer Fähigkeit zur Evolution philosophisch zu durchdenken.

(4) Mit dem *Evolutionsproblem* ist unabdingbar eine Reihe von Fragen verknüpft, auf die der dialektische Materialismus eine Antwort geben muß, wenn er seinen Anspruch, eine philosophische Welterklärung zu liefern, erfüllen will. Wie die Diskussion um das System der Kategorien zeigte, orientiert sich die Mehrzahl der Verfechter eines solchen Kategoriensystems am Verlauf der Erkenntnisgeschichte, die wegen der Einheit von 'Logischem und Historischem' mit der objektiven Struktur der Wirklichkeit zusammenfallen soll. Ganz abgesehen vom inhaltlichen Zutreffen dieser höchst problematischen These, die P. O. Gropp – wie im ersten Teil der vorliegenden Arbeit dargestellt wurde – denn auch mit aller Schärfe kritisiert, wird hier doch die Analyse des anvisierten universalen Entwicklungsprozesses unumgänglich: Anfang, Ende, und treibende Kraft dieses Prozesses bedürfen nämlich einer Erklärung.

Gleichsam eine negative Lösung besteht in dem von Gropp vorgebrachten Hinweis auf die unerschöpfliche Vielfalt der ständigen Veränderungen in der Welt. Nach dieser Konzeption gibt es nur einen ewigen Wechsel, der weder Anfang noch Ende hat. Demzufolge existiert auch kein allgemeiner aufsteigender Entwicklungsprozeß, der im Kategoriensystem seinen Ausdruck finden könnte. Allerdings darf nicht übersehen werden, daß dieser scheinbar so einfache Rückzug auf das unbestimmte, unendliche, vielfältige Geschehen für das Selbstverständnis des Marxismus-Leninismus eine schwere Hypothek mit sich bringt. Denn die im historischen Materialismus so nachdrücklich vertretene These von der zielgerichteten Entwicklung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse, die schließlich in der klassenlosen kommunistischen Gesellschaft kulminiert, bleibt auf diese Weise ein isoliertes Moment, ohne umfassende philosophische Begründung.

Sobald aber ein solcher Prozeß ins Auge gefaßt wird, muß etwas über seinen Beginn gesagt werden. In der außerhalb der Zeit liegenden nur begrifflich erfaßbaren ontologischen Struktur der Wirklichkeit muß diesem Anfang dann die Ausgangskategorie des Systems der philosophischen Grundbegriffe entsprechen. Welche Probleme sich hier für eine konsequent materialistische Theorie ergeben, zeigt die Tatsache, daß manche Autoren die Grundkategorie der 'Materie' mit der Natur oder dem Sein identifizieren. Die prinzipielle Schwierigkeit besteht ja darin, daß bei der philosophischen Deutung sowohl die geistigen Phänomene als auch die materielle Struktur der Welt erfaßt werden müssen. Wenn man nun, wie die Marxisten-Leninisten, einen Dualismus vermeiden will, dann stellt sich die Aufgabe, aus einem einzigen Prinzip heraus die Existenz sowohl des Geistes als auch der Materie zu erklären. Da aber wegen ihrer erklärten Abneigung gegen alle theologischen Reflexionen für die Vertreter des dialektischen Materialismus die Deutung des reinen, noch nicht differenzierten Seins durch den philosophischen Gottesbegriff nicht in Frage kommt, bleibt ihnen nur der Weg einer spekulativen Ausweitung der Materiekonzeption.

Bezüglich der in der Subordination der Kategorien dargestellten realen Entwicklung stellt sich ferner die Frage nach der treibenden Kraft dieses Prozesses. Nach Auffassung der Sowjetphilosophen besitzt die Materie die Fähigkeit zur 'Selbstbewegung', kraft derer sie sich durch ständige Negation der vorhergehenden Stadien in spiralig aufsteigender Linie zu

höheren Gebilden entwickeln kann.[118] Dabei ist es nun insbesondere wichtig zu wissen, ob diese Entwicklung ständig in aufsteigende Linie verläuft und ob sie auf ein besonderes Ziel hin ausgerichtet ist.

(5) Bei der Beschreibung des universellen Weltprozesses stehen im dialektischen Materialismus eine *anthropozentrische* und eine *kosmozentrische* Konzeption einander gegenüber. Die anthropozentrische Lehre kam bei den Befürwortern eines Kategoriensystems klar zum Ausdruck: Die Entwicklung der Menschheit und insbesondere die geschichtlich fortschreitende begriffliche Verarbeitung der Welt bildet *den* grundlegenden Entwicklungsprozeß. Es ist ohne weiteres einleuchtend, daß sich in dieser am Menschen orientierten Auffassung auch die im historischen Materialismus so betonte gesellschaftliche Entwicklung unschwer einordnen läßt. Im Gegensatz hierzu orientiert sich M. N. Rutkevič nicht an der Geschichte der Menschheit, sondern an dem Geschehen in kosmischen Dimensionen. Dementsprechend lehnt er die Konzeption einer universellen aufsteigenden Entwicklung ab. Für ihn gibt es nur den Prozeß des ewigen Entstehens und Vergehens.[119] Innerhalb dieser kosmischen Ereignisse spielt sich dann u.a. als ein Teilgeschehen die Entwicklung der Menschheit auf unserem Planeten ab.[120]

Für den Aufbau des Kategoriensystems ist es nun von entscheidender Bedeutung, ob die anthropozentrische oder die kosmozentrische Weltansicht zu Grunde gelegt wird. Während nämlich bei den geschilderten Sowjetautoren, die sich an der Menschheitsgeschichte orientieren, immer noch die Möglichkeit besteht, durch eine entsprechende Ausweitung ihrer Konzeption die kosmische Weltsicht mit zu erfassen, besteht bei der besonders in Jugoslavien, Polen, und der ČSR geübten Besinnung auf das Individuum die Tendenz, die gesamte philosophische Weltauffassung ausschließlich vom Menschen her zu begründen. Bei dieser ganz auf den Einzelmenschen bezogenen Haltung besteht dann die Gefahr, daß die Welt nicht mehr als eine in sich ruhende Wirklichkeit betrachtet wird, in welcher der Mensch lebt, und mit der er sich auseinandersetzen muß. Ebenso wie im westlichen Existentialismus liegt hier die Versuchung nahe, die Welt ausschließlich in ihrer Bezogenheit auf den Einzelnen als die je-meinige zu sehen. Für eine philosophische Grundlegung hätte dies zur Folge, daß alle Kategorien aus der menschlichen Existenzsituation heraus abzuleiten wären.

Es ist nun bemerkenswert, daß die orthodoxe Lehre des dialektischen Materialismus mit einer solchen Konzeption unverträglich ist. Denn die Auffassung von der außerhalb des Menschen und unabhängig von ihm existierende Wirklichkeit läßt keine ich-bezogene Weltsicht zu. So erweist sich hier die fachtechnische Frage nach dem Aufbau des Systems der philosophischen Grundbegriffe als Angelpunkt für die Deutung des Verhältnisses von Mensch und Welt.

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ANMERKUNGEN

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[15] Gropp, S. 153.
[16] Gropp, S. 153.
[17] Gropp, S. 153–154.
[18] Gropp, S. 154.
[19] Alekseev und Judin, S. 154; Losev, S. 474; Kopnin [5], S. 130; s. dazu auch Fleischer [3], S. 71f. und Fleischer [4], S. 172–173.
[20] Kopnin [4], S. 39 u. 46.
[21] Kopnin [2], S. 113; Kopnin [4], S. 45.
[22] Minasjan, S. 111.
[23] Kopnin [1], S. 102; Tugarinov [2], S. 14–15.
[24] Sitkovskij, S. 70; Kopnin [1], S. 97.
[25] Andreev, S. 7; 'Nekotorye itogi...', S. 17.
[26] Sitkovskij, S. 70.
[27] Kopnin [2], S. 113.
[28] Kopnin [1], S. 131.
[29] Šeptulin [3], S. 38.
[30] Tugarinov [2], S. 15; Kopnin [1], S. 102 u. 132.
[31] 'Nekotorye itogi...', S. 16–17; Kopnin [3], S. 474; Kopnin [1], S. 130–131.
[32] Kopnin [1], S. 100–101.
[33] Kopnin [4], S. 46.
[34] Sitkovskij, S. 70–71; 'Nekotorye itogi...', S. 17.
[35] Kopnin [3], S. 474; Kopnin [1], S. 130.
[36] Kopnin [1], S. 131.
[37] Kopnin [4], S. 45–46.
[38] Andreev, S. 7.
[39] Die drei Grundgesetze der Dialektik, welche insbesondere die ständige Entwicklung aller miteinander verknüpften Ereignisse bestimmen, sind: Das Gesetz der Einheit und des Kampfes der Gegensätze, das Gesetz des wechselseitigen Übergangs von quantitativen in qualitative Veränderungen, und das Gesetz der Negation der Negation. S. dazu: *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii*, S. 147, u. *Marksistsko-leninskaja filosofija*, S. 135.
[40] Andreev, S. 9 u. 11.
[41] Čertkov, S. 48–49.
[42] Šeptulin [3], S. 45.
[43] Kopnin [1], S. 131.
[44] Kopnin [1], S. 132; Kopnin [2], S. 115.
[45] Kopnin [3], S. 474.
[46] Bibler [1], S. 44.
[47] Šeptulin [3], S. 43.
[48] Sitkovskij, S. 77.
[49] Sitkovskij, S. 89.
[50] Sitkovskij, S. 90.

[51] Levko, o. S. zitiert nach Šeptulin [3], S. 45.
[52] Šeptulin [3], S. 45–46.
[53] Losev, S. 473–474.
[54] Šeptulin [3], S. 46; Puzikov, S. 122.
[55] Šeptulin [3], S. 46.
[56] Puzikov, S. 122.
[57] Rožin, S. 136. Zur Problematik des Materiebegriffs im dialektischen Materialismus s. Planty-Bonjour, S. 90f.; Fleischer [1], S. 12–20, Thomas, S. 299–310, und Archipcev.
[58] Minasjan, S. 15.
[59] Tugarinov [2], S. 15.
[60] Kopnin [1], S. 102.
[61] Bibler [1], S. 9 u. 13; Šeptulin [3], S. 40.
[62] Einen Überblick über die verschiedenen Positionen geben Šeptulin [2], S. 12; Šeptulin [4], S. 70–89 und Alekseev, S. 154.
[63] Vergl. Kopnin [1], S. 139.
[64] Tugarinov [2], S. 15; Tugarinov [1], S. 158.
[65] Tugarinov [2], S. 17.
[66] Tugarinov [2], S. 17; Tugarinov [1], S. 158.
[67] Tugarinov [2], S. 16.
[68] Afanas' ev, S. 181; Kopnin [1], S. 133; Šeptulin [2], S. 12–13; Šeptulin [3], S. 41–42.
[79] Kopnin [1], S. 132.
[70] Kopnin [1], S. 133.
[71] Kopnin [1], S. 134–135.
[72] Kopnin [1], S. 139.
[73] Kopnin [1], S. 139; Kopnin [2], S. 116; Kopnin [3], S. 474.
[74] s. Anmerkung 7–18 der vorliegenden Arbeit.
[75] Kopnin [1], S. 139.
[76] Kopnin [1], S. 139; Bibler [1], S. 12 u. 34; Šeptulin [2], S. 13.
[77] Šeptulin [3], S. 41; Kopnin [1], S. 135; Rozental', S. 118.
[78] Sitkovskij, S. 77; Rozental', S. 167–203; Kopnin [3], S. 474.
[79] Šeptulin [3], S. 41; Dzjuba, Šaulov, S. 165; s. Ballestrem, S. 1–19.
[80] Kopnin [2], S. 115; Šeptulin [3], S. 51.
[81] Kopnin [2], S. 115.
[82] Čertkov, S. 49.
[83] Dzjuba, Šaulov, S. 165.
[84] Rozental', S. 198; Kopnin [1], S. 134; Kopnin [2], S. 116.
[85] Šeptulin [1], S. 34; Bibler [2], S. 56.
[86] Rožin, S. 136–137; Kopnin [1], S. 135; Rozental', S. 110–111.
[87] Kopnin [1], S. 135; Minasjan, S. 105–106; Rozental', S. 111; Rožin, S. 137.
[88] Kopnin [1], S. 139–140; Čertkov, S. 49; Rozental', S. 199; Sitkovskij, S. 77.
[89] Sitkovskij, S. 78–79; Rozental', S. 198.
[90] Vergl. die Zusammenstellung der Kategorien im Abschnitt III (5) der vorliegenden Arbeit.
[91] Tugarinov [2], S. 19; Tugarinov [1], S. 159.
[92] Kopnin [1], S. 133.
[93] Kopnin [1], S. 134; Kopnin [2], S. 115.
[94] Kopnin [1], S. 136.
[95] Gropp, S. 152.
[96] Minasjan, S. 107–108.

97 Minasjan, S. 109–110.
98 Puzikov, S. 122.
99 Puzikov, S. 124–125.
100 Tugarinov [2], S. 17; Tugarinov [1], S. 158.
101 Tugarinov [2], 17; Tugarinov [1], S. 158.
102 Tugarinov [2], S. 19; Tugarinov [1], S. 159.
103 Rožin, S. 128.
104 Kopnin [1], S. 138.
105 Kopnin [1], S. 140–141; vergl. auch Kopnin [2], S. 118–119.
106 Kopnin [1], 140.
107 Kopnin [1], S. 141.
108 Kopnin [1], S. 141–142.
109 Sitkovskij, S. 86–89.
110 Sitkovskij, S. 87–88 u. 90.
111 Sitkovskij, S. 91–92.
112 Sitkovskij, S. 93.
113 Sitkovskij, S. 95–97.
114 Sitkovskij, S. 99.
115 Sitkovskij, S. 100.
116 Bibler [2], S. 47.
117 Bibler [2], S. 47.
118 Dahm, S. 147–150.
119 Rutkevič, S. 385–386 und 391.
120 Rutkevič, S. 385 und 391.

ERVIN LASZLO

TRENDS IN EAST-EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY

*A Case Study on Hungary**

Soviet Marxism-Leninism is no longer a common denominator of the philosophy of all East-European Communist countries. Today there have emerged national variants of Marxism-Leninism, signifying the presence of something like a 'Polish', 'Czech', 'Yugoslav', and 'Hungarian' philosophy. The over-all trend is undoubtedly from uniformity towards diversity in the philosophical thinking of the East-European Communist bloc. But what further conclusions do recent developments warrant? My purpose in this paper will be to examine this question through a detailed consideration of developments in one Communist country – Hungary – and the focussing of the results in the general East-European perspective. Thus this study will serve the double purpose of giving an outline of philosophical evolution in Hungary, and examining the trend which underlies the common features of such developments in Eastern Europe.

It is often claimed by Communist theoreticians that the rise to power of a Marxist-Leninist Party is not the consequence of the exercise of main force, but the outcome of a spontaneous revolution of the masses. This claim was made also in regard to Hungary. The fact that there was hardly any Communist underground even in the last phases of the Second World War, when it was evident that Hitler had lost out, necessitated complex explanations by Marxist historians. These were to the effect that the Red Army's occupation brought about a crisis among the Hungarian upper classes, which made possible the increase of a revolutionary spirit among the lower classes. But in fact, the Red Army imported the Communist ideology from Soviet Russia, and implanted it by force in Hungarian soil. An objective look at Hungarian history before 1945 tells us that, with the exception of the brief *Commune* of 1919, the handful of dedicated Communists had no success with their ideas in Hungary. As long as Communist ideas coïncided with widespread objectives, and dissatisfaction with the current regime was so profound as to make mere reform inadequate in the eyes of the people, revolution on the Communist pattern was given a measure of support. But at the least sign of more peaceable or reasona-

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ble opportunities for improving the lot of the lower and lowest classes, even the hungry and overworked industrial workers and the still almost feudal peasantry turned against the Communists.[1]

Reaction to the Communist ideology in Hungary varied between general but usually vague sympathy, to distrust and hatred. Certainly, sympathy must have been close to zero toward the end of the Second World War to prevent Communists from organizing an underground worthy of the name. The Red Army leaders appreciated this fact, for in their first appeal to the population they cautiously declared: "When the Army penetrates on Hungarian soil, it is not led by intentions to occupy any part of it or to change Hungary's present social order ... the Red Army has no other intention than to destroy the German Army and annihilate Hitler Germany's reign in the country."[2] But in fact the Red Army came to change the existing social order by the right of might and in the name of Marx and Lenin.

In the more than 20 years which followed the Communist armed takeover in 1945, the ideology of Marx and Lenin was propagated with all conceivable means. But the means of propagation, as well as the propagated aspects of the ideology were so different in these 20 odd years that we can distinguish four conceptually distinct – although in practice sometimes overlapping – periods. Such a scheme of 'periodization' is also customary among Marxist-Leninist historians, although the names I use to denote the periods are different from those used by them. I shall recognize (1) a period of transition, (2) a period of *Gleichschaltung*, (3) a period of reorientation, and (4) a period of liberalization. Let us consider the main characteristics of each of these periods in turn.

I. THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 1945–1948

In this period the basic tenets of the Communist ideology were diffused, often under cover of democratic slogans. The ideology was, on the whole, without significant popular cogency; few people other than the numerically small group of convinced Communists took it seriously. Diverse 'ideologies' and *Weltanschauungen* coexisted – there was great interest in renewing Hungary's severed contacts with the Western culture, and a revival of religious sentiment seemed to take shape. During the latter part of this period Communists gradually attempted to weed out the most

flagrantly incompatible products of what was the beginning of an intellectual and spiritual renaissance.

II. THE PERIOD OF 'GLEICHSCHALTUNG', 1949–1956

With the overt Communist seizure of power in 1948, diversity soon yielded to uniformity. Even the most reputed Hungarian Communist theoretician, Georg Lukács, was attacked in 1949, and remained thereafter on the defensive. Hungarian Stalinism, led by Mátyás Rákosi, was not interested in originality, only in orthodoxy. Public debates of ideological issues were staged, but had a purely formal, administratively determined ending: the final summation came from Party headquarters, and there was no court of higher appeal on any intellectual (or other) domain. A small group of anti-dogmatic theoreticians attached itself to Lukács, but was practically condemned to silence. The main authority was József Révai, and, of course, Rákosi. The weeding out of 'revisionism', 'counter-revolutionism' and signs of 'crisis' (the latter supposedly in the works of Hungarian writers) were carried out in the name of the Party, and resulted in the usual Stalinist repressions.

A certain resistance could develop in the field of arts, however, feeding on Stalin's theses on linguistics, which had the effect of somewhat 'declassifying' language by assigning it not to classes but to society as a whole. Thus Hungary's 'national' language afforded some flexibility in assessing its national literature and culture in general.

With the death of Stalin and the initiation of the original 'New Course', the ideological *Gleichschaltung* was further relaxed. Lukács and his followers were increasingly heard, and the various repressed 'ideologies', ranging from anti-dogmatic Marxism to Thomism and even to Existentialism, showed signs of life. Their message carried, however, only within intimate private groups and required the utmost caution.

III. THE PERIOD OF REORIENTATION, 1957–1960

The imperceptible deterioration of the terroristic *Gleichschaltung* came to an abrupt end in 1956. The revolution revealed anti-dogmatic tendencies of impressive force, and not even Soviet tanks could reinstall a regime capable of maintaining an ideological orthodoxy comparable to that of

the previous years. In fact, diversity flourished, but only under careful cover. In the open, Communist theory was reduced to vulgarization and repetition – Hungarian theoreticians, out of a fear of hitting the wrong note and unwillingness to lend a hand to the regime, preferred silence.

IV. THE PERIOD OF LIBERALIZATION, 1961 TO THE PRESENT

Communist theory gradually came into its own in Hungary as the Kádár regime stabilized, introduced the new 'New Course' in 1961, and could permit itself the luxury of tolerating a wider scale of opinions. By changing the Rákosi era's 'whoever is not with us is against us' to 'whoever is not against us is with us', diversity became institutionalized and originality and sincerity came to be increasingly tolerated at the expense of strict orthodoxy. The philosophical climate improved thereby, for now it became possible to publish one's own views, and not only quotations from accepted sources. Of course, personal views still had to have the compulsory framework of showing that they were in accord with the intentions of Marx and Lenin, at least insofar as developing ideas are concerned which these 'Classics' held important. But, under cover of such 'good Communist' intentions, increasing room was slowly provided for the diversity of sincere opinion.

Let us see now where the period of liberalization could lead Hungarian philosophers: what are their major problems, and how do they think about them?

Marxism-Leninism originated as a theory of man, society and history, and concern with these problems is basic to the mind of Hungarian philosophers to this day. Hungarian work on these fields is a strange mixture of historiography, theoretical social science, philosophical anthropology, psychology, ethics, and political science. While work coming under each of these headings has been performed in Hungary in the name of a 'Marxist philosophy of history and society', some individual problems have crystallized, and work on them has been particularly intensive. Among the historical studies this has been the case concerning recent Hungarian history, especially since the end of the Second World War: here the main endeavor has been to reconcile a cool appraisal of the facts with the requisites of the Marxist interpretation of history. In the ensuing

struggle between adherence to dogma and appreciation of reality, the more realistic forces appear to have won out lately.[3]

The second outstanding problem-complex has been the evaluation of the role, nature and relations of man in the new and the coming social order. While these studies have often gone under the name of 'ethics', 'moral studies' and 'psychology', they ill fit any of these categories when taken in the Western sense. They would make a very 19th-century ethics, with a metaphysical basis and objectivistic emphasis, with practically no work in the logic of ethics or meta-ethics. As to psychology, these studies would qualify only as a kind of behaviorism deduced from a prior historical-social mechanics. They are in fact hypothetical exegeses of the Marxist-Leninist notions of Socialist and Communist society, with the role and nature of man speculatively fitted in, and realistically compared to today's Hungarian man in the street. Nevertheless, they are remarkable already in virtue of the serious concern they show with the fate of man, particularly when the Soviets' manifest lack of such concern is taken into account. In this respect Hungary follows closely in Poland's footsteps.

Two further fields of inquiry deserve mention: one is the question of the 'Asian mode of production' which has found a brilliant exposition in Hungary entirely due to Ferenc Tókei, a gifted specialist of great erudition on Chinese culture and philosophy; the other the history of ideas with special regard to Hungary – here the outstanding personality is László Mátrai. His researches into obscure but intrinsically interesting Hungarian thinkers of the last several centuries deserve attention beyond the boundaries of this small country.

Another problem which much occupies the minds of Hungarian philosophers is that of dialectics. They take this question most seriously. The influence of Georg Lukács (who has traditionally emphasized the importance of dialectics in the Marxist conception of history as well as in aesthetics), and also that of Béla Fogarasi (the Marxist philosopher whose greatest contribution is usually considered to be his work on logic) has most probably had much to do with the development of the controversies that now center around the technical questions of dialectics. As in the USSR, both the dialectical logical and the formal-technical sides are strongly represented. In addition, there is much interest in probing into the philosophical implications of the dialectical principle. This leads Hungarian theoreticians on the one hand to the Marxist theory of know-

ledge, and on the other to a more technical philosophy of logic. The latter has definitely gained a foothold in Hungary, due in no small measure to the brilliant work of Academician László Kalmár, an internationally known mathematical logician.

Hungary used to have a deeply religious rural population and, much to the consternation of the Communist leaders, it still has one today. Consequently the atheist doctrine of Marxism-Leninism has become an important element in Hungarian philosophy. But, 'atheism' is a term disliked by most Hungarian philosophers. Instead, they prefer to speak of 'materialist *Weltanschauung*', 'criticism of religion', 'criticism of religious *Weltanschauung*', or 'criticism of the genesis and history of religion'. Inasmuch as these preferences signify a specification of the topics of their activity they are indeed entirely justified: in fact, there is hardly anyone in Hungary who deals with atheism in a positive manner, almost everyone in this field devotes himself to various forms of 'religion-criticism'. In the 'fifties the sporadic attempts at systematic atheism tended to degenerate into anti-clericalist mud-slinging. Since 1960, however, László Mátrai initiated a more differentiated atheist movement, the organ of which became the journal *Világosság* (Light). It is from that time on that the various 'criticisms' of religion have appeared, as shorter studies usually in that journal and as more detailed works in individual volumes. The greater part of such criticisms deals with catholicism and its official philosophy, Neo-Thomism. A relatively smaller number of works analyzes religious *Weltanschauung* and the genesis and history of the world's religions. These tend to be of more interest to the objective reader than the predominantly polemical attacks on catholicism.

The Hungarian people are famed for their talents in the arts. Budapest, the capital city, has brought forth many an internationally reputed painter, dancer, composer, interpreter, and writer. Channelling the work of such highly instinctive people into the prescribed 'socialist-realist' channels has proven to be a major and most difficult task of the country's philosophers and aestheticians. But 'socialist realism' has unpleasant associations with Stalinism, and Hungarian thinkers now prefer to use more neutral and at the same time more precise terms. Thus 'socialist realism' becomes for them 'Marxist aesthetics', or 'literary science' or 'musicology' and so on, depending on the branch of the arts they treat. While each of these distinctions thus had its valid *raison d'être*, what all effort in this field has in

common is a marked socialist-realist element, in other words, an emphasis on the socialist character and function, and the realist orientation, of art in general and the specific works of art in particular. The degree of emphasis on these components varies greatly, however. In the work of Party-theoreticians, the socialist-realist components predominate, and Marxist-Leninist dogma obscures whatever realistic analysis may have been needed in the evaluation of works of art. But in the work of the many Hungarian writers and self-made aestheticians, socialist-realist dogmas function merely as tacit assumptions. It would be wrong, however, to claim that such writers and aestheticians are fully 'anti-Marxist' or 'existentialists'. Some basic socialist-realist assumptions have seeped in deeply enough to be found even in the pronouncements of self-confessed existentialists and non-conformists. In fact, even where affinities with the classics of Western literature and art are strongly stressed, there is a differentiated and typically Marxist awareness of the social and epistemological functions of art. Such elements are Marxist-Leninist, if not in comparison with orthodox dogma, then next to the individualistic, non-materialistic and also non-social-conscious views of Western art-lovers and critiques.

Among Hungarian aestheticians one personality stands out: Georg Lukács. His influence was uncontested in aesthetics until the aftermath of the events of 1956 set in, and while it has been contested since then (mostly by the concerted attacks of József Szigeti in 1957–1958), it is nonetheless felt today, especially by the serious aestheticians. His influence now takes the form of implicit assumptions, rather than explicit statements. Lukács is no longer the subject of open controversy; the 'Lukács-tradition' lives on in the work of his influential students, such as Heller, Hermann, and Zoltai. They can now publish relatively freely, although – according to Zoltai – they still feel occasionally cramped by their sympathies.

At present, popular theorizing about the values and functions of art and literature is becoming more expert, and technical philosophical aesthetics is growing more liberal. Hence there is a *rapprochement* between popular art and literary criticism on the one hand, and the formerly insular Marxist philosophical aesthetics on the other. The unresolved questions of the Marxist doctrine crystallized as the popular slogans 'realism', 'timeliness', and 'modernism'. Widespread controversies on these topics came into the open already in 1958, and constitute the substance of the most sustained and profuse debate in the history of Marxism-Leninism in Hungary.

The problems raised by modern art are the subject of hefty discussions; but so are the problems raised by modern science. Just as Engels did his best to bring an interpretation of natural science in accord with the Marxist view of history and society, so contemporary Marxist-Leninist philosophers try to harmonize the findings of contemporary physics, biology, psychology, and even sociology, with the basic tenets of the ideology.

Hungarian philosophers encountered three major problems in the course of their investigations. Considerable work has already been done on these problems, and more is expected to be forthcoming in the next few years. They may be enumerated as follows: the definition of the Marxist concept of matter, the correct evaluation of the philosophical implications of relativity theory, and the true statement of the Marxist principle of man's social determination. The characteristic feature of the recent treatment of these problems by Hungarians is a thorough knowledge of *either* the relevant scientific theories *or* the corresponding Marxist-Leninist doctrines. Accordingly, the ideologically well-versed thinkers reinterpret science, and the scientifically schooled thinkers reinterpret the ideology. The controversies which have thus been engendered go on to this very day. A major one among them is the interpretation of relativity theory. The philosopher Elek and the physicist Jánossy maintain that Einstein's mathematics are acceptable but his relativity interpretation of them is idealist, since general relativity seeks to do away with the notion of particle and hence of matter, within the invariant space-time frame described by the tensor equations. Elek and Jánossy come out in favor of the Lorentz transformations as the consistently materialistic principle of the physical universe. Most other Hungarians oppose this view and deny that relativity theory is idealist in content, urging instead its acceptance.

Another tough problem facing Hungarian philosophers is that of the social determination of the individual. Traditional Marxism takes the lead from Marx's thesis on Feuerbach, according to which the human essence is not an abstraction inherent in each single individual, but the ensemble of the social relations. This appears to make the personality of man fully dependent on the kind of society he lives in. More empirical sociological investigations left no doubt about the fact, however, that the present social order of Communist countries poses many difficulties for the individual. In fact, the pressure of social and economic difficulties in Hungary became so acute that the concern of most philosophers was channelled to the

daily problems of the ordinary citizen. All but the most dogmatic thinkers admitted that the average person is still 'alienated' from his true nature, notwithstanding the Socialist order. The more progressive philosophers go even further. A good example is the work of Ágnes Heller, an illustrious Lukács pupil, who was in disgrace after 1956 but has been rehabilitated since. She is now a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences' newly founded Research Group on Sociology.

Heller not only concedes that there is alienation in Socialist society but affirms that social conditions do not directly determine whether an individual is alienated or not. The individual can overcome his state of alienation, regardless of the economic-social conditions in his society. He can do this, Heller says, by constructing a purposive life for himself, within the determined but spontaneous life offered by his society. Everyone can build his own life, we are now told. This is a long way from the traditional Marxist view that the human essence is the ensemble of social relations!

Ágnes Heller is not the only one today to hold more realistic views than has been customary in Hungary. There is an increasing concern among Hungarian philosophers with the pragmatic world of everyday life. They are torn between traditional Marxist dogma and their increasingly acute appreciation of realities. The outcome is a return to the humanist concerns of the young Marx on the one hand, and a recourse to the deliverances of the contemporary sciences on the other. In the process, Hungarian philosophers are learning to think for themselves. If they would get more freedom to publish their own views, Hungarian philosophy could become an interesting and even an important component in contemporary philosophical thought. And this conclusion is not surprising. Life in a Communist country is a daily challenge of reason and common sense. It forces one to face issues which the well-contented citizen takes for granted. This gives rise to philosophical reflection. But part of the challenge is that the fruits of reflection cannot be published. Could they be, the challenge to the freedom of opinion would be removed and with it much of the intense speculation which today no doubt occupies the time and energy of many intellectuals. But at present the confrontation between dogma and reality makes for much soul-searching and speculation. It is fascinating to find tell-tale signs of it in the published works of Hungarian thinkers. The gradual domination of realism over dogma in their minds is signified by

such notions as the presence of alienation in Socialism, the acceptance of the highly reputed relativity theory including its non-materialistic connotations, and the slow but, as it seems inevitable, reinterpretation of most basic Marxist notions. (We may recall in this connection a remark Adam Schaff is reputed to have made at Yale University when questioned as to recent changes in Communist philosophy: "The form [i.e. the terminology] is not changing, only the meaning..."!) The above changes in Hungary add up to a recognizable general pattern, which may be profitably compared with similar changes in other East-European countries.

Professor Bocheński suggested[4] that the general character of Marxism-*Leninism* is that it is cosmocentric, i.e. emphasizes the primacy of nature as the framework wherein human beings and human society have emerged, insisting that the latter can be properly comprehended only upon a full grasp of the former. This may be contrasted to the anthropocentrism of Marxism in its non-Leninist formulation: here the emphasis is on man and human society and, historically at least (i.e. insofar as Engels' works on Dühring and the Dialectics of Nature have postdated Marx's anthropological speculations) the explanation of nature follows and is dependent on the explanation of man and human society. Now, the accepted form of Marxism in Eastern Europe has been Marxism-*Leninism*, and this is still the case today, at least on the surface. But a meaningful sign of the tacit elimination of the Leninist ways of thinking, not only in Hungary, but also in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, is the return of the philosophers to the anthropological concerns of the young Marx. Debates such as those centered on Kafka and on the problem of alienation, have been widespread and central in these East-European countries but relatively restricted and peripheral in the USSR. Therefore, as professor Bocheński and other members of this Institute suggested, a rough but useful distinction between the philosophical orientation of the Soviet-Union and the 'progressive' East-European countries may be proposed in reference to the cosmocentrism of the former and the anthropocentrism of the latter.

Current philosophical thought in Hungary has many striking features but few, if any, unique ones. The above periodization corresponds by and large to developments in other East-European countries, with only minor changes due to such events as the 1956 revolution in Hungary, its aftermath, and the initiation date of Kádár's 'New Course'. These do not affect the first two periods (the periods of transition and of *Gleichschal-*

tung), which coïncide with local developments in most of these countries with the exception of Yugoslavia.

We can thus propose final reflections on the further evolution of philosophy in Hungary and suggest that some such reflections may apply to the other countries of Eastern Europe as well. However, indulging in predictions in the sphere of socially-politically conditioned processes is an undertaking not free of pitfalls; hence the following remarks are offered in a spirit of undogmatic speculation.

The developments of recent years, viewed in their entirety, add up to what is nowadays fashionably referred to as a 'trend': an underlying tendency which may be distilled by a comparison of the major characteristics of its various stages. Warrant for prediction could only be supplied by a hypothetical extension of the trend in the future – and this is based on the categorical precondition that no major changes will interfere with similar 'trends' in the spheres of politics, economy, and international relations. Thus these concluding reflections will state not that what is the case today, but that what may be the case in five or ten or twenty years, *if* the now prevailing trends are set forth.

The principal characteristic of the non-Soviet East-European philosophy of the future would be a basic but undogmatic Marxism, with but diminishing lip-service paid to Leninism. The main concern of this philosophy would be man, his rôle and well-being in the more stabilizing than changing social order. Thus there would be a *rapprochement* between the concerns of East-European philosophers and those of the West who adhere to the schools of existentialism and the Heideggerian philosophy of everyday life. But the *rapprochement* in philosophic concerns does not entail one in method and presuppositions. There is good reason to believe that the latter will continue not only to be distinct from existentialism in Eastern Europe, but even opposed to it. For, among the basic presuppositions of future East-European philosophy we must reckon *materialism* and *realism*, and among its methods *historicism* and *dialectics*. There is no warrant to suppose, at least as far as this writer can see, that East-European philosophers will cease to argue from materialist and realist premisses with the help of historicist and dialectical notions to conclusions which will set off their thought radically from that of existentialists – notwithstanding an increasing similarity of concerns.

These presuppositions, while not current in this particular combination

in the West, are not indefensible in themselves. Certainly, materialism and realism have proven to be perennial components of speculative thought in the history of philosophy, and historicism finds a measure of support by many thinkers other than positivists such as Popper. Dialectics in its Hegelian formulation is usually rejected out of hand by Western thinkers; but here the question is: just what do East-Europeans *mean* by this term? Soviet thinkers use it in a constructive and relatively orthodox sense (cf. recent papers by Boeselager and Comey); and lip-service is often paid to the 'three laws of the dialectic' by other East-Europeans. But, to judge from the writings of the new generation of thinkers in Hungary and from their views offered in conversation[5], it would appear that many of them mean no more by 'dialectics' than the affirmation that: considering a thing or problem by contrary aspects may lead to its better comprehension; processes of perception and cognition interact and result in novel phenomena upon synthesis; and objects in the physical as well as social world are not mutually distinct but intimately interrelated, bringing forth the phenomena open to our purview in virtue of their 'concrescence' (to use a Whiteheadian term). If this is *all* East-Europeans mean by 'dialectics' – and the next years may tell – then their philosophy cannot be rejected out of hand for including this supposition.

It has not been my purpose to write an apology of Hungarian and East-European philosophy either as of 1967 or even 1977. I merely sought to focus attention on underlying trends which warrant, in my opinion, a reasonably optimistic assessment of the probable fate of philosophy in much of the Eastern half of this Continent.

REFERENCES

* Paper read for the Institute of East-European Studies, and recorded for broadcast by Radio Bern, on February 13, 1967.

[1] These and the following historical remarks are substantiated in detail in E. Laszlo, *The Communist Ideology in Hungary* (series 'Sovietica'), Dordrecht 1966, Part I, Chapter 1: 'The Impact of Communist Ideology in Hungary Prior to 1945'.

[2] MMI Archiv (Budapest), *Röpiratgyüjtemény*, IV,1/1944/x.

[3] Bibliographies of these and the subsequently outlined fields are given in full in E. Laszlo, *op. cit.*

[4] At the discussion following the reading of this paper, as well as in *SST*, 7 (1967) 63.

[5] During this writer's visits to Hungary in 1963, 1965, and 1966.

J. HÄNGGI

DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER DISKUSSION UM DIE FORMALE LOGIK IN DER SOWJETUNION*

Es ist für die sowjetischen Philosophen keine leichte Aufgabe, die formale Logik im Lehrgebäude des dialektischen Materialismus unterzubringen, denn es gibt kaum zwei Disziplinen die auf so gegensätzlichen Prinzipien beruhen wie die formale Logik und die Dialektik. So ist es nicht erstaunlich, dass die Frage nach dem Gegenstand der formalen Logik und ihrem Verhältnis zur Dialektik immer wieder Anlass zur Diskussion gibt. Gerade gegenwärtig ist in der Sowjetunion wieder eine Kontroverse über dieses Problem im Gange. Es mag deshalb von Nutzen sein, zum besseren Verständnis der gegenwärtigen Diskussion den Verlauf der vorhergehenden kurz darzustellen.

In der ganzen Diskussion um die formale Logik lassen sich drei Perioden unterscheiden. Die erste schliesst sich unmittelbar an den Beschluss des ZK der KPdSU vom November 1946 an und dauert bis Ende 1951, wobei der Verlauf dieser Diskussion durch die Linguistikbriefe von Stalin im Sommer 1950 eine bedeutende Wendung erhält. Der Streit der Redaktion der Zeitschrift *Voprosy Filosofii* mit Kondakov und Bakradze von 1955/56 gehört zwar dem Inhalt nach noch zur ersten Diskussion, leitet aber zugleich die zweite Periode ein, welche besonders dem Problem des Widerspruchs gewidmet ist und ihren Höhepunkt in der Konferenz vom April 1958 findet. Die dritte, gegenwärtige Periode wird durch einen Artikel von M. N. Alekseev anfangs 1964 eröffnet.

I. DIE ERSTE PERIODE

Im November 1946 fasste das ZK der KPdSU den Beschluss, Logik und Psychologie als Unterrichtsfächer an den Mittel- und Hochschulen einzuführen.[1] Dieser Beschluss enthielt zugleich sehr konkrete Ausführungsbestimmungen, die zum Teil praktisch nicht durchführbar waren, weil die Fristen zu ihrer Verwirklichung einfach zu knapp bemessen waren. So sollte unter anderem schon im Unterrichtsjahr 1947/48 der Unterricht der Logik und Psychologie an 200 Oberschulen eingeführt werden, und ander-

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seits die Ausbildung von Logiklehrern so vorangetrieben werden, dass bis zum Schuljahr 1950/51 der Bedarf für die Oberschulen völlig gedeckt sei. Dass diese überstürzten Forderungen nicht die besten Startbedingungen für die Logik waren, sollte sich später erweisen.

Solange die Logiker noch keine eigenen Lehrbücher besassen, halfen sie sich mit dem Logiklehrbuch von G. I. Čelpanov, das noch 1946 in einer überarbeiteten Auflage erschien.[2] (Dieses Lehrbuch aus der Zeit vor der Revolution hatte übrigens, wie wir in der Bibliographie von Primakovskij[3] finden, noch 1945 eine Neuauflage erlebt.[4]) 1947 erschienen dann die vom Beschluss des ZK geforderten Logiklehrbücher, und zwar für die Hochschule von V. F. Asmus[5] und für die Mittelschule von S. N. Vinogradov.[6] Beide wurden sofort Gegenstand einer heftigen Kritik, welche sich auch auf den Unterricht der Logik bezog. Verwechslung von Denken und Sein, Vermischung von formaler und dialektischer Logik, Formalismus, Unparteilichkeit, Entfremdung von der Praxis, Fehlen der Kritik des Idealismus, schlechte Auswahl der Beispiele, usw., dies waren die Vorwürfe welche den sowjetischen Logikern gemacht wurden: Es war für die Kritiker von vornherein klar, dass die formale Logik eine Wissenschaft der bourgeoisen Klasse sei und nur nach gewissen Änderungen zu einer sowjetischen Wissenschaft werden könne. Diese Ansicht wurde auch von hoher Stelle bestätigt. Am 23. März 1948 gab der Minister für Hochschulbildung der UdSSR, S.V. Kaftanov, einen Erlass heraus, in welchem ganz klar gesagt wurde, dass die Logik eine klassengebundene Wissenschaft sei.[7] Auch an der Allunionskonferenz zur Logik vom Juni 1948 in Moskau[8] wurde diese Meinung vertreten.

In dieser ersten Phase der Diskussion waren die konstruktiven Vorschläge äusserst selten, und die Autoren von Artikeln und Rezensionen beschränkten sich darauf, das vorhandene Material zur Logik zu kritisieren und auf Fehler und Lücken hinzuweisen. Wie aber diese Mängel behoben werden könnten, darüber schwiegen sie sich aus. So wurde auch nie erklärt, worin der Klassencharakter der Logik bestehen sollte.

Diese wohl kaum lösbare Aufgabe wurde den sowjetischen Logikern jedoch durch die Linguistikbriefe von Stalin abgenommen.[9] Die Erklärung Stalins, dass die Sprache nicht klassengebunden sei, kam auch den Logikern zugute. Da nach ihrer Meinung die Logik eng mit der Sprache verbunden ist, wandten sie diese Theorie unverzüglich auf die Logik an und erklärten, auch diese habe keinen Klassencharakter. Damit entstand

nun eine Reihe von neuen Fragen: Ist die Logik überhaupt eine philosophische Wissenschaft? Welchen Platz nimmt sie im dialektischen Materialismus ein? Welches ist ihr Verhältnis zur dialektischen Logik? Die Redaktion der *Voprosy Filosofii* erliess einen Aufruf an sämtliche Logiker, ihre Meinung zu diesen Problemen zu äussern: Als Antwort darauf erhielt sie über sechzig Artikel zugesandt, von denen rund ein Dutzend im vollen Wortlaut, die restlichen in einer kurzen Zusammenfassung veröffentlicht wurden.[10]

In dieser Diskussion schälten sich erstmals klar die beiden Richtungen in der Logik heraus, welche sich heute noch, wenn auch teilweise mit andern Akzentsetzungen, gegenüberstehen. Die einen anerkannten nur die formale Logik als Logik und wiesen der dialektischen Logik irgendeine andere Aufgabe zu. Für die andern war die formale Logik nur ein untergeordneter Spezialfall der allgemeinen dialektischen Logik.

Bei der ersten Gruppe finden wir folgende Lösungen. Nach K. S. Bakradze[11] muss die formale Logik eingebaut werden in den Erkenntnisvorgang, wie ihn Lenin beschrieben hat: von der Anschauung zum abstrakten Denken und von diesem zur Praxis. In diesem Prozess vollziehen sich die beiden Übergänge in der Form des Schliessens und dieses ist der Hauptgegenstand der formalen Logik. Die Dialektik dagegen hat die Aufgabe, den Erkenntnisprozess als ganzen zu untersuchen, namentlich das Verhältnis von Denken und Sein, die Probleme der absoluten und relativen Wahrheit, usw. Formale und dialektische Logik haben somit nicht den gleichen Gegenstand.

Eine andere Lösung fand I. I. Os'makov.[12] Er unterscheidet zwischen der Logik des Denkens, welche allgemeinmenschlich ist, und der Wissenschaft der Logik, welche einen Teil der Weltanschauung der jeweiligen Klasse bildet und folglich als sowjetische Wissenschaft nur dialektisch sein kann.

Einige weitere Logiker, darunter auch N. I. Kondakov[13], betrachteten die formale Logik als eine Spezialwissenschaft. Dies bedeutet, dass sie sich zur Dialektik wie zu einer allgemeinen Methodologie verhält.

Für diejenigen, welche sowohl die formale als auch die dialektische Logik als Logik anerkannten, blieb das Problem zu lösen, weshalb es zwei Wissenschaften über den gleichen Gegenstand gebe. Hier finden wir folgende Lösungen. Die am häufigsten geäusserte Ansicht ist diejenige, dass die formale Logik die untere Stufe der dialektischen Logik bildet, wobei

dieses Verhältnis meist mit demjenigen von niederer und höherer Mathematik verglichen wird. Die elementaren Denkgesetze der formalen Logik erfassen nur das Beständige, das Feste, die relativ beharrlichen Zustände, während die dialektische Logik das Sich-Verändernde, die Bewegung und Entwicklung, die Widersprüche erfasst. Zu dieser Gruppe gehörten unter anderen V. I. Čerkesov[14], A. D. Aleksandrov[15], und B. M. Kedrov.[16]

Eine andere Unterscheidung machte A. O. Makovel'skij[17], der die formale und dialektische Logik als historisch und qualitativ verschiedene Stufen betrachtete. B. I. Lozovskij[18] dagegen wies den beiden Logiken einen verschiedenen Gegenstand zu. Die formale Logik ist nach ihm die Logik der Erscheinung, während die dialektische Logik die Logik des Wesens ist.

Neben diesen Ansichten wurden aber auch noch eine Reihe von sehr extremen und teilweise längst verurteilten Theorien vertreten, wie zum Beispiel dass die formale Logik eine klassengebundene Wissenschaft sei (A. A. Gelašvili[19]), oder dass die Logik eine höhere Stufe der Grammatik sei (V. G. Smirnov[20]). Dies führte wahrscheinlich auch dazu, dass die Diskussion Ende 1951 durch eine Erklärung der *Voprosy Filosofii*[21] abgebrochen wurde. Der anonyme Verfasser dieses Artikels (wahrscheinlich die Redaktion) kritisierte vor allem die Vermischung von formaler und dialektischer Logik und stellte dann ein Programm für die weitere Arbeit in der Logik auf. Darin wird unter anderem gefordert, dass die Logik materialistisch begründet werden müsse und dass die Logistik von Whitehead und Russell widerlegt werden solle.

II. DIE ÜBERGANGSZEIT

Nun wurde es für einige Jahre ruhig um die Logik. Ja es schien sogar, als sollte die Logik aus dem Unterricht der sowjetischen Schulen entfernt werden. Hier machte sich die überstürzte Einführung der Logik bemerkbar. Der Mangel an qualifizierten Lehrern und Lehrmitteln und der Unterricht der Logik zu einer Zeit da man sich nicht einmal über die grundlegendsten Fragen der Logik im klaren war, mögen viel zum Misskredit dieser Disziplin beigetragen haben. Anfangs 1955 wandten sich V. M. Boguslavskij und P. V. Tavanec in einem Brief an die Redaktion der *Voprosi Filosofii*[22] und beklagten sich, dass der Kampf gegen die Logik auch nach dem Beschluss des ZK von 1946 noch nicht beendet sei.

"Er nahm nur eine andere Form an – die Form des hartnäckigen Widerstandes gegen die Schaffung normaler Bedingungen für den Logikunterricht."[23] So wurde in halboffiziellen Erklärungen des Kulturministeriums der RSFSR immer wieder davon gesprochen, die Logik vom Lehrplan zu entfernen, und tatsächlich wurde die Ausbildung von Lehrern für die Logik an allen pädagogischen Instituten des Landes seit 1954 eingestellt.[24] Boguslavskij und Tavanec bemängelten weiter, dass es immer noch kein gutes Logiklehrbuch gebe und dass das Ausbildungsniveau der Logiklehrer ungenügend sei. In einem kurzen Nachwort unterstrich die Redaktion der *Voprosi Filosofii* die Wichtigkeit dieser Probleme und forderte alle Logiklehrer auf, ihre Aufmerksamkeit diesen Fragen zu widmen.[25]

Nun geschah etwas völlig Überraschendes. Zwei Nummern später wandte sich die Redaktion der *Voprosi Filosofii* mit aller Wucht gegen die Logiker welche die formale mit der dialektischen Logik vermischten. Der Vorwand für diese Kritik waren die Logiklehrbücher von N. I. Kondakov und K. S. Bakradze.[26] Dass es sich um einen Vorwand handelte, geht – nebst der Tatsache dass das Buch von Bakradze schon 1951 erschienen und längst besprochen war – aus dem Text des Artikels hervor. Die Redaktion selbst schrieb, dass es sich hier nicht um einzelne Fehler, sondern um eine ganze fehlerhafte Tendenz handle. Und der Fehler bestehe eben darin, die formale mit der dialektischen Logik zu verquicken und so die dialektische Logik durch die formale Logik zu ersetzen. Bakradze und Kondakov wehrten sich beide in einem Brief an die Redaktion gegen diese Kritik und versuchten darin, ihre Positionen zu erklären und zu begründen.[27] Dies hatte einen weiteren Artikel der Redaktion zur Folge.[28] Darin wurde klar gesagt, dass es der Zweck der Kritik gewesen sei, die Philosophen auf die Wichtigkeit der Ausarbeitung der dialektischen Logik hinzuweisen.

III. DIE ZWEITE PERIODE

Dieser Streit zwischen der Redaktion der *Voprosi Filosofii* und den beiden Logikern leitete eine ganz neue Entwicklung ein. Die Logik wurde aus einem blossen Unterrichtsfach zu einem Gegenstand der wissenschaftlichen Forschung. Die Versuche, eine einheitliche 'dialektisch-formale Logik' zu schaffen, wurden endgültig begraben. Dagegen wurde mit der Ausarbeitung der dialektischen Logik[29] einerseits und der formalen Logik

anderseits begonnen. Zudem wurde zu dieser Zeit die mathematische Logik erstmals auch von den Philosophen anerkannt. Und zwar war es die Redaktion der *Voprosi Filosofii*, welche in ihrer Kritik an Kondakov und Bakradze den Logikern vorwarf, sie würden die Erfolge der mathematischen Logik zu wenig berücksichtigen.[30] Diese Anerkennung der mathematischen Logik fand ihren Ausdruck in der Gründung eines Logikseminars am Philosophischen Institut der AN SSSR, welches im September 1956 seine Arbeit aufnahm.[31] Der Zweck dieses Seminars war die Information über die Forschungen im Gebiete der Logik, einschliesslich ihrer Anwendungen auf Wissenschaft und Technik, und der Meinungsaustausch unter den Forschern. Der grösste Teil der Seminararbeiten war der mathematischen Logik gewidmet. Auch die am 20. Dezember 1956, ebenfalls am Philosophischen Institut, gehaltene Vortragsreihe befasste sich mit der mathematischen Logik.[32]

In dieser zweiten Periode entwickelte sich vor allem eine Diskussion um das Problem der Widersprüche, welche ihren Höhepunkt in der vom Philosophischen Institut organisierten Tagung 'Zur Frage der dialektischen Widersprüche im Lichte der zeitgenössischen Wissenschaft und Praxis' vom 21. bis 26. April 1958 in Moskau fand. Zu dieser Diskussion verweisen wir auf das Buch von N. Lobkowicz, *Das Widerspruchsprinzip in der neueren sowjetischen Philosophie*[33], möchten aber doch die für die Logikdiskussion wesentlichen Ergebnisse hier anführen.

Bei allseitiger Anerkennung der realen Widersprüche, stellte sich für die Logiker das Problem, wie diese Widersprüche im Denken abzubilden seien. Dabei zeigte sich wiederum die Trennung der Logiker in zwei Gruppen. "Die einen verteidigen den 'dialektischen Widerspruch', die dialektische Logik, ...; die andern fordern ein widerspruchsloses Denken, verteidigen die formale Logik."[34]

IV. DIE DRITTE PERIODE

Die dritte Periode der Diskussion wurde offiziell durch den Artikel von M. N. Alekseev in den *Filosofskie Nauki* anfangs 1964 eröffnet.[35] Aber die Gründe für diese Diskussion machten sich schon einige Jahre früher bemerkbar. Am 27. Oktober und 3. November 1958 fand an der MGU eine Sitzung zur Frage der Aufgaben der wissenschaftlichen Forschungsarbeit im Gebiete der formalen Logik statt.[36] An dieser Sitzung wurde

auf die Wichtigkeit der Ausarbeitung der formalen und besonders der mathematischen Logik für die Anwendung in Wissenschaft und Technik hingewiesen. Zudem forderten die Teilnehmer eine Umgestaltung der Ausbildung der Logiker an der philosophischen Fakultät der MGU und legten dazu auch gleich einen Lehrplan vor, der das Schwergewicht eindeutig auf die mathematische Logik legte. Die Sitzung wandte sich an das Ministerium für Hochschulbildung mit der Bitte, eine Zeitschrift für die Logik zu schaffen, was seither zum 'ceterum censeo' der sowjetischen Logiker geworden ist. Im Jahre 1959 wurde dann auf Initiative von S. A. Janovskaja (1896–1966) an der MGU ein Lehrstuhl für mathematische Logik gegründet, jedoch nicht an der philosophischen, sondern an der mechanisch-mathematischen Fakultät.[37] Die Forschungstätigkeit in der Logik dehnte sich auf immer weitere Gebiete aus, was auch in den letzten Logikkonferenzen zum Ausdruck kam, welche alle den Problemen der Logik und der Methodologie der Wissenschaften gewidmet waren.

Die erste dieser Konferenzen fand vom 21. bis 26. Mai 1960 in Tomsk statt.[38] Ihr folgten die Zusammenkünfte in Kiev, 1962, und Tomsk, Ende 1963.[39] Die letzte Konferenz wurde vom 21. bis 25. Juni 1965 in Kiev abgehalten.[40] Der grösste Teil der Referate, die an diesen Konferenzen gehalten wurden, war methodologischen Problemen gewidmet, aber auch Problemen der Informationstheorie, der Kybernetik, der maschinellen Übersetzung und auch der Begründung der Mathematik. Natürlich brachten diese Forschungsgebiete einerseits logische und anderseits philosophische Fragen mit sich, welche die neueste Diskussion um die Logik ins Leben riefen. Diese Gründe gibt auch Alekseev in seinem oben erwähnten Artikel an.

Ein zweiter Grund und zugleich Gegenstand der Diskussion ist Folgendes. Für die Lösung der vielen logischen und philosophischen Fragen, die eng miteinander verknüpft sind, gibt es keinen Ort an der Hochschule, der für beide zugleich zuständig wäre. Die heutige Situation ist nämlich so (jedenfalls trifft dies für die MGU zu), dass es einen Lehrstuhl für Logik an der philosophischen Fakultät und einen Lehrstuhl für mathematische Logik an der mechanisch-mathematischen Fakultät gibt. Nun machte I. S. Narskij, der Leiter des Logiklehrstuhls der philosophischen Fakultät, in einem Referat vor dem Wissenschaftlichen Rat der philosophischen Fakultät der MGU den Vorschlag, den Unterricht der formalen Logik aufzuheben, respektive in einen Einführungskurs und den

Geschichtskurs der Logik zu verweisen, und dafür den Unterricht der mathematischen Logik und der Mathematik auszubauen. Denn nach seiner Ansicht wird der Unterricht der Logik an den Hochschulen auf dem Niveau der traditionellen Logik, welche in der Mitte des letzten Jahrhunderts entstand, geführt, und dies entspricht weder den wissenschaftlichen Erfordernissen, noch den Forderungen der Partei. Zudem vertrat Narskij die These, dass es heute gar keine traditionelle formale Logik mehr gebe und dass die zeitgenössische formale Logik mit der mathematischen Logik identisch sei. Ja, er machte den Missstand im Logikunterricht sogar verantwortlich dafür, dass bis heute die Probleme der dialektischen Logik noch keine eindeutige Lösung gefunden haben.

Dieses Referat von I. S. Narskij, welches er im Februar 1966 hielt, wurde in gekürzter Fassung in den *Filosofskie Nauki* veröffentlicht[41] und mit einem Vorwort der Redaktion versehen. Darin wurden die umstrittenen Punkte angeführt und die Spezialisten aufgefordert, sich dazu zu äussern. Als erste Entgegnung erschien dann anfangs 1967 ein Artikel von V. I. Čerkesov.[42]

In den bisher veröffentlichen Artikeln werden von neuem die Grundfragen nach dem Gegenstand der Logik und dem Verhältnis der formalen zur dialektischen Logik aufgeworfen. Die folgende Darstellung soll einen Überblick über die bisher geäusserten Ansichten geben.

V. GEGENSTAND UND CHARAKTER DER LOGIK

M. N. Alekseev definiert die Logik vorerst einfach als Wissenschaft vom Denken. Der besondere Aspekt, der sie von den andern Wissenschaften welche das Denken untersuchen, unterscheidet, ist der, dass die Logik die besonderen Bedingungen untersucht, welchen das Denken entsprechen muss um zur Wahrheit zu gelangen. Zwar ist die Logik allein nicht imstande, eine vollständige Theorie der Wahrheit zu geben, aber man kann sie auch nicht von der Frage nach der Wahrheit ausschliessen. Die Logik ist also die Wissenschaft von den Bedingungen und Mitteln, auf Grund welcher das Denken wahres Wissen erlangen kann. Da das Denken ebenfalls eine Form des Erkennens ist, hat die Logik auch eine direkte Beziehung zur Erkenntnistheorie, ja sie geht sogar völlig in sie ein und ist deshalb eine philosophische Wissenschaft.

Dies entspricht jedoch nicht der Ansicht von I. S. Narskij. Nach seiner

Meinung ist nur die dialektische Logik eine philosophische Wissenschaft. Die mathematische Logik, wie übrigens auch die traditionelle Logik, ist kein Teil der Philosophie, gehört aber notwendig zur philosophischen Ausbildung und kann auch für die Entwicklung des dialektischen Materialismus von Nutzen sein.

Gegen diese 'nihilistische' Einstellung zur Logik wendet sich V. I. Čerkesov. Nach seiner Auffassung haben sich in der Geschichte der Logik zwei Richtungen gebildet. Die eine, von Aristoteles und den Stoikern herkommend, betrachtet die Logik als Wissenschaft von den Wegen und Arten der Erkenntnis der Wahrheit. Die andere Richtung, welche von Kant ausgeht und heute vor allem durch R. Carnap vertreten wird, sieht die Logik als eine Wissenschaft von der formalen Richtigkeit des Denkens. Nach Čerkesov ist nun gerade die erste Auffassung diejenige, welche vom dialektischen Materialismus gelehrt wird.

Welches ist aber die Aufgabe der dialektischen Logik, wenn die mathematische Logik die einzige Logik des heutigen wissenschaftlichen Denkens ist? Diese Frage richtet Čerkesov an Narskij.

VI. FORMALE UND DIALEKTISCHE LOGIK

Für I. S. Narskij ist der Streit um die 'Konkurrenz' von formaler und dialektischer Logik gegenstandslos, denn jede von ihnen hat ihren eigenen Gegenstand. Das Verhältnis der beiden lässt sich in folgenden drei Thesen ausdrücken:

(1) Sowohl die formale wie die dialektische Logik wirken auf allen Stufen der Erkenntnis. Es gibt keine 'dialektischen Urteile oder Schlussfolgerungen', welche die Gesetze der formalen Logik verletzen würden.

(2) In Bezug auf die Logik als Wissenschaft ist die dialektische Logik ihre Metatheorie, welche den Rahmen ihrer Anwendung abgrenzt. Anderseits ist das formal-logische Denken ein Sonderfall der Anwendung der Prinzipien des dialektischen Denkens.

(3) In der historischen Entwicklung ist eine Annäherung der formalen Logik an die Forderungen des dialektischen Denkens festzustellen. Diese Annäherung hat jedoch asymptotischen Charakter.

Es gilt deshalb die dialektische Logik in der Richtung einer Methodologie der Erkenntnis auszuarbeiten. Ihr Gegenstand soll die Analyse der Kategorien der subjektiven Dialektik sein.

Mit dieser Arbeitsteilung zwischen formaler und dialektischer Logik ist V. I. Čerkesov nicht einverstanden. Denn nach seiner Meinung hat die eine wie die andere Logik sowohl die Form als auch den Inhalt des Denkens unter dem Aspekt der Wahrheit und Falschheit zum Gegenstand. Der Unterschied liegt darin, dass die formale Logik, welche auf dem Prinzip der Unzulässigkeit des Widerspruchs begründet ist, nur unter "verhältnismässig einfachen Bedingungen" gültig ist, während die dialektische Logik, welche auf dem Prinzip der Einheit der Gegensätze begründet ist, unter beliebigen Bedingungen ihre Gültigkeit behält. Das Verhältnis der beiden Logiken ist sodann nach dem Prinzip der Übereinstimmung bestimmt. Dieses Prinzip – wie Čerkesov anhand von Beispielen zeigt – hat sich aus der Entwicklung der naturwissenschaftlichen Theorien herausgebildet. Es besagt, dass eine ältere Theorie, welche durch neuere Entwicklungen überholt wird, nicht verworfen, sondern als Spezialfall in die neue Theorie einbezogen wird. Und so ist nach Čerkesov nicht die mathematische, sondern gerade die dialektische Logik die hohe Logik des heutigen wissenschaftlichen Denkens.

Mit diesen ersten Publikationen der gegenwärtigen Diskussion um die Logik sind erneut die beiden Richtungen unter den sowjetischen Logikern zutage getreten. Und wenn Čerkesov Narskij vorwirft, dass seine Überlegungen nicht neu seien und dass man dieselben schon in den fünfziger Jahren gehört habe, so kann man diesen Vorwurf ebensogut auch Čerkesov machen. Immerhin ist in dieser Diskussion eine neue Tonart zu hören. Die Diskussion erweckt nicht den Eindruck, als werde hier von versteiften Positionen aus gesprochen, sondern sie scheint durchaus einem echten Bedürfnis der Beteiligten zu entsprechen. Das mag auch darin begründet sein, dass die Diskussion nicht durch einen bestimmten Anlass ins Leben gerufen wurde, sondern aus der gesamten Forschungstätigkeit in der Logik herausgewachsen ist. Die Diskussion wird auch von allen Seiten begrüsst und ihre Fortsetzung gewünscht. Besonders M. N. Alekseev betont den Nutzen einer solchen Diskussion und warnt davor, die Streitfragen der Logik nicht mit wissenschaftlichen Mitteln, sondern – wie dies manchmal die Tendenz sei – durch rein administrative Methoden zu lösen.

ANMERKUNGEN

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DISCUSSION:
THOMISM AND MARXISM-LENINISM

I

The similarities between Thomism and Marxism-Leninism are many and sometimes very striking. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that no other two contemporary philosophical schools have so much in common. This is, of course, denied by Most Marxist-Leninists, and even those who did study Thomism, like B. E. Byxovskij[1], violently deny any sort of similarity. Yet it is a fact that the majority of studies done on Marxist-Leninist philosophy have been made by Thomists[2] – which could best be accounted for by their close kinship. And a glance at a list of the major doctrines held by the two schools easily convinces one that the similarity is not just superficial. Here are a few examples.

Both schools uphold epistemological realism. That is one common point. Both, also, defend a doctrine of absolute truth and the capacity to know some aspects of reality definitely. It also seems that there is, on both sides, a profound distaste for phenomenalism as an ontological position; in opposition to phenomenalism they both believe in some sort of substratum carrying the phenomena, by whatever name. The doctrine concerning the status and the role of philosophy is basically the same: both Thomists and Marxist-Leninists think that philosophy is more than the logic and methodology of science, while at the same time maintaining that philosophy must make use of the results of science. It is asserted on both sides that, while there is nothing in consciousness before sense-experience, all experience is not simply sensual. There are also many common points in anthropology: man is conceived not in the Cartesian fashion, as a conjunction of two things, but as *one* substance; it is true that the Thomists add their peculiar and difficult doctrine of the 'partial substantiality' of the soul, which is denied by the Marxist-Leninists, but this is a rather secondary aspect. In any case, both schools are categorically opposed to what the Marxist-Leninists call 'vulgar materialism': the mind is not a body and does not have a single property of bodies. Finally, there seems

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to be a striking similarity between the Thomistic concept of potency and that of dialectics in Marxism-Leninism. Both are used wherever we meet with serious ontological difficulties, as in the problem of movement.

II

There is almost no understanding of this similarity on the part of the Marxist-Leninists. Many of them, perhaps the majority, know very little about Thomism. This is not entirely their fault, since Thomistic philosophy is, at present, suffering an eclipse. Very often Marxist-Leninists will identify Thomist philosophy with Thomist theology (which is a different thing) and both with Catholic theology, or even with the current religious beliefs of Catholics, conceived as a monolithic system imposed by some powerful Roman central authority. Since they themselves are militant philosophers, believing strongly that every philosopher is a kind of politician and propagandist, they quite naturally imagine that a similar attitude is assumed by the Thomists. The result of this is that even those few who do devote some study to Thomist doctrines often seriously misunderstand them. They search above all for political or religious implications, and if they find some, they tend to interpret everything else from the political or religious point of view. One classical instance of such a misunderstanding is the latest article by Byxovskij in *Kommunist*. Here is a characteristic quotation from it:

Konečno, dlja tomista (a o tomistax Boxenskogo poučat' nečego – on sam k nim prinadležit) istina zaranee zadana. Dlja nix ravnenie na svjačennoe pisanie, otcov cerkvi, papskie encikliki, na teologičeskie dogmy – vysšij zakon filosofskoj subordinacii.[3]

(Naturally, for a Thomist (and it is not necessary to teach Bocheński about Thomists – as he himself is one of them) the truth is given in advance. For them, the orientation to Holy Scripture, the Fathers of the Church, the Pontifical Encyclicals, theological dogmas is the supreme law of philosophical subordination.)

This is obviously false. No such doctrine has ever been defended by any Thomist known to me, far less by myself, however I might be classified.[4] As this is not a personal polemic but an attempt to clarify the relations between two schools of thought, I shall state only the following:

(1) It is not true that for the Thomist *istina zaranee dana* – the truth is given in advance. I do not know a single Thomist who would assert such

an assertion. He does, in fact, believe that some truths are immediately given. I myself believe that the sentence 'the paper on which I am writing is white' is such a 'given' truth. But according to Thomism most truths, and especially those which philosophy tries to establish, are not given; they must be reached through the difficult effort of philosophizing.

(2) It is not true that a Thomist ever claimed that "the orientation to Holy Scripture" etc. is "the higher law of subordination". Just the contrary is true. It was Aquinas who, in spite of tremendous opposition (he was twice condemned), established the principle that a philosopher has no right to use *any* religious premiss. There *are* many Catholics who would admit what Byxovskij says, but certainly *not* the Thomists.

Thomists, moreover, greatly regret that their Marxist-Leninist colleagues do not admit this Thomistic principle, but constantly make use of statements drawn from their own 'sacred writings' – the works of Karl Marx, Fredrick Engels, V. I. Lenin (and at one time even of Joseph Vissiarionovich) – as valid premisses in their reasoning. Dr. Blakeley showed this quite convincingly, using hundreds of texts; but Soviet philosophers reacted only by making fun of his name – not a very strong philosophical argument. Thomists also regret that the decrees of the Communist Party have played that very role in Soviet philosophising which they themselves ascribe to Papal Encyclicals in Thomistic thought; and though this may no longer be the case, these decrees still exercise considerable influence on Soviet philosophy. This being the case, it is surprising that a man like professor Byxovskij, who has himself been guilty of *citatologija*, should accuse the present author of similar nonsense. The charge against me is completely unfounded and cannot be substantiated by reference to a single line I have written.

Merely from the point of view of technical proficiency, Marxist-Leninist philosophy has still a long way to go before it reaches the level of Thomism, and indeed in some areas it might justly be compared to the state of Christian thought prior to Abelard.

III

One of the consequences of this insufficient level of clarity, which greatly handicaps understanding the similarities between Thomism and Marxism-Leninism, is the continual defence by Soviet philosophers of Engels'

famous 'basic problem'. This causes them to make great efforts and, I believe, to waste valuable time in solving pseudo-problems and attacking philosophers who are actually of their own opinion. Generally speaking, Soviet philosophy is full of such problems; one other instance is the no less famous problem of the *sovpadenie* of dialectics, theory of knowledge and epistemology. Since Byxovskij presents a rather interesting treatment of the 'basic problem', which I previously criticised, I would like to make here a few further remarks concerning it.

Byxovskij does not deny a certain multiplicity of questions involved in the 'basic problem'. He even explicitly acknowledges that there are two 'sides' (*storony*) of the one basic problem.[7] However, he asserts that those 'sides' are dialectically connected and accuses me of ignoring their connection (*svjaz'*), because of my supposed primitive 'metaphysical', methodology. The term 'metaphysical' here means, as it usually does in Soviet writings, 'anti-dialectical', i.e., *in concreto*, a view according to which there are no interconnections between things and phenomena at all. This is, I think, another instance of the unfortunate Engelsian heritage, for to the best of my knowledge there are no such 'metaphysicians', and even if there were, I would certainly not wish to be one of them.

Now how is that *svjaz'* to be conceived? I said that one can very well be an epistemological realist while still being an ontological idealist. According to Byxovskij this is due to confusion. He claims that a realist of that sort would recognise that our knowledge is secondary (*vtoričnо*) in relation to 'knowledge in general' (*po otnošeniju k soznaniju voobšče*), to the 'spiritual principle' (*k duchovonomu pervinačalu*), and so he would be an idealist anyway.[8] Moreover, if a realist is an ontological idealist, the theory of the relations between the knowing subject and that which is known will be of a quite different type than it is for materialism. According to Byxovskij, an example of this is Thomism, which supposedly bases the possibility of rational knowledge on the substantial identity (*tождestvo*) of the rational soul with the basic spiritual structure (*pervoosnovoj*) of being; materialism, on the other hand, has a quite different conception of knowledge.[9] Then he goes on to quote different philosophers – Plato, Berkeley, and Leibniz – and to criticise my presentation of their views.

Behind all this there is a lack of understanding of several important distinctions which have been worked out in contemporary philosophy. For one thing, Byxovskij, like most of the Marxist-Leninists (and I must

say, like many Thomists) is not able to distinguish the mental from the ideal. Thus Plato is for him an idealist, because he asserts the priority of the Ideas, which for Byxovskij are probably something spiritual. It is likely he would interpret the teaching of the Marburg School in the same way. Once such an identification is made, there can, of course, be no difference between an ontological and an epistemological idealist. But this identification – common with empiricists, like Mach – is *obviously* wrong. Mathematical entities are not spiritual entities, in spite of their not being real. The negation, as used in logic, is not a spiritual entity: on the other hand, images and concepts in one's head are by no means ideal: they are *somewhere*, namely in the head; they exist at a certain *time*; they are *changing*; they are purely *individual* and *contingent* – in other words, they are quite obviously real phenomena. This confusion can be traced back to Ockham and his doctrine of the *species*, which was quite commonly received by the majority of modern philosophers up to Husserl, who, as far as I know, was the first to re-establish the distinction in recent times.

IV

Byxovskij falsely accuses me of denying that there *are* certain connections between the various answers to the different questions confused in the so-called 'basic problem'. What I did say was that they are different problems and that it is simply impossible to make such a massive identification of them, as Byxovskij and his colleagues do.

Here again are the different questions I distinguished. There are at least three, though perhaps a fourth should be added.

1. The *epistemological problem*: what is the nature of knowledge?

The two most important answers are:

1.1. Knowledge consists in assimilating a pre-existing entity (epistemological realism).

1.2. Knowledge consists in creating the known entity (epistemological idealism).

2. The *mind-body problem*: what is the nature of the relations between the two? There are very many possible answers to that question; let us, however, pick out those two which are particularly dear to Marxist-Leninists, namely:

2.1. Body is basic, mind secondary (materialism).

2.2. Mind is primary, body secondary (mentalism).

3. The *ontological problem*: what are the relations between the real and the ideal (in the Platonic meaning of the term)? Here again, out of the many possible answers we shall select two which seem to suit the Marxist-Leninists best:

3.1. The real is basic, the ideal secondary (ontological realism).

3.2. The ideal is basic, the real secondary (ontological idealism).

To which one more problem may be added:

4. The *theological problem*: is there a personal entity, different from nature, which is the basis or the cause of it? Here only two answers are possible:

4.1. There is no such entity (atheism).

4.2. There is such an entity (theism).

We have, consequently, eight different theorems, and a great many combinations of them are mathematically possible (exactly $2^4=16$). Now both Byxovskij and I are of the opinion that not all mathematically possible combinations are also semantically possible, that is, if we add to the material symbols of the different theorems the corresponding rules of meaning. But the difference between us is this: while Byxovskij seems to think that out of the 16 only 2 remain as semantically possible, I maintain that this is an over-simplification due to bad analysis, and that, as a matter of fact, the number of semantically possible combinations is far greater. This is due perhaps to a difference in our general attitudes: Byxovskij, like many Soviet philosophers, oversimplifies; he tries here and elsewhere to reduce everything to the white-black pattern. However, I do not believe in the fruitfulness of such a method. It seems to me that every simple scheme in philosophy is *a priori* wrong, because the world, as I see it, is most complex.

But to return to our question. What is the position of Byxovskij and the Marxist-Leninists in general? They believe that every epistemological realist (if he is a true one) must be a materialist, an ontological realist and an atheist. Likewise, they seem to imply that every epistemological idealist (if he is a true one) must logically be a mentalist, an ontological idealist and a type of theist. Sometimes they go as far as to assert the equivalence of such statements – which would mean that putting figures as abbreviations of the corresponding sentences:

(A) $1.1 \equiv 2.1 \equiv 3.1 \equiv 4.1$

(B) $1.2 \equiv 2.2 \equiv 3.2 \equiv 4.2$

Now I personally think that Byxovskij is wrong. He is not *completely* wrong, but partially; by that, I mean that certain of the above theorems do, in fact, entail some others; but certain other theorems do not.

To begin with the first statement, it seems that an epistemological idealist, if he wishes to be coherent, will have difficulty in accepting materialism, ontological idealism, and theism. For, according to him, knowledge consists in, so-to-speak, fabricating its object. Now, if that production is conceived as a mental act, this would entail, so it seems, that the nature of objects is mental; thus materialism becomes impossible; also, as the mental is something real (it is a real process going on in one's head), he could hardly become a Platonist of any sort; finally, it is very difficult to see how he could admit anything which transcends his consciousness and thus how he could admit a God. The last point merits stress, because epistemological idealism has repeatedly been asserted to be a camouflaged type of theism – which it certainly is not.

On the contrary, an epistemological realist has a variety of choices before him. By admitting that the thing known is not identical with his own mental activity, he is free to assert it as material, or mental, or both. He is also free to consider the one or the other factor as basic.

Furthermore, he will be free to become either an ontological realist or an ontological idealist. Plato, for example, was an ontological idealist but, contrary to what Buxovskij thinks, quite clearly an epistemological realist, and that in spite of his doctrine of *anamnesis*; for he did *not* conceive knowledge as consisting in the production of the known, but as a real *otraženie*, in his case one of the Ideas (which were not mental for him). Finally an epistemological realist may be either a theist or an atheist.

V

In order to exemplify this multiplicity of possible interrelations, let us compare Thomism and Marxism-Leninism with regard to our four problems. Table I represents a scheme of both views.

In one point (the epistemological problem) the identity of views is perfect, in spite of some compromise with idealism found on both sides

(in Lenin's texts which imply illationism, and in the Thomism of Mercier and his followers). On another point (the ontological problem) there is probably a like identity of views, and if this is not quite clear, it is because of a lack of elaboration of Marxist-Leninist (and partially also of Thomist) doctrines. As far as the mind-body problem is concerned, there is certainly

TABLE I

Problem	Thomism	Marxism-Leninism
Epistemological	Realism	Realism
Mind-Body	Moderate Mentalism	Moderate Materialism
Ontological	Realism	not clear, but rather Realism
Theological	Theism	Atheism

no identity of views, but the similarity is considerable. To be more precise, we must distinguish two levels here: the anthropological and the metaphysical. On the first level, the main difference consists in the Thomist doctrine of the 'incomplete' substantiality of the rational soul, which is denied by Marxist-Leninists. On most other points the teaching seems to be identical. On the metaphysical level the Thomist says that the first principle of being is spiritual, adding however that 'spirit' does not have here the same meaning as in anthropology. The Marxist-Leninists assert that this principle is matter, conceived not as brute corporality, but as nature endowed with virtual forms of movement. Here the difference, if any, does not seem to be as great as one would at first imagine.

But there is one point in which the difference of views is clear-cut and above any doubt: Thomists are theists, while Marxist-Leninists are atheists. However, if I am not very much mistaken, this is the *only* point of unequivocal difference, insofar as our problem is concerned. And I would venture that, even generally speaking, the differences between both schools are few and appear nearly exclusively where the three basic Kantian questions, i.e., religious questions, are concerned: Is there freedom of will? Is the human soul immortal? Is there a God? In practically *all* other points, the agreement is considerable.

VI

This leads us to another point concerning the relations between the two schools, namely the attitude most Marxist-Leninists take towards Thomism. The most important factor in the formation of this attitude is their anti-religious bias. As Thomism is a philosophy which came to be within the framework of a religious society, it is considered by them as something very inferior to the more recent, less religious trends of thought, like Kantianism or Existentialism. The fact that they do so is curious, because I believe that according to the principles of Historical Materialism their attitude should be a very different one. Let me try to sketch a justification for this thesis.

What does Historical Materialism teach? It teaches that every progressive class produces valuable elements in the superstructure of society. Now, the young bourgeoisie did produce Renaissance philosophy, which is said to be materialist, and magnificent art. But the contemporary bourgeois class is not producing anything of that quality – its philosophy is skeptical and its art decadent, due to the fact that it is no longer a progressive class but already a reactionary one. (Strictly speaking the bourgeoisie should not be called 'reactionary' but rather 'conservative', since it wishes to perpetuate the state of things existing in non-Communist countries. On the contrary, the feudal class, which Thomism is supposed to represent, would be a truly reactionary class, one wishing to restore bygone things, i.e., mediaeval things.) In any case, the important point is this: every progressive class has a valuable philosophy. Consequently, on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, the class of feudal lords did have such a philosophy at the time when it was a progressive class. That is a conclusion which has not been drawn by any Marxist-Leninist known to me, most probably because of their anti-religious bias.

Now, the teaching of Aquinas arose immediately after the peak of development of feudal society. It is known, however, that peaks in philosophy are never contemporaneous with the summits in general civilisation: thus Plato and Aristotle follow Pericles by more than a century. Anyway, according to all that we know, mediaeval society produced its best in philosophy (also in art, etc.) not during the barbarian periods of the 'Middle Ages' proper, but precisely during the 13th century. Consequently, if I were a Marxist-Leninist, I would have searched this

period for valuable 'eternal' elements which, according to their doctrine, should always appear when a class is progressive. And it seems to me that from this point of view Thomism would offer many such elements.

But the bias is so strong that most Marxist-Leninists do their utmost to explain away every such element, and to show that in fact there is nothing common in the two doctrines. One instance of such a desperate attempt is the article by Byxovskij, discussed in the present paper.

VII

Perhaps if such handicaps could be overcome, the Marxist-Leninists and the Thomists would realise that in commonly upholding certain basic truths they are standing together, and practically *alone*, in the contemporary world of sceptics, irrationalists, and subjectivists. A few years ago I attended an international meeting of logicians and methodologists at Stanford. The most pathetic figures at that meeting were professor B. M. Kedrov and a Dominican priest, Father Kane. Both were desperately trying to explain to the mass of logicians present that there is something which can be called an essence, and that science is, after all, in search of such essences. They were politely listened to, but nobody took them very seriously. Of course this was due, to a large extent, to their unpreparedness to meet an ambiance such as existed at Stanford – they were both talking in incomprehensible languages. But this was not the only cause of failure; most of their listeners were hardened positivists, who considered all talk about essences as pure mythology.

Similar situations arise very often. They arise not only when Soviet thinkers are meeting, say, American or French philosophers, but also – and this must be stressed – in discussions with the so-called 'revisionists' of the East-European countries. There also, a Soviet Marxist-Leninist will feel lost and will find nobody to take him seriously. And it is not because those 'revisionists' are positivists, because mostly they are not. The reason lies deeper than that. The 'revisionists' are anthropocentrists, in the same category with the Kantians and the existentialists, and in sharp opposition to the clearly cosmocentric approach of the Soviets. For the latter, man is certainly the highest entity in nature, but he is still a part of it, even if a very peculiar part. One cannot understand anything in anthro-

pology without starting with the general laws of nature, with the study of dialectics, i.e. with dialectical materialism.

In that respect also, Thomism is one of the very few trends which assumes a similar attitude. Practically all other present-day philosophical trends, linguistic analysis, existentialism, the recent forms of phenomenology, neo-Kantianism (which appears to be still alive) and the Western variety of 'Marxism' are anthropocentric.

VIII

The similarities outlined above should, nevertheless, not prevent us from seeing the deep differences between both schools. Many of them are perhaps only the result of a different terminology and a different level of analysis, which, in practically every respect, is far higher in Thomism. But even apart from such superficial differences, which might be overcome, there are some fundamental divergences of views. The opposition in all religious questions has already been mentioned. One other important field where the schools are in sharp opposition is the conception of the relations between faith and knowledge – or, if one prefers a less religious terminology, between *Weltanschauung* and science. To a Thomist it is obvious that the Marxist-Leninists have not reached the Thomistic level of insight in that question and that they are constantly confounding one with the other; constantly invoke science where this has nothing to say and where their assertions are based on an act of faith – as, for example, when they are talking about the spatial infinity or the unicity of the world.

Besides that, there is Hegel. If Soviet philosophers would consistently follow Hegel, then, of course, the gap between both schools would become very considerable. Thomists are partisans of a modified Aristotelianism – and there is perhaps no philosophy so radically anti-Aristotelian as that of Hegel; personally, I think that there is very little outside of Hegel to oppose the great Greek philosopher on his own level. So if Marxism-Leninism, following the advice of the 'later' Lenin, would turn Hegelian, the differences would be more and more apparent and basic.

In fact, many contemporary Soviet philosophers actually seem to indulge in a tendency toward 'hegelianising' Marxism-Leninism. But I think that they will always have difficulty in doing it thoroughly, for they are dialectical *materialists*, not pure dialecticians, and if 'materialism' means

anything in that context, it means Aristotelianism, with its theory of absolute truth, of 'reflection', of the substratum, etc. Now the similarities with Thomism seem to arise mostly insofar as Marxism-Leninism defends such 'materialist' elements in its doctrine.

IX

Perhaps a sort of prognosis might be allowed in conclusion to these remarks. What is the future of the doctrines which are upheld in common, if without any sort of collaboration, by Thomists and Marxist-Leninists? To give an immediate answer to this question, I would say that the future does not look bright at all.

To begin with Thomism, one must say that it is in a bad if not desperate state. While it produced a number of real philosophers during the first half of the 20th century, they seem to be gone now and to have little influence. Actually, the Church has reversed its old policy, and it seems that in most of its schools Thomism is no longer being taught. Mystical ideologists, like Teilhard de Chardin and existentialisms of every possible shade seem to be far more popular among Catholics than Thomism. A leading representative of one of the most important philosophical institutes, and supposedly a Thomist, said in public that no philosophy of being is possible without reference to the self. Thomism is undergoing one of its greatest defeats in history.

The situation of Marxism-Leninism seems to be far better. After difficult years of oppression by unintelligent tyrants, it is just starting to work with enthusiasm. The general impression is that, if the general level of its literary production is still rather low, it is continuously improving. Yet, I am not so sure that the impetus will be durable. I personally feel that the 1950 conference on Pavlov was a disastrous defeat for dialectical materialism. How could any discerning dialectical materialist allow something of that sort? But that is not all. If I am not very much mistaken, there is a continuous erosion of Marxist-Leninist doctrines by an increasing number of quite different 'Marxisms'. I personally regret, but find it symptomatic, that so many Soviet philosophers no longer use the term 'Marxism-Leninism' but speak instead of 'Marxism' *tout court*. Also, what is happening in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and in other Communist countries, combined with the thought of some Western Communists, may not

be without effect. There is a real possibility that Marxism-Leninism as we know it will be slowly but surely corrupted by those influences – I mean that it will lose those elements which appear to me valuable.

X

But the fact that the general situation is not good should not influence a philosopher in his work. After all, what the many (Plato's *hoi polloi*) think is irrelevant to him. He also has a social responsibility for doctrines he believes to be true. Socially speaking it would be very beneficial if all philosophers who upheld such doctrines in common could realise their community of views and form a sort of common front against scepticism, irrationalism, subjectivism, and simple nonsense.

It would therefore be most desirable if Thomists and Marxist-Leninists would stop talking without information about the other's position and make a serious attempt to *understand* it. It has always been the policy of this journal to promote such understanding. The success is, one must confess, rather modest. The great majority of non-Communist philosophers know very little about Marxism-Leninism; and the Marxist-Leninists, even those who are relatively well informed about Thomism, are producing such articles as the latest one by Byxovskij.

The desideratum of a better understanding between Thomists and Marxist-Leninists, while being paramount, does not exclude other philosophers, who would share all or some of the doctrines common to both schools, e.g., the Whiteheadians.

Practically, this could take the form of meetings which would be devoted to discussing *common* doctrines. Why not meet a few times and talk together about the Kantian influences in existentialism (ego-centrism), about the primacy of ontology, or about similar topics? Philosophers who would take the initiative of organising such meetings would contribute more to the development of philosophy than those who go on discussing relatively secondary problems (secondary for philosophers, even though they might be of primary importance to politicians).

J. M. Bocheński

REFERENCES

[1] B. Byxovskij, 'Partii v filosofii i filosofskij kamuflaž', *Kommunist*, 1967,1, 122–128. This 'pamphlet' is concerned with my article 'On partijnost' in philosophy' (*SST*, **5**, 1965, 1–11). I am rather astonished to see Byxovskij answering – in a review nearly as long as the study concerned – the first installment of my article, which, by the way, does not even touch on the most important questions, like that of class-committment etc., reserved for the second part (not yet published). Also, while being pleased to see a Soviet philosopher devote so much attention to my modest speculations about the meaning of a term, I am rather distressed by the fact that the author did not read it carefully. For in several places he attributes to me statements, which either I did not make or directly denied. Here are three instances: (1) Byxovskij, p. 122.: "As it seems, 'partijnost", a *purely Russian* invention, is inaccessible to a translation in *other languages*." I wrote, p. 10, note 1: "The term is *difficult* to translate into *English*, without using a rather barbaric expression like 'party-mindedness'." I *do* speak German and know that there is in that language 'Parteilichkeit'. But how would Mr. Byxovskij translate it into English? (2) Byxovskij, p. 122: "'partijnost' is for Bocheński the *rejection of objectivity*, the synonym of prejudice, of bias." I said just the opposite, p. 3: "As asserted in Soviet philosophy the doctrine of 'partijnost'' is by no means a simple theory. The least one can say about it is, that it is a product of several sentences which, at least apparently, deal with quite different matters... (namely:) 1. 'partijnost'' as opposed to problematicism... 2. Partijnost' as opposed to individualism... 3. The doctrine of partijnost' as sociologism... 4. Partijnost' as an emotional attitude." There is not a single word about the rejection of objectivity etc. (3) Byxovskij, p. 123: "First of all 'partijnost'' is supposed to mean the rejection of problematicism, rejection of the fact that *there are* philosophical problems, the solution of which is not known." In my text, after stating two extreme interpretations of that point, one of which is, that every philosopher holds a solution for every philosophical problem, I said, p. 5.: "What is meant by Soviet philosophers must be something intermediary...: all philosophers do hold a solution for every *basic* problem" (and *not* for *all* – contrary to what Byxovskij says). It is unnecessary to list further instances. But I am afraid that some Communist may say that Byxovskij is a dangerous *sabotažnik*, who renders the defence of Communist doctrines difficult by such lack of attention to what he is talking about; that would be a pity indeed. (All italics in this note were supplied by me.)

[2] It will be enough to remind one of the works of G. A. Wetter, Th. Blakeley, H. Dahm, N. Lobkowicz, and others.

[3] Byxovskij, p. 123.

[4] Here Byxovskij uses a strange method, which I shall call 'classify and club'. It is like this: (1) You put your adversary into a class well described by a convenient name ('idealist','Thomist','Machist', etc.); (2) You define that class by quoting a few sentences from one or two writers also put into that class; then draw a general metaphysical, ontological, epistemological (etc.), view which every member of the class has to hold; (3) Then you ascribe (logically) those views as a whole to the patient; (4) And finally you club. Now there may be people who really do not deserve to be clubbed, because I do not think this a strong philosophical argument, but being defined by the common teaching of such a group, because they simply repeat what they read in the Classics and the current *Osnovy*. But I have never done this. I claim therefore the right to be judged not according to an *a priori* definition of a 'Thomist', but according to what I actually wrote. Now I *did* write a number of books, which are, I submit, rather widely circulated.

I am responsible only for what I said in them and for nothing else. I also dislike very much being called an '-ist' of any kind. – Incidentally, this article is not a plea for Thomism, but a study of certain similarities between it and Marxism-Leninism, with a few practical conclusions.

[5] Th. Blakeley, *Soviet Scholasticism* (Sovietica), Dordrecht, 1961.

[6] I prefer not to quote the gentlemen in question; their names are, however, at the disposal of all interested.

[7] Byxovskij, p. 126.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 127.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

PHILOSOPHY HOLDINGS IN SOVIET AND EAST-EUROPEAN LIBRARIES

During visits to Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia at the end of 1964, and to the Soviet-Union in mid-1966, I checked the philosophy holdings of major research libraries, using as a sample 20 works by eight major 20th-century thinkers. The 20 works are intended to be broadly representative; they include studies in phenomenology, existentialism, positivism, linguistic analysis, pragmatism, speculative philosophy (Whitehead), and 'Hegelian' Marxism (Lukács). I have not included works by Soviet, East-European, or West-European Marxist-Leninists – which are amply provided by all five of the libraries in question.

The works are mainly in the original languages; there is a scattering of translations into other Western languages (e.g., Husserl, Heidegger, and Whitehead into French) and into East-European languages (e.g., Sartre into Polish and Hungarian, Wittgenstein into Hungarian and Serbo-Croatian, Lukács into Serbo-Croatian). Only one of the 20 titles – Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* – exists in a Soviet-Russian translation, although there is a 1909 Russian translation of Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* in the Warsaw University Library. There are more Serbo-Croatian translations of contemporary philosophic works – the 20 here listed, as well as others – than Polish, Hungarian, and Czech translations combined.

In general, those libraries which have a higher proportion of the 20 works also have a higher proportion of other philosophic works by these eight authors, as well as a higher proportion of works of roughly comparable thinkers, e.g., William James, Gabriel Marcel, Karl Jaspers, John Austin, Henri Lefèbvre. The same is true of the works of earlier non-Marxist and non-materialist philosophers – Plato, Berkeley, Hume, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, *et al.* Where many primary sources are held, many secondary sources tend also to be held: e.g., Warsaw University Library and the Combined Library of the Philosophy

Selected Philosophic Works listed by Five Major Soviet and East-European Research Libraries (1964–1966)

	Belgrade (Univ.)	Budapest (Univ.)	Moscow (Lenin)	Prague (Univ.)	Warsaw (Univ. & Phil./Soc.[a])
J. Dewey					
Experience and Nature (1925)	0	1	1	1	4
Logic: Theory of Inquiry (1938)	1	1	2	1	1
M. Heidegger					
Sein und Zeit (1927)	1	2	2	0	3
Holzwege (1950)	1	1	0	0	1
Einführung in die Metaphysik (1953)	1	1	0	0	1
E. Husserl					
Logische Untersuchungen (1900–1901)	1	1	1	2	6
'Husserliana' series, Vol. I et seq. (1950–)	1	1	1	1	2
G. Lukács					
Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (1923)	1	1	0	0	0
Der junge Hegel (1948)	2	1	2	1	4
M. Merleau-Ponty					
La Structure du comportement (1942)	1	1	1	2	2
Phénoménologie de la Perception (1945)	0	0	0	1	2
Les Aventures de la dialectique (1955)	1	0	0	0	2
J.-P. Sartre					
L'Être et le Néant (1943)	1	1	2	1	5
L'Existentialisme est un humanisme (1946)	1	2	1	1	4
Critique de la raison dialectique (1960)	0	1	0	0	3
A. N. Whitehead					
Science and the Modern World (1925)	2	0	2	0	5
Process and Reality (1929)	0	0	0	0	1
Adventures of Ideas (1933)	1	1	2	0	1
L. Wittgenstein					
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921)	2	3	1	0	3
Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953)	1	0	0	0	4
Total no. of works	16	15	12	9	19
Total no. of copies	19	19	18	11	54

Key: 0 = title not listed; 1 = one copy listed; 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 = two, three, four, five, or six copies listed.

[a] Special library of departments of philosophy and sociology, Warsaw University.

Statistical Summary: Soviet and East-European Library Holdings (duplicate copies not counted)

I.	Total of all five libraries (by *author*):	
	Dewey: 9 out of 10 possible listings, or	90%
	Heidegger: 10 out of 15	67%
	Husserl: 10 out of 10	100%
	Lukács: 7 out of 10	70%
	Merleau-Ponty: 9 out of 15	60%
	Sartre: 10 out of 15	67%
	Whitehead: 8 out of 15	53%
	Wittgenstein: 6 out of 10	60%
	Ranking (from most to least adequately represented in the five libraries): Husserl (100%), Dewey (90%), Lukács (70%), Heidegger and Sartre (67%), Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein (60%), Whitehead (53%).	
II.	Total of all eight authors (by *library*):	
	Belgrade: 16 out of 20 possible listings, or	80%[a]
	Budapest: 15	75%
	Moscow: 12	60%
	Prague: 9	45%
	Warsaw: 19	95%
	Ranking (from most to least complete holdings): Warsaw (95%), Belgrade (80%), Budapest (75%), Moscow (60%), Prague (45%).	

[a] Some of the unlisted titles are included in the uncatalogued Philosophy Department Library, which is open to faculty members and graduate students.

and Sociology Departments of Warsaw University, which have a high proportion of works by Heidegger and Whitehead (and also Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, *et al.*) also have a high proportion of commentaries on Heidegger and Whitehead (and also Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, *et al.*).

On the basis of my own observations, private libraries in Belgrade, Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw (and also Zagreb, Bratislava, and Cracow) are much better supplied with works of contemporary philosophers than private libraries in Moscow (or Leningrad). This is understandable in view both of the relatively easy contacts between East- and West-Europe and the fact that many items in private East-European libraries were acquired before Communist regimes came into power.

Ranking by adequacy of library holdings in philosophy – or even of library holdings across a range of disciplines – is not a reliable index of general cultural and intellectual freedom. As of mid-1966 there is greater cultural and intellectual freedom in Czechoslovakia than in the Soviet-Union, despite the fact that the Lenin Library holds 60% and the Prague

University Library only 45% of the 20 titles. Similarly, there is greater cultural and intellectual freedom in Yugoslavia than in Poland, despite the fact that the two Warsaw libraries checked hold 95%, and the Belgrade University Library only 80% of the 20 titles.

The statistics and rankings, by author and by library, are given in the above tables.

George L. Kline

A BOOK ON AQUINAS

The publishing house *Mysl'* (which is actually publishing most of the serious Soviet literature) has, among others, a series 'Mysliteli prošlogo', 'Thinkers of the Past'. In that series, booklets on Epicurus, Bruno, Montesquieu, Herder, and Fichte have already been published. A new item is a volume on Aquinas (Juzef Vorgoš, *Foma Akvinskij*, M. 1966, 212 pp.). It is not an original Soviet work, but a translation from Polish. The author is said to be an *ad'junkt* (assistant) at the chair (*kafedra*) of dialectical and historical materialism in the Warsaw Military-Political Academy. It is a characteristic fact that it was necessary to get a foreign and, more specially, a Polish book on that subject. In fact, the number of specialists in mediaeval philosophy in the Soviet-Union seems to be rather small, and their knowledge – as manifested by the articles published up to now – rather limited. On the contrary, the Communist philosophers in Poland have had, from the very beginning, to deal with a vigourous Neo-Thomistic school; Poland is, namely, the only Communist country in Europe where there exists a significant school of Neo-Thomists, represented by some well-informed and active thinkers (Swieżawski, Krąpiec, etc.). On the other hand, the Polish CP obtained the collaboration of at least one specialist in mediaeval philosophy (Legowicz).

This explains why the level of this volume is by far superior to anything else published up to now in the Soviet-Union on Aquinas, and this in spite of the fact that the series does not pretend to be destined for specialists, but belongs to a type of *haute vulgarisation*. The author knows at least some works of Aquinas (he quotes the *Summa Theologiae* and the *De Regimine Principum*) and the most important recent works of Neo-Thomists (Garrigou, Gilson, Manser, Maritain). He does not proceed by the method known as 'quote and club', but tries to analyze the texts. He

quotes about 40 pages of selected texts from Aquinas. On the whole this is an immense progress.

Of course, the book is not intended to supply knowledge, but arguments in favor of Marxist-Leninist positions. Consequently, the author does not look, at least in most cases, for what might be interesting or positive in the thinker he writes about, but for weaknesses and errors. Also, he is so dominated by the dogma, according to which everybody who is not a Marxist-Leninist has to be a sort of 'fideist', that he says astonishingly false things, e.g. about the relations between science and theology ('faith' would be the more correct expression, p. 50f.). Also, the texts are selected in such a way, that they give the reader a completely one-sided view of Aquinas. That the dogma of Engels about the 'basic problem of philosophy' is taken over, was to be expected; and the author labors hard to twist the doctrine under consideration into a shape which would allow him to call it 'idealist'. The most inaccurate are, I feel, the considerations about the freedom of will and pre-determination (pp. 134ff.).

Yet, this book, which has been printed in 10000 copies, will bring, after all, some knowledge about Aquinas to Soviet philosophers, who were talking in a still less intelligent way about him up to now. Its publication in Russian is one of the growing contributions of non-Russian Communist countries (above all of Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany and Poland) to Soviet philosophy.

J. M. B.

DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGY

Professor Gorskij dedicates to the memory of the late Mrs. S. A. Janovskaja his new volume on the problems of the general methodology of science and of dialectical logic (D. P. Gorskij, *Problemy obščej metodologii nauk i dialekticeskoj logiki*, Mysl', M., 1966, 374 pp.). Yet, one might wonder if Mrs. Janovskaja, an outstanding logician, who did much for the development of scientific logic in the Soviet-Union, would have approved of such a 'methodology of science'; for the book is more concerned with *philosophy* of logic, than with methodology, as it is currently understood by those who know scientific logic. Consider the titles of the chapters: 'Means and methods of reflecting reality used in scientific knowledge'; 'The process of reflecting movement'; 'The problem of the contradictions and the

difficulty of reflecting movement'; 'The concept and the ways of its constitution'; 'Development of concepts and of scientific theories'; 'Truth and social practice'. At the same time one looks in vain for the word *verojatnost'* (probability) in the otherwise excellent index. Is it possible that probability is of no interest for methodology, whatever it might be, dialectical or not dialectical? Perhaps it is so, but then the word 'methodology' is used in a way which has very little to do with its current use.

One may think that this is just a question of terminology. I believe that it is more than that. For if *this* is the only methodology offered – and this is what regularly happens with the Dialecticians – no room is left for the very real problems with which everybody who wants to understand science, has to struggle. Something very similar was happening – and often still does – with so-called 'formal' logic. It was mostly conceived (as by Neo-Thomists, Marxists-Leninists in the past, and *most* philosophers of Western continental Europe) as a philosophy, not as a logic proper – and in the name of that philosophy every effort to study genuine logical laws was (and largely still is) condemned. The 'Logic' of professor Gorskij belonged to *this* class of 'logics'; he is now adding a 'methodology' like it.

This is not intended to mean that the book is devoid of interest. It certainly merits much attention as a book on philosophy of logic. Some of the chapters (e.g. those dedicated to the formation of concepts) merit even the attention of the methodologist. But on the whole it must be considered as apt to hamper the normal development of methodology in the Soviet-Union, especially as the author enjoys such respect and authority.

J. M. B.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The *Bibliografija sovetskoj bibliografii 1965* (Kniga, M., 1966) which was authorized for print on IX.20.1966 and has just been published, contains little about Soviet *philosophy*. We note however:

Novaja sovetskaja literatura po filosofii. Knigi i stati po dialektič. i ist. materializmu, istorii filosofii, logiki i psixologii. Lit. dostupobšaja v B-ku... Izd. s 1946 g. Ežemes. M. (Fuhdam. b-ka obšč. nauk im. Volgina). 325.

A NEW PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY

There is now in the Soviet-Union a second short philosophical dictionary: *Kratkij slovar po filosofii* (Izd. Polit. Lit., M., 1966, 360 pp.). It has been edited by I. V. Blauberg, P. V. Kopnin and I. K. Pantin; about 60 other philosophers collaborated. This new dictionary is exceedingly well presented – a very rare thing up to now in Soviet philosophical literature. It is a small volume ($6\frac{3}{4}$ by $5\frac{1}{2}$″), nicely bound and printed on good quality paper in clear type. As far as the content is concerned, it is mostly systematical. There are no names of philosophers as items (however, an index of the most important ones is added on pp. 347–359, with dates of birth and death and a short biographical sketch). The standpoint is very similar to that of the last edition of the Dictionary by Judin and Rozental'.

J. M. B.

REVIEWS

I. Ja. Ščipanov (ed.), *Russkie prosvetiteli (ot Radiščeva do dekabristov). Sobranie proizvedenij v dvux tomax*, M. 1966, 440, 478 str.

P. L. Lavrov, *Filosofija i sociologija. Izbrannye proizvedenija v dvux tomax*. Red. I. S. Knižnik-Vetrov i A. F. Okulov, M. 1965, 752, 703 str.

For many years Soviet publishing in the history of Russian philosophy has been closely restricted to the works of such approved 'materialist' thinkers as Lomonosov, Radiščev, Herzen, Belinskij, and Černyševskij. With the exception of Tolstoj and Dostoevskij, the Russian idealist and religious philosophers who contributed so mightily to the development of Russian culture in the 19th and early 20th centuries remain entirely unpublished in the Soviet period.

The present works, new titles in the 'Philosophical Heritage' series of the Moscow publishing house *Mysl'*, are significant because they represent a step, however small, beyond the usual confines, to some figures long absent from the Russian scene – figures who, in some lights (and to some earlier Soviet interpreters), have seemed distinctly 'idealist'. Not that the Soviet editors of these volumes parade the idealism of their subjects. Indeed, great pains are taken to stress the intimate bonds between these thinkers and the materialist movement in Russia, and from one point of view the present volumes are interesting primarily as demonstrations of the extent to which 'materialism' can be stretched to accommodate the Russian philosophical patrimony.

In the case of the late 18th and early 19th-century thinkers whose works are included in *Russkie prosvetiteli*, it is not difficult for the editor to justify calling them defenders of "advanced principles in philosophy". For they lived in an age when materialism could not have been expected to flourish in Russia. If they eulogized natural law and private property, they also showed their progressive spirit by condemning autocracy and serfdom; if they spoke of 'God' and 'the soul', they also opposed what the editor calls 'orthodox Christianity' and criticized Kant and the German idealists. And since to Soviet philosophers 'advanced principles' must lead in the direction of materialism, the editor does not hesitate to say that the thinking of these early Russian philosophers "inclines toward materialism", and even that "basically they preached materialistic ideas", though he adds that these ideas "frequently suffered from deistic limitations and inconsistencies".

The thinkers represented are P. I. Čeliščev, V. V. Passek, A. F. Bestužev, I. P. Pnin, V. F. Malinovskij, V. V. Popugaev, A. S. Kajsarov, A. S. Lubkin, T. F. Osipovskij, and A. P. Kunicyn. The editor, professor Ščipanov of Moscow

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State University, who is the dean of Soviet scholars in the history of Russian philosophy, contributes a general introduction as well as informative biographical and bibliographical notes. Understandably, the works selected for inclusion are those in which these writers came closest to social radicalism and philosophical materialism. The editor fails to point out, for example, that Lubkin's religious orientation was much more evident in his later writings on morality and metaphysics, and of course none of these writings appear in the volume. Still, the publication here of Popugaev's *O blagopolučii narodnyx tel* (1801–1802), Lubkin's *Načertanie logiki* (1807), and Kunicyn's *Pravo estestvennoe* (1818–1820) – to name only the most substantial works which are included, in their entirety – is a considerable service, entitling professor Ščipanov to the gratitude of everyone interested in the history of Russian philosophy.

In the case of Lavrov, the editors' situation is somewhat more awkward. Pëtr Lavrov, the chief theoretician of Russian Populism and one of the most learned of 19th-century Russian philosophers, knew the work of the earlier Russian 'materialists' and was a contemporary of Černyševskij; he was in a position to know the 'truth', yet he refused to subscribe to it. Worse, he explicitly criticized materialism as a philosophical system, admired Immanuel Kant, developed what he called a 'subjective method' in social philosophy, and declared that critical thought is the motive force of history. For these sins Lavrov was in effect excommunicated by Soviet scholars, despite his great services to the cause of Russian revolutionary Socialism and his close friendship with Marx and Engels. A projected eight-volume edition of some of Lavrov's works (chiefly his political writings) was cut short in 1935 after the publication of the fourth volume, and none of his works has been printed in the Soviet-Union since that time.

For the present rehabilitation of Lavrov, the editors have again chosen the path of 'materializing' an otherwise 'idealist' thinker, but in this case the path has been prepared over a period of several years. In 1955, the *Kratkij filosofskij slovar'* still dismissed Lavrov as a 'subjective idealist'. In 1963, however, this description was tempered slightly: the *Filosofskij slovar'* of that year says simply that his views "inclined toward subjective idealism". In the following year, with the publication of the third volume of the *Filosofskaja enciklopedija*, a further step was taken: Lavrov's philosophy was called "a kind of intermediate link between the materialism of Černyševskij ... and the neo-Kantianism and subjectivism of Mixajlovskij". Now, in the work under review, the editors go further still. Despite Lavrov's 'limitations' and 'inconsistencies', they argue, he viewed himself as belonging "to the same camp as the materialists", and in his philosophy he adopted "on the whole, a materialistic point of view".

However grotesque this characterization, the fact remains that the present work makes Lavrov's writings available to Russian readers. True, his important critique of materialism (*Mexaničeskaja teorija mira*) is missing, but most of his other major philosophical writings, including his essays on Hegel and the influential *Istoričeskie pis'ma*, are included in their entirety, with helpful edi-

torial notes. (The senior editor, I. S. Knižnik-Vetrov (1878–1965), published a book on Lavrov in 1925 and prepared the ill-fated edition of his works in the nineteen-thirties.) The editors' introduction supplies useful biographical information, which is supplemented by the inclusion of Lavrov's brief autobiography. There is still no full biography, bibliography, or adequate critical study of this major Russian philosopher, but the present volume is an encouraging sign. The Soviet 'materialization' of Russian thinkers, however fanciful from a philosophical point of view, at least has the advantage of making some of their works publishable again.

James P. Scanlan

Helmut Fleischer, *Philosophie in der Sowjetunion 1964–1965* (Berichte des Osteuropa-Instituts a.d. Freien Universität Berlin. Heft 74) (Philosophisch-soziologische Reihe herausgegeben von Professor Dr. Hans-Joachim Lieber), Berlin 1966, 138 SS.

This book is a welcome addition to the scarce scientific literature about Soviet philosophy: it is a report of the most important articles published in the four leading Soviet philosophical magazines during the years 1965 and 1966. As a matter of fact, the author does not restrict himself to the said articles, but also quotes a number of books – including some published before 1965. The book is written by one of the best informed scholars working in the field and will render great services to all those interested in contemporary Soviet thought. It is, however, technical and destined for specialists.

The book is divided into two main parts. The first (pp. 9–40) is a general survey of the organization, division and problematics of Soviet philosophy. In the second, the author discusses a number of central topics treated by Soviet philosophers during the two years under consideration.

The first part contains, after a short chapter on the division of philosophy (pp. 15f.) and some remarks about the level of systematization in different disciplines (pp. 17–20), a survey of the literature in ten branches of philosophy, ranging from dialectical materialism to the critique of bourgeois views (pp. 21–40).

This part is particularly valuable as a guide for further study, because Dr. Fleischer here quotes practically every important writing on each subject-matter.

The second part is more doxographic – the aim is to present the views maintained by the various Soviet philosophers. The author divides the problems studied into two classes: the diamatic ones (the concept of matter, the ideal nature of consciousness, dialectics, and contradictions, pp. 41–73), and those concerning histomat (structure of histomat, the 'essence of man', theory of values, ethics, pp. 74–132).

Out of the whole a vivid image of philosophical work in the Soviet-Union emerges. The general impression one gains is that there is quite a lot of work going on, that many problems are being stated, and many solutions – often sharply opposed – offered. As Dr. Fleischer himself states, the result of this work can, certainly, not be called sensational, but is respectable and shows that there are in the Soviet-Union a large number of philosophers who earnestly strive for rational understanding of problems brought about both by the natural sciences and by social developments. At the same time, one is struck by the amount of work which, it must be said, is wasted on pseudo-problems connected with theories inherited from the classics – of which the Leninist definition of matter, the formulation of the 'basic problem' by Engels, or the doctrine of the 'coïncidence' are just a few instances.

The reviewer regrets that the author did not pay more attention to logical

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questions which are hotly discussed in the Soviet-Union today. But the field covered is so large, that no single worker is able to do equal justice to all its aspects – and probably everyone will be biased in one or in another way. However, Dr. Fleischer did supply an excellent tool of research.

J. M. Bocheński

Ästhetische Aufsätze (Studia Philosophica), Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1966, 223 pp.

The volume contains eight papers by seven Hungarian aestheticians. The first two of these appear under a common heading, 'Timely Questions – Controversial Questions', but are in fact translations of two separate newspaper articles by the present 'official' aesthetician in Hungary, József Szigeti. To say that these articles appeared in the daily organ of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' (Communist) Party, *Népszabadság*, is to indicate their general tone and orientation.

In fact, the first of these articles, 'On Meaningful Life and the Meaning of Art' is a doctrinaire critique of 'bourgeois', especially 'modern' art and a programmatic request for 'socialist realism'. It assumes without question that the 'lack of purpose' in 'bourgeois art' follows from the class-conditions of capitalist society and from its increasingly acute crises. 'Socialist realism', on the other hand, is based on conditions under Socialism. "The elimination of the opposition between classes and the opposition between individuals and society begins with the development of Socialism and is fully realized in Communism, which frees the individual from the pressure of the division of labor in that the wealth of society, its mastery and power over nature and over itself, becomes the inner wealth of the socialized individual. Therein consists the all-round harmonious development of personality". (p. 9). Few Western aestheticians would resist the temptation to close the book at this point. Which is a pity: it subsequently contains some ideas of value.

Szigeti's second article is a concentrated polemic directed against Máté Major, an influential professor of architecture in Budapest. The article, while containing remarks of interest has an *ad hominem* flavor which renders it unpalatable to the objective reader.

The second contribution, by János Maróthy, an aesthetician and critic of music, originally appeared in the theoretical organ of the Party, *Társadalmi Szemle*. Its present version is said by the editors to contain some ideas from his new work *Music and the Bourgeois – Music and the Proletarian*. Despite its ideologically orthodox background, the paper, entitled 'On Realism in General and Concretely', is a systematic exposition of some (partly) novel and valuable ideas. It makes the interesting point that Marxist aesthetics' conception of 'bourgeois realism' denotes just one species of realism in art, although it is usually taken as the *only* one. The main limitation of 'bourgeois realism' is that it "reflects reality from the viewpoint of the individual". Since it is characterized by the fact that it is such a '*bourgeois*' realism, not merely by its being a form of *realism*, its antidote is either 'bourgeois anti-realism' or 'realistic anti-bourgeoism'. It is evident that 'socialist realism' is of the second variety. All contemporary art can be graded from the lowest pole of 'bourgeois decadence' to the highest of 'socialist realism' according to the measure in which it overcomes the 'isolation-motive' of bourgeois art and reflects the social-human content of

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society. (Maróthy evaluates even individual works of art according to this standard. For example, he ranks Bartók over the dodecaphonists, and within the latter group Berg over Schönberg and Webern, and within the *Oeuvre* of Berg his opera *Wozzeck* over his other works.) Maróthy distinguishes two 'ways to socialist realism': one, 'from below' (i.e. through the efforts of the progressive masses) and the other 'from above' (through the works of artists). His documentation of the possibility of the former instance rests on quotations from Marx and a few references to pamphlets from underground Communist movements. And the way 'from above' is merely programmatic: it is said that it must rest on a detailed analysis of both form and content. Obviously, this is directed against those tendencies in Hungary (as elsewhere in the Socialist world) which accept any kind of non-representative art as long as it is said to have a 'socialist content'.

A valuable contribution to some aspects of aesthetics comes next in the volume: Iván Vitányi's 'Degrees of the Aesthetic Reflection of Reality'. Besides discovering and discussing a number of 'dialectical relations' in aesthetics, the actual contribution of the paper consists in the development of a suggestion made by the Soviet aesthetician Vanslov, according to which there are three different varieties of aesthetic phenomena: 'elementary verbal imagery', 'folk-art', and 'professional art'. Vitányi undertakes the challenging task of analyzing each of these as "degrees of the aesthetic reflection of reality". Whether or not one accepts the Socialist realist framework within which the discussion is couched, one would find it profitable to follow Vitányi's exposition with care. For, even if he does not hold the 'import' or 'meaning' of art to be its reflection of reality, as Vitányi does, the characteristics of the various forms of art, and of the pre-artistic elements in ordinary verbal communication, are rightfully analyzed in terms of the influences of the natural and social environment. It is to such an analysis that this paper makes its contribution.

'Our Slogan: Kafka?' is the title of the next selection from the pen of a leading Hungarian Marxist philosopher, László Mátrai. From his lofty position in the Hungarian ideological echelon, Mátrai's occasional offerings always had a solid ideo-political *raison d'être*. This time it was to counteract the dangerously swelling wave of admiration for Kafka, triggered by the 'Kafka-debates' of Prague, in March, 1963. While the paper contains a brilliant analysis of Kafka's aesthetic values, it soon becomes clear that it is proposed in view of an ideological goal, namely to prevent the development of a 'Kafka-cult' in Hungary and its unforeseeable damage to 'socialist realist' art and theory. Mátrai's advice: read Kafka but do not follow him. At the time of his paper's initial publication (October, 1963) this was evidently the wisest advice to offer.

István Király's paper 'Attila József' was written for, and appeared originally on, the 25th anniversary of the tragic suicide of Attila József, Hungary's first and greatest 'socialist realist' poet. Király set himself the task of analyzing József's *Oeuvre* as that of a consistently Socialist realist poet, throughout his many changes of mood and attitude. Although Király speaks of the poet in

terms which in the West are normally reserved for Shakespeare and Goethe ("Humanity learned. And the hunted, lonely son ... attained, from the lowest position to the greatest height: to immortality"), it is not certain that the Western reader would be acquainted even with József's name, let alone his poetry. (As Király himself admits at one point, József was the poet's, rather than the public's poet.) Written in a fine literary style, the article belongs more on the pages of a literary magazine than in a volume on philosophical aesthetics.

More philosophical 'technique' went into the composition of the finely shaded analysis of Adorno's aesthetics by Dénes Zoltai: 'The Musical Culture of the Present in the Mirror of the Aesthetics of Th. Wiesengrund-Adorno'. Adorno, an aesthetician who goes a long way on the Marxist path without – frustratingly for the Marxists – going *all* the way, presents a serious problem of evaluation. Zoltai's analysis was written as the opening paper of the 'Adorno-debate' of that noted center of Hungarian music theory, the *Bartok-Archiv*. No doubt, it fulfills this function admirably. But it is questionable what interest it has for aestheticians who are not unduly worried about Adorno's refusal to find a solution to the problems of modern music in the 'inevitable realization of Communist society'. In fact, Zoltai's main problem is: what *weltanschauliche* orientation characterizes Adorno's music-philosophy? His answer is: one which has lost the proper political perspective. Adorno does not account for modern music in reference to class structure and there is no category in his aesthetics for art's reflection of the fight against the inhuman reality of capitalism. Also, there are only thesis and anti-thesis in his aesthetics, and no synthesis. Zoltai points out a path for the Marxist criticism of Adorno, performing a service similar to Mátrai's in regard to ideological propriety in Hungarian aesthetics. (But is this of real interest to the non-Hungarian and non-Marxist aesthetician to whom this German-language volume is addressed? This question-mark is all the more a pity as Zoltai does have writings, e.g. on beauty in contemporary music, which *are* of general interest.)

The volume under discussion closes with a long paper by József Ujfalussy, 'The Process of Becoming (*'Entstehungsprozess'*) of Musical Logic'. On closer scrutiny this turns out to be a translation of the first five chapters of Ujfalussy's book, *A valóság zenei képe* (The Musical Image of Reality). As the present writer already reviewed this book (in *SST*, **4** and *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, **5**) he need not discuss its content here. But he should remark that an editorial omission, which runs throughout the volume, is especially serious here: there is no note to the effect that the contributions are translations of previously published papers, respectively of chapters in a previously published book. In fact, the opposite impression is conveyed, e.g. by the novel title of Szigeti's two newspaper articles.

Obviously, the book was produced to impress the non-Hungarian public with the accomplishments of current Hungarian aesthetics. But it is also evident that the editors could not quite make up their minds *whom* to impress: the serious

aestheticians, or the Party ideologues. They attempted to have their cake and eat it. As a result, the volume presents Hungarian aesthetics neither as fully orthodox, nor as satisfactorily sincere and original. But it does manage to show how diversified current Hungarian writings on aesthetics actually are.

Ervin Laszlo

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LÁSZLÓ RÉVÉSZ

POLITICAL SCIENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE: DISCUSSION AND INITIAL STEPS*

I. POLITICS AND SCIENCE

In order to understand correctly the Marxist-Leninist conception of political science, it is first necessary to see what meaning Marxism-Leninism gives to the concepts of 'science' and 'politics'.

(a) According to Marxist-Leninist theory, *politics* is the regulation of the relations between classes or between classes and the state. Thus it is an instrument of the class struggle, a weapon used by the state to suppress those classes opposed to the ruling class. While internal politics deals with the class struggle within one particular state, external politics is concerned with it on the international level. And just as the class struggle must be fought with a united front, so also must the internal and external politics of a Communist-ruled state form a unity. The attitude towards a hostile class should be identical on both the national and international levels.

The politics of a Communist state or a Marxist-Leninist party must be closely connected with ideology, i.e., with the reflection of social being. This means, of course, that socialist ideology must form the basis of the politics of the CP. In fact, since it is a dialectical ideology, it provides the CP with a basis for a highly elastic and adaptable line.

The most important characteristic of party politics is alleged to be its intimate connection with science, insofar as it is 'scientifically grounded', i.e., based upon an understanding of the objective laws of social development and a penetrating scientific analysis of social phenomena. Thus the politics of a Marxist-Leninist party must correspond to the objective laws of development, serving as a means for utilizing these laws in the realm of practical activity. The scientific character of party politics means that it is intimately linked with the 'science of sciences', with dialectical and historical materialism. This requires, among other things, that it take into consideration the time and place when selecting the correct tactical line for a particular problem.[1]

(b) The Marxist-Leninist view of science and scientific investigation is

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basically different from that of the West. According to the former view ideology and science are inseparable. Of course, in the case of the natural sciences this contact is only indirect, but even here ideological elements must be present. The most important difference between the natural and social sciences consists precisely in the fact that the former are only indirectly ideological and only indirectly carry a class character. Marxist-Leninist ideology is a scientific ideology, and all sciences must be connected with it in one way or another.[2] Thus 'pure science' or 'science for science's sake' is decisively rejected, and in its place is put 'science for the people'[3], whereby the 'people' is not equivalent to the population but includes only its 'progressive' elements, the select elite.[4] According to this thesis science and scientists must not be objective in the sense of a 'bourgeois objectivity'[5], since such an objectivity could only be advantageous for bourgeois reactionism.[6] They must be 'party-minded', i.e., directed and controlled by the party as are all elements of the ideological superstructure. Thus the scientist must strive for a 'party-minded objectivism' instead of a 'bourgeois objectivity'.[7] An attack against the principle of party-mindedness would be equivalent to an attack on the people and an attempt to deprive the people of an effective instrument.[8] The connecting link between science and party-mindedness is always ideology, itself an affair of the party.[9] Only with the aid of party-mindedness is it possible to discover the laws of development of society and nature.[10] And behind the party-mindedness of the scientist lies his political position, i.e., his membership in a particular class.[11] A party-minded science also contributes to the discovery and, at the same time, the formation of the will of the people.[12]

Of course, as the Yugoslavian political scientist Adolf Bibič warned, the party-mindedness of science and art can become deformed, as happened during the period of the cult of personality in the Soviet-Union and in other socialist countries.[13]

Thus science must serve the party and its policies, namely, the construction of Socialism and Communism. The Hungarian constitution of 1949 justified this thesis in the following way: "The Hungarian People's Republic effectively supports scientific work, which serves the interests of the people..." (Art. 49). Article 62 of the Polish constitution of 1952 likewise repeats this position: "The People's Republic of Poland provides for the manifold development of a science which bases itself on the most

outstanding accomplishments of humanity and progressive Polish thought, i.e., a science which stands at the service of the people."

It is clear that a Socialist or Communist regime can never permit a 'depolitization' of science or any contraposition of party-mindedness and science; further, it must decisively reject the view that science and ideology have nothing to do with one another. This is unequivocally confirmed in Gomulka's speech to the 13th plenary meeting of the CK of the Polish United Workers Party.[14] Those scientists who maintain that party-mindedness restricts the freedom of scientific creativity are only demagogues.[15] Any scientist who does not, in his work, take the given social formation into consideration and who does not give priority to common interests, is not party-minded.[16] On the other hand, a revisionist alteration of the official party line by the representatives of socialist science cannot be tolerated either.[17] Attempts to separate Marxist philosophy from practical party politics are branded as heresy, since, as one reads in the Czechoslovakian literature, the unity of philosophy and politics is a presupposition of the unity of progressive thought and revolutionary action.[18]

The subservient role of science carries with it the predominance of the technical and natural sciences over the humanistic sciences. For example, the institutes for social sciences in Hungary received only 3.3% of all grants allocated for the Hungarian scientific institutes.[19] While in 1960 about 50% of the Hungarian institutes for technical research employed more than 100 persons (12 had more than 200, the institute for telecommunications 509), there was not a single institute for humanistic sciences with 100 members.[20] The numerical proportions of natural scientists to social scientists in Poland are: in the institutes of the Academy of Sciences, 1:6; in all institutions of higher learning, 1:4.[21]

In support of this *de facto* condition the following argument is put forward: The state is not in a position to promote all branches of science in an equal manner; for this reason, those branches of science which are directly connected with production are most strongly supported. The social sciences have a *raison d'être* and deserve governmental support only insofar as they contribute to the planning and direction of the economy, propagate the internal and external policy of the state and party, and educate the citizens in the proper *Weltanschauung*.[22] Thus the social sciences must fulfill three tasks in order to be recognized and promoted:

(1) They must contribute to the correct organization of production and to the improvement of administration in the government and economy.

(2) They must carry on the struggle against the 'remnants of the past' in the consciousness of men, the struggle for the new man of Communism. Among these 'remnants', religion, bourgeois nationalism and crime are considered the most dangerous. The representatives of the social sciences must support internationalism, the correct Marxist-Leninist scientific *Weltanschauung* and the struggle against crime.

(3) Finally, they must fight for the international fame of the Soviet-Union, against bourgeois falsification and anti-Communism, and for peace, peaceful co-existence and socialism.[23]

It was in this direction that the Polish party chief Gomulka, in his address to the general meeting of the Polish Academy of Sciences, underlined the special importance of the social sciences. They must contribute to the triumph of socialist ideas in the consciousness of man and to the final defeat of reactionary theories.[24]

II. POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE SOVIET-UNION

In the Soviet-Union the 'scientific character' of the CP's direction of state and social affairs was elevated, several years ago to a basic principle of the construction of Socialism and Communism.[25] The movement for the 'Scientific Organization of Work' (NOT) includes several million workers. The difficulties encountered in the administration of the government and economy, the disappointments in the progress of the 'education of the new man', the negative experiences of the party reform of 1962, the difficulties in the international Communist movement, etc., all served to throw open the question, at the beginning of 1965, of whether or not the structure and promotion of the sciences as well as the activity of the scientists measured up to the new tasks which faced them. From several sides it was pointed out that the information and the scientists who would be immediately helpful to the party and state organs in the fulfilment of their tasks were scattered in numerous different branches of sciences or did not exist at all. For example, scientific information concerning the functioning of the party and state mechanism is to be found in the following branches of science: history (chiefly history of the party), philosophy, law, and the foundations of scientific Communism. The conse-

quences of such a decentralization of scientific information are the following:

(1) Since the problems of the political organization of society are not directly the task of any one branch of science, many important problems simply are not considered. The neglected problems concern mainly the form and method of the activity of the party organs and the mutual relations between the functioning of the party, state and economic organs.

(2) The statesman or political functionary finds the social scientists very inaccessible.

(3) The political organs do not have at their disposal a source of information concerning the scientific principles and requirements of their activity.[26]

Thus the problem centers on the point, whether there should be several 'political sciences' or a single 'science of politics' (political science) which would organize and transmit all relevant information.

One main position was put forward by F.M. Burlackij in a speech to the annual meeting of the Association for Political Sciences and later published as an article in *Pravda*. In this article Burlackij maintains that the above-mentioned deficiency can only be removed when the autonomous existence of a new branch of science – political science – is officially recognized.[27]

His argument is as follows: The 'scientific leadership of society' correctly became a generally recognized concept and a valid political watchword, since scientific leadership is one of the presuppositions of socialism. All the unnecessary reorganizations in the state and economic administration can be traced back precisely to the lack of scientific direction. If the social scientists had provided suitable recommendations, many fluctuations and undesirable consequences could have been spared. But the politicians and government officials often could find no answer in the works of the social scientists even to the most important problems of internal and external policy. As long as the corresponding research is divided among several branches of science, no significant change can take place. According to Burlackij, the solution lies in a more extensive differentiation of the Marxist-Leninist social sciences, in the detachment of the above-mentioned themes from the respective disciplines and in the merging of these themes into a new branch of science, political science. Such a differentiation is seen as a logical consequence of the deepening of theoretical research. Not

long ago the autonomous existence of Scientific Communism was recognized, and the results were positive.[28] This also should be the case with political science. In the twenties this group of problems was given greater attention, and even a special journal, *Xozjajstvo i upravlenie* (Economy and Administration) was published. Burlackij feels that this tradition should be continued.

The problem is formulated by Burlackij in the following way: The previous conception of 'many political sciences' (philosophy, history of the party, political economy, theory of the state and law, Scientific Communism, etc.) is false. One must first detach from the various 'political sciences' all problems of a political nature and then integrate them into a single branch of science, into *the* political science. In the opinion of Professor Marian Zychowski, the leading Polish political scientist, the differentiation of the social sciences (or political sciences) is closely bound up with an important tendency towards integration; the only question is which science should fulfill the integrating function. Here the various opinions are at odds. The jurists believe it should be the theory of state and law, others consider political sociology as more suited for this purpose.[29]

Burlackij was correct in maintaining that during Lenin's life a good deal of attention was given to the promotion of the political sciences (not to *the* political science). Nevertheless, as is often heard today, after his death social phenomena began to be interpreted *subjectivistically* and *voluntaristically*; the cognitive function of the political sciences (social sciences) became 'deformed' under the pressure of objective and subjective factors.[30]

Burlackij's statements awakened great interest in Soviet professional circles, and his recommendations were almost unanimously welcomed and accepted as correct. In February, 1965, at the annual meeting of the Association for Political Sciences in Moscow, it was Burlackij who spoke on the necessity of introducing *one* complex political science both as a branch of science and as a course of instruction at the institutions of higher learning. He took this opportunity to present his ideas to specialists in a much more concrete and thorough manner than he had done for the public in his *Pravda* article. It is thus justifiable to regard his paper as an expression of the general state of mind in the Soviet-Union concerning the new, complex political science. He emphasized that the necessity for this new branch of science arises from practice. Political science is called

upon to investigate the class relations both within the framework of a single society as well as on the international scale. Among other things it is to fulfill the following main tasks:

(1) It should examine the political system in the socialist countries, including

(a) the state: its role and methods of operation,

(b) the party: its role in society and in the state, the forms and methods of party leadership in the same,

(c) the political organizations: the coalition parties (in the peoples' democracies), the national fronts, etc.,

(d) the social organizations: the unions, the Komsomol, the various societies for art and science,

(e) the methods of scientific administration of society: the principles and limits of 'prognostication', the mechanism for working out political decisions and the supervision of their fulfillment,

(f) selection and change of the leading cadres,

(g) public opinion: its formation and influence on politics, the forms and methods of propaganda, especially the ways and means of increasing their effectiveness.

(2) It should investigate the problems of political power in the capitalist countries, especially in the developing nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

(3) It should make a thorough study of foreign policy, including

(a) the general principles of foreign policy,

(b) the mechanism of executing foreign policy,

(c) the principles of the relationships between Socialist and capitalist countries,

(d) the general principles and problems of the struggle for peace, peaceful coexistence, disarmament, etc.

(4) It should scrutinize the political currents of the present-day, their ideology and theory.[31]

The participants in the lively discussion supported Burlackij's ideas. In order to have a more or less complete picture of the variety of conceptions of 'political science' or 'political sciences', it is necessary to review shortly the most important contributions.

According to P.P. Gurcev, political science, i.e., the science of politics, is a complex, technical science belonging to the social sciences and having

Marxism-Leninism as its foundation. It is *the* political science which, in the present conditions in the Soviet-Union, can and should examine all political phenomena (i.e., class relations) in a complex fashion.

S.F. Kečekjan emphasized that political science is a new, independent science alongside the already existing social sciences. He made an attempt to delineate the boundaries of this new branch of science, but most of his colleagues found that he went too far.

V.M. Čxikvadze, Doctor of Legal Sciences and Director of the Institute of the AN for State and Law, adopted an intermediate position by taking pains not to disengage too much from the theory of state for incorporation into political science. He claimed that legal science also has a decidedly political character and significance and is thus likewise a political science. It was merely because of a deficiency in the development and promotion of the theory of state and law that it so often shut itself off from purely political problems (which explanation, nevertheless, was rejected by the other participants in the discussion). In the future, legal science, as a political science in the *broad* sense of the term, must offer more to practical politics. Political science in the *narrow* sense of the term should have as its field of investigation the political organization of society.

While Čxikvadze wanted to restrict the domain of political science as much as possible, V.E. Guliev proposed reducing the bailiwick of the theory of state and law. It would be relieved of some of its tasks by the new science, which, in his opinion, ought to include not only the juridical aspects of the state but also the purely practical and technical aspects. Also, a corresponding main course of study ought to be introduced at schools on the university level.

A number of legal scholars, e.g., S.N. Bratus, M.I. Piškotin, and others, wanted the special political science to concentrate chiefly on the forms and methods of operation of the party organs and the mutual relations between these, on the one hand, and the forms and methods of operation of the government and the economy on the other. They maintained that the establishment of a new science may not take place at the cost of the theory of state.

P.N. Galanža and V.F. Čirkin did not give so much consideration to the special interests of the legal sciences and the theory of state and law. Čirkin urged that political science, as a science concerned with state and social administration, should be a complex science which treats all

problems of the political organization of society. Galanža expressed regret that legal science is developing more and more in the direction of practical politics and is taking on a definite sociological character. In his opinion the jurist must be a 'legal scientist' (*pravolog*); the study of politics should be left to the representatives of political science.

Those participants who were not directly affected by the disengagement of a part of the theory of state almost unconditionally supported Burlackij's proposals.

V.A. Tumanov stressed the harmful consequences of a scientific system in which no attention is devoted to the complex investigation of the political activity of individual social groups. In this regard, a new complex science would have much to do. F.F. Petrenko saw the existence of an autonomous political science as necessary in order to support more systematically and comprehensively the activity of the CP. He pointed to a paradoxical situation: the party is the leading core of the state and society (constitution, art. 126); however, the problems of party leadership and their forms and methods are treated only at the *various* party courses, without any scientific foundation or any consideration of the sociological aspects. Also, the practical activity of the party and the state, the whole mechanism of party leadership, the social composition of the party, and its structural changes cannot be properly handled within the framework of the presently existing scientific disciplines. All of these *lacunae* can and should be filled by political science. According to M.A. Krutogolov, political science should also concern itself with the problem of the single-party (or multi-party) system in socialism as well as the voting system, the number of candidates, etc.

Several participants went even further than Burlackij with regard to the establishment and delineation of the limits of political science and put special emphasis on its significance for the practical needs of foreign policy. G.P. Zadorožnyj demanded the inclusion of the political aspects of diplomacy, G.B. Štrausenskij the consideration of the political experiences of the construction of socialism in the other socialist countries as well as the problems of the revolutionary movement in general. A.A. Galkin maintained that political science should aid in working out the tactics of the struggle for peace, democracy and socialism in the international arena. According to Arbatov, political science should embrace two broad themes, internal and foreign policy. Finally, V.V. Tumanov criticized those Soviet

scholars who wanted to have nothing to do with political science simply because the term was also current in the bourgeois countries. He emphasized that political science develops very differently in socialist and in capitalist states.[32]

The participants of the discussion declared themselves in favor of an independent political science, but they cautioned that the introduction of a new discipline at the universities would be premature (one must first create the scientific basis for the training of lecturers – L. R.). Finally, a commission was established at the Institute for State and Law to work out the problems of the new discipline.[33]

The discussion of Burlackij's proposals was not limited to the general meeting we have just recounted; scientists and political functionaries of all types expressed a position on the subject. The editors of *Pravda* received numerous letters from all parts of the Soviet-Union with regard to Burlackij's article. In these letters, Burlackij's initiative was greeted with much more sympathy than at the general meeting which was attended by precisely those jurists whose own discipline stood to be restricted by the new arrangement. The authors of the letters especially brought forward the tasks of the new science in the domain of foreign policy. The fact that these opinions appeared in *Pravda* and were evaluated in a positive fashion shows that political science as an independent branch of science is generally supported by the editors of *Pravda* and the responsible party organs (the Ideological Commission, the Department for Sciences of the CK, the departments for contacts with foreign countries, etc.).

The director of the Institute for Latin America, Academician S. Mixajlov, and several other members of his institute made the statement: "The political sciences already exist, but they have not yet formally received 'citizenship'; for this reason their development is hindered." The scope and quality of political research has lagged far behind the needs. The head of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the AN protested that studies concerned with international relations, the international workers' movement, the social structure of capitalist and socialist society, etc. were regarded only as historical, legal or philosophical works, although all of them differed both in theme and in method from these sciences and properly belonged to the domain of political science.

In the letters sent to *Pravda* by specialists, the following groups of problems were suggested as subject matter for political science:

(1) Political systems, questions concerning the direction, organization and administration of the state in the socialist system;

(2) Problems of political power in the capitalist and the developing nations;

(3) Problems of present-day international relations and theoretical questions of foreign policy;

(4) Basic questions of the international Communist and workers' movement as well as the national liberation movement;

(5) Current political ideologies and theories.

It must be mentioned that the first group of problems was considered as the most important.

Some contributors regarded political science as more or less co-terminus with Scientific Communism. To this the *Pravda* editors replied that Scientific Communism covers a considerably broader range of problems, i.e., the problems of the stateless social order and its laws of development.[34]

Following the above-mentioned annual meeting of the Association for Political Sciences, an important article on the problem of political science was published in *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (Soviet State and Law).[35] Here also a position is taken in favor of recognizing political science as an autonomous branch of science.

In this article the following argument is brought forward in support of its position: The conception became current, and still prevails in Soviet legal literature, according to which the only science capable of treating the theoretical problems of state and law is precisely the 'theory of state and law'. Nevertheless this thesis can no longer be upheld, since – as also underlined in the party program – the political organization of society includes considerably more than the state, in spite of the fact that the two are often regarded as identical. The political organization of Soviet society embraces the CPSU, the mass organizations, the cooperatives and agrarian associations, the Komsomol, the unions, the voluntary social organizations (social organs for the 'spontaneous activity' of the citizens), etc. And in the peoples' democracies the non-Communist parties and the peoples' fronts are to be added. All of this, the total political organization of society, must be incorporated into a single important branch of science, whereby the theory of state and law should limit itself to purely legal problems.

Thus even the official organ of the legal sciences wishes to grant political

science a broader scope than was originally conceived. The main task of political science is to be the analysis and scrutiny of political relations (class relations) both in socialist and capitalist countries, within the framework of a single state as well as between different states. The authors of the article are even agreed that a special course of study in political science (Theory of the Political Organization of Society) be introduced at the schools of university standing. It is to treat the following main problems:

(1) The social and economic foundations of the political organization of society (relations of production – in the sense of property relations, class structure, political structure, form of government), the reflex influence of political activity on the social and economic structure of society;

(2) The relation between the society, state and individual;

(3) The forms and methods whereby the people can participate in political activity (through their representatives or directly), the forms and methods of public opinion research, the referendum;[36]

(4) Methods of political operation (especially those of the state and social organs), methods of individual political work – for the purpose of bringing about the 'will of the people';[37]

(5) The organizational structure of the social groups (the parties, unions, farmers' associations, youth and women's groups, organizations for spontaneous social activity, etc.), including their participation in the execution of state power;

(6) The state apparatus, the distribution of jurisdictions, problems of coordination, etc.;

(7) The forms and methods of administering the economy.

Finally, the authors pointed out that in the event that this course is introduced at the university-level schools, there will have to be corresponding alterations in the teaching plans of several other disciplines. They have in mind philosophy, Scientific Communism, the theory of state and law, history of the party, and contemporary history.

Even the *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy) expressed a position on the problem of political science in a report on the general meeting of the Society for Political Sciences.[38] E.V. Tadevosjan, a reputable scholar, gave an account of the argument presented at the meeting and at the same time revealed his own stand. It is the goal of Marxism-Leninism to produce a complex system of philosophical, economic and political knowledge. Nevertheless, this does not mean that all economic,

social and political problems should be treated only in Marxism-Leninism in the narrow sense of the term. For example, Marxism-Leninism is also concerned with the political economy of Socialism; but, in spite of this, there exists an autonomous branch of science by the same name. The situation is exactly the same with political science. Scientific Communism discusses the general laws of development and the forms of the revolutionary (Communist) transformation of society. But concrete politics, just as concrete economy, does not fall under Marxism-Leninism. On the other hand, Tadevosjan considered it more appropriate to speak of concrete politics instead of political science.

Further details concerning the status of political science as an autonomous discipline and the pertinent discussions have not been made known. In line with general practice, the report of the above-mentioned commission will first be discussed by a smaller group, and it will be some time before this new branch of science is recognized and finally taught at the universities.

It must be mentioned that following a resolution of the CK passed on April 25, 1960, all high schools and technical schools have introduced as a required subject a course entitled 'The Foundations of Political Knowledge'.[39] Of course, this high-school course is significantly different from the course proposed for the universities. It was first introduced during the academic year 1961–1962 for the upper classes, with the express purpose of informing the students about the most current questions of party theory and politics. The course builds upon the previous knowledge of the students in the natural and social sciences, especially the history of the Soviet-Union and contemporary history. Its aim is the training of students in Marxist-Leninist *Weltanschauung* and the spirit of Communism. It discusses the inevitable victory in the world of Marxist-Leninist ideas, the world-wide significance of the October Revolution, the formation of the world socialist system, the complete and final victory of Socialism in the Soviet-Union as well as its period of full-scale construction of Communism. Besides this, it also includes the teaching of the Soviet constitution. Further, it supplies information on the political organization of Soviet society, the structure of the state, the complementary rights and duties of the Soviet citizens, the most important parts of Soviet law, the chief advantages of socialist democracy as opposed to 'deceitful and false bourgeois democracy', etc. And special attention is

devoted to the inevitable victory of peace, democracy ('socialist' democracy) and Communism throughout the world. According to the party decree, the textbook should comprise at least 290 printed pages.

In conclusion, the following points should be noted:

(1) It is characteristic of the often insufficiently considered actions of the Khrushchev era that the new discipline was introduced in the high schools without any consideration of whether or not the necessary teachers were available.

(2) The teaching of the 'Science of Politics', especially with regard to the problems of party work, party leadership and control in the state, economy and society, etc., is currently restricted to the various party schools, also designated 'political schools'. The present educational system of the party has three levels: the basic (or elementary), the intermediate and the advanced course of instruction. The lowest level is called 'Elementary Political School' (*načal'naja politškola*) and the intermediate level the 'Schools for the Foundations of Marxism-Leninism' (*školy osnov marksizma-leninizma*); the advanced level consists of a number of courses taught in different educational institutions and is thus broadly diversified.[40] The instruction lasts two, four, and two to four years respectively, on the three levels.[41] The syllabus for the three courses covers the greater part of those subjects recommended for inclusion in political science, but oriented in a much more practical direction.[42] The most highly respected central educational institution for higher political functionaries is the Academy of Social Sciences of the CK (*Akademia obščestvennych nauk pri* CK). Its aim is to train ideological functionaries for the central party organs, for the CK of the union republic parties, for the district and territorial (*oblast'* and *kraj*) committees, and to prepare teachers for the universities and specialists for the scientific research institutes. It was founded on the second of August, 1946, with the following sections: political economy, foreign economy and politics, general history, international relations, history of the Soviet-Union, dialectical and historical materialism, history of Russian and Western European philosophy, logic and psychology, theory and history of literature, and theory and history of art. For each subject there is one chair, which is open to regular and corresponding members of the AN and to those holding the degree of doctor of sciences. Thus it is a great honor to be able to teach at this party school. The course of studies lasts three years, with an additional three years for the 'aspir-

ants'. Besides the training of young scholars, the Academy also conducts research work. The various chairs were given the power to confer the title of candidate, with the subsequent confirmation of the academic senate. The academic senate itself was empowered to accept doctoral dissertations and grant the title of doctor of sciences.[43] There also exist special party schools, attached to the CK's of the republics (excluding the RSFSR), which must also be regarded as university-level schools for political sciences.[44]

III. POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE PEOPLES' DEMOCRACIES

While in the Soviet-Union political science as an autonomous discipline and as a university course of study is still in *statu nascendi*, in the peoples' democracies it can already look back on a certain tradition and is, in fact, already taught at the universities.

In *Hungary*, politics (i.e., political science) was one of the most important disciplines taught in the faculty of law until 1949. In that year it was replaced by the history of political doctrine, and two years later even this completely disappeared from the academic program. In Czechoslovakia discussions are still going on concerning the ways and means whereby this new discipline can be introduced both as a field of research and as a course of study at the universities. In Poland and above all in Yugoslavia a solution, although probably not a final one, has already been found.

The efforts of certain scholars in *Czechoslovakia* met with sharp protest from those who wished to isolate Marxist philosophy from the practical politics of the CP. The advocates of this separation pointed to the sad experiences of the cult of personality. During the period of the cult of personality, the party-mindedness of Marxist-Leninist science was conceived solely as the interpretation, justification and propagation of the party's daily policies.[45] The official answer to this heresy was that the correct solution lay in a closer approximation of politics and Marxism-Leninism, possibly within the framework of a new discipline, political science. The discussion about the introduction of political science as a separate branch of science began in Czechoslovakia during 1965,[46] taking as its point of reference the Czechoslovakian tradition. From 1945 until the fifties there was in this country a university-level school for political

and social sciences and subsequently a school for political and economic sciences.[47]

However, scholars later accepted the Soviet classification of the social sciences, which recognized only three disciplines within the framework of Marxism-Leninism: Marxist philosophy, political economy and the history of the Communist movement. One also found prevalent in Czechoslovakia the opinion that Marxism-Leninism embraced all the social sciences. The science of politics was treated as a part of the history of the Communist movement and thereby was always connected with the past. Nevertheless, experience showed that historical science can in no way replace political science. A number of politically relevant topics (strategy, tactics, ideology, internal problems of the CP, etc.) were not to be found in any branch of science. The political mechanism of leadership and the state and social organs were not considered in any science from the standpoint of their structural development and their functioning; they were treated exclusively in their historical development. Still more neglected were the political systems, political theories, foreign policy, etc.

It is held today that political science is the only interdisciplinary branch of science which can include all of these problems. The main advocate of political science in Czechoslovakia, F. Kratochvil, enumerates the following problems as belonging to the domain of political science: the political systems, the norms and laws of political leadership, the goals, functions and structure of the political institutions and the state and social organizations, political theory, international politics and its institutions, and the political relations between Socialist states and between Socialist and non-Socialist states; in short, the functioning of the political systems. Within the range of these themes, political science should supply well-founded recommendations to the responsible party and state functionaries for the solution of their practical tasks.

But even Kratochvil can conceive of political science only as a class-bound, party-minded branch of science. It must look into the problems of the Czechoslovakian political model and discuss from a class standpoint the meaning of the concepts liberty, equality, social justice, democracy, etc. And in accomplishing this task it must look beyond the present situation to possible future developments. In his opinion, the present concept of democracy is no longer adequate; political science must indicate the ways in which this concept can be extended, for "a broad national

discussion can signify merely a formal democracy; the decision handed down from above does not exclude democracy and freedom".

Kratochvil emphasizes the special importance of political science for the state and party functionaries, for journalists, political commentators in radio and television, for diplomats, etc. And in Czechoslovakian publications stress is laid upon the enhanced significance of political science as a consequence of the international situation (the policy of coexistence).[48]

The first step towards the recognition of political science was taken by the CK of the CP of Czechoslovakia, which, at Novotny's request, resolved to establish a research institute for political science to be attached to the CK. The institute must place the results of its research at the disposal of the top party and state leadership.[49] Of course, through this connection, the party-bound nature of political science will be highly accentuated.

It is Yugoslavia and Poland in which political science has already found recognition. The pioneer was Yugoslavia.

In *Yugoslavia* – as also in all of the other socialist states – the teaching of political sciences began at the various party schools after the Second World War. And as long as it was limited to the party schools, there was no deviation from the general situation in the Eastern bloc countries. Only in the fifties do we find in Yugoslavia the beginning of a step by step alteration of the system of political and ideological education. From 1950 to 1957 attention was turned to the critical Marxist analysis of the causes and results of socialist development and thereby also to the reorganization of the curriculum for the study of politics. Strangely enough, in Yugoslavia it was the jurists who called attention to the necessity for the systematic instruction of politics at the universities. The first actual course of political studies was introduced in the faculty of law at Belgrade; and, on the basis of this experiment, the other faculties of law soon followed suit. Some of the republics even established university-level schools for government or for political sciences, and in 1962 a new faculty for political sciences was organized at the University of Zagreb. Also in Belgrade and several other cities (e.g., in Laibach) there are in operation such schools for political sciences. The most highly regarded center for the training of political scientists was – and still is – Zagreb. The first curriculum of the Zagreb faculty was replaced in the academic year 1965–1966 by a second,[50] which had been revised on the basis of the resolutions and recommendations of

a national conference held in 1964.[51] According to this new academic plan, the course of study will last four years, as in all other faculties of Yugoslavian universities with the exception of medicine (five years) and technical subjects (five and a half years).

In the *first* year of study, the courses taught are of an introductory nature: introduction to political science; philosophy of politics, law and history; principles of general and political sociology; political economy; modern political history; methods of quantitative analysis; and foreign languages. The major subject is introduction to political science.

In the *second* year special attention is given to Yugoslav affairs: sociology of Yugoslav society; economics and political economy in Yugoslavia; history of civilization; modern political history of the peoples of Yugoslavia; political and economic geography; methods of investigating social phenomena; and foreign languages.

In the *third* year the following subjects are taught: political anthropology; history of political doctrine; principles of social and political psychology; modern political systems; science of government; the political system of Yugoslavia; modern economic systems and international economic relations; and foreign languages.

The required subjects of the *fourth* year are: the systematic science of politics; history of Marxism; the legal system in Yugoslavia; the *Kulturpolitik* in Yugoslavia with an introduction to the general problems of *Kulturpolitik*; international political relations; international law; and the theory of information and communication.

Besides the normal plan of studies there are also correspondance courses and post-graduate studies. After the students have completed eight semesters of study and have passed the prescribed examinations, they (as 'graduate political scientists') can enroll in post-graduate studies and attain the degree of Master of Political Sciences. This higher course of study is open not only to the graduates of the political faculty but also to students coming from the humanistic and social sciences.

There are many practical opportunities for political scientists in foreign service, journalism, personnel work, etc.

A section for political research was also established within the framework of the faculty of political sciences, so that the activity of the faculty would not be limited exclusively to teaching. The main tasks of this section are threefold: (1) the investigation of problems which are currently being

taught in the faculty; (2) the analysis of theoretical problems of politics, including international relations; (3) the study of those problems which arise in concrete social and political practice.

During the summer vacation the students must acquire practical experience in the various social and political organizations. Their observations are later to be worked out at the section for political research.

The faculty publishes its own periodical for political sciences, *Politicka misao* (Political Thought); founded in 1965, it assures the Zagreb faculty of a leading position in Yugoslavia in the area of political sciences.[52]

In the Eastern bloc proper *Poland* has displayed the greatest interest in political science.

This country can also look back on a certain tradition in the field of political science. Both before 1939 and after 1945 there were special courses of study in political science, for example, in the faculties of law at the universities of Warsaw and Kraców. After 1945 the following institutions were founded: the Academy of Political Sciences in Warsaw (Foreign Service College), the School for Social Sciences in Kraców, the School for Social Sciences of the CK of the Polish United Workers' Party, and the Military-Political Academy. There was also a whole network of party schools, as in the other Communist-ruled countries. Nevertheless, what was lacking was some connection of theory and practice and a sufficiently differentiated and complex system of political education. Until the academic year 1955–1956, 'The Foundations of Marxism-Leninism' was a required subject at all Polish institutions of higher learning. This course, the aim of which was the political education of the students, nevertheless failed to consider the mechanism of the present-day political systems, the structure of capitalism, political practices in capitalist countries, etc. For this reason, a new discipline was introduced in the academic year 1963–1964; it was called 'The Foundations of the Political Sciences'.[53] Today this discipline has purely a didactic character, as it fulfills an important ideological and political function. Some of the lectures are delivered by political and social functionaries to assure the unity of theory and practice.

Discussions on the subject matter of political science took place in Poland both before and after 1963 and contributed significantly to the working out of the main lines of the discipline. From these discussions emerged the following important conclusions:

(1) Political science is an autonomous discipline, possessing equal rights with all of the other social sciences.

(2) It takes in the boundary problems of such areas as law, economy, sociology of political relations, modern political history, social psychology, etc.

(3) It treats all of those boundary problems which had previously been investigated only fragmentarily and usually from the standpoint of one of the traditional disciplines.

(4) Further differentiation (and at the same time integration) will require the creation of new political disciplines, e.g., the theory of socialist politics, the theory of contemporary ideological and political doctrines, the theory of contemporary constitutional systems, etc.

(5) It is necessary to conduct interdisciplinary research, with the participation of members of all those scientific disciplines which have similar boundary problems.

(6) The course 'Citizenship Education' was introduced in the elementary and high schools without consideration of the fact that the required teachers were not available. These teachers should be trained in the department of political science.[54]

At the second all-Polish symposium concerned with these problems, the famous party ideologist Zenon Kliszko summarized the tasks and goals of the 'Foundations of the Political Sciences' in the following way:

> The main purpose of your discipline is to broaden the students' knowledge about party politics, the politics of the peoples' state (on the international level) and the mechanism of the organs of state power, so that the students will understand the main phenomena of internal and foreign politics. The instruction must not only supply the student with a store of information on these problems, but must also explain to him how the social, political and economic problems are to be analyzed. This discipline must elucidate the principles of the politics of the socialist and capitalist countries as well as of the countries of the 'third world'.

Kliszko stressed that ideological and pedagogical considerations were central here. Nevertheless, this discipline cannot replace but only complement the work already done at the universities by the political and youth organizations.[55]

Above all the new discipline must satisfy the demands expressed by the resolutions of the eleventh and twelfth plenary sessions of the CK and by

those of the Fourth Congress of the PZPR; here it was stated that students should be educated in such a way that they adopt a positive ideological and political attitude and a positive relationship towards the problems of the socialist state and the international workers' movement. In order that the new discipline can fulfill these exacting demands, it is to recruit teachers from the ranks of experienced and politically mature economists, historians, jurists, philosophers and even active politicians. They are to be appointed by the rector at the recommendation of the director of the section for the 'Foundations of the Political Sciences'; the director, however, must first obtain approval from the district (*wojewódstwo*) party committee and the Ministry of Higher Education.[56]

The 'Foundations of the Political Sciences' was introduced experimentally in 1963 at 13 institutions of higher learning (at all universities, two polytechnical schools, three teachers' colleges and the Warsaw School of Agriculture); it was taught in 23 faculties to third and fourth year students and comprised 45 hours per semester. In the academic year 1966–1967 it became a 60 hour two-semester course; it was offered by 27 institutions of higher learning, including 70 faculties, and is scheduled to be introduced in all such institutions by establishing teaching chairs, institutes and eventually even special faculties.

An investigation of student opinion showed that the students were especially interested in present-day problems. For this reason this course of study does not have to assume a historical orientation. Following the first provisional syllabus, a second, interdisciplinary program was put together. It consists of four parts:

(1) First subject-group (propaedeutic cycle): political theory, the domain of the political sciences.

(2) Second subject-group (descriptive cycle): the contemporary political and social systems of the world, the internal policy of the Polish Peoples' Republic and the problems of constitutional law. In this part special attention is given to the bourgeois states and the 'third world'.

(3) Third subject-group: the socialist camp and the workers' movement. The following particular problems are considered: (a) the key problems and lines of development of the workers' movement after World War II; (b) the relations between the Socialist states; (c) the problems of peaceful coexistence, the basic principle of the foreign policy of Socialist states; (d) the post-World War II foreign policy and military policy of the most

important capitalist powers; (e) the German question after World War II; (f) the policy of the Socialist states towards the developing nations; (g) the role of Poland in the world and the Polish foreign policy.

(4) Fourth subject-group: Polish political economy, on a comparative basis, including the economic cooperation with the Socialist camp and with the rest of the world, the sociology of the individual classes and strata of Polish society, industrial and agricultural sociology, etc.

In order to coordinate and direct the pedagogical and scientific work of the departments for this discipline at all Polish institutions of higher learning, there has been established at Warsaw University an organizational center for political sciences. It publishes a periodical, *Studia Nauk Politycznych* (Studies in the Political Sciences), coming out three to four times a year; the first issue appeared in mid-1966. The task of this journal is to supply information on organizational questions concerning the departments for political sciences, discussions of the program, and the organization and program of political sciences in other countries.[57]

At the head of the organizational center stands a scientific council, whose members include the directors of the sections for political sciences at the Polish universities. At the first meeting, held on July 3rd, 1965, the following proposals were approved:

(1) A special Institute for Political Sciences is to be established at Warsaw University.

(2) A system is to be worked out for training future teachers of political sciences (a course for doctoral candidates, positions for assistants, stipends, etc.)

(3) A commission should work out uniform scripta for all universities and institutions of higher learning. Representatives of the latter should comprise its membership.[58]

The proposed institute was, in fact, established and is now conducting research. One of its tasks is to coordinate the research carried on in the various sections for political sciences and to investigate the research methods themselves. For the moment, it is concentrating its efforts on: the modern Socialist state and the political systems in the Socialist countries; Polish domestic policy; the role of the socialist states in present-day international affairs; the contemporary political and ideological systems and the doctrine of the bourgeois state.

The institute works closely together with several other institutes at

Warsaw University, especially with the Polish Institute for International Problems and one of its offsprings, the East-West Institute.

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[6] *Ibid.*, S. 10.

[7] Cf. V.I. Lenin, *Sočinenija* [Works], izd. 4, t. 9, str. 380. Further, 'Vsesojuznoe soveščanie istorikov' [All-Union Conference of Historians], *Novaja i novejšaja istorija*, M. 1963,2, 3–43, here str. 16. The following is an excerpt from Ponomarev's speech: "The political content of the historical sciences serves as the criterion of party-mindedness; it depends upon the extent to which the historian makes his work a necessary, effective and useful part of the general activity and struggle of the people led by the CP. ... The scholar must always pay attention to the social significance of certain elements of his work. He himself must check what he is writing for the masses how his work contributes to the development of the people in the direction of Communism...."

[8] Urban, *op. cit.*, S. 19.

[9] Ščerba, *op. cit.*

[10] *Novaja i novejšaja istorija*, 1963,5, 3–9. The leading article by the editors is concerned with historical science as an ideological weapon in the struggle for Communism.

[11] Cf. the report on the Ninth Polish Congress of Historians, in *Zycie Warszawy*, Warsaw, Sept. 14, 1963, p. 5.

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[18] Vladimir Ruml, 'Rozvoj leninismu a filosofie' [The Development of Leninism and Philosophy], *Nová myšl*, 1964,1, 9–18.

[19] Imre Szabó, 'The Situation of the Social Sciences and of the National Program', *Felsöoktatási szemle*, 1963,7–8, 385–394.
[20] Sándor Balázsy and György Varga, 'A tudományos kutatómunka megszervezésének és gazdaságosságának néhány kérdése' [Some Questions Concerning the Organization and Productiveness of Scientific Research], *Közgazdasági szemle*, 1961,7, 817–837.
[21] *Tygodnik powszechny*, Kraców, May 5, 1961, p. 5.
[22] Cf. the speech of the general secretary of the Polish AN, Henryk Jablonski, in *Trybuna Ludu*, Dec. 14, 1963, 1–2.
[23] Cf. the speech by L.E. Il'ičev, chief of the ideological section of the CK KPSS, delivered at a meeting of leading state and party officials with writers and artists, in *Izvestija*, Dec. 23, 1962, p. 3. Cf. also *Trybuna Ludu*, Dec. 14, 1963, pp. 1 and 3.
[24] *Zycie Warszawy*, May 19, 1962.
[25] Cf. for example P.A. Račkov, 'Vozrastanie roli nauki pri socializme i razvite ee social'noj organizacii' [The Growth of the Role of Science in Socialism and the Development of Its Social Organization], *FN*, 1965,6, 3–15.
[26] Cf. G.S. Ostroumov, 'Podstawy naukowe polityki – w centrum uwagi radzieckiego Towarzystwa nauk Politycznych' [The Scientific Principles of Politics – at the Center of Attention of the Soviet Society for Political Sciences], *Studia nauk politycznych*, 1966,1, 129–142. Cf. also: *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1965,7, 148–151; 'Obščestvennaja nauka i formirovanie kommunističeskogo mirovozzrenija' [Social Science and the Formation of the Communist World-View], the leading article by the editors in *Političeskoe samoobrazovanie*, M. 1964,6, 3–11; and 'On Working Out the Problems of the Political Sciences. Report on the Letters to the Editor', in *Pravda*, June 13, 1965, p. 4.
[27] 'Politics and Science', *Pravda*, Jan. 10, 1965, p. 4.
[28] Scientific Communism was even introduced at all institutions of higher learning in the Soviet-Union as a required subject, as was planned in a resolution of the June, 1963, meeting of the CK. Cf. the directive of the Minister for University and (Special) High-School Teaching, pertaining to the introduction of the new ideological course, 'The Foundations of Scientific Communism': Directive no. 263/1963, Aug. 20, 1963, *Bjulleten' ministerstva vysšego i srednego special'nogo obrazovanija SSSR*, 1963,10, 5–8. For an interesting discussion of this course cf. K. Silko, I. Serova and A. Kučakova, 'Kurs naučnogo kommunizma v vuze' [The Course on Scientific Communism at the Institutions of Higher Learning], *Kommunist Belorussii*, Minsk, 1966,5, 55–58.
[29] 'The Dilemma Over the Political Sciences', *Trybuna Ludu*, Feb. 23, 1967.
[30] Bibič, *op. cit.*
[31] Cf. the report on the discussion on political science in *VF*, 1965,10, 164–166.
[32] Zychowski maintains, in his article, that Western political scientists strive to isolate themselves from philosophy and ideology and to limit themselves to 'factography', *Trybuna Ludu*, Feb. 23, 1967.
[33] Cf. Ostroumov, *op. cit.*
[34] *Pravda*, June 13, 1965, p. 4.
[35] S.S. Alekseev and V.E. Čirkin, 'O sisteme nauk, izučajuščix problemy političeskoj organizacii obščestva, gosudarstva i prava' [On the System of those Sciences Which Study the Problems of the Political Organization of Society, the State and Law], *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1965,5, 45–52.
[36] A real referendum has no place in Soviet practice. The constitution (art. 49, sec. d) establishes it as a way of polling the whole people as having an informative character, a conception which was shared by most Soviet jurists. A new direction was taken by

the 1961 party program, which conceived the referendum as a vote. For this reason, the 'consultative character' of the referendum is, in the present-day literature, variously hailed and condemned. Cf. I.N. Gavrilenkov, *O razvitii socialističeskoj gosudarstvennosti v kommunističeskoe obščestvennoe samoupravlenie* [On the Development of the Socialist State System in Communist Social Self-Government], M. 1961, p. 102; V.F. Kotok, 'O razvitii form sočetanija narodnogo predstavitel'stva s neposredstvennoj demokratiej v SSSR' [On the Development of the Forms of Combination of Popular Representation with Immediate Democracy in the USSR], *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1960,12, p. 15; and an article in *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1963,6, 15–25, esp. 19–20.

[37] The 'will of the people' is not the sum total of all individual wills but the will of the most active, experienced and conscious members of society, for "only the most active and experienced individuals recognize the objectively conditioned interests and needs of the whole people". Cf. A.S. Pigolkin, *Tolkovanie normativnyx aktov v SSSR* [The Interpretation of Normative Acts in the USSR], M. 1962, pp. 12–15. Thus the will of the people is equivalent to the will of the party.

[38] *VF*, 1965,10, 164–166.

[39] Cf. *Spravočnik partijnogo rabotnikaja* [Handbook for Party Workers], M. 1961, pp. 535–537.

[40] Cf. F. Krotov and A. Petrov, 'Ideologičeskaja rabota partorganizacij' [The Ideological Work of the Party Organizations], *Partijnaja žizn'*, M. 1966,3, 20–28.

[41] *Sovetskaja Belorussija*, August 4, 1965, p. 3; and *Pravda*, August 8, 1965.

[42] Cf. *Pravda*, August 2, 1966, 2–3; I. Zelenkov and F. Krotov, *Voprosy partijnoj učeby. Iz opyta organizacii političeskogo prosveščenija* [Questions of Party Teaching. From the Experience of the Organization for Political Education], M. 1966, pp. 7–8; *Političeskoe samoobrazovanie*, 1966,7, 21–60.

[43] *Bol'šaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija*, 2nd ed., v. 1, p. 582.

[44] *Partijnaja žizn'*, 1966,11, p. 80; *Kommunist*, 1966,4, p. 129.

[45] Ruml, *op. cit.*

[46] 'Politická veda – ano ci ne?, [Political Science – Yes or No?], *Nová mýsl*, 1965,5.

[47] Cf. Karel Ondris, 'V politické vědě' [In Political Science], *Nová mýsl*, 1966,20, 16–18; and Frantisek Kratochvil, 'Obsah a funkce politické vědy' [The Content and Functions of Political Science], *Nová mýsl*, 1966,8, 12–14.

[48] Kratochvil, *op. cit.*

[49] *Rudé právo*, Prag, Dec. 21, 1966.

[50] Cf. *Politicka misao*, 1964,1, 117–121. Quoted from Radovan Vukadinovič, 'Rozwój nauk politycznych w Jugoslawii w świetle działalności wydziału nauk politycznych w Zagrebiu' [The Development of Political Sciences in Jugoslavia in the Light of the Activity of the Faculty for Political Sciences in Zagreb], *Studia nauk politycznych*, 1966,1, 143–184.

[51] *Politicka misao*, 1965,1, 119–159. Quoted by R. Vukadinovič, *op. cit.*

[52] Vukadinovič, *op. cit.*

[53] More extensively in Marian Zychowski, 'Nauki polityczne' [Political Sciences], *Nowe drogi*, 1966,12, 20–27.

[54] Marian Zychowski, 'The Dilemma over the Political Sciences', *Trybuna* Ludu, Feb. 23, 1967, p. 5, and by the same author 'Nauki polityczne w Polsce Ludowej' [The Political Sciences in the Polish Nation], *Studia Nauk Politycznych*, 1966,1, 18–36.

[55] *Trybuna Ludu*, Oct. 1, 1965.

[56] Cf. 'The Organizational and Methodic Principles of the Implementation of the

Program for "The Foundations of the Political Sciences"', *Studia nauk politycznych*, 1966,1, 86–95.

[57] Cf. Zychowski, *op. cit.; Nowe drogi*, 1966,12, 20–27; the article by Teodor Filipiak, 'The Study of the Political Sciences', *Prawó i zycie*, Warsaw, July 3, 1966, p. 2.; and the introduction to no. 1, 1966, of the journal *Studia Nauk Politycznych.*

[58] Cf. *Studia Nauk Politycznych*, 1966,1, 96–97.

[59] Marian Zychowski, 'Nauki polityczne w Polsce Ludowej' [The Political Sciences in the Polish Nation], *Studia Nauk Politycznych*, 1966,1, 18–36.

R.J. KEMBALL

RUSSIAN 19TH-CENTURY THOUGHT – RECENT SOURCE MATERIAL

I. GERCENOVEDENIE AND GERCENIANA

1. M.I. Gillel'son, E.N. Dryžakova, M.K. Perkal', *A.I. Gercen; Seminarij (posobie dlja studentov)*, Izd. 'Prosveščenie', M.-L., 1965, 340 str.

The joint effort of three Soviet *Gercenovedy*, this Seminar is "destined for students, post-graduate students, and teachers at universities and pedagogic institutes"; at the same time, it "may prove useful to all students of Herzen's work and of Russian 19th-century literature" generally. As defined by A.I. Barsuk, a seminar should aim at helping the student "to master scientific methods and to engage in independent research on a specific theme". It should also provide the reader "with the auxiliary scientific material and orientational projects indispensable for further independent creative work" (p. 3). In these aims, this valuable work most certainly succeeds, but to the Sovietologist its interest and its implications extend well beyond the study of Herzen as such.

A. *Survey of contents*

The book contains three main chapters, each divided into sections and numerous subsections, as follows:

Chap. I: *Introduction to the study of Herzen's life and work.* This chapter – of special interest to Sovietologists – includes an important historical review of the various editions of Herzen's *Works* (A.2, pp. 17–48, by M.K. Perkal'); two sections dealing with Herzen in the eyes of his contemporaries (A.3, pp. 48–62, by M.I. Gillel'son; B.1, pp. 62–82, by E.N. Dryžakova); and a section devoted to research on the Herzen legacy during the Soviet period, 1917–1964 (B.3, pp. 97–116, by E.N. Dryžakova and M.I. Gillel'son).

Chap. II: *Brief bibliography of Herzen's works and of the literature relating thereto* (pp. 117–131). In addition to lists of the more important editions of Herzen's *Works* (1) and basic monographs and *sborniki* (3),

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this chapter includes the inevitable catalogue (mercifully short) of pronouncements by Marx, Engels, and Lenin concerning Herzen (2).

Chap. III: The third and main chapter in the book (pp. 130–309) lists a wide series of *themes suitable for independent research.* These are grouped in seven sections, as follows: Biography of Herzen (§§ 1–14); Herzen's world-outlook (§§ 15–20); Herzen as author (§§ 21–38); Herzen as publisher (§§ 39–44); Herzen, Russian *kul'tura*, and the social movement in Russia (§§ 45–63); Herzen and the *kul'tura* of the peoples of the USSR (§§ 64–76); Herzen and Western European *kul'tura* (§§ 77–88). – Among these sections, special interest attaches to the fifth, which includes 19 subsections on Herzen's relations with and attitude towards not only such 'radicals' as Bakunin, Belinskij, Černyševskij, Dobroljubov, and Ogarëv, but also such widely differing individuals and groups as Gogol' and Granovskij, I.S. Turgenev, Tolstoj and Dostoevskij, as well as the Decembrists and the Slavophils. The seventh section includes subsections on Herzen in relation to German, English, Czech, and French *kul'tura* (the latter followed by special paragraphs on Herzen and Proudhon and Herzen and Michelet); also on Herzen and Poland and Herzen and Italy (with a special paragraph on Herzen and Garibaldi). The book closes with a list of (Soviet) dissertations on Herzen defended between 1945 and 1964 – 5 doctoral theses and no less than 67 dissertations for master's degree (*kandidatskie dissertacii*) – and, finally, the invaluable index of names for which modern Soviet studies are justly renowned – in sharp contrast, alas, to most of their pre-revolutionary counterparts! The field covered is, of course, immense, and this review will perforce be confined to one or two aspects of particular interest from the viewpoint of Sovietology – more especially, Soviet intellectual historiography.

B. *The Lemke edition of Herzen's Works*

One of these aspects is the discussion of the famous 22-volume edition of Herzen's *Works and Letters* published between 1915 and 1925 by M.K. Lemke.[1] Lemke, who in 1904 had been accorded access to the archives of the Third Section, was already known as the author of two valuable works on the history of the Russian censorship and had just published two articles devoted to Herzen when, in 1907, he was approached by Herzen's heirs with the proposal that he prepare an edition of his works.[2] "A first-class expert on the archives, a scholar-enthusiast,

well known for the democratic nature of his convictions, Lemke was fitted like no one else for the role of editor of Herzen's collected works" (p. 33). It is interesting to note that Lemke – evidently forewarned by his earlier studies – devised his own plan to circumvent the Tsarist censorship, whereby all those texts of Herzen's banned in Russia would have been published abroad in a separate volume of similar format (p. 34, note 3)! This alone affords some idea of Lemke's thoroughness and his scientific *souci d'objectivité*. In the event, his stratagem proved unnecessary since, long before publication of his edition was completed, Russia had a new censorship – no less stringent than the old, but one in broad sympathy with Herzen's views!

In general, Lemke's work is highly praised – as it deserves to be – by the author of this section of the book (M.K. Perkal'). In his eyes, the most valuable parts are the commentaries, especially those of a biographical and literary-historical nature, "which have to a large extent retained their scientific worth up to the present day" and which in certain respects are even superior to those in the recent 30-volume edition published by the Soviet Academy of Sciences (p. 37 and p. 46).

Ironically (but significantly), the only real criticism raised against Lemke is on the score of his utter *impartiality* – an impartiality both self-confessed and freely admitted by Perkal', who cites Lemke's own words in this respect: "I have completely abstained from (giving) any personal evaluation of Herzen's works. By confining my task to the conscientious provision of all the most characteristic written material both for and against..., I deliberately set out not to influence the reader's own impressions and evaluation, *in the belief that all subjectivism on the part of the (an?) editor would be anti-scientific.*"[3]

Perkal' continues: "In striving for maximum objectivity, Lemke cites in the commentaries contradictory, mutually exclusive opinions on Herzen ... opinions ... of persons of differing political orientation, from differing ideological camps. The selection of these views undoubtedly reflects the ideological struggle (which raged) round the name of Herzen, but the editor-commentator remains outside this struggle." Lemke's integrity and revolutionary sympathies are not questioned; *but* (and it is a big 'but') his edition of Herzen, though completed with the aid of the Soviet Government, had largely been prepared before the Revolution. It was thus only natural (continues Perkal') that the commentaries in his edition

should reflect "views on literary history which took shape during the pre-revolutionary era and which bear the stamp of the liberal-bourgeois conceptions that dominated literary criticism in the early 1900's". These conceptions allegedly include: a failure to follow up the evolution of Herzen's views, more especially the ideological 'progress' (*sdvigi*) that took place in his world-outlook during the 1860's; an underestimation of the role of *Kolokol*; inadequate treatment of Herzen's 'liberal vacillations'; and an exaggeration of his differences with Černyševskij and the editors of *Sovremennik*.

"The position of dispassionate observer taken up by Lemke, his primordial concern with the factual, documentary aspect of his commentaries, led him to erroneous conclusions on a number of other questions. The need to adopt a critical attitude towards Lemke's commentaries is unavoidable. The full utilisation of the wealth of factual material contained in his 'Complete Edition...' is possible only on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology" (pp. 39–41).

This takes us back to the old problem of *partijnost'*, and of what constitutes true objectivity. There is an ironic twist in the fact that Lemke – an admirable investigator not only in Western eyes but also in those of the author of this section of the book under review – should have used the Soviet catchword 'anti-scientific' in almost exactly the opposite sense to that in which it is used by Soviet investigators today, and should find himself criticised for an attitude of mind and a mode of approach that are generally rated among the highest virtues of the true historian.

Behind the ideologically subjective 'objectivity' of much Soviet criticism lies, of course, the all-pervading spirit of Lenin, who – apart from his total lack of qualifications to set up as a literary critic – was, by the limited nature of his own horizons, incapable of accepting that there could be any other interpretation of Herzen's thought than that which his own fanaticism and narrow dogmatism conceived. In his article 'To the Memory of Herzen' (1912), recognized by Perkal' as "polemical and passionate", Lenin yet "provided a model of the Marxist understanding of Herzen's work (and) pointed to its place in the history of the Russian revolutionary movement and of (Russian) social thought" (pp. 96–97).

C. *Herzen studies during the Soviet period*

As the section on *Gercenovedenie* during the Soviet period shows, it was

largely on these lines that most early Soviet studies of Herzen were based. According to the authors (in this case E.N. Dryžakova and M.I. Gillel'son), critics like Lunačarskij, Steklov, and Friče all tended to examine Herzen from the immediate viewpoint of the October Revolution. "For the most part they were journalists (*publicisty*), not research workers, and the main problem that preoccupied them was the question: 'Is Herzen ours?', in the political sense of the term." Their interpretations of Herzen differed widely, not only as between one another, but also (and *a fortiori*) from other studies which appeared in 1920 (the 50th anniversary of Herzen's death) – studies based on "the idealistic, anti-Marxist theories of the advocates of Russian liberalism and populism". "The most essential shortcoming of the Herzen literature of those years was an almost complete failure to study the source material." The shining exception was Lemke, whose researches continued until 1923 – a date which the authors regard as roughly marking the close of the first stage of Soviet *Gercenovedenie*, typified by "a sharp struggle centred on the problem of Herzen's Socialism and revolutionary make-up" (pp. 97–101).

The same year saw the publication of the first documents from the archives of the Third Section and the Tsarist censorship, a number of which were concerned with Herzen and his activities. So began the second *étape*, which gave way to the third stage around the mid-thirties, with the publication of L.O. Piper's work on *Herzen's World-Outlook* (1935).[4] This important study – which contains, incidentally, an account not only of Herzen's relations with the Slavophils but also of the Slavophil movement as such – is here briefly dismissed with the remark that its author "erroneously considered Herzen to be a disciple of Schelling (*Šellingianec*)". The study of Herzen's philosophical views was intensified towards the end of the 1930's. While these studies took Lenin's evaluation of Herzen as their starting-point, many of them failed to associate Herzen sufficiently with "a variety of facts and events in Russian and European life"; as a result, he often emerged "isolated from the general development of the social thought of his time" (p. 104).

After a review of the two important double volumes of *Literaturnoe nasledstvo*, devoted to Herzen and Ogarëv, which appeared in 1941 (tt. 39/40 and 41/42), and the 1945/46 literature published in connection with the 75th anniversary of Herzen's death, the authors move on to the *Gerceniana* of the Ždanov period.

D. *The Ždanov period (1948–1953)*

In a reference to D.I. Česnokov's work, *Mirovozzrenie Gercena* (1948), they have this to say of that exaggerated patriotic-chauvinistic outlook of the period which Gleb Struve and others noted in relation to the Belinskij centenary literature of the same year.[5] "(Česnokov) started out from the concept, prevalent in those years, that Russian progressive 19th-century philosophical thought was in a somewhat exclusive position *vis-à-vis* the general evolution of philosophy in Europe, that the Russian revolutionary democrats were (invariably) critical of Western European theories, but themselves took over nothing from these theories."[6]

Of Ja.E. El'sberg's *Gercen; Žizn' i tvorčestvo* (also 1948, but with amended editions in 1951 and 1956): "El'sberg's book (especially the 1st and 2nd editions) displays a defect common to many monographs of the late 40's and early 50's, viz. a somewhat (over-)simplified portrayal of the complex path that Herzen followed, and an exaggerated emphasis on the practical revolutionary activity both of Herzen himself and of his contemporaries."

As for V.A. Putincev's study, *Gercen-pisatel'* (1952), it fails to show up in sufficient relief "Herzen's links with the philosophical and aesthetic problems of his time (e.g. with the enthusiasm of the Russian progressive intelligentsia for Utopian Socialism in its George-Sandian aspect)"; nor does it adequately demonstrate "the parallels with (Herzen's) closest contemporaries – Turgenev, Nekrasov, and Saltykov-Ščedrin". Once again, however, the 2nd edition of this book (1963!) shows a considerable improvement, in response to criticisms expressed (pp. 105–106).

The fundamental change which took place in Soviet criticism soon after Stalin's death (here tactfully referred to as 'the mid-fifties') is summed up by the authors in the following passage: "Starting with the middle fifties, a new stage in Soviet *Gercenovedenie* begins. The liquidation of the (insistence on) dogmatic interpretation of social and historical facts enabled Soviet scholars to elaborate many problems of *Gercenovedenie* deeply and comprehensively." The authors then cite, in support of their thesis, the "outspoken criticism of several studies of the 1946–1955 period" voiced in the celebrated ninth issue of *Voprosy istorii* for 1955: "Among the serious shortcomings of many historical studies must be counted the persistent attempt to embellish reality, to suppress the contradictions

inherent in it, and *to adjust these or those facts to (fit in with) a particular point of view*. The authors of such works set out, not from objective reality, not from historical facts, but *from subjective motives, from falsely conceived political interests*. In so doing, they only bring harm both to politics and to science."[7]

Coming as they do from a recognised and respected Soviet publication, these are strong words. And the fact that they should be re-cited ten years later, in support of similar criticisms voiced by the authors of the present work, together with the fact that post-1953 editions should be acknowledged to show such improvement on earlier ones – all this tends to confirm the growing belief that Soviet literary and historical criticism is at last, slowly but surely, working itself out of that ideological straitjacket in which it has so long been confined. Behind all these criticisms one senses, in particular, a welcome readiness – a demand, even – to examine a given thinker against the full social and political background of his time. Such an approach entails, *inter alia*, a far greater preoccupation than formerly with that thinker's contemporaries, including those of a different ideological-political persuasion from his own; it also involves – and nowhere more than in the case of so cosmopolitan a *seigneur* as Herzen – the need to study foreign sources and to admit (why on earth not?!) the existence and operation of foreign influences.

The task of collecting material on Herzen – both primary and secondary sources – was vast beyond belief. In the period 1933–1940, this was carried out mainly by *Goslitmuz* (under the direction of V.D. Bonč-Bruevič). It covered eight of the most important archives in the USSR and nine others abroad, and its work included – most happily – the almost complete photocopying of the material at that time held in the Rapperswil Museum in Switzerland, but later transferred to Warsaw, where it was subsequently destroyed during the Nazi occupation. Great work was also undertaken by the editors of *Literaturnoe nasledstvo*, who – by contacting Herzen's descendants and many leading libraries abroad (Bibliothèque nationale, British Museum Library, Columbia University Library, International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, Feltrinelli collection and Museo del Risorgimento in Milan, Municipal Museum in Rome, Polish and Czech Academies of Sciences, etc.) – managed to assemble microfilms of more than 500 unpublished letters of Herzen, as well as numerous others previously published elsewhere (pp. 12–13).

It was not least this encouraging example of international cooperation which finally made possible the realisation in the USSR of all the important Herzen publications of recent years, more especially Vols 61–64 of *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* (1953–1956), the collection of articles (*sbornik*) entitled *Problemy izučenija Gercena* (1963), and finally the Academy of Sciences 30-volume *Sobranie sočinenij* (1954–1965) – which, it is worth noting, still does not boast the epithet *polnoe*, but which undoubtedly represents, as the authors state (p. 115), the culminating point (*itog*) in present-day *Gerceniana*.

E. *Bibliographical omissions*

It is at first sight somewhat disconcerting to find that, in a section of nearly 20 pages which reviews well over 70 Soviet studies of Herzen, exactly one paragraph is devoted to foreign investigators (pp. 114–115). Moreover, although one learns from it that "foreign research workers have increasingly turned to the study of Herzen's life and work ever since the mid-1930's", the paragraph in question mentions exactly five names, only two of whom are referred to in any detail at all.[8] However, applied to the book *as a whole*, this impression turns out to be totally misleading, and the bibliographies in Ch. III include, *inter alia*, such basic Western books as Lampert's *Studies in Rebellion*, Carr's *Romantic Exiles*, Labry's study of *Herzen et Proudhon*, and Venturi's *Esuli russi in Piemonte dopo il '48*; also important articles by Mervaud, Cadot, Grandjard, Partridge, and Tregenza that have appeared in various Slavist and historical journals in the West. Notable omissions, on the other hand, include Venturi's classic work on Populism (*vide infra*) and Malia's *Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, 1812–1855* (1961), which, whatever its faults, is by far the most comprehensive of recent English-language studies of Herzen. Nor does one find Grandjard's detailed study of *Ivan Tourguénev et les courants politiques et sociaux de son temps* (1953, reprinted 1966), which surely contains sufficient apposite material to deserve inclusion somewhere in this work.

The bibliography to the subsection on 'Herzen and the Slavophils' lists all the relevant *Works* of the leading Slavophils, plus other important sources such as Košelëv's *Zapiski* and Brodskij's *Rannie slavjanofily*. A serious omission, however, is any mention of Samarin's side of the Herzen-Samarin polemic of 1864 – of great importance not only for itself, but

because it inspired Herzen's equally important *Pis'ma k protivniku*, which he published soon afterwards in *Kolokol*. While Herzen's letters are given in the 30-volume edition of his *Works*, Samarin's are given neither there *nor* in the only existing edition of his own *Works*, the last published volume of which (t. XII, 1911) contains his letters only as far as 1853. To find Samarin's letters to Herzen, then, one must turn to the first and second issues of *Rus'* for 1883, where the complete exchange was originally published, accompanied by an historical commentary. This omission is of some importance, since the inevitable effect is to lead the reader only to Herzen's side of the argument.[9] – Among Soviet works in this section, there is no mention of the book by Piper referred to earlier, nor of the 3-volume 'Academia' edition of *Byloe i dumy* published in 1931–1932, which contains, *inter alia*, a commentary on 'Herzen and the Slavophils'.[10]

In the subsection on 'Herzen and narodničestvo', the most notable omission is Venturi's vast study on Populism. This is all the more striking since Venturi, with his markedly 'progressive' sympathies, is in general very much *persona grata* with Soviet critics.[11]

Finally, one is struck by the fact that the 4½-page bibliography to the subsection on 'Gercen-filosof' contains not a single foreign work – not even Lampert's section 'A Philosophy of Existence'; on the other hand, it *does* list one article (by V.A. Malinin and I.Ja. Ščipanov) on well-worn 'bourgeois falsification' lines.

F. *General conclusions*

While this last factor might well be attributable to ideological hesitations, it seems to the present writer that the other omissions are probably no more than unintentional defects. The authors' summary of the Soviet period of *Gercenovedenie* brings out clearly the dual 'front' on which Soviet scholars are allegedly engaged: "From the above survey – which is by no means complete – it is clear that during the years of Soviet power *Gercenovedenie* has become a scientific discipline. In the struggle against bourgeois, liberal-populist, and (over-)simplified sociological attitudes, the Leninist evaluation of Herzen as a revolutionary won the day. It was on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology that the dogmatism which hampered the development of Soviet science during the years of the personality cult was overcome. All this created the prerequisite conditions

for the publication of the Academy of Sciences' 30-volume edition of Herzen's Works and Letters..." (p. 115).

Just how seriously the first 'struggle' is really taken by Soviet scholars, it is hard to say. True, the obsessionist attitude still breaks through at times. Thus, having congratulated themselves on the scope of *Gercenovedenie* in other countries, as exemplified in *Problemy izučenija Gercena*, the authors continue: "At the same time, as the editors of the *sbornik* rightly remark, 'the ideologists of imperialist reaction and the revisionists endeavour either to depreciate the tremendous spiritual values contained in the Herzen legacy, or else to distort their true significance, presenting the great Russian revolutionary (and) outstanding Russian philosopher who went over to dialectic materialism and scientific socialism as a bourgeois individualist-aesthete, a forerunner of existentialism'. ... articles in the *sbornik* from the pens of leading Soviet *Gercenisty* refute these attempts on (the basis of) concrete evidence" (p. 112).

One would like to think that such occasional outbursts represent an ideological reinsurance policy more than anything.... Certainly, taken as a whole, the work under review testifies to a remarkable standard of objectivity and balance. This emerges clearly from other sections of the book which it is impossible to deal with here in such detail as one would like – more especially in the reviews of Herzen in the eyes of his contemporaries (pp. 48–82). To take a few examples: The authors point out the greatly abbreviated nature of the 1933 Soviet edition of M. von Meysenbug's memoirs, and emphasise the consequent need to consult the complete German original (pp. 55–56); the harsh criticisms of Herzen expressed by both Ševyrëv and Pogodin are treated in some detail, and well contrasted with the much more differentiated attitude of the Slavophil camp, in the persons of the Aksakov brothers and Samarin (pp. 60–68, *passim*). Particularly striking is the long account given of Apollon Grigor'ev's letter to Gogol', in which – discussing not only the latter's *Correspondence with Friends* but also Herzen's *Kto vinovat?* – he broached basically the same problem as Samarin in his polemic with Herzen: that of the conflict between historical and/or social necessity on the one hand and free will and human responsibility on the other.[12] On the subject of Apollon Grigor'ev and his views, the authors conclude: "Such was the position of the future '*počvennik*', with his cult, inherited from Gogol', of the moral responsibility of each before all, with his religious ideal of

good and his firm faith in the possibility of (successful) action in order to uncover... 'those talented forces, not yet revealed to the world, that go by the name of Nation and Orthodoxy (*narod i pravoslavie*)'" (p. 69).

A glance through the list of dissertations on Herzen suggests that here, too, horizons are sensibly widening, and that Soviet scholars are at last beginning to get away from the old, stereotyped themes.[13] Thus, for the ten-year period 1953–1963, the present writer counted two dissertations dealing with Herzen and the Slav question, two more with Herzen and the Slavophils, and no less than five others covering various problems of history, historiosophy, and historiography. All these are virtually new subjects, as compared with those chosen in the preceding years (1945–1952).

Quite apart from its high standard of excellence as a guide to Herzen, then, the work under review testifies to a broadening of horizons and a praiseworthy striving after objectivity which augurs well for the future of Soviet literary and historical research in general. Its authors have done an excellent job, and are to be sincerely congratulated on yet another valuable addition to Soviet *Gerceniana*.

2. M.V. Nečkina, E.L. Rudnickaja (red.),
   (a) *Kolokol; Gazeta A.I. Gercena i N.P. Ogarëva.* Vol'naja russkaja tipografija, 1857–1867. London-Ženeva. Faksimil'noe izdanie. (Vyp. I–XI), Izd. AN SSSR, M., 1962–1964.
   (b) *Poljarnaja zvezda; Žurnal A.I. Gercena i N.P. Ogarëva* v vos'mi knigax, 1855–1869. Vol'naja russkaja tipografija, London–Ženeva. Faksimil'noe izdanie. IX Kniga – Priloženija, Izd. 'Nauka', AN SSSR, M., 1966 – .

These facsimile editions of *Kolokol* and *Poljarna zvezda* are *Gerceniana* of a very different type. Inasmuch as all the texts known or believed to stem from Herzen's own pen (most of them signed 'Iskander') have been published – many of them several times over – in editions of his *Works*, these photomechanical reprints might at first sight appear to be little more than a luxury – a type of consolation prize to pander to the whims of the bibliophil. In fact, however, there are more cogent reasons for their publication, as Academician M. Nečkina reminds us in the first part of the Foreword to the *Kolokol* edition (Vyp. I, pp. V–XVI). Reviewing the previous literature on *Kolokol*, both pre- and post-revolutionary, and

enumerating some of its shortcomings, she points out that previous students of *Kolokol* seldom had the full texts to hand. In the provinces, sets of the journal are practically non-existent and, even in large centres like Moscow and Leningrad, it can usually only be studied in libraries, and then only by means of microfilms, with all their attendant drawbacks. "Hence the difficulty of gaining access to the original, the eternal citations handed down (from one investigator to the next), and the prime emphasis placed on the 'Herzen-biographical' aspect. ... To possess the original text of *Kolokol* has always been the dream of historian, philosopher, literary critic, and economist (alike). The aim of our edition is at last to provide the reader with what has long been a bibliographical rarity" (Vyp. I, p. XVI). Nor does this rarity apply only to the Soviet-Union: even in England (where the vast majority of issues were originally published), Simmons could trace only four sets, and of these only two – those in the British Museum and the London School of Economics – are complete.[14]

There are thus good grounds of a practical nature for these handsome reprints. To these might be added a further reason which – while harder to define and by no means evident to all – is yet not without significance to those with a feeling for 'atmosphere'. Even though they provide little new in the way of actual texts or documentation, these facsimiles unquestionably contribute something towards recreating the spirit of the *époque* and conjuring up some sense of the conditions of Herzen's voluntary exile, and to that extent make it easier to understand the quite remarkable influence he and his free press undoubtedly wielded during several critical years.[15]

A. *Kolokol*

The edition of *Kolokol* consists of eleven volumes (*vypuski*), of which the first nine contain the 245 issues of *Kolokol* as such; the tenth contains the 42 supplements (13 issues of *Pod sud* and 29 of *Obščee veče*) published in conjunction with it. The eleventh *vypusk* is in many ways the most valuable of all, comprising as it does no less than ten different indices, as follows: (1) Table of contents of each issue of *Kolokol* and supplements; (2) Index of articles appearing therein; (3) Index of articles to which Herzen appended commentaries, introductory notes, etc.; (4) Index of authors (including pseudonyms); (5) Index of (personal) names referred to in text; (6) Index of geographical names mentioned in text; (7) Titles

of books; (8) Titles of newspapers, reviews, almanachs, etc.; (9) Index of leaflets and proclamations; (10) Index of literary (fictional) characters referred to in text (e.g. Lenskij, Oblomov, Taras Bul'ba, etc.). To the research worker, these indices alone are worth their weight in gold.

The story of *Kolokol*, the first uncensored Russian *gazeta*[16] – its immediate success and resounding influence inside Russia, where it is alleged to have been avidly read by the Emperor himself – all this is too well known to bear repeating here. Less known, perhaps, are the strenuous efforts undertaken by the Tsarist regime to prevent the paper from circulating on the continent of Europe. As recounted by E.L. Rudnickaja in the second part of the Foreword (Vyp. I, pp. XVII–XXIII), strong Russian diplomatic pressure resulted almost immediately in its being banned from the shops and post offices of Berlin; within a year or so, its sale had also been forbidden in Saxony, Naples, Rome, and Frankfort-on-Main. Finally, in the summer of 1859, A.E. Timašev, then Head of the Third Section, undertook a special trip to Western Europe in a serious attempt to get the *Verbot* made complete! Small wonder that the Russian authorities were becoming alarmed: at about that time Herzen, in a letter to Ivan Aksakov, revealed that Trübner (Herzen's London publisher) had received orders for no less than 4800 copies of various issues. They had only been able to supply 4300, but the first eighteen issues had meanwhile been reprinted![17] For several years, *Kolokol* continued to exercise a wide influence inside Russia until firstly – with the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 – Herzen found himself deprived overnight of his main battle-cry and secondly – with his courageous and unwavering support of the Polish cause in 1863 – he found himself deserted by many of those Russian 'liberals' who had earlier ranked among his most ardent supporters.

B. *Poljarnaja zvezda*

By contrast, *Poljarnaja zvezda* never presented such a 'headache' to Russian officialdom. Indeed, it was partly its unsuitability as an article of contraband, added to the fact that it appeared only once a year or so, which persuaded Ogarëv and Herzen to launch *Kolokol*, as a means of providing rapid comment on the fast-moving issues of the day in a form (thin paper and so-called album format) which would render it easy to smuggle across frontiers.[18]

Nevertheless, to *Poljarnaja zvezda* belongs the honour of being the *first*

periodical to emerge from Herzen's (or, indeed, any other) uncensored Russian press. Moreover, it certainly enjoyed its own share of success. The fact that Herzen here published the first extracts from *Byloe i dumy* would alone ensure it an honoured place in history. But this was not all. Other classics of Russian 19th-century thought to appear in its pages included the exchange of letters between Gogol' and Belinskij in connection with the former's *Selected Passages from Correspondence with Friends*, also Čaadaev's first *Lettre philosophique* (in Russian translation). Of course, Herzen's own thought was very far removed from that of either Gogol' or Čaadaev, but his intellectual honesty and fundamental magnanimity seldom failed to match his passionate and sometimes erratic enthusiasms. It was typical of the man that he should have introduced the Gogol'-Belinskij exchange with the remark that "the polemic between them is too important a document for (us) to refrain from publishing it out of faint-hearted feelings of delicacy" (*Pol. zvezda*, Kn. I, p. X).

It was no mere chance that *Poljarnaja zvezda* should have been launched in 1855. The enthusiastic hopes placed by Herzen in the new reign were matched only by his utter loathing and contempt for the old one. The latter feeling found expression in his unrelenting attacks on that much maligned sovereign, Nicholas I; the former, in his rousing appeals to the new Emperor, with whom, as Herzen put it, he felt himself united, notwithstanding all other differences, by a common love for the Russian people. – "The death of Nicholas", he wrote, "is more than the death of a man; it is the death of principles pursued with implacable severity and up to their very limit. As long as he lived, they somehow managed to survive, consolidated by habit, supported by (his) iron will. (But) now that he is dead, his reign must not be continued" (Kn. I, p. IV).

Nicholas I suffered the immense misfortune of beginning his reign under the shadow of the ill-fated Decembrist conspiracy, and Herzen – with quite uncharacteristic obstinacy – could never forgive him his 'victory over the five'. At the age of 14, he had sworn, with Ogarëv, to dedicate his life to the cause for which the Decembrists had suffered, and this task he pursued with a single-mindedness at times bordering on fanaticism. To Herzen, the issue was simple: the Decembrists were knights in armour – martyrs to the cause of human freedom; Nicholas – the young Tsar they had tried to assassinate on the first day of his reign – was the villain and the executioner. The other side of the picture – the gross deceits

practised by the Decembrists, the cowardly murder of Miloradovič and Stürler, Küchelbecker's revolver raised against the Grand Duke Michael, and, above all, the cynical, cold-blooded resolve to kill Nicholas himself for no better reason than that he *was* the Tsar – all this Herzen chose to ignore, as he also ignored the exemplary courage and patience shown by Nicholas on the fateful day, the immense trouble he took to try and unearth the true ring-leaders, and the clemency he finally exercised – all exemplified in the words alleged to have been used to a Moscow dignitary: "Je suis dans la rigoureuse nécessité de faire des exemples; mais on ne me contestera pas, je crois, le plus beau droit des souverains, celui de faire grâce."[19]

Herzen's unbending hatred of the repressive aspects of Nicholas' reign – healthy enough in itself – here got the better of his fair judgment, blinding him to the fact that the great tragedies of history are not the struggles of right against wrong, but of right against right: that sympathy, and even admiration, for the *ideals* of the Decembrists need not and should not preclude an understanding of the tormenting position in which Nicholas (through no fault of his own) found himself placed, confronted as he was with an 'abstract' conspiracy directed not even against himself *qua* himself, but against the entire structure of the State, by a handful of hot-heads representing little but themselves, yet determined to stop at nothing to achieve their ends. Herzen's oversimplified interpretation of events – backed up by his brilliant gifts of rhetoric and invective – had, however, one incalculable advantage: it provided an uncomplicated and inspiring battle-cry to which all lovers of 'freedom' could rally. In naming his journal after that of the Decembrists, in depicting the heads of their five martyrs on the cover sheet, and in publishing inside their poems, their memoirs, and their diaries, as well as those of their youthful friends (e.g. Puškin's *V Sibir', Vol'nost'*, and his early *Epistle to Čaadaev*), Herzen remained faithful to his childhood oath.

The Decembrist legacy, then, was one face of *Poljarnaja zvezda* – the face that looked back to the tragedies of a dark and rigorous past. Its other face was that which looked forward to the new reign with hope and confidence, and campaigned untiringly for at least the rudiments of a decent existence for all, not only in Russia, but also in Poland, whose inherent right to freedom and independence Herzen staunchly defended to the last. In the very first issue, Herzen addressed himself to the new

ruler: "Of course, my banner is not Yours. I am an incorrigible Socialist, You an autocratic Emperor; but between Your standard and mine there may be one thing in common – namely, that love for the people of which I just spoke..." – "You truly love Russia – and You can do so much – so much for the Russian people. I also love the Russian people; it was for love of them that I left them, for I could not sit idly by and watch in silence the fearful deeds perpetrated upon them by landlords and officials."

"... I am prepared to wait, to efface myself, to talk of other things, if only I may keep alive the hope that You will do something for Russia. Sire, grant freedom to the Russian word. ... Grant us freedom of speech... we have something to say to the world and to our own people. Give the land to the peasants. It belongs to them as it is. Purge Russia of the infamous stain of serfdom, heal the blue weals on the backs of our brothers – those fearful traces that betray (her) contempt for humanity. Your father, on his death-bed – have no fear, I know that I am addressing his son – confessed that he had not managed to do all he would have liked to do for *all* his subjects... (The spectre of) serfdom rose to rack his conscience at the last minute. In thirty years he did not *manage* to free the peasants! – Make haste! Free the peasant from future misdeeds, save him from the blood he will (else) have to shed... – I feel ashamed (when I think) with how little we are prepared to give ourselves content; we desire things, the justice of which you doubt as little as everyone else" (Kn. I, pp. 12–13).

These are living documents. There are countless others besides; and when one reads them again, as is now possible, embedded in their original *milieu*, they seem to take on a new and even more vivid lease of life. The facsimile edition of *Poljarnaja zvezda* now appearing is in the same capable hands as the earlier one of *Kolokol*: Academician M.V. Nečkina as general editor and E.L. Rudnickaja as supervisor of the texts. There will be nine books (*knigi*) in all, of which Books 1 to 7 cover the yearly issues for 1855–1862 published from London (none appeared in 1860), while Book 8 contains the only other issue, published in 1869 from Geneva. Book 9 will supply the commentaries and indices. At the time these lines were written, the first three Books had been received. To judge from these, the reproduction seems rather better than in the case of *Kolokol* – doubtless due to differences in the quality of the originals.

All this constitutes another fine job carried out in the best interests of scientific research.

One last thought: if only Soviet scholars could be persuaded to devote even one-tenth of their time and energy to the *non*-'revolutionary-democratic' Russian thinkers, our debt of gratitude to them – already immense – would be multiplied many times over. An edition of Čaadaev has long been promised.[20] A fine edition of Gogol' has existed for some years.[21] Dare one envisage the possibility one day of similar Soviet editions of the complete works of the leading Slavophils, with notes, commentaries, appendices, and, above all, the indices whose absence from those ultra-rare pre-Revolutionary editions makes itself so sorely felt? As Thaden very justly puts it: "Russia's conservative writers have often been dismissed as mere reactionaries; seldom have historians seen them in terms of their own ideals and intellectual development. ... Their ultimate defeat and failure, however, do not justify an almost exclusive emphasis on the importance of Russia's radical intelligentsia, for the picture of nineteenth-century Russian life is distorted if one fails to understand the radicals' opponents – Russia's conservative nationalists."[22] We do not ask them to 'approve' – let alone to share – the ideas of a Khomiakov or a Samarin, a Čaadaev or an Ivan Kireevskij, but simply to recognise (and this they evidently do) that a study of them is essential to any balanced view of *history*. This idea, then – this *mečta* – is put forward, not as carping criticism, but in all sincerity, and in the firm belief that serious scientific research both in the Soviet-Union and in the West would derive immeasurable gain from such an undertaking. Meanwhile, let us be grateful to Soviet scholarship for the magnificent work accomplished on Herzen!

II. ČAADAEV – EDITIONS OF THE 'LETTRES PHILOSOPHIQUES'

1. Georges Haldas (ed.), *De Pouchkine à Gorki.* Collection en douze volumes, Vol. II. Editions Rencontre, Lausanne, 1966. 583 pp. Pierre Tchaadaev: *Lettres philosophiques* (pp. 23–105); *Apologie d'un fou* (pp. 107–127).
2. Heinrich Falk S.J., *Das Weltbild Peter J. Tschaadajews nach seinen acht 'Philosophischen Briefen'* (Veröffl. des Osteuropa-Institutes München, Band IX), Isar Verlag, München, 1954, 136 SS.

Čaadaev's eight *Lettres philosophiques* belong to the basic documents of Russian 19th-century thought. Like many others of their kind, however, they have never been easily accessible to scholars. Even today, the original French texts of five of them have still not been published and, until comparatively recently, were available only in Russian translation in a somewhat remote volume of *Literaturnoe nasledstvo*.

True, the notorious first letter, whose publication in Nadeždin's *Teleskop* in October 1836 became the matter of such a *cause célèbre*, was never lost sight of for long; Herzen, as we have seen, republished it in his *Poljarnaja zvezda*, and English translations of it can be found to-day in more than one anthology of Russian 19th-century thought.[23] But it was clear from the start – indeed, it was known both from Nadeždin's evidence and Čaadaev's own admission – that this particular letter was only the first of a series; yet it was not until 1862 that I.S. Gagarin (the Russian prince and friend of Čaadaev who had meanwhile become a Jesuit priest) published in Paris what purported to be the French originals of four *Lettres*, together with the celebrated *Apologie d'un fou* (1837) in which Čaadaev had replied to his critics, but which, of course, had never been published inside Russia.[24] Not until the relaxation in censorship prescriptions in 1905 did it become possible to publish these letters in Russia, and it was Gagarin's texts that Geršenzon took over and finally republished, complete with Russian translations of all of them, in his 2-volume edition of Čaadaev's *Works and Letters* (M. 1913/14), which is still to-day the most complete selection of its kind available.[25]

It was evident to Geršenzon (as it had been to Gagarin) that the series of *Lettres* was still not complete, but it was not until 1935 that the mystery surrounding them was finally unravelled. In a long and detailed article published in Nos. 22–24 of *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* that year, D. Šaxovskoj – himself related to Čaadaev – recounted the full story of the series, placing the letters in their proper context and sequence, and appending (in Russian translation only) the texts of *five* letters never previously published.[26]

Briefly, Šaxovskoj revealed that the full series of eight *Lettres philosophiques* – "evidently removed (by the police) during a search of Čaadaev's residence" and *numbered in Čaadaev's own hand* – was now housed in the Institute of Russian Literature of the Academy of Sciences in Leningrad. Of the four letters previously published (by Gagarin and by Geršenzon), the so-called fourth did not belong to the series at all, thus leaving three

letters, which, with the five newly published ones, made up the full series of eight. Comparing the two 'sets' of letters, Šaxovskoj continued: "The first (Leningrad) letter ... corresponds to Gagarin's first one, with insignificant variations in isolated words; the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th are entirely new; the 6th and 7th correspond to Gagarin's 2nd and 3rd (respectively), though with fairly significant differences in wording ("*odnako že v otličajuščejsja dovol'no značitel'no redakcii*"), (while) the 8th is again completely new." Whereas the three letters published by Gagarin were primarily concerned with philosophy of history, the remaining five dealt rather with 'general-philosophical' themes.[27]

With his article, Šaxovskoj published the full texts of these five letters (albeit only in Russian translation, with occasional facsimile illustrations of small parts of the original French MSS), but he did *not* publish either French or Russian versions of the three letters already known. As a result, until comparatively recently, those wishing to study the complete set of eight letters were in practice dependent on the rare Gagarin (1862!) or Geršenzon (1913/14) editions for Letters I, VI, and VII, and on the hardly less rare copies of *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* Nos. 22–24 for the other five.[28]

In 1954, however, a *German* version of Šaxovskoj's five letters was published as an Appendix to Father Falk's interesting monograph on Čaadaev's world-outlook. Admittedly, Falk's versions are *double* translations (i.e. *German* translations of Saxovskoj's *Russian* translations of Čaadaev's *French* originals!); but, since 'beggars cannot be choosers', students of Čaadaev must be thankful to have at least *some* version of these five letters available on the open book market.[29]

And now, in recent months, a totally unexpected reprint of Gagarin's version of the *Lettres* and the *Apologie* has appeared, more or less out of the blue, as part of the 12-volume collection of Russian classics (in French) put out by Editions Rencontre, Lausanne, under the general title *De Pouchkine à Gorki*. This edition is, of course, a popular one, with no particular pretensions towards scientific accuracy. Even so, considering the excellent and original decision to publish texts of Čaadaev in such a collection at all, it is disconcerting to find that, in the year of grace 1966, the editor is apparently still blissfully unaware of Šaxovskoj's findings: there is no word about the other *Lettres*; Gagarin's (alleged) fourth letter is reproduced, without comment, alongside the other three; and, to cap

all, the whole series begins with the note: "Traduction française de P. [*sic*] Gagarine"![30]

These are regrettable errors in a highly creditable enterprise, and they must be mentioned here. But the main object of the present note is a positive one: to emphasise that at last the original French texts (none of them *substantially* different from the Leningrad versions) are again available for those prepared to invest in this excellent and relatively inexpensive series – which, incidentally, also includes extensive excerpts (in French again) from Herzen's writings on the problem of Russia and the West.[31]

Thus, students of Čaadaev, thanks to Father Falk's monograph and to the Rencontre collection, now have at their disposal all the *essential* components of Čaadaev's thought as expressed in his complete set of eight *Lettres philosophiques* and the *Apologie d'un fou.*[32] For this alone, those who know to their cost the frustrating situation that obtained in former years will probably feel that they have much to be thankful for.

At the same time, they will continue to nurse the hope that, before long, Soviet scholarship will oblige by publishing – in that long-promised edition of Čaadaev's *Works* – the *complete French originals* of all eight *Lettres philosophiques* housed in the manuscript section of the Institute of Russian Literature in Leningrad.[33]

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[1] *A.I. Gercen; Polnoe sobranie sočinenij i pisem*, tt. I-XXII, pod red. M.K. Lemke, Lit.-izd. otdel Narkomprosa-GIZ, Pgr., 1915–1925 (henceforth: *Lemke, Pol. sob. soč. Gercena*).

[2] Cf. M.K. Lemke, *Očerki po istorii russkoj cenzury i žurnalistiki XIX stoletija*, SPB.-M. 1904; *Epoxa cenzurnyx reform 1859–1865 godov*, SPB. 1904; 'A.I. Gercen v Evrope 1847–1851. Po arxivu III Otdelenija sobstven. e. i. v. kancelarii', *Sovremennij mir*, 1906,1, 36–66; 'Očerki žizni i dejatel'nosti Gercena, Ogarëva i ix druzej. Po neizdannym istočnikam', *Mir Božij*, 1906,1, 36–69; 2, 119–148; 4, 120–153; 7, 90–118. – Lemke's classic work on the reign of Nicholas I, *Nikolaevskie žandarmy i literatura 1826–1855 gg.*, was first published the following year (SPB. 1908).

[3] Lemke, *Pol. sob. soč. Gercena*, t.I, str. XXV (my italics, R.J.K.). Cited in *Gercen – Seminarij*, str. 39–40.

[4] L.O. Piper, *Mirovozzrenie Gercena; istoriko-filosofskij očerk*, Socékgiz, M.-L., 1935.

[5] On this point, cf. *inter alia SST*, V,3 (Sept. 1965), 184–185.

[6] For Soviet criticism of studies of this kind, cf. esp. the review in *Voprosy istorii*, 1956,6, 180–185.

[7] Cf. *Voprosy istorii*, 1955,9, 4. Cited in *Gercen – Seminarij*, str. 107 (My italics, R. J.K.).

[8] The two authors in question are E. Reissner and G. Ziegengeist – both working in

Eastern Germany. A footnote on p. 115 refers the reader to the bibliography of foreign literature on Herzen in *Kratkaja literaturnaja énciklopedija*, t.2, M. 1964, stlb. 159–160.

[9] Cf. *Rus'*, 1883,1, 30–42 and 2, 23–30: 'Perepiska Ju.F. Samarina s A.I. Gercenom'. – A brief account of Samarin's side of the argument is given in N.V. Riasanovsky, *Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), pp. 159–161. For Herzen's side, cf. *inter alia* the AN 30-vol. edition, t. XVIII, str. 600–602.

[10] This fact is mentioned in the main text (*Gercen – Seminarij*, str. 102) – which renders the omission all the more surprising.

[11] Cf. Franco Venturi, *Il populismo russo*, Giulio Einaudi, Turin, 1952 (2 vols). English translation by Francis Haskell, *Roots of Revolution; A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London/Knopf, New York, 1960. For favourable Soviet comment on Venturi, cf. *inter alia SST*, V,4 (Dec. 1965), 327.

[12] Samarin had advanced his own argument partly in terms of Khomiakov's basic distinction between the principles of freedom and necessity, which he labelled the Iranian and the Kushite principles respectively.

[13] On this point, cf. the present writer's review in *SST*, V,3 (Sept. 1965), 173–174.

[14] Cf. *Kolokol* facsimile edition, vyp. I, note 52 on p. XVIII. The reference is to J.S.G. Simmons, Librarian-Lecturer in Charge of Slavonic Books at the University of Oxford.

[15] As an example of 'atmosphere' influence, the present writer can cite from personal experience the inspiration derived, when translating Blok's poems into English, from consulting contemporary (rather than modern) editions of Blok's verse. The 'atmosphere' factor evidently defies objective analysis, but is none the less real and operative for all that.

[16] *Gazeta* – the nearest English equivalent here would seem to be 'news-sheet'. The frequency of *Kolokol*'s appearance varied considerably, being once monthly for the first 8 issues and basically twice monthly thereafter; from Nov. 1861 until June 1863, it even appeared four times a month. For complete details, cf. *Kolokol* facsimile edition, vyp. I, str. XVII, incl. note 46.

[17] Letter of 17 June 1859. Cf. *inter alia* Lemke, *Pol. sob. soč. Gercena*, t. X, str. 42. – In general, *Kolokol* facsimile edition, vyp. I, str. XVII.

[18] Cf. *Kolokol* facsimile edition, vyp. I, str. XVII.

[19] Cf. 'Pis'mo k A.S. Xomjakovu otca ego', dated 3 (15) mai [mars?] 1826 (in *Pol. sob. soč. A.S. Xomjakova*, t. VIII, 'Priloženija', str. 3–15), str. 9. The letter as a whole paints an extremely favourable portrait of the new Tsar, and this by a man who was very far from being a reactionary. As a young man, A.S. Khomiakov (the son and future Slavophil) had consistently argued against the Decembrists, accusing them of merely seeking to replace the Tsarist autocracy by the dictatorship of a tiny minority. Even in 'liberal' England, the sentences passed on the Decembrists were variously referred to 'humane' and 'wise'; the Annual Register even described them and the preceding judicial inquiry as "most honourable to the character of the Russian Government and the new Emperor".

[20] Cf. *inter alia* V.A. Malinin, 'Naučnaja istorija russkoj filosofii i spekuljacii sovremennyx buržuaznyx filosofov' (in *Protiv sovremennyx buržuaznyx fal'sifikatorov marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii*, str. 162–191), str. 184, incl. note 24. Also *infra*, ref. 33.

[21] *N.V. Gogol': Polnoe sobranie sočinenij*, tt. I–XIV, Izd. AN SSSR, L., 1937–1952. This edition is virtually complete, except for Gogol's *Meditations on the Divine Liturgy*,

included in the original plan, but finally discarded as being allegedly 'devoid of literary interest'.

[22] Edward C. Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Russia*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1964, pp. vii–viii.

[23] (a) *Russian Philosophy* (ed. by James M. Edie, James P. Scanlan, and Mary-Barbara Zeldin; with the collaboration of George L. Kline), Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1965 (3 vols). – The complete *Lettre philosophique* No. I, translated by Mary-Barbara Zeldin from the French original in Geršenzon (see note 25, *infra*), is given in Vol. I, pp. 106–125. – (b) *Russian Intellectual History; an Anthology* (ed. by Marc Raeff), Burlingame, Harcourt, Brace & World, New York-Chicago 1966. – The complete *Lettre philosophique* No. I, translated by Valentine Snow from Geršenzon, appears on pp. 160–173. – (c) Very brief extracts may be found in: Hans Kohn, *The Mind of Modern Russia*, Harper and Row, New York-London, 1962, pp. 38–46.

[24] *Oeuvres choisies de Pierre Tchaadaïeff, publiées pour la première fois par le P(ère) Gagarin(e) de la compagnie de Jésus*, Librairie A. Franck, Paris/A. Frank'sche Verlagshandlung, Leipzig, 1862, 208 pp.

[25] *Sočinenija i pis'ma P.Ja. Čaadaeva* (pod red. M. Geršenzona), Moskva, t.I, 1913; t.II, 1914.

[26] 'Neizdannye "Filosofičeskie pis'ma" P.Ja. Čaadaeva', Publikacija, perevod i kommentarii D. Šaxovskogo, in *Literaturnoe nasledstvo 22–24*, M. 1935, pp. 6–78. – The explanatory article covers pp. 6–17; the Russian translations of the five new *Lettres*, pp. 18–78. – D(mitrij Ivanovič) Šaxovskoj's paternal grandmother, Princess Natal'ja Dmitrievna Ščerbatova, was a first cousin of Čaadaev's mother.

[27] Šaxovskoj, *op. cit.*, p. 10. – More specifically, Čaadaev first develops his central theme from the point of view of religion (Letter II), philosophy (III), and natural science (IV), after which he relates the whole to other philosophical systems (V). Letters VI and VII (Gagarin's 2 and 3) deal, as stated, with philosophy of history. Letter VIII provides a summary and conclusion to the series as a whole. (Cf. Šaxovskoj, p. 70, note 1 to Letter V; also Falk, *op. cit.*, p. 123, note 11.)

[28] Falk (p. 9, note 13) records that in 1951 there was apparently only *one* copy of *Literaturnoe nasledstvo 22–24* in the public libraries of Germany!

[29] Cf. Falk, *op. cit.*, pp. 85–128 (Anhang: 'Deutscher Text der fünf neu aufgefundenen "Philosophischen Briefe" Čaadaevs, aus dem Russischen übertragen und mit zusätzlichen Anmerkungen versehen'). – Falk states (p. 10) that, despite laborious efforts through every imaginable intermediary, it proved impossible to obtain photographic copies of the original French texts in Leningrad. He therefore had no option but to work on Saxovskoj's Russian translations, as did Koyré, who had the particularly ungrateful task of then putting the Russian *back* into French once more (cf. A. Koyré, *Études sur l'histoire de la pensée philosophique en Russie*, J. Vrin, Paris, 1950, p. 54, note 1. – For 'Lettres II à VI' read 'Lettres II à V, ainsi que VIII', R.J.K.). These double translations, however unsatisfactory, are thus not only excusable but unavoidable. The same cannot be said of the French edition of Zen'kovskij's *Istorija russkoj filosofii*, where citations from Čaadaev – available in the original French in Geršenzon and translated into Russian by Zen'kovskij for his original Russian version – are then put back into French by the translator, often with appreciable differences in emphasis and even meaning (cf. B. Zenkovsky, *Histoire de la philosophie russe*, traduit du russe par C. Andronikof, t.I, Gallimard, Paris, 1953, pp. 168-192).

[30] Cf. *De Pouchkine à Gorki*, Vol. II, pp. 8–12; p. 24. To be fair, the fact that Čaadaev's *Lettres philosophiques* and *Apologie d'un fou* were originally written in French is

mentioned on p. 10, where, however, as the result of a further slip, Nadeždin's *Teleskop* is referred to as 'Le Télégraphe'. In fact, Polevoj's *Moskovskij Telegraf* had been banned in 1834, i.e. 2 years before the famous issue (No. 15) of *Teleskop*, which, in a sense, replaced it. Haldas apparently relies exclusively on the classic study of Charles Quénet – which, however, appeared too early (1931) to embody the full implications of Šaxovskoj's findings.

[31] *De Pouchkine à Gorki*, Vol. IV, Lausanne 1967, 576 pp. This contains, *inter alia*: Alexandre Herzen, 'La Russie et l'Occident' (pp. 281–445). – *Compléments*: 'Le peuple russe et le socialisme; Lettre à Jules Michelet' (pp. 519–560). – Lénine: 'À la mémoire de Herzen' (pp. 561–569).

[32] The collection *De Pouchkine à Gorki* is available only by direct subscription from the publishers; the volumes, which are unfortunately not sold separately, cost Sw. Fr. 8.50 each, post free.

[33] In an 'official' introductory article preceding that of Šaxovskoj, the Soviet philosopher V. Asmus referred to long and detailed research being carried out on Čaadaev, the results of which "the Soviet public will await with impatience" (*Literaturnoe nasledstvo 22–24*, p. 6). Šaxovskoj himself stated (*loc. cit.*) that the material contained in Geršenzon's edition represented "not more than half" of what Čaadaev had written. Despite Šaxovskoj's announcement (1935) of a forthcoming *complete* edition of Čaadaev's *Works*, Falk (p. 8, note 5) in 1951 received official confirmation from *Meždunarodnaja kniga* that this edition had not so far been published. This is still the case today, more than thirty years later. In 1965, V.A. Malinin (see ref. 20, *supra*) referred to a forthcoming *selected* edition as follows: "The edition of selected philosophical works of P.Ja. Čaadaev at present in preparation (*podgotavlivaemoe nyne izdanie*), which will also include works not previously published, will undoubtedly contribute towards unmasking the idealistic (school's) falsification of the views of (this) Russian thinker." – Assuming, as all investigators seem to do, that Šaxovskoj's translations of the eight *Lettres philosophiques* are complete, and to that extent faithfully reproduce all the *ideas* expressed there by Čaadaev, the apparent refusal to countenance the use of photocopies or microfilms of the original French MSS remains a mystery, unless they are being kept in reserve as the *pièce de résistance* of the long-awaited new Soviet edition. It is worth noting that in the early sixties M.-B. Zeldin was able to translate "selections from *Letters III, V*, and *VIII* ... from the author's French manuscript (Academija Nauk, F. 93, Op. 3, Nos. 1352, 1354, and 1356; collection P.J. Daškov): *Letter* III, pp. 2–9; *Letter* V, pp. 4–8, 11–12; *Letter* VIII, pp. 5–7." (Cf. *Russian Philosophy*, Chicago 1965, Vol. I, note on p. 106; also ref. 23, *supra*).

PIERRE J. BEEMANS

SCIENTIFIC ATHEISM IN THE SOVIET-UNION: 1917–1954

The usual periodization of Soviet philosophy discerns four stages of its development: 1917–21, 'War Communism'; 1921–30, the 'period of discussions'; 1930–47, the 'dead period', and since 1947, the present period of 'renewal and intensification of philosophical activity'.[1] It is interesting to observe that in scientific atheism the same stages are to be found, but quite differently distributed in time, viz.: 1917–21, 'War Communism'; 1921–41, the period of discussions and of massive atheistic propaganda; 1941–54, the 'dead period'; and since 1954, the present productive period. This article will be devoted to outlining the development of scientific atheism during the first three periods.

'War Communism' (1917–21) brought with it very little intellectual activity in any field, and scientific atheism was no exception. The country was racked by revolution, civil wars, famine, foreign invasions and the consolidation of the new Soviet empire over the many national minorities. The Church at this point constituted a very special problem. It had been an organic part of the Tsarist regime, highly favored by it and highly loyal to it. Quite naturally, it was strongly opposed to the new, avowedly atheistic regime, and openly supported the efforts of the various 'White' armies under Wrangel, Kolchak, Denikin and Kornilov, (and, for the same reasons, supported the allied military intervention). The moral and economic principles of the Bolsheviks contradicted every tenet of Christianity, and the various Churches could be relied upon to use their influence to oppose them. On January 18, 1918, Tixon, the newly elected Patriarch (the first since 1700), anathematized and excommunicated the Bolsheviks, and called upon the people to oppose them. Furthermore, most of the revolutionaries drew their attitudes towards religion primarily from the vehement anti-clericalism of Russian tradition, not from the historical materialism of Engels and Lenin, and so their methods tended to be far more direct. Finally, the country was in such chaos that no effective programme of mass propaganda or atheistic studies could be set up.

Thus, aside from the establishment of the newspaper *Revoljucija i cerkov'*

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(Revolution and the Church) in 1919, most of the measures were administrative.

In the Soviet Constitution of 1918, the Church is explicitly separated from the State, and the schools from the Church.[2] Religion is in this sense made a private affair, for the State. But the State has a responsibility to its members to further among them a *Weltanschauung* which corresponds to the real, atheistic nature of the world and of man. Thus, *atheism* is not a private affair: the State can never foster religion, but it can and must foster atheism and limit religious activities.

The 1918 Constitution does just this, restricting any religious activity which might be an externalization of belief, and charging the government with a definite work of propaganda. The government ordered the dissolution of most of the monasteries and convents during this period, the closing of many churches, the confiscation of the vast wealth of the Church treasures, and the execution of an estimated 28 bishops and 1200 priests. At the same time, the Bolševik party was ordered to augment its ideological struggle against religion, and membership in the party was closed to believers.[3] Party cadres were given a great deal of local autonomy in the carrying out of these orders. Repressions became so harsh that several *ukazy* had to be issued condemning measures which only served to antagonize believers unnecessarily and to hinder the atheistic campaigns, especially those which involved destruction of churches, desecration of religious objects, or degradation of the clergy.

The first signs of systematization in atheistic and anti-religious propaganda only appear after Lenin's monitum to the editors of the official Party philosophical journal, *Pod Znamenem Marksizma* [Under the Banner of Marxism] in 1921.[4] In it he outlines some of the tasks to be carried out: (a) a careful study of atheistic literature in all languages, and the translation of the most suitable, especially from the French 18th-century materialists; (b) continual re-examination and improvement of government anti-religious work; (c) demonstration of the connection between bourgeois class interests and religion; (d) use of the findings of natural science against religion and for materialism; (e) the systematic study of Hegelian dialectics from a materialist standpoint. This began the second period, which was to last until 1941. The first few years saw the widespread establishment of most of the atheistic journals, e.g.: in November 1921, the weekly *Bezbožnik* [The Godless]; in January 1922, the

daily, *Bezbožnik* (later changed to *Bezbožnik u stanka*, The Atheist at the Workbench); in 1925, *Antireligioznik* [The Antireligious]; in 1926, *Voinstvujuščij Ateizm* [Militant Atheism]; and in these same years, a series of other publications in minority languages. The theoretical journal of the Party, *Pod Znamenem Marksizma*, begun in January 1921, also carried many articles on atheism.

The first part of this period, 1921–26, witnessed two disputes over methods and content of atheistic work which are worth some attention, since they influenced the development of scientific atheism and paralleled the mechanist-Deborinite controversy taking place in the field of philosophy proper.[5]

In the first dispute, Em. Jaroslavskij, editor of *Bezbožnik*, was opposed to S. Polidorov and M. Kostelovskij, of *Bezbožnik u stanka*. Polidorov and Kostelovskij were propounding a very hard and fundamentalist line in atheistic work. They denied the value of studying and teaching the history and origins of religion and atheism, seeing it as meaningless in the new Communist world. For the same reasons, they also condemned as bourgeois and decadent Jaroslavskij's use of Western sources on atheism and his appeals for moral rectitude and virtues (honesty, sobriety, etc.) among atheistic workers. They rejected the differentiation in treatment that Jaroslavskij proposed for the various religious groups on the basis of their relative influences over populations of different regions and their attitudes to the Soviet regime. For them, the content of atheistic propaganda was to consist only in showing the connection between religion and the exploiting classes, and in vilifying and suppressing the clergy and religious rites; the only roots of religion to be combatted were the social roots. The technique they proposed for all this was the establishment in the villages of 'anti-religious dictatorships', composed of militant atheist proletarians from the cities. This school of tactics seems to have been quite prevalent, and it compromised the work of Jaroslavskij's *Bezbožnik* in the rural areas, particularly as both magazines initially bore the same name.

The central Committee of the Party finally resolved the dispute in favour of Jaroslavskij in April, 1926, condemning the neglect of the subjective element in atheistic propaganda and warning against the dangers of a 'proletarian aristocratism' of the workers towards the rural population. This 'anarchist' attitude was basically that, by destroying all churches

and imprisoning all clergy, religion would automatically disappear. Jaroslavskij, following Lenin faithfully, recognized that such a policy was not sufficient and that in certain circumstances it could even reinforce religious convictions among the people. It also created a great deal of unfavourable publicity abroad for the new Soviet state.

The other extreme appeared in the dispute over a Ukrainian *sbornik* published in 1925 by Viktorii Ulasevič, proposing that the real roots of religion were not social conditions but simply ignorance. Moreover, in the new socialist society, the struggle against religion was no longer a class-struggle or a political matter, since classes had been done away with and religion had been divorced from politics.[6] Therefore, atheistic work should be removed from government and party control, and should consist purely of scientific educational work by small rural circles of trained atheists. This tendency was also condemned by the April, 1926 meeting of the Central Committee, reaffirming the essentially Leninist position that "no education can in itself be a means for liberating man from the religious trance".[7]

The result of the Central Committee *ukaz* was to link atheistic propaganda tightly to the Party and the State, to make it more organized and systematic, and to promote atheistic circles and propaganda among workers, farmers, school-children and students, armed forces, Party cadres, etc. Although there was not much systematization in the philosophical sense, there was a systematic development of certain thematic areas: history of religions, 'scientific' arguments against religion, the immorality of religion and its alliance with the exploiting classes, etc.

In 1925, under the aegis of *Bezbožnik*, a congress of the readers of that magazine was called, which resulted in the formation of the *Sojuz Voinstvujuščix Bezbožnikov* [League of the Militant Godless]. This organization was to mushroom to enormous proportions, numbering millions of members and even constituting national branches abroad. It was the principal tool for active atheistic agitation and propaganda during this period, charged with setting up anti-religious schools and study circles and atheistic museums, with producing anti-religious literature, art, films, etc. These schools and museums were among the most popular techniques: by 1927, there were 6 anti-religious 'seminaries', and by 1930, 44 anti-religious 'universities'. Any town of any size had its anti-religious museum, usually installed in a church.

The active persecution of the Churches was being carried on regularly, despite the Party and governmental warnings against the dangers that excessive administrative measures might entail for the work of the Party as a whole. The extent to which these warnings were prompted by concerns of justice can be gathered from the statistics of arrests and executions of religious leaders and believers.[8] The desired effect was achieved however, and by 1927 the Orthodox Church's resistance to the regime was broken. Henceforth, it was to function, if at all, under the close supervision of the Communist Party.

The quantity of atheistic and anti-religious literature during this period is prodigious. J.M. Bocheński quotes sources which show that the State Publishing House issued 44000000 pieces of anti-religious literature in 1930, and 140000000 copies of 1832 titles between 1928 and 1940.[9] However, it is the content of the material that is germane to this paper. A history of the philosophy of this period yields 41 books devoted to scientific atheism on the philosophical level, presumably the most important ones. The principal writers were Em. Jaroslavskij, A.T. Lukačevskij, A.B. Ranovič, I.I. Skvorcov-Stepanov, and V.D. Bonč-Bruevič. It is interesting to note that most of their books and articles dealt with the history and origins of religion, along the lines laid down by Engels in *On the History of Early Christianity*. One of the classical works in this field was, and still is, Jaroslavskij's *How Gods and Goddesses are Born, Live and Die*.[10]

For the rest, most of the atheistic publications on the philosophical level were translations of the French 18th-century materialists, and of 'scientific' refutations of religion.[11] There is no mention of any treatment of the epistemological roots of religion.

Thus, although this period was one of hectic and harsh anti-religious activity, with the exception of a few works on the social origins of religion, there was no elaboration of a coherent theory of scientific atheism. There was no effort to understand the nature of religious belief, and little comprehension of the tenacity it held in the souls of men. The Jaroslavskij-Polidorov-Ulasevič disputes are quite symptomatic of the ambivalence on the subject at this time. Although the ultimate goal was the same, strategy and tactics were polarized between two approaches, which can be called 'determinism' and 'voluntarism'. This polarization can tentatively be projected backward to a fundamental difference of attitude towards the social and epistemological roots of religion.

The determinists followed a basic Marxian inspiration: that the fundamental cause of religion is the socio-economic condition of man (although they did not understand it in the Marxian context of alienation), and that when this condition is corrected by the abolition of classes, economic exploitation and poverty, religion itself will inevitably wither away. This inevitable process need at most be aided by a pedagogical atheism aimed at drawing the people out of their history; the laws of social development will do the rest.

The voluntarists, although acknowledging the basic truth of this Marxian principle, placed their emphasis on the tactical considerations, in the spirit of Lenin. The war against religion had to be carried on in the concrete Russian context, coping with the immediate difficulties mentioned in the first few pages of this article. Moreover, it was not enough to let the social laws work themselves out; where progress was being hindered by the barriers of religion, man must play an active part in the course of history and must destroy those barriers. Moreover, inasmuch as the epistemological roots of religion are ever-present in the mind, Party and State, as the vanguard of scientific socialism, have the responsibility to work all the harder to expunge the religious illusion and to eliminate anything that might activate this essential deficiency in the knowing process.

Although determinism, as exemplified by Ulasevič, and the extreme voluntarism advocated by the *Bezbožnik u stanka* group were both rejected, it was nevertheless a voluntarist line that dominated, under Jaroslavskij. With it prevailed the fallacy that atheism could be instilled by administrative measures and superficial propaganda.

In 1941, the situation altered completely. The USSR was at war with Germany and in the early stages was in danger of losing, largely because of desertions by the military and the peasantry to what seemed at first to be a more palatable political system. The Party rapidly realized the need for popular support and the essential role religion could play in arousing it. The anti-religious press was suppressed, the League of the Militant Godless dissolved in 1941, and Jaroslavskij himself disappeared in late 1943. In the same year, some of the few remaining Orthodox bishops were summoned, and a new Patriarch was elected (the first since 1924), who appealed to the people to combat the enemy in the name of religion. Churches were re-opened, some clergy released from prison, and

religious services given more latitude. The Party media themselves called upon the people to defend 'Holy Mother Russia'.

In a large part due to the bitter repressions of the Germans, the tactic worked, and believers and clergy fought valiantly against the enemy. By the end of the war, they had proven themselves loyal Soviet citizens. The argument that the Churches were treasonous and allied to the enemies of the State was so patently false that it was gradually discontinued as a part of atheistic propaganda. Severe administrative restrictions against religion remained in force, but were relaxed in some of the large centres. Furthermore, thirty years had passed since the Revolution, and a whole new generation of Party people and intellectuals had grown up with virtually no exposure to religion. It had played no part in their lives, and to many it seemed a pointless thing to devote time and attention to, particularly as it obviously did not constitute a threat to the state.

The anti-religious press was very slow to resume. In 1947 the *Vsesojuznoe Obščestvo po Rasprostraneniju Političeskix i Naučnyx Znanij* (All-Union Society for the Diffusion of Political and Scientific Knowledge) was created and charged with the task of conducting anti-religious propaganda. "However, this work was carried on ineffectively until the '50's; very little anti-religious literature was printed and there were no theoretical investigations in atheism whatsoever."[12] In his exhaustive bibliography of books and articles on scientific atheism from 1947–64, T.J. Blakeley mentions only 20 works published before 1954 – out of a total of 504.[13] Thus, there is little of philosophical interest in the period, and little to be gained by devoting more time to it.

It should be noted, however, that the situation changed radically in the latter half of 1954 with the two declarations of the Central Committee: July 7, on the deficiencies in anti-religious work, and November 10, on the errors being committed in scientific atheist propaganda.[14]

Despite the philosophical poverty of these first three stages of the growth of scientific atheism in the Soviet-Union, there are several relevant conclusions that can be drawn. First, although scientific atheism had been touted from the very start as an essential part of dialectical and historical materialism, it remained until 1954 a superficial field of polemical and political agitation and propaganda. Second, it developed in virtually complete ignorance of the real significance of Lenin's *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* and *Philosophical Notebooks*, and of Marx' *Economic and Philo-*

sophic Manuscripts of 1844, although both the latter were known by the mid-thirties. An explanation for this may be found in the fact that after August, 1938, Stalin virtually prohibited works on Lenin and his theories.[15] Anti-religious propaganda, however, did adhere very closely to the practical considerations following from Lenin's theoretical atheism: close control of socio-economic-political conditions, central defining authority on ideology, and active expurgation of the religious 'disease'.

REFERENCES

[1] Cf. J.M. Bocheński, *Soviet Russian Dialectical Materialism*, Dordrecht 1963, pp. 31–32.

[2] Cf. 'Ob otdelenii Cerkvi ot Gosudarstva i Školy ot Cerkvi (Dekret soveta narodnyx kommisarov, 23 janvarja 1918 g.)' [On the Separation of Church from State, and Schools from Church], articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, in *O Religii i Cerkvi*, Moskva 1965, str. 95–96.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 58: 'O Postanovke Antireligioznoj Propagandy i o Narušenii Punkta 13 Programy (Postanovlenie CK RKP (b) 1921 g.)' [On the Organization of Anti-religious Propaganda and on the Violations of Point 13 of the Programme], art. 1.

[4] Cf. 'O Značenie Voinstvujuščego Materializma' [On the Significance of Militant Materialism], in V.I. Lenin, *Soč.*, tom 33, str. 178–185.

[5] Cf. S.N. Savel'ev, 'Em. Jaroslavskij i Preodolenie Anarxističeskix Vlijanij v Anti-religioznoj Rabote v SSSR' [Em. Jaroslavskij and the Overthrowing of Anarchistic Influences in Anti-religious Work in the USSR], in *Ežegodnik Muzej Istorija Religii i Ateizma VII*, Leningrad 1963, str. 36–50.

[6] *Puti antireligioznoj propangandy* [The Paths of Anti-religious Propaganda], *K postanovke raboty* [For the Organisation of Work], vyp. 2 (pod red. V. Ulasevič), Kiev 1925.

[7] Cf. *KPSS v resolucijax i rešenijax s'ězdov, konferencii i plenumov CK* [Resolutions and Decisions of Central Committee Congresses, Conferences and Plenums], Cast' 2, Moskva 1954, str. 53.

[8] For more detailed accounts of the organizational aspects of Soviet anti-religion, cf.: V. Gsovski, *Church and State Behind the Iron Curtain*, New York 1954; N.S. Timasheff, *Religion in Soviet Russia 1917–42*, London 1943; J.M. Bocheński, *Handbook on Communism*, New York 1962, pp. 493–542.

[9] Bocheński, *op. cit.*, p. 506.

[10] Em. Jaroslavskij, *Kak rodjatsja, živut i umirajut bogi i bogini* [How Gods and Goddesses are Born, Live and Die], Moskva 1921.

[11] A well-documented source gives the following figures for the years 1917–37: Voltaire, 206000 copies; d'Holbach 79000; Helvetius, 48000; Diderot, 124000; C. Darwin, 230000; D.I. Mendeleev, 136000; I.P. Pavlov, 95000; K.A. Timirjazev, 773000. Cf. Ju.A. Čukovenkov, 'Sovetskaja Antireligioznaja Pečat' v 1937–41 gg.', in *Ežegodnik Muzej Istorii Religii i Ateizma V*, Leningrad 1961, str. 76–90.

[12] Cf. *Marksistsko-Leninskaja filosofija i sociologija v SSSR i Evropejskix Socialističeskix stranax* [Marxist-Leninist Philosophy and Sociology in the USSR and in European Socialist Countries], Moskva 1965, str. 188.

[13] Cf. T.J. Blakeley, 'Soviet Writings on Atheism and Religion' and 'Soviet Writings

on Atheism and Religion. Supplement', in *SST* 1964,4, 319–338, and 1965, 1-2, pp. 106–113.

[14] Cf. *Voprosy ideologičeskoj raboty* [Questions on Ideological Work], Moskva 1961: 'O Krupnyx Nedostatjax v Naučno-ateističeskoj Propagandy i Merax eë Uluščenija' [On Large-Scale Deficiencies in Scientific Atheist Propaganda and the Means for its Improvement], str. 61–65; and 'Ob Ošibkax v Provedenii Naučno-ateističeskoj Propagandy sredi Naselenija' [On Errors in Conducting Scientific-atheist Propaganda among the Population], str. 72–76.

[15] Cf. L. Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, London 1962, p. 471.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

VALUE THEORY

One of the most interesting developments in recent Soviet philosophy is the surge of activity in general value theory. Several reasons might be suggested to partially explain this phenomenon: First, as a result of the increasing attention paid to contemporary 'bourgeois' philosophy, where several highly articulated philosophies of value are to be found, it became necessary to work out a Marxist-Leninist theory which could be offered in their place. This reason is in fact put forward by V.V. Mšvenieradze. And in a recent *sbornik* on value theory (*Problema cennosti v filosofii*, M. 1966) no less than half of the articles are concerned with the critique of non-Marxist theories. Secondly, Soviet philosophers working in this area do not have to struggle to bring their views into harmony with the authoritative texts of the classics, since little can be found there which bears directly on general value theory. Of course, their investigations must move within the general framework of dialectical and historical materialism, but that there remains ample room for originality is evident from the works of V.P. Tugarinov, O.G. Drobnickij, O.M. Bakuradze, and others. In any case, a wide range of problems is brought into focus: the central issue is the nature of values themselves, but also considered are the nature of value judgments, the criterion of value, the classification of values, the role of values in science, etc.

A good example of the extent to which Soviet value theory has developed is found in an article entitled 'Value and Historical Necessity' (*FN*, 66,6) by a philosopher from Tbilisi, O.I. Džioev. The author's concern is to ascertain the role values play in determining the course of history, and this in turn "depends upon whether valuative consciousness is wholly determined by historical being or whether values have their own logic, their own objectivity. . ." (34).

In considering the problem of the objectivity of values, Džioev remains true to the general direction already taken by Soviet value theory. This might be expressed in the following way: values are qualities which are

necessarily related both to the objective world and to man; it is always real phenomena or objects that have value, and they have this value only for man, e.g., as satisfying his needs or desires. In the 1963 *Filosofskij slovar'* we read: "Values are properties of material objects and of phenomena of social consciousness, which characterize their significance for society, class and man" (p. 496). Drobnickij describes value as "a form of manifestation of a definite type of relation between subject and object" (*Problema cennosti v filosofii*, str. 33). And V.A. Vasilenko formulates, perhaps most clearly, the dual context in which values are to be situated: "Insofar as a value is determined by both sides of the value-relation, its magnitude (*veličina*) and character depend simultaneously both on the determinate subject (the subjective factor of value) and on the properties of the object – the bearer of value (the objective factor of value). In this sense one can say: a value is a function of two variables" (*Ibid.*, p. 45).

Now from an *a priori* standpoint, this characterization of values as relational qualities would allow Soviet philosophers to search for the ground of objectivity of values in one of two places: in the value-laden object or in the subject for whom the object possesses value. It is certainly more current among the Soviets to opt for the former. One emphasizes that things are always considered valuable in virtue of the objective properties which they possess and that values thereby have an objective foundation in reality. However, Džioev rejects this position, pointing out that the objective existence of valuable objects is something quite different from the objectivity of values themselves, and further that the former does not account for the objectivity of the criterion by which we judge things valuable in the first place.

In presenting his own view, the author turns rather to the subjective pole of the value-relation, to man as the possible ground for objectivity. But, since historical man possessed different sets of values in different epochs, it seems that man also cannot function as the touchstone of objectivity. The solution is to be found in a more differentiated concept of man: while man certainly has historically varying features, according to his class, his nationality, etc., he also possesses generic features, i.e., that which is universally present in all men. And rooted in these two sides of man are two different kinds of values: class values and general human (*obščečelovečeskie*) values. With this division alone the author offers nothing radically new in Soviet philosophy; it can be traced back at least

to 1958, and it presently enjoys considerable support, appearing even in the article on 'values' in the new *Kratkij slovar' po filosofii*. However, what is interesting here is the unequivocal assertion that the general human values are not functions of the dialectics of the historical process; thus they can be called 'unconditional' (*bezuslovnye*) or, to use an alternate translation, 'absolute'. In Džioev's opinion, only an absolute value, independent of historical change, can function as a criterion for conditioned values; for example, if we are able to reject some class values and acknowledge others, it is only because we have at our disposal a criterion which is not class-bound, i.e., an absolute value.

In order to further substantiate this thesis – that some values must be unconditional, Džioev presents a noteworthy analysis of human activity, the upshot of which is that human freedom presupposes the existence of unconditional values. As others (V.P. Tugarinov, V.E. Davidovič, T.I. Ojzerman) have recently emphasized, freedom is not achieved with the simple recognition of necessity. Man is free as an *active subject*, insofar as he introduces into the world a new type of determination; and this type of determination is nothing other than his goal-directed activity. Now since man sets his goals according to certain ideals and these in turn according to his values, if the latter were merely a result of his socio-economic situation, we could hardly designate this activity as free: "If values were completely determined by concrete historical conditions, if they were devoid of any independence, freedom would be an illusion" (36).

As a result of this investigation into the nature of values, the author can conclude that it is precisely because some values have a certain independence vis-à-vis the historical process that they can here play such an active and decisively formative role. For example, although the necessity for social change is rooted in the economic base of society, the very realization of the contradictions which are present and the formation of the new social ideal of the progressive class is based upon unconditional, general human values. And further, if these values "take part in determining the course of history in general, then all the greater must be their significance in the development of science and philosophy, art, morals and legal consciousness" (38).

It is obvious that many interesting implications could be drawn from this position. I will mention only three: First of all, since general human values are not dependent on social and economic factors, and are yet an

important element in the formation of history, the monist view of historical causation falls. One cannot even say that, in the end, the historical process is totally a function of the developing economic base. Secondly, the criterion by which all ideological forms, all elements of the superstructure, are to be evaluated is itself not a part of this superstructure. And finally, as these unconditional values necessarily operate in every free human action, all such action is, in one important respect, free of class-character. It will be interesting to see whether the Soviets themselves draw these and other implications of the theory of 'unconditional' values and how they will fit it into the traditional schemata of historical materialism.

James J. O'Rourke

BIOGRAPHY OF SOVIET LEADERS

Soviet Leaders, edited by George Simmonds (Crowell, New York, 1967), is a useful reference work, containing an introductory aperçu of Soviet affairs since Khrushchev and forty-two concise biographies of prominent contemporary Soviet personalities in the following fields: party, government, and law; military; foreign service; economic theory and practice; science and philosophy; the arts. Each biographical sketch is followed by a selected bibliography, and a general glossary of political and historical terms is appended by the editor. Of particular interest to those who follow Soviet philosophy are the portraits of V.A. Fock, by S. Müller-Markus, T.D. Lysenko, by M.W. Mikulak, and F.V. Konstantinov, by R.T. De George. Professor De George incorporates into his sketch of Tugarinov's career an indication of the Soviet philosopher's own contributions to the development of historical materialism.

J. O'R.

A NEW CHAIR FOR DIALECTICAL LOGIC

Moscow State University has established a new chair for dialectical logic, appointing Academician M.B. Mitin as its first occupant (*Vestnik MGU*, VIII, 1967,3, 83).

J. O'R.

NEW PROGRAMS IN SOVIET PHILOSOPHY

We learn with interest that new programs in Soviet philosophy are being introduced at two universities in the United States this year. The Philosophy Department of Boston College has recently announced that a special program, leading to a Ph.D. in Soviet philosophy is being inaugurated this September. This new program is being directed by Professor Thomas J. Blakeley, formerly Senior Assistant of the Fribourg Institute for East-European Studies and author of a number of important works on Soviet philosophy which have appeared in the *Sovietica* series. The courses to be offered in connection with this new program include: 'Introductory Sovietology', 'Eighteenth-Century Russian Philosophy', 'Development of Dialectic from Hegel and Marx through Contemporary Russian Philosophy', 'Contemporary Marxism', 'Advanced Sovietology', 'Philosophy of History: A Marxist-Leninist View', 'Concept of Alienation in Hegel and Marx', 'Twentieth-Century Hegelianism', 'Philosophical Themes in Russian Literature', and 'Deviationism in Modern Marxism'.

The Institute of Contemporary Russian Studies at Fordham University has also added courses on Marxist and Marxist-Leninist philosophy to its curriculum. A notable feature of the recent summer school at the Fordham Institute was two courses conducted by Father Gustav Wetter S.J., one, in Russian, on Russian Philosophy, and another, in English, on Soviet Ideology.

T. R. P.

REVIEWS

Richard T. De George, *Patterns of Soviet Thought. The Origins and Development of Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1966, 293 pp.

Die Übereinstimmung mit den Lehren von Marx, Engels und Lenin ist für die Sowjetphilosophie ein zentraler Beweisgrund ihres eigenen Wahrheitsanspruchs. Daraus ergibt sich die besondere Bedeutung, die der Frage nach den theoretischen Voraussetzungen der Sowjetphilosophie beizumessen ist. Die Kontinuität der philosophiegeschichtlichen Entwicklung wird dabei zwar häufig behauptet und von westlicher Seite nicht weniger oft bestritten, doch ist das Problem bisher nur selten eingehend untersucht worden. Von sowjetischer Seite liegt zum Thema lediglich die umfangreiche Studie T.I. Ojzermans vor[1], unter den wenigen westlichen Darstellungen ist die Arbeit H.J. Liebers zu nennen[2], die freilich schon mehr als 10 Jahre zurückliegt und die Entwicklung der Sowjetphilosophie nach dem Tode Stalins unberücksichtigt läßt. Zwar wird die Frage nach den entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Grundlagen im Rahmen der zahlreichen systematischen Analysen der Sowjetphilosophie in der Regel berührt, doch kann dabei kaum jenes Maß an differenzierter Betrachtung erreicht werden, daß dem Problem eigentlich angemessen wäre. Auf diesem Hintergrund gesehen, darf die hier angezeigte Arbeit De Georges mit einem weitverbreiteten Interesse rechnen, und es soll vorweggenommen werden, daß sie geeignet erscheint, die Diskussion über Kontinuität und Wandlung im Marxismus-Leninismus neu zu beleben.

De George, der schon im Vorwort seiner sorgfältigen Untersuchung nachdrücklich davor warnt, klassischen Marxismus und gegenwärtige Sowjetphilosophie als fugenlose und unteilbare Einheit anzusehen, in der es einen Entwicklungsprozeß im Sinne fortlaufender Veränderung nicht gegeben hätte, gliedert seine Arbeit in drei Hauptteile, die die wesentlichen Etappen markieren: Marxism-Leninism-Soviet Philosophy and Ideology.

Seit es eine Diskussion um Marx und den Marxismus gibt, ist die Frage nach dem Einfluß der Philosophie Hegels und Feuerbachs auf das Marxsche Denken ein bevorzugter Gegenstand zahlreicher Kontroversen geworden. Th. Masaryk hat wohl zuerst die entscheidene Bedeutung Feuerbachs betont, er wollte – wie E. Thier festgestellt hat – "Marx nahezu in Feuerbach auflösen"[3]; demgegenüber hat J. Plenge schon 1911 behauptet, daß Marx ausschließlich durch das Prisma der Hegelschen Philosophie gesehen und verstanden werden muß. Es ist angesichts dieser kontroversen Lage, die den Stand der Forschung bis zur

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Gegenwart kennzeichnet, unbedingt begrüßenswert, daß De George seine Darstellung der philosophischen Grundlehren von Karl Marx mit einer knappen, aber inhaltsreichen Charakterisierung Hegels einleitet und den Versuch unternimmt, diejenigen Prinzipien der Hegelschen Philosophie zu formulieren, die für die Entwicklung des Marxismus relevant geworden sind (18). Auch das Verhältnis von Marx zu Feuerbach wird durch eine eingehende Analyse von Feuerbachs *Wesen des Christentums* und die Konfrontation mit den Marxschen *Thesen über Feuerbach* beleuchtet. Insofern Marx – wie De George zeigt – an Feuerbachs materialistischen Humanismus und damit an seine Religionskritik anknüpft, die die Religion als Entfremdung des Menschen von seiner eigenen Natur versteht, hat er den Ausgangspunkt für seine kritische Gesellschaftstheorie, die den Staat als Resultat der Entfremdung des Menschen von der Gesellschaft begreift (29). Hegel und Feuerbach sind für Marx als Anreger seiner Theorie bedeutsam geworden, aber nicht so, daß er sie auf eklektische Weise verbunden hätte, sondern indem er in kritischer Auseinandersetzung über sie hinausgeht.

Es ist hier nicht der Ort, eine ausführliche Darstellung der Marxinterpretation De Georges zu liefern, wie sie an Hand der wichtigsten Schriften im folgenden geleistet wird. De George kommt es dabei vor allem darauf an, die geistige Entwicklung von Marx sichtbar werden zu lassen, die sich auf philosophischem Gebiet im wesentlichen in der Zeit von der Abfassung der Doktordissertation (1841) bis zur Niederschrift der *Deutschen Ideologie* (1845–46) vollzieht. Während die Doktordissertation als Ausdruck der Marxschen Konversion zu Hegel erscheint (37f.), ereignet sich über die *Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie* und die Pariser Manuskripte ein Wandlungsprozeß, der mit der *Deutschen Ideologie*, die als erste klare Darlegung der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung gekennzeichnet wird (46), einen gewissen Abschluß findet. "With The German Ideology Marx had for all essential purposes completed the philosophical framework in which he was to work for the rest of his life" (52). Begrüssenswert ist, daß De George in seiner Untersuchung der *Politischen Ökonomie* von Marx ein eigenes Kapitel widmet. Die Darlegung der Grundgedanken der ökonomischen Hauptwerke von Marx gibt vor allem dem Nichtökonomen einen instruktiven Überblick und macht Verbindungen zwischen Philosophie und Ökonomie im Marxschen Denken deutlich.

Verglichen mit der kaum noch übersehbaren Zahl von Marx-Monographien, ist die Literatur über Friedrich Engels wenig umfangreich. Seine Bedeutung, so schien es lange Zeit, war durch jene Selbsteinschätzung aus der Feuerbach-Schrift (1888) treffend umrissen, in der Engels betont, daß Marx der "größte Teil der leitenden Grundgedanken, besonders auf ökonomischem und geschichtlichem Gebiet, und speziell ihre schließliche scharfe Fassung" gehöre, Marx also mit Ausnahme einiger Spezialfächer die theoretische Arbeit hätte allein leisten können. Engels erscheint so leicht als wichtigster Propagandist des Marxschen Werkes, zugleich aber auch als terrible simplificateur, der eine eigenständige philosophische Potenz kaum besessen hat. Obwohl De George das oben bei-

gebrachte Engels-Zitat anführt, sucht seine Darstellung solch vereinfachendem Vorurteil entgegenzuwirken. Der Autor weist nicht nur auf die zentrale Bedeutung von Engels für die Sowjetphilosophie hin, die sich vor allem aus der Tatsache ergibt, daß Engels durch Anwendung der Dialektik auf die Natur in ihrer Gesamtheit der eigentliche Begründer des dialektischen Materialismus ist (107), sondern betont gleichzeitig, daß Engels mit dem *Anti-Dühring* (1877) "the most systematic presentation of the Marxist views in philosophy, political economy, and socialism" (77) geschaffen hat. Schon aus diesen Hinweisen ergeben sich Zweifel an der Berechtigung jenes einseitig negativen Urteils über Engels, das man in der angedeuteten Form noch häufig antreffen kann. Max Adler hatte bereits 1924 in seiner Schrift über *Engels als Denker* nachzuweisen versucht, daß Engels schon vor seiner Bekanntschaft mit Marx eine beachtliche Kenntnis der Hegelschen Philosophie besaß und mit philosophischen Problemen durchaus vertraut war. Die Verteidigungsschrift Hegels aus dem Jahre 1842 *Schelling und die Offenbarung* zeigt einen philosophischen Sachverstand, den man bei Lektüre der späten Schriften von Engels kaum vermuten würde. So verstärkt sich die Annahme, daß Engels im Verlauf seines Lebens ein Opfer der freiwillig übernommenen Aufgabe, erster Apologet des Marxschen Werkes zu sein, geworden ist. Es wäre interessant, dieses Problem einmal genauer zu untersuchen. Der 'frühe Marx' ist seit der Veröffentlichung der Frühschriften (1932) eine bekannte Tatsache geworden, der 'frühe Engels' ist bis heute weitgehend unentdeckt geblieben[4].

Da De George in einem kurzen Exkurs das Problem 'Marxismus und Revisionismus' behandelt, sei hier angemerkt, daß eigentlich schon Engels selbst in der Spätphase seiner Entwicklung Anlaß gegeben hat, ihn als den ersten Revisionisten zu bezeichnen. Engels war es, der in der 1895 verfassten Einleitung zur Marxschen Schrift *Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich 1848 bis 1850* ausdrücklich betont hat, daß der parlamentarische Weg zum Sieg des Sozialismus, die Eroberung der Macht durch 'Benutzung des Wahlrechts' an die Stelle einer bewaffneten Erhebung des Proletariats treten müsse. Und Engels war es auch, der am 1. Mai 1891 gegenüber August Bebel in einem Brief sehr scharf jeden Versuch einer Beeinflussung der sozialistischen Theorie durch Intervention der Partei zurückwies: "Ihr – die Partei – *braucht* die sozialistische Wissenschaft, und diese kann nicht leben ohne Freiheit der Bewegung." Diese Gesichtspunkte zu unterstreichen, erscheint besonders notwendig, weil sie in der gegenwärtigen Sowjetphilosophie unberücksichtigt bleiben.

Die Analyse des Leninismus, die im zweiten Hauptteil der vorliegenden Untersuchung gegeben wird, ist wohl die beste kurze Darstellung des Themas, die bisher vorliegt. Sie behandelt zunächst die spezifisch russischen Einflüsse, die Lenins Denken bestimmt haben, insbesondere die Bedeutung Plechanovs und rückt dann Lenins Lehre von der Partei sowie eine eingehende Interpretation von *Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus* in den Mittelpunkt. Als wichtig erscheint der wiederholt gegebene Hinweis auf dem apologetischen Charakter zahlreicher Schriften der Klassiker, die "under the pressure of controversy" (7)

entstanden sind und schon dadurch zahlreiche terminologische Ungenauigkeiten und den polemischen Stil erklärlich machen. Dies gilt in besonderer Weise für *Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus*: "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism was a major excursion into philosophy, but it was in great part polemical and motivated more by practical necessity than by the desire for philosophical reflexion" (161). Was das Verhältnis Lenins zu Marx anbetrifft, so urteilt De George, Lenin sei weniger an philosophischen Argumenten interessiert gewesen als an einer Anleitung zum Handeln ("guide to action"), an einer Lehre, die geeignet erschien, die Diktatur des Proletariats zu verwirklichen (164). De George weist mit Recht darauf hin, daß Lenin die wichtigsten Quellen für den Marxschen Humanismus (auf die etwa Adam Schaff in neuerer Zeit rekurierte) – die Pariser Manuskripte und die *Deutsche Ideologie* – nicht gekannt hat, da sie bis zu seinem Tode nicht veröffentlicht waren (162). Freilich sollte nicht übersehen werden, daß Lenin schon in seiner Schrift über die *Volksfreunde* (1894) eine erstaunliche Kenntnis des Marxschen Denkens und ein echtes Interesse an philosophischen Problemstellungen gezeigt hat, daß zwar in der Folgezeit durch sein unmittelbares politisches Engagement zurückgedrängt wurde, seine Einschätzung als bloßen Pragmatiker aber ebenso fragwürdig macht wie die Exzerpte und Randglossen zu Hegel, die er im Schweizer Exil anfertigte.

Den Beitrag Lenins zur Sowjetphilosophie faßt De George wie folgt zusammen: "In the developing pattern of Soviet thought Lenin adds much to the content of Marxism-Leninism, but his most significant contribution to the *pattern* of thought is that because of him Marxism (and Marxism-Leninism) is officially recognized as a body of truth which is developing and not static and which can be modified, at least in part and from above, by its custodians, the leaders of Communist Party" (177). Der Begriff der Parteilichkeit (*partijnost'*) wird mithin zu einem wesentlichen Entwicklungsmoment der Sowjetphilosophie (176).

Die Darstellung der Sowjetphilosophie umfaßt den dritten Hauptteil der Arbeit De Georges. Sie beginnt mit einer Betrachtung der historischen Entwicklung bis zum Jahre 1961 und gibt dann einen klar gegliederten Überblick über Grundprobleme der gegenwärtigen Sowjetphilosophie: Matter, Mind, and Modern Physics; Categories and Laws of Dialectics; Logic and Theory of Knowledge; Historical Materialism; Class Struggle and Social Development; Social Consciousness, Individuals, and the Masses. Hierbei verifiziert der Verfasser an Hand eines umfangreichen Materials seine bereits in der Einleitung formulierte These: "The Soviet period is marked by selective dogmatization and interpretation of Leninist doctrine, by the subordination of philosophy to the Party, and by the adaptation of theory to the changing conditions of the USSR" (8). Auf dieser Basis wird abschliessend der Versuch unternommen, in behutsamer Form einige Entwicklungsperspektiven der Sowjetphilosophie sowie Möglichkeiten der kritischen Auseinandersetzung aufzuzeigen. Eine Erörterung der zahlreichen Probleme, die durch De George im letzten Teil seiner Untersuchung aufgeworfen werden, würde den Rahmen dieses Berichtes weit sprengen.

Auf sie kann schließlich auch deshalb verzichtet werden, weil auf diesem Gebiet mit der eigenen Sachkenntnis unserer Leser in besonderem Maße gerechnet werden kann. Abschliessend sei vermerkt, daß De George eine aufschlußreiche und unbedingt lesenswerte Arbeit zu verdanken ist, die für die Beurteilung des Marxismus-Leninismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart, aber auch im Hinblick auf zukünftige Entwicklungstendenzen eine unentbehrliche und anregende Orientierungshilfe darstellt.

R. Thomas

ANMERKUNGEN

[1] T.I. Ojzermans, *Formirovanie filosofii marksizma*, Moskva 1962.
[2] H.J. Lieber, *Die Philosophie des Bolschewismus in den Grundzügen ihrer Entwicklung*, Frankfurt-M – Berlin – Bonn 1956.
[3] E. Thier, *Das Menschenbild des jungen Marx*, Göttingen 1957, S. 17.
[4] Hierbei sei auf eine in Ostdeutschland erschienene Arbeit verwiesen: Horst Ullrich *Der junge Engels*, Berlin 1961. Ausserdem ist zu nennen: Auguste Cornu, *Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels*, Berlin 1954ff.

Nicholas Lobkowicz (ed.), *Marx and the Western World.* University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame-London, 1967. XIX+444 pp.

In the preface to this book, Professor Lobkowicz writes: "... this volume gathers together an immense amount of learning and scholarship that even by itself is certainly of value. For the Notre Dame Symposium was not only one of the very first symposia held in the West which brought together 'socialist' and 'capitalist' scholars to discuss major *weltanschauliche* issues. It was also the first truly international meeting concerned with the ideas of Karl Marx. It is no exaggeration to say that this volume contains the results and conclusions of some of the most prominent Marx specialists of the mid-twentieth century" (xii).

The present reviewer must declare his agreement with this statement. He would only wish to change one phrase: not only "*some* of the most prominent Marx specialists" are represented here but *most* of them. And he would add that in recent history there was probably never such a brilliant meeting of Marxologists as the one organized in April, 1966, by Professor Lobkowicz and presented (without the discussions) in the present volume. It is truly a great book and merits a place in even the most modest library for Sovietology.

Of course, most of the papers presented here pertain directly to Marxology and not to Sovietology. However, the Sovietologist presupposes and utilizes Marxology; and this volume offers him the results of the patient work of a generation of Marxologists. Moreover, some of the papers are directly relevant to Sovietology, as the article by Professor E.V. Il'enkov, and to some extent – if we interpret Sovietology broadly – the articles by W. Wesolowski, G. Petrovič and S. Stojanović. In the remaining studies one also finds several interesting remarks on current Soviet philosophy.

Since *Studies in Soviet Thought* is not a journal of Marxology, this review will be limited to an enumeration of the contents and some random remarks.

The book is divided into four parts. The first part, occupying nearly half of the total pages, is devoted to 'The Foundations'. It contains the following papers: G. Lichtheim (London), 'On the Interpretation of Marx's Thought'; I. Fetscher (Frankfurt), 'The Young and the Old Marx'; M. Rubel (Paris), 'Did the Proletariat need Marx and did Marxism Help the Proletariat?'; W. Wesolowski (Warsaw), 'Marx's Theory of Class Domination: An Attempt at Systematization'; R.C. Tucker (Princeton), 'Marx as a Political Theorist'; G. Petrović (Zagreb), 'The Philosophical and Sociological Relevance of Marx's Concept of Alienation'; S. Stojanović (Belgrade), 'Marx's Theory of Ethics'; and K. Kosík (Prague), 'The Individual and History'.

The second part, 'The Impact of Marx and Marxism on the Non-Communist World', includes five studies: G. Niemeyer (Notre Dame), 'Marx's Impact on European Socialism'; M. Rubel (Paris), 'Marx and American Democracy'; H. Jaguaribe (Stanford), 'Marxism and Latin American Development'; H. Carrère d'Encausse (Paris), 'Marxism and the Moslem World: The Middle East'; and M. Inoki (Kyoto U., Japan), 'Marxian Socialism in the Far East'.

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The third part, on 'Marx and Christianity', opens with a paper by the editor, entitled 'Marx's Attitude Toward Religion', a brilliant survey of the problem of religion in Marx. The Catholic and Protestant views are presented by G. Fessard, S.J. (France) and J.L. Adams (Harvard) in two papers bearing identical titles, 'Is Marx's Thought Relevant to the Christian?'.

The fourth and last part, under the heading 'Marx and the Western World', seems to be devoted to critical remarks on Marx's thought. E.V. Il'enkov (Moscow) writes 'From the Marxist Point of View', H. Marcuse (U. of California) on 'The Obsolescence of Marxism', and G. Kline (Bryn Mawr) offers 'Some Critical Comments on Marx's Philosophy'. There are also comments on some of the papers, one of which (that of K. Kosík) is also followed by the author's rejoinder.

Now whatever might have been the historical origin of contemporary Soviet philosophy, most of the problems it is presently discussing have little connection with the thought of Karl Marx as found in his own writings. Of course, if the term 'Marxism' is taken to include everything produced by Engels, Kautsky, Plekhanov, Lenin, and several others, then 'Marxism' indeed becomes very relevant to Soviet philosophy. On the other hand, contemporary Soviet research on Marx does not seem to be very relevant to Marxology, as this latter discipline is normally understood. The only Soviet paper presented at the Notre Dame Symposium serves to substantiate this judgment. Professor Il'enkov of the IF offered very little to the outstanding group of Marxist scholars: Apart from his critical remarks on certain (mostly political and economic) problems as viewed by non-Communist Marxologists, there was only an unsubstantiated statement that the current Marx-interpretation, by opposing the young to the old Marx, "represents the [*sic*] most complete misunderstanding" (p. 402). Now this is one possible position on the problem of the unity of Marx's thought, and several other authors of the present work show a certain sympathy for it. But surely we could have expected a little more than a flat dogmatic statement from a leading Soviet philosopher and historian of philosophy.

Several representatives of the other Communist countries made more worthwhile contributions. Professor Wesolowski's paper does not strike one as being highly original, but it is certainly an honest piece of work. And the presentations of K. Kosík, G. Petrović and S. Stojanović all contain valuable ideas and witness to a speculative effort to penetrate the thought of Marx.

The paper by Professor Lobkowicz has already been mentioned. To be found here are a number of interesting insights into Marx's own views and several interpretations of other thinkers (above all, Hegel). Further, the author formulates for the first time – as far as is known to the present reviewer – a basic difference between Marx's conception of religion and that of Soviet philosophy. This difference consists in the fact that while Marx looked upon religion, and Christianity in particular, as a lifeless corpse not worth fighting, the Marxist-Leninist considers it a highly dangerous adversary which must be attacked with all the means at one's disposal, i.e., with the enormous literature called

'scientific atheism' and the current religious policy of the state and party.

A final remark might be permitted. There can be no doubt that Marx has had and still exerts a vast *political* influence; it might also be true that his thought is very relevant for sociology and national economy. However, if only his properly philosophical achievements are taken into consideration, an impartial historian of philosophy would be hard-pressed to rank him as a first-class thinker. That he was a speculative thinker and put forward several original conceptions is not to be questioned. But surely his speculative contributions are rather modest in comparison, say, with Hegel, or even with Bergson or Whitehead, to name only a few others. Why then are so many studies devoted to the thought of Karl Marx? There can be only one answer: because of his political relevance. And that is not a very encouraging fact to realize, for only if a philosopher – and thereby also a historian of philosophy – concerns himself with what is *philosophically* most relevant and fundamental, can he properly accomplish his own tasks and render his service to society.

With this in mind, the remark made above on the limited value of Soviet Marxology can be seen as a point in favor of Soviet philosophers. They seem to be aware of the fact that the real philosophical problems are not to be found in Marx but must be sought elsewhere. In this sense, they are far less faithful 'Marxists' than some of their Western colleagues – and with good reason.

Yet, history is what it is, and the trends of thought which have appeared could be of interest as historical phenomena. One might hope that thinkers of the class of Professor Lobkowicz or Professor Kline would devote their efforts to the study of some greater philosophy. But for those interested in the history of thought, the enormous amount of work done on Marx and presented in this magnificent volume is a useful and welcome achievement. It must be accepted with gratitude.

J.M. Bocheński

BIBLIOGRAPHIE DER SOWJETISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOVIET PHILOSOPHY

In the course of the past eight years the Institute of East-European Studies at the University of Fribourg has published a *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie.* When the sixth and seventh volumes are published in the course of the next year, the series will cover Soviet philosophical publications for the 20-year period 1947–1966.

Beginning with the present issue of *SST* the *Bibliographie* will be published in the form of quarterly lists. It is hoped that this will make the material more available and more immediately useful.

As in the past the entries are drawn from *Voprosy filosofii, Filosofskie nauki, Vestnik MGU, Vestnik LGU, Kommunist,* and the book-lists which they contain. Every effort at completeness will be made.

In order to facilitate cross-reference and to avoid confusion with the numbering system already enshrined in the *Bibliographie,* the entries in these lists will be designated by numbers indicating the year and issue of *SST* in which the list appears, and the respective place of each entry in its list. Thus, 68.4.231 indicates that the entry is number 231 on the list which appears in *SST,* 1968,4.

The abbreviations are self-explanatory for the most part. A complete list of them is to be found on p. xii of *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie,* IV, Reidel, Dordrecht (Holland), 1963.

The editors would be happy to have comments and suggestions on this project which is intended as a regular feature in *SST.*

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1965:

November Organization of the first institute for complex social researches, at LGU. (*VF*, 1966,8, 144–147).

December Discussion concerning the Asiatic Mode of Production held at the Institute of Ethnography of the AN in Moscow (*VF*, 1966,8, 141–144).

December Second session of the Severo-Kavkazskogo Council for the Coordination and Planning of Scientific Research Work in the Social Sciences, at Rostov on the Don. Theme: 'The Formation of Communist Social Relations' (*VF*, 1966,8, 147–148).

Dec.-Jan. Two meetings at MGU on 'The Structure of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy' (*FN*, 1966,4, 165–167).

1966:

Feb. 16–19 First all-union symposium devoted to the problems of sociological research in the SU. Held in Leningrad under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Education (SSSR), the AN and various faculties of LGU. More than 500 participants (*VF*, 1966,10, 156–166).

February Symposium: 'Creativity and Contemporary Scientific Progress.' Organized by the Leningrad section of the RSFSR Writers' Union, bringing together writers, scholars (in both the natural and social sciences) and estheticians to discuss the inter-relation of science and art (*FN*, 1967,2, 181–183).

March Symposium in Moscow on 'The Person and Society,' sponsored by the Institute of Social Sciences of the CK SEPG and the Academy of Social Sciences of the CK KPSS. Papers delivered by G.E. Glezerman, V.G. Afanas'ev, G.M. Gak and others (*VF*, 1966,8, 134–140).

March — All-union theoretical conference on the theme, 'The Mathematical Modelling of Living Processes'. In Moscow for the conference were 450 philosophers, mathematicians and natural scientists (*VF*, 1966,11, 148–151).

May — Meeting at the IF of the directors of the institutes of philosophy and sociology in socialistic countries, including Bulgaria, Hungary, East-Germany, Poland, Rumania, SSSR, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia. Among the Soviets taking part were F.V. Konstantinov, P.V. Kopnin, P.F. Judin and M.T. Iovčuk (*VF*, 1967,2, 146–163).

May — The second 'Week of Contemporary Thought', organized in Greece by the Center for Marxist Studies, centered on the theme, 'Science, Philosophy and Society'. Talks were given by delegates from France, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece and the SSSR (G. Kursanov) (*VF*, 1966,11, 156–158).

June 1–3 — All-Union Symposium on the Problems of Consciousness, in Moscow. Some of the leading contributors were V.M. Banščikova, N.P. Antonov, F.I. Georgiev, A.N. Leont'ev, V.V. Orlov and K.K. Platonov (*FN*, 1966,6, 155–159).

June — Soviet-Polish symposium on the study of the development of science, organized by the AN together with Lvov University, in Lvov and Užgorod. Among the speakers were B.M. Kedrov, P.V. Kopnin, I.A. Majzel' and V.Ž. Kelle (*FN*, 1967,1, 173–178; *VF*, 1967,3, 133–140).

June — Scientific conference in East-Berlin on 'The Theoretical Problems of the Fluctuation of Labor'. Delegates from East-Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, SSSR, Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia (*VF*, 1966,11, 152–156).

June — Discussion initiated by the editorship of VF to discuss the book, *The Construction of Communism and the Development of Social Relations* (ed. by G.E. Glezerman, M.D. Kammari, F.V. Konstantinov and V.S. Semenov), (Nauka, M., 1966) (*VF*, 1966,12, 131–139).

June — Second all-union symposium on the philosophical problems of the theory of gravitation of Einstein and relativist cosmology, in Kiev. Co-sponsored by the Ministry of Education SSSR

and the AN USSR (Ukrainian Republic) (*VF*, 1966,12, 139–144).

Summer — Meeting in the ancient city of Trakai, along with the host Lithuanian philosophers were representatives from Latvia, Estonia, Leningrad and Moscow. They discussed present problems of contemporary sociology (*VF*, 1966,11, 151–152).

Summer — Discussion at the Institute for the History of Science and Technics of the AN on the book, *Contradictions in the Development of Science*, Nauka, M., 1965 (*VF*, 1967,4, 131–133).

Aug. 4–11 — Eighteenth International Congress of Psychology in Moscow, with the participation of some 4500 psychologists from foreign countries. Opening address delivered by A.N. Leont'ev, president of the congress, on the significance of the theory of reflection for psychology. After the congress the *VF* organized a special meeting between several well-known Western psychologists and a group of Soviet psychologists, mathematicians and members of the editorial board of *VF* (*FN*, 1967,2, 173–176; *VF*, 1966,12, 124–131).

August — International Congress of Mathematicians in Moscow (*FN*, 1967,2, 177–180).

August — Symposium organized by the Institute for the History of Science and Technics of the AN to consider bringing together the methods of psychology and those of the history of science in the study of scientific creation. Participating along with the Soviet scholars were psychologists from France, Australia and the USA (*VF*, 1966,12, 144–146).

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W. F. BOESELAGER

LENIN ÜBER DIE PHILOSOPHIE

Die Lehren des Vladimir Il'ič Ulianov, genannt Lenin, *über* die Philosophie sind ihr günstiger, als oft fälschlich angenommen wird. Im Gegensatz zum jungen Marx, der die Philosophie und die Theorie überhaupt in die Praxis 'aufheben' wollte, vertritt Lenin die Bedeutung der theoretischen, objektiven, rationalen Erkenntnis (die von der 'Praxis' begründet, nicht aufgehoben, wird). Viel weniger als die spätere Sowjet-Philosophie enthält Lenins eigene Lehre von der Parteilichkeit der Philosophie einen voluntaristischen oder pragmatischen Widerspruch dazu. Anders als Engels versucht Lenin Sensualismus und Empirismus zu überwinden, er entwickelt ontologische Kategorien und vertritt im Gegensatz zu Engels' Positivismus die Selbständigkeit der Philosophie als eines spezifischen Wissensgebietes.

Diese wichtigen Lehren der höchsten Autorität des Marxismus-Leninismus sollen im vorliegenden Aufsatz zusammenfassend dargestellt werden. Da verschiedene Äusserungen Lenins anders zu interpretieren sind, als es gewöhnlich geschieht, wird viel und manchmal ausführlich aus Lenins Schriften zu zitieren sein (in den Anmerkungen). Auf die interessante Auseinandersetzung mit anderen Interpretationen, sowohl der Historiker als auch der Schüler Lenins, musste weitgehend verzichtet werden.

I. HISTORISCHE VORBEMERKUNGEN

Der durch seine Begabungen und durch seine Erfolge gleichermassen hervorragende Gründer der Sowjetunion war eine komplexe Erscheinung: höchst aktiver, pragmatischer Revolutionär und ernsthafter Philosoph zugleich. Die beste Charakterisierung Lenins scheint die eines Ingenieurs zu sein.[1] Wie ein moderner Ingenieur glaubte er an die absolute Gültigkeit und grosse Bedeutung der theoretischen Erkenntnis, und wie einem Ingenieur diente ihm alles, auch die reine Theorie, zur konstruierenden praktischen Verwirklichung seiner Pläne, zur Konstruktion eines

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neuen Menschen und einer neuen Welt. Die Verbindung gegensätzlicher Elemente von Theorie und Praxis in Lenins Charakter und Leben hat sich dem ganzen Leninismus aufgeprägt.

Lenin hat sich erst verhältnismässig spät mit Philosophie beschäftigt.[2] Er wurde dabei hauptsächlich von Plechanov in die marxistische Philosophie eingeführt und betrachtete ihn als seinen Lehrer.[3] Eine systematische Darstellung seiner philosophischen Anschauungen hat er nicht gegeben. Die relevanten Gedanken müssen aus verschiedenen Schriften gesammelt werden:

(1) Das Buch *Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus*[4] schrieb Lenin 1908 als Streitschrift gegen die sogenannten Machisten.[5] Es ist rein polemisch und stellt Lenins eigene Gedanken meistens nur indirekt und unsystematisch dar.[6]

(2) Ein viel sorgfältigerer und nachdenklicherer Lenin zeigt sich in den *Philosophischen Heften*, genannt *Tetradi*, die Exzerpte, Randglossen, kurze Kommentare und Entwürfe der Jahre 1914–16 enthalten und zuerst posthum 1929 herausgegeben wurden.[7] Abgesehen davon, dass hier die Polemik zurücktritt, ist auch sonst ein grosser Fortschritt in der Qualität von Lenins philosophischer Arbeit festzustellen. Zu vielen Fragen zeigt er ein eindringliches philosophisches Interesse und Problembewusstsein, jedenfalls im Vergleich zu dem erstgenannten Werk. Nur handelt es sich eben leider um Notizen, die nicht durchgearbeitet sind, und manchmal ist es schwierig, zu entscheiden, ob Lenin eine bestimmte Meinung selbst vertritt oder sie nur referiert.

(3) Schliesslich finden sich noch Passagen zur Philosophie und über die Philosophie in verschiedenen Artikeln und Broschüren mehr oder weniger philosophischen Inhalts.[8]

II. LENIN ÜBER THEORIE

In der Frage nach der Natur und Bedeutung der Theorie nimmt Lenin eine sehr differenzierte aber nicht sorgfältig ausgearbeitete und darum manchmal widersprüchlich erscheinende Haltung ein. Er vertritt eine im Wesentlichen rationalistische Auffassung. 'Rationalistisch' wird hier im weiteren Sinne verwendet, nämlich als Bezeichnung für die Annahme, dass es dem Menschen möglich und wertvoll ist, theoretische, objektiv und kritisch begründete sowie logisch kohärente Sätze zu wissen und zu

sagen. Diese Annahme verbindet sich mit der Forderung, dass etwas Nicht-Rationales – sei es das Individuelle als Gegenstand, als Teil des Erkenntnisprozesses oder als Subjekt, sei es der Wille, das Gefühl, die Praxis oder der Glaube – auf keinen Fall die *Methode* der Erkenntnis und ihrer Darstellung im sorgfältig entwickelten Gebiet der Wissenschaften bestimmen kann und darf. Das Irrationale darf – und muss vielleicht – an hervorragender Stelle Gegenstand der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis und Darstellung sein, aber aus der Methode im weitesten Sinne ist es – nach Meinung eben der Rationalisten – rigoros fernzuhalten. Um die rationalistischen Auffassungen Lenins von der Theorie zu zeigen, sollen folgende Punkte untersucht werden: (A) Lenins *allgemeine* Einschätzung der Theorie, (B) seine Theorie von der *Praxis*, (C) die *Parteilichkeitslehre*, (D) Lenins eigenes *Verhalten* gegenüber der Theorie.

(A) Allgemein betont Lenin in vielen seiner Schriften die *Bedeutung der Theorie*. Der Marxismus insbesondere ist für ihn ein wissenschaftliches System, dessen 'allmächtige' Überlegenheit gerade darin liegt, dass er frei von 'Träumerei', Glauben und anderen irrationalen Elementen in vollständiger Übereinstimmung mit den Naturwissenschaften die objektive Wahrheit enthält.[9] Nur durch die wahre Theorie kann die Arbeiterklasse und die Partei geeint und zur richtigen Praxis geleitet werden.[10] So bekämpft Lenin die Überbetonung der 'Spontaneität' der Arbeiterklasse und hebt die Rolle des 'bewussten Elementes', d.h. der Theorie und der die Theorie kennenden und entwickelnden Intelligenz hervor.[11] Lenins Lehren geben keinen Anlass zu der Feststellung, das er "alle theoretischen Fragen den Parteiinteressen rücksichtslos unterordnet".[12] Auch seine Lehre von der Parteilichkeit sowie sein eigenes Verhalten rechtfertigen – wie weiter unten noch gezeigt werden soll – eine solche Behauptung nicht.

Anstelle von Marx' beinahe mystischer Erwartung der revolutionären Befreiungstat des Proletariates, die der Philosoph nur durch Kritik fördern kann, stand für Lenin ein handfester propagandistischer Kampf um die Gefolgschaft der besonders in Russland grösstenteils der Intelligenz angehörigen Revolutionäre. Sie mussten gerade mit theoretischen Argumenten überzeugt und geeint werden. Die bewusste und disziplinierte Aktion forderte eine systematische, radikale Theorie. (Der Unterschied zwischen der philosophischen Lehre von Marx und von Lenin wird übrigens auch dadurch verständlich, dass Lenin die philosophischen

Jugendschriften von Marx zum grossen Teil nicht kannte und dass er Marx durch die Interpretation von Engels sah.)

(B) Lenins Lehre von der *Praxis* steht zum Teil in Widerspruch zu seiner dargestellten Betonung der Theorie. Er schrieb in den 'gelben Heftchen' von 1894, seiner ersten veröffentlichten Arbeit, die marxistische Theorie vereine wesentlich in sich die "Wissenschaftlichkeit mit dem revolutionären Geist"; die Revolution sei Aufgabe und Ziel der Wissenschaft.[13] Der Widerspruch zwischen dieser Auffassung und Lenins starker Betonung und Entwicklung der Theorie kann nur durch eine Interpretation aufgelöst werden, die die zitierte Stelle als jugendliche Übertreibung auffasst. (Wie gesagt, beschäftigte Lenin sich erst ab 1899 intensiver mit Philosophie.) Gemässigter ausgedrückt will er wohl das Folgende sagen: Die theoretische Arbeit dient der (wertvollen) praktischen Arbeit; die Theorie, deren inneres Ziel die wahre Erkenntnis ist, führt durch diese zum richtigen Handeln.[14]

Auch Lenins vielfältige Theorie der 'Praxis' in den *späteren* Werken macht Interpretationsschwierigkeiten. Um eine 'Aufhebung' der Theorie in der revolutionären Praxis wie beim jungen Marx handelt es sich dabei jedenfalls nicht (und Lenin lehnt es ausdrücklich ab, dass die Praxis ein 'Anderssein' der Logik im Hegelschen Sinne sei[15]). Der junge Marx hatte in seinen philosophischen Schriften die geschichtsmetaphysische 'Aufhebung', d.h. Negation *und* Verwirklichung, der philosophischen Theorie in der Praxis verkündet: Der seiner selbst bewusst werdende kollektiv handelnde Mensch (Proletariat) stellt in der Revolution die dialektische Einheit von Theorie und Praxis, von Gedanken und Wirklichkeit, her, d.h. dass zugleich die Philosophie Gestalt, Tat, konkret, wirklich – und die materielle Geschichte selbstbewusst, ideal, 'philosophisch' wird.[16] In einer solchen Auffassung der Einheit von Theorie und Praxis, der 'Aufhebung' der Theorie in der Praxis, kann von 'Theorie' und von 'Philosophie' nur noch in ganz übertragenem Sinne die Rede sein. Das eigentlich Theoretische an der Theorie wird hier nur im negativen Sinne 'aufgehoben'. Marx spricht selbst vom 'Verlust', der 'Negation', dem 'Verurteilen' der Philosophie und vom 'Verlust' ihres 'Existenzmediums'.[17]

Ganz anders hat die 'Praxis' bei Lenin einen erkenntnistheoretischen Sinn.[18] Er schreibt ihr eine so entscheidende Rolle *in* der 'theoretischen' Erkenntnis zu, dass er die Unterscheidung der beiden Gebiete Theorie und Praxis aufzugeben scheint. Weiter unten wird über diese Lehre

ausführlicher zu berichten sein.[19] Hier genügt es, vorwegzunehmen, dass bei Lenin 'Praxis' in der Erkenntnistheorie unter anderem zum Namen einer theoretischen Erkenntnisfunktion, also etwas gar nicht Praktischen, wird. Dadurch ist es möglich, dass die 'Theorie' Theorie bleibt, auch wenn die 'Praxis' in sie eingeht.

(C) Lenins Lehre von der *Parteilichkeit* (*partijnost'*) scheint seinen Rationalismus zu verderben. So wie diese Lehre aufgefasst, dargestellt und weiterentwickelt wurde, bedeutet sie eine dem Rationalismus krass widersprechende Unterwerfung der Wahrheit unter den Willen und unter die Politik. Lenin selbst ist aber kaum so weit gegangen. Seine Lehre von der Parteilichkeit, wie sie in *Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus* dargestellt ist, enthält im Wesentlichen vier Gedanken.[20]

(1) In der Grundfrage der Philosophie gibt es nur zwei mögliche extreme Meinungen; wer nicht für den Materialismus ist, ist für den Idealismus. Es ist im Grunde unmöglich, neutral zu sein, einzelne idealistische Thesen mit anderen materialistischen zu verbinden oder die Frage offen zu lassen. Das radikale '*Entweder–Oder*' ist für Lenin das Wichtigste an der Lehre der Parteilichkeit.[21] Selbst wenn eine ungerechtfertigte und dogmatische Vereinfachung in dieser Behauptung liegt, so ist sie doch keine irrationalistische Behauptung.

(2) Ob jemand materialistische oder idealistische Anschauungen hat, hängt von "ausserhalb der Philosophie liegenden *Ursachen*"[22] ab, d.h. von seiner Stellung im Klassenkampf. Wer nicht auf der Seite der fortschrittlichen Klasse steht, *kann* die materialistische Wahrheit nicht erkennen. Dem Zusammenhang nach ist es nicht nötig, das Wort 'Ursache' hier im strengen Sinne von 'causa' zu verstehen; es kann vielmehr als Bedingung (*conditio*) und zwar als notwendige Bedingung interpretiert werden. Dann ist kein Widerspruch gegen den Rationalismus in dieser zweiten These enthalten. Ihr zufolge werden die theoretische Erkenntnis oder die Wahrheit ja nicht mit der Stellung im Klassenkampf oder einem 'Interesse' identifiziert, sondern nur durch diese psychologisch und wissenssoziologisch ermöglicht.

(3) Die Meinungen der philosophischen Parteien haben *Folgen* ausserhalb der Philosophie. Jeder, auch der 'gutgemeinte' Idealismus dient der Religion[23] und damit der Reaktion.[24] Umgekehrt hat der Materialismus grösste Bedeutung für die gesellschaftliche Praxis des Fortschritts. Auch diese Behauptungen über die notwendigen Folgen der wahren und der

irrigen philosophischen Erkenntnis stehen an sich nicht im Widerspruch zum Rationalismus.

(4) Schliesslich ist in Lenins Lehre von der Parteilichkeit der Gedanke enthalten, dass die philosophische Erkenntnis selbst auch ihrem *Inhalt* nach nicht wertfrei, sondern moralisch, gut oder böse, emotional *engagiert* ist. Dieser Gedanke wird aus dem vorigen gefolgert. Erst in ihm wird ein irrationalistisches Moment sichtbar: Der Mensch ist verpflichtet, die Wahrheit zu erkennen; wenn er sich irrt, so ist er nicht nur gefährlich, sondern auch schuldig und muss bekämpft werden. *Nicht nur der Akt des Philosophierens sondern auch sein Inhalt hängt vom Willen ab.*

In dem zuletzt genannten Satz der Parteilichkeitslehre liegt offenbar ein Verlassen des rationalistischen Standpunktes. Aber es darf daraus *nicht* auf einen *allgemeinen Irrationalismus* geschlossen werden, denn es ist zweierlei zu berücksichtigen:

(1) Lenin bezieht die irrationale Parteilichkeit, die Willensbeeinflussung des Erkenntnisinhaltes auf die bürgerlichen und die revisionistischen Strömungen[25], also auf den negativen Fall, die *Unwahrheit*. Eine irrationale Auffassung der Wahrheit oder der Wahrheitserkenntnis selbst (im Unterschied zu ihren Bedingungen, Begleiterscheinungen und Folgen) lässt sich – wenigstens in den wichtigsten Schriften – nicht finden.

(2) Lenin vertritt, wie bereits gezeigt wurde, eine allgemein rationalistische Auffassung der Theorie, der Erkenntnis, der Wissenschaft, der Wahrheit.[26] Vor allem aber begründet er *selbst* alle seine Behauptungen, wenn auch oft unzulänglich, so doch immer mit *rationalen Argumenten* und nicht etwa mit seinem guten Willen oder seiner Stellung im Klassenkampf. Den Marxismus beschreibt er als "richtig"[27], "fortgeschritten"[28], "wissenschaftlich", "im Einklang mit der Wissenschaft", oder als von "strenger und höchster Wissenschaftlichkeit"[29], als "folgerichtig", "abgeschlossen", "einheitlich", usw.[30] Von einer moralischen oder glaubensmässigen Annahme des Marxismus spricht er nicht.

Diese Tatsachen bedeuten, dass Lenin den *Subjektivismus der Parteilichkeit auf die Gegner der Wahrheit beschränkt*[31]: Der Reaktionär ist durch seine Parteilichkeit unfähig und nicht bereit, rational zu erkennen; er ist Idealist aus Klasseninteresse und aus dauerndem und konstitutivem bösen Willen. Aber bei einem Mitglied der fortschrittlichen Klasse bewirkt das kämpferische Klasseninteresse gerade das Gegenteil; gerade durch seine Klassenzugehörigkeit und Parteilichkeit erkennt es die

Wahrheit ganz objektiv und rational. Die objektive Haltung gegenüber dem Erkenntnisgegenstand ist geradezu das Wesensmerkmal des fortschrittlichen Philosophen und gleichzeitig die allgemeinste Bedeutung von 'Materialismus'. Die Parteilichkeitslehre ist also, auf diese Weise interpretiert, eine irrationalistische Theorie des Irrtums, verbunden mit einem allgemeinen Rationalismus der wahren Erkenntnis.

Lenins Rationalismus der wahren Erkenntnis ist von seinen Nachfolgern verlassen und von manchen Historikern nicht gesehen worden. Sie haben seine Lehre von der Parteilichkeit als Partei-Pragmatismus und als Emotionalismus oder Voluntarismus in der Philosophie (und in der Wissenschaft überhaupt) aufgefasst.[32] Damit haben sie seine Lehre übertrieben und ihm unrecht getan. Die Parteilichkeit der Philosophie in diesem Sinne stammt erst aus Stalins Zeit.[33]

(D) Lenins eigenes *Verhalten* bestätigt seine rationalistische Auffassung und Hochschätzung der Theorie. Insbesondere widerspricht auch seine Art zu diskutieren der gegebenen rationalistischen Interpretation der Parteilichkeitslehre tatsächlich nicht.

Eine zynische Unterordnung der Erkenntnis unter praktische Ziele, eine utilitaristische oder voluntaristische Haltung gegenüber der Wahrheit lässt sich bei Lenin nicht nachweisen. Erst durch die Darstellung und Haltung der späteren Leninisten (v.a. Stalins) sowie auch deren Gegner hat sich sein Name verbunden mit der Degradierung der Theorie zu einem Werkzeug der Politik.[34]

Der einfachste Beweis für Lenins Bewertung der reinen Theorie ist seine eigene wissenschaftliche und speziell philosophische Arbeit. Wenn ein Revolutionär die Theorie verachtet und an ihre Manipulation glaubt, dann macht er sich nicht die grosse Mühe, z.B. Hegels *Wissenschaft der Logik* zu analysieren. Auch das ziemlich oberflächliche Buch *Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus* hat kein Verächter oder Feind der Theorie geschrieben. Es ist auch nicht richtig, dass Lenin diese Arbeit geschrieben hat, um den Zusammenhang von Philosophie und Politik zu beweisen, im Gegenteil. Seine philosophischen Gegner Bogdanov, Bazarov, Lunačarskij waren ja seine politischen Verbündeten auf dem bolschewistischen Parteiflügel. Darum hat Lenin solange versucht, die politischen und philosophischen Meinungsverschiedenheiten getrennt zu halten, bis seine menschewistischen Gegner ihm das dadurch unmöglich machten, dass *sie* ihre (in Lenins Augen falsche) Politik propagandistisch mit der

von Lenin als einzig richtig betrachteten orthodoxen philosophischen Lehre (Plechanovs) identifizierten.[35] Es scheint, dass Lenin mit der Veröffentlichung dieses Buches kein anderes politisches Ziel verfolgte, als diese Identifikation zu widerlegen. Aber selbst wenn er ein unmittelbar politisches Ziel verfolgt hätte – so wie es ja zweifellos bei seinem vorhergehenden Neutralitätsabkommen mit den machistischen Bolschewiken der Fall gewesen war – so widerspräche das einer rationalistischen Haltung gegenüber der Theorie doch nicht. Lenin wäre ein schlechter Politiker gewesen, wenn er die praktische politische Bedeutung ganz theoretischer Meinungs*äusserungen* verkannt oder ignoriert hätte. Tatsächlich aber war er ein politisches Genie, pragmatisch, ja opportunistisch in allen Fragen der Politik. Er verlangte sogar, religiöse Ansichten in der Öffentlichkeit (und nur in der Öffentlichkeit!) unwidersprochen zu lassen, wenn das taktisch für seine Revolution von Vorteil war.[36] Damit handelte er entsprechend seiner eigenen Lehre, dass Handeln wichtiger sei als die Theorie.[37] Aber diese Handlungsweise impliziert ja nicht, dass durch praktische oder taktische Notwendigkeiten die Wahrheit oder Falschheit selbst beeinflusst oder ersetzt würde, und sie widerspricht deshalb nicht Lenins Hochschätzung der Theorie.

Schwieriger ist es, Lenins Dogmatismus und Intoleranz in der Diskussion mit seinem Rationalismus in Einklang zu bringen. In einer überheblichen und dogmatischen Art und mit einem Mangel an Problembewusstsein, die ihresgleichen suchen, hielt er seine eigenen Behauptungen und Beweise immer für unbezweifelbar und einzigartig richtig. Andererseits erledigte er Gegenargumente entsprechend der irrationalen Theorie des Irrtums in seiner Parteilichkeitslehre, ohne auch nur zu versuchen, die 'gegnerischen' Thesen des 'Idealismus' nüchtern und sachlich zu verstehen, darzustellen und zu kritisieren. Er zeigt ihnen gegenüber eine durchaus unsachliche moralisierende Haltung.

Die Fähigkeit und Bereitschaft, andere als die eigenen Ansichten nüchtern zu betrachten und die eigenen für grundsätzlich diskutabel zu halten, kann als Prüfstein des Rationalisten betrachtet werden; und Lenin hätte diese Prüfung nicht bestanden. Es scheint aber richtiger zu sein, diese Tatsache auf Lenins *Charakter*, auf einen völligen Mangel an Selbstbescheidung und Geduld, zurückzuführen, als auf ein inneres Verlassen des rationalistischen Standpunktes zu schliessen. Sicherlich hat sein Verhalten zur Entwicklung der Parteidogmatik unter Stalin bei-

getragen, die dem Rationalismus widersprach. Aber es scheint, dass Lenin selbst an eine Unterwerfung der Wahrheit unter den politischen Willen und Zweck nicht gedacht hat. Seine Charakterschwächen dürfen mit einem Verlassen des rationalistischen Standpunktes nicht verwechselt werden.

III. LENIN ÜBER PHILOSOPHIE

Für Lenin ist – im Gegensatz zu Engels' Szientismus – die 'Philosophie des Marxismus'[38] ein *gegenüber den Einzelwissenschaften selbständiges Gebiet.*

Engels' Werke enthalten zahlreiche Stellen, an denen die Existenzberechtigung einer selbständigen Philosophie bestritten wird; nur als Lehre vom Denken kann sie noch bestehen bleiben, alle übrigen Fragen fallen ins Gebiet der Einzelwissenschaften.[39] Da, wo Engels im äusseren Widerspruch zu dieser Auffassung die Bedeutung der 'Philosophie' betont[40], meint er offenbar das theoretische Denken überhaupt, nicht aber eine spezifisch philosophische Theorie.[41] Ebenso meint er keine spezifisch ontologische Wissenschaft, wo er von der Dialektik als der "Wissenschaft von den allgemeinen Bewegungs- und Entwicklungsgesetzen der Natur, der Menschengesellschaft und des Denkens" spricht.[42] Vielmehr handelt es sich hier für ihn nur ganz allgemein um eine Untersuchung des Zusammenhangs und der Bewegung in der Wirklichkeit, wie sie in zunehmendem Masse in den Einzelwissenschaften von Natur und Gesellschaft durchgeführt werde. Die Philosophie als Lehre von der objektiven Dialektik soll durch den Fortschritt der Wissenschaften erübrigt werden, sodass sie nur noch als Lehre von der subjektiven Dialektik, dem Denken, bestehen bleibt.[43]

Bei Lenin ist es ganz anders. Zwar betont er an einigen Stellen von *Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus* die Wichtigkeit der Naturwissenschaften so stark, dass dabei die Philosophie überflüssig zu werden scheint.[44] Aber tatsächlich soll nur der enge *Zusammenhang* von Materialismus und modernen Wissenschaften hervorgehoben werden.[45] Das beweisen die Bemühungen, zwischen einer 'Form' der marxistischen Philosophie, die durch den Fortschritt der Physik verändert werden soll, und dem 'Wesen' dieser Philosophie zu unterscheiden.[46] Lenin gibt zu diesem Zweck seine berühmte philosophische Definition von 'Materie',

die von dem physikalischen Gebrauch desselben Wortes zu unterscheiden sei.[47] Auch in bezug auf die Parteilichkeit macht Lenin einen strengen Unterschied zwischen Einzelwissenschaft und Philosophie.[48]

In den *Tetradi* äussert sich Lenin nicht klar über die Natur der Philosophie[49], aber er fasst die Dialektik als Ontologie auf und identifiziert sie mit der Philosophie.[50] Noch in seinem Aufsatz von 1922 findet sich eine deutliche Unterscheidung der "philosophischen Grundlage" von jeder "wie immer gearteten Naturwissenschaft".[51]

Gegenstand der Philosophie sind für Lenin die letzten Erklärungsprinzipien der Wirklichkeit.[52] In *Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus* finden sich die oberflächlichen unphilosophischen Methoden von Engels zusammen mit philosophischen Gedanken. So beruft sich Lenin zur Begründung seines erkenntnistheoretischen Realismus einerseits auf Engels' "Produktion des Alizerin", die Existenz der Welt vor der Entstehung des Menschen und Ähnliches.[53] Andererseits fasst er die Materie ontologisch als reales Sein auf und schreibt ihr die "Eigenschaft der Empfindung" sowie Unendlichkeit und Unerschöpflichkeit zu, leugnet die Möglichkeit, eine Bewegung ohne Materie zu denken, usw.[54], stellt also ganz philosophische Spekulationen an. In den *Tetradi* sind es vor allem Lenins Kommentare über die objektive Dialektik[55] und die dialektische Erkenntnis, die zeigen, was er unter philosophischen Problemen versteht. Eine positivistische Beschränkung der Fragen zeigt Lenin in beiden Büchern nicht.

Es entspricht den geschilderten Lehren Lenins und seiner Erkenntnistheorie (s.u.), dass er ein *Gegner des Positivismus* war. Sein ganzes Buch *Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus* ist gegen die positivistische Revision des Marxismus, gegen den hinter dieser stehenden Positivismus von Mach und Avenarius, sowie gegen die Lehren Humes gerichtet.[56] 'Positivismus' war für Lenin ein ausgesprochen pejorativer Ausdruck. Er berief sich bei seiner Ablehnung des Positivismus auf Marx und Engels.[57] Bezeichnend ist dabei die von Lenin ausdrücklich vertretene historiographische Methode der Positivismusforschung: Alle verschiedenen positivistischen Strömungen sind zusammenzufassen, um das ihnen Gemeinsame ohne Rücksicht auf Nuancen zu verurteilen.[58]

Es wäre eine besondere Untersuchung wert, zu klären, in wieweit Lenin überhaupt irgendwelche philosophischen Gedanken konsequent oder originell durchgedacht hat, wie gross er also als Philosoph war.[59]

Dass er eine ontologisch fundierte philosophische Theorie mit wissenschaftlicher Methode für notwendig und für möglich hielt, ja sie selbst aufstellen wollte und ernsthafte Ansätze dazu gemacht hat, genügt jedoch für den vorliegenden Zusammenhang. Der folgende Überblick über Lenins erkenntnistheoretische Begründung der Philosophie mag nebenbei als Beispiel für seine philosophische Arbeit dienen.

IV. ERKENNTNISTHEORETISCHE GRUNDLAGEN

Lenins erkenntnistheoretische Erklärung und Begründung seines Rationalismus und seiner prophilosophischen Einstellung sind widersprüchlich und unbefriedigend. In seinen Schriften finden sich sensualistische Aussagen aber daneben auch eine Abstraktionstheorie. Der Begriff, mit dessen Hilfe der Zusammenhang und die von Lenin beabsichtigte Überwindung des Empirismus vielleicht möglich scheint, ist die erkenntnistheoretisch verstandene 'Praxis'.

In *Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus* wird in aller Deutlichkeit ein *Sensualismus* vertreten, aus dem eigentlich eine empiristische Unmöglichkeit der Philosophie zu schliessen wäre. Lenin nennt ihn einen "objektiven Sensualismus"[60], er behauptet, die Existenz der realen Aussenwelt sei der Empfindung gegeben[61], und er beruft sich dabei auf den naiven Realismus des gesunden (aber vorphilosophischen) Menschenverstandes.[62] Damit setzt er sich einfach darüber hinweg, dass die englischen Empiristen und Kant die Unmöglichkeit einer *sinnlichen* Erkenntnis von Realität, Kausalität, Notwendigkeit usw. bewiesen haben, obwohl er sie ausführlich zitiert.[63] Lenin leugnet jede andere als die sinnliche Erkenntnis und behauptet gleichzeitig die Objektivität der genannten Kategorien, also die Ergebnisse einer intellektuellen Anschauung. Er weigert sich, die kritizistische Fragestellung überhaupt zu verstehen.[64] Insoweit unterscheidet sich sein Realismus also nicht vom positivistischen 'Glauben'[65], und eine philosophische Theorie müsste eigentlich konsequenterweise ausgeschlossen sein. (Auf vorphilosophischem Niveau stehen auch einige von Lenins Argumenten für den Realismus, wie z.B. Engels' Alizerin u.a.[66])

Lenins *Abstraktionstheorie*, bzw. Ansätze dazu, finden sich ausführlicher erst in den *Tetradi*. Er spricht hier vom 'Begreifen' als von einer dialektischen Stufe, einem Schritt über die 'Empirie' hinaus[67], als von der

Erkenntnis des Wesens, der Kausalität usw.[68], er billigt die Unterscheidung von Sensiblem und Intelligiblem[69] und verfeinert dementsprechend seine Widerspieglungstheorie.[70] Eine wirkliche Ausarbeitung dieser Lehre ist jedoch nicht vorhanden, und so ist auch die Frage nicht gestellt, von welcher Art das Vermögen ist, das angenommen werden muss, wenn die Sinnlichkeit nicht genügt. Dieses wäre auch das Vermögen, mit dem der Mensch philosophieren kann. Das Problem führt zu Lenins Lehre von der 'Praxis'.

In beiden zitierten philosophischen Hauptwerken Lenins erscheint viele Male der Begriff der *Praxis* in erkenntnistheoretischem Zusammenhang. Man kann von einer erkenntnistheoretischen Lehre der 'Praxis' sprechen[71], die im Folgenden kurz analysiert werden soll. Sie ist erstens ein wichtiges Beispiel und ein zentrales Stück in Lenins Philosophie, zweitens zeigen sich in ihr seine hegelianischen Gedanken, und drittens ist es notwendig, den Unterschied zur Lehre von der Praxis beim jungen Marx zu sehen.

Man kann folgende zum Teil von einander verschiedene erkenntnistheoretische Thesen über die 'Praxis' unterscheiden:

(1) Die Menschen setzen in der 'Praxis', d.h. wenn sie handeln, de facto *in unreflektierter Gewissheit* die Wahrheit der Erkenntnis voraus.[72] Diese recht triviale Feststellung ist für Lenins Lehre nebensächlich.

(2) Durch 'milliardenmalige' *Wiederholung* des Schliessens 'in der Praxis' erhalten die *logischen* Gesetze ihre axiomatische Gültigkeit.[73] Auch diese extrem psychologistische Auffassung der Logik äussert Lenin nur am Rande.

(3) Die 'Praxis' wird der 'reinen' gedanklichen Spekulation gegenübergestellt, sie nimmt geradezu die Bedeutung von *Erfahrung* an.[74] Dieser häufig erscheinende und zentrale Begriff umfasst noch engere Bedeutungen (4 und 5):

(4) Die 'Praxis' wird als eine notwendige *dritte Erkenntnisoperation* oder als diese einschliessend und bewirkend verstanden.[75] Die Sinneswahrnehmungen (Ergebnis der 1. Operation) werden im 'Denken' (2. Operation) verarbeitet, und dann wird das Ergebnis in der 'Praxis' (3. Operation) *geprüft*. Die 'Praxis' ist hier eine Rückkehr zur sinnlichen Grundlage, eine Art Verifikation des abstrahierten Gedankens in der individuellen und sozialen Tätigkeit. Mit diesem Punkt hängt der folgende zusammen:

(5) In der 'Praxis', d.h. der zweckgerichteten und bewussten materiellen Tätigkeit, zeigen sich der Erkenntnis die *intelligiblen Gegenstände in ihrer objektiven Wirklichkeit und Wahrheit*[76], weil die 'Praxis' selbst allgemein und 'unmittelbar wirklich' ist. Die Funktion der 'Praxis' unterscheidet sich hier von der des vorigen Punktes darin, dass sie nicht ein Zurückgehen (auf die Sinnlichkeit zur Prüfung der Ergebnisse des Denkens) sondern ein Weitergehen zur Erfassung des Gegenstandes als real existierenden ist. Das Ergebnis der 'Praxis' sind hier nicht mehr nur wahre Erkenntnisse sondern auch das Wissen von der objektiven Wahrheit selbst dieser wahren Erkenntnisse. Der vorige Punkt bleibt im Phänomenalen, hier erreicht die 'Praxis' das Noumenon.

(6) Im Zusammenhang mit dem Begriff der 'Praxis' führt Lenin auch das *Leben* in die Erkenntnistheorie ein.[77] Es wird nicht präzisiert, ob mehr an die Erkenntnis als eine Äusserung (also Folge) oder als eine Förderung (also Ursache) des Lebens durch die 'Praxis' gedacht ist. Jedenfalls aber soll die dialektische Ganzheit der Erkenntnis gegenüber dem schematischen und mechanischen Charakter der Empfindungen und des 'Denkens' betont werden.

(7) In zweierlei verschiedener Weise drückt schliesslich die 'Praxis' in der Erkenntnistheorie den Gedanken aus, dass die Erkenntnis sich *entwickelt*, historisch ist: Erstens *schreitet* die Erkenntnis in der Geschichte *fort*, Unbekanntes wird erkannt, und so besteht 'in der Praxis' d.h. unter Berücksichtigung des tatsächlichen Verlaufes der Dinge, keine prinzipielle Grenze zwischen Unbekanntem und Erkanntem.[78] Der technische Fortschritt ist das Resultat davon und der Beweis dafür.

(8) Zweitens führt die Geschichte zu einer '*Vereinigung*' von Theorie und Praxis[79], die aber von Lenin nicht weiter erklärt wird. Wichtig ist allerdings schon, dass er sie *nicht* als 'Aufhebung' der theoretischen Erkenntnis, als deren Überwindung und Erfüllung in einer geschichtlichen Tat, etwa der Revolution, beschreibt (wie Marx). Auch denkt er sicher nicht an eine höchste Stufe der Idee (wie Hegel). Was er jedoch meint, bleibt dunkel.

Bei den hier aufgezählten Gedanken Lenins über die 'Praxis' in der Erkenntnistheorie ist die Praxis ein schillernder und problematischer Begriff. Es bieten sich drei verschiedene Interpretationsmöglichkeiten für Lenins Gedanken an:

(1) Eine *unphilosophische* oder vorphilosophische Auffassung: Lenin

weigert sich, die erkenntniskritische Fragestellung ernst zu nehmen. Er nimmt Realität, Kausalität, Notwendigkeit usw. unphilosophisch mit dem *gesunden Menschenverstand* an (wie Engels). Die geschilderten Argumente für den Realismus mit Hilfe der Praxis wären nach dieser Interpretation auf das phänomenale Gebiet beschränkt. Sie würden die Existenz der Welt der Erscheinungen mit Hilfe von Erscheinungen 'beweisen', obwohl ja niemand diese Existenz bestritten hat. Bei der ganzen Theorie der 'Praxis' würde es sich um eine Beschreibung der 'praktischen' Bedingungen, Formen, Begleiterscheinungen usw. des Erkenntnisprozesses handeln. Eine philosophische Erklärung, was die Objektivität der Wirklichkeit und der Wahrheit jenseits aller Erscheinungen denn ist, gäbe sie nicht – ebensowenig wie eine Widerlegung etwa des transzendentalen Erklärungsversuches von Kant. Die unter (4) und (5) referierten und zitierten Thesen wären ein Missbrauch der verwendeten Begriffe und unverständlich. Alle anderen wären trivial.

Es ist nicht einzusehen, warum Lenin eine solche unphilosophische Einstellung nicht geäussert hätte, sondern sie mit vielen ontologischen Ausdrücken verbrämte, wo er sich doch auf Engels' Positivismus stützen konnte. Darum schon erscheint diese erste Interpretation eine unzulässige Vereinfachung zu sein.

(2) Man kann Lenins erkenntnistheoretische Lehre von der 'Praxis' auch ganz *hegelianisch* interpretieren: Wenn die *Identität* von Denken und Sein, von Logischem und Historischem, von Denkinhalt und Denkprozess (von *conceptus obiectivus* und *conceptus subiectivus*) als metaphysische Grundwahrheit vorausgesetzt wird, so stellt sich die Frage nach der Objektivität der Erkenntnis überhaupt nicht mehr. Was Lenin sagen wollte, wäre nach dieser Interpretation folgendes: Die Einheit von Begreifen und Begriff umfasst auch die mit dem Begreifen innerlich eng zusammenhängende Tätigkeit des Subjektes. So wird also auch der Begriff als Erkenntnisinhalt von den Merkmalen des Handelns bestimmt: er ist real, materiell, lebendig, sich entwickelnd. Die Wahrheit als Prozess ist ein materieller Prozess und darum objektiv. Wenn diese Interpretation Lenins Meinung trifft, so werden die Punkte (2), (7) und (8) verständlicher, als sie es sonst sind. Aber im Ganzen hätte Lenin nicht behaupten dürfen, dass er Hume und vor allem Kant widerlege, sondern die Probleme dieser Philosophen stellten sich ihm nicht.

(3) Schliesslich kann man Lenin auch *realistisch* interpretieren, mit

dem gleichzeitigen Versuch, hegelianische Gedanken im Bereich der Beschreibung (nicht der Deutung) des Erkenntnisprozesses anzuwenden. Das bedeutet, dass Lenin mit der Einführung der 'Praxis' in die Erkenntnistheorie die erfahrungsabhängige, lebendige, ganzheitliche und dynamische Natur des intellektuellen Erkenntnis*prozesses* ausdrücken wollte, um die (stillschweigend angenommene) intellektuelle Anschauung psychologisch und ontologisch von einer 'abstrakten' platonischen Intuition zu unterscheiden. Von einer solchen Intuition hätte er gefürchtet, dass sie nicht an die Wirklichkeit gebunden wäre und zu idealistischen und theologischen Phantasien führen würde. Die Einheit von Theorie und 'Praxis' wäre dann ein Parallelismus zwischen Erkennen und Handeln. Die 'Praxis' wäre Kriterium der Wahrheit in dem Sinne, dass eine mit dem Handeln eng verbundene Fähigkeit des Intellektes im Handeln zur Anschauung der Wahrheit kommt. Besonders der fünfte Punkt spricht für diese Interpretation. Auch Lenins materialistisches und realistisches Grundanliegen macht sie wahrscheinlicher als die vorige.

Tatsächlich ist wohl an beiden Interpretationen (2 und 3) etwas Richtiges. Lenins Auffassungen sind eine Mischung aus hegelianischen und realistischen Gedanken oder ein Versuch der Synthese. Eine vollständige Untersuchung dieser Fragen kann hier nicht angestellt werden. Warum es aber geht, ist, zu betonen, dass Lenin sich bei Annahme der zweiten *oder* der dritten Interpretation seiner Theorie der 'Praxis' darum bemüht, entsprechend seinem Rationalismus und seiner prophilosophischen Einstellung, die *überempirische Erkenntnis* philosophisch zu begründen. Dass er dabei gerade den Begriff der Praxis einführt, ist sehr bemerkenswert und zeigt trotz aller Interpretationsschwierigkeiten jedenfalls deutlich, dass Lenin von der Aufhebungstheorie des jungen Marx weit entfernt ist.

Lenins grösste Bedeutung scheint hier darin zu liegen, dass er (1) die philosophischen Probleme der Erkenntnis gestellt, und (2) durch seine widersprüchlichen Äusserungen viele Möglichkeiten des Weiterdenkens offen gelassen und sogar angeregt hat. Ein positivistisches oder ein monolithisches System, zum Dogma erhoben, hätten wohl alle weitere Philosophie unmöglich gemacht.

V. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Lenins Auffassung der Philosophie und die mit dieser Auffassung zu-

sammenhängenden Lehren sind nicht sorgfältig ausgearbeitet und vielleicht auch nicht kohärent. Jedoch sind die folgenden Gedanken einigermassen klar bei Lenin festzustellen:

(1) *Rationalismus*: Lenin betont die Wichtigkeit der theoretischen, objektiven, rationalen Erkenntnis; er bemüht sich selbst um das Studium, die Entwicklung und die Darstellung von rein theoretischen Gedankengängen und er unterscheidet die Theorie von der praktischen Politik; die 'Praxis' soll bei Lenin die Theorie nicht 'aufheben', sondern sie soll sie begründen; Lenins Lehre von der Parteilichkeit enthält zwar eine irrationale Auffassung des Irrtums aber nicht der Wahrheit; allerdings hatte Lenin nicht die für einen Wissenschaftler oder für einen rationalistischen Philosophen geeigneten Charakterzüge.

(2) *Überwindung des Empirismus*: Im Widerspruch zu seinen sensualistischen Behauptungen vertritt Lenin die Erkenntnis realer ontologischer Kategorien und entwickelt Ansätze zu einer Abstraktionstheorie; die schwer zu interpretierenden Gedanken über die 'Praxis' in der Erkenntnistheorie sollen das überempirische und doch realistische Wissen begründen.

(3) *Überwindung des Szientismus*: Lenin nimmt mit zunehmendem Alter immer deutlicher die Selbständigkeit eines spezifisch philosophischen Wissensgebietes an; er unterscheidet dieses Gebiet von den Einzelwissenschaften; Lenin entwickelt selbst ausgesprochen philosophische (z.B. ontologische) Begriffe und Thesen.

Mit diesen Gedanken stellt Lenin sich in einen klaren systematischen Gegensatz zur Lehre des Positivismus. Die Geschichtsmetaphysik des jungen Marx war vom Positivismus weit verschieden, aber sie hatte keinen gemeinsamen Boden mit ihm, auf dem sie sich gegen ihn hätte richten können. Engels dagegen vertrat selbst einen unpräzisen Positivismus. Aus diesen historischen Gründen ist es wichtig, dass Lenin eine eindeutig antipositivistische und prophilosophische Lehre aufgestellt hat. Damit hätte eigentlich von den sich widersprechenden Auffassungen der Philosophie im 'Marxismus' von Marx und Engels ((1) die praktizistische Aufhebung der Philosophie und aller Theorie beim jungen Marx, (2) die positivistische Wissenschaftstheorie des älteren Engels, (3) die in beider Werk, vor allem bei Engels, de facto doch versuchte philosophische Theorie- und Systembildung) die prophilosophische Tendenz von vornherein für den Marxismus-Leninismus massgeblich werden müssen. Der

lange und verlustreiche Kampf der Philosophie um ihre Existenzberechtigung, der nach Lenins Tod in der Sowjetunion geführt wurde, hätte getreu nach Lenins Lehre eigentlich nicht nötig sein dürfen.

ANMERKUNGEN

[1] Vgl. I. M. Bocheński, *Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus (Diamat)*, 2. Aufl., Bern 1956, S. 33.

[2] 1899 schrieb Lenin an seinen Freund Potresov, er sei sich seiner philosophischen Unbildung (*neobrazovannost'*) bewusst und wolle jetzt mehr über Philosophie lernen, um dann darüber schreiben zu können. (V. I. Lenin, *Sočinenija*, Izd. IV, tom 34, Gt. M. 1955. str. 20.)

[3] Plechanovs Autorität in philosophischen Fragen war bei den russischen Marxisten (inclusive Lenin) sehr gross. Es wäre interessant, zu untersuchen, in wieweit die Lehren des Marxismus-Leninismus nicht viel mehr von Plechanov stammen – teils durch Lenin vermittelt – als von Lenin selbst.

[4] V. I. Lenin, *Materializm i émpiriokriticizm, Kritičeskie zametki ob odnoj reakcionnoj filosofii* [Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus, Kritische Bemerkungen über eine reaktionäre Philosophie], M. 1909. – Im Folgenden wird mit der Bezeichnung *M.i.é.* Bezug genommen auf *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij*, izd. V, Gt. M. 1958 ff., tom 18, Gt. M. 1961 und in eckigen Klammern [] auf W. I. Lenin, *Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus, Kritische Bemerkungen über eine reaktionäre Philosophie*, 6. Aufl., Berlin 1960 (Nachdruck der deutschen Ausgabe des IIL, M. 1947). Der Wortlaut der Übersetzung wird bei Zitaten übernommen.

[5] Die Machisten waren russische Kommunisten, die den wirtschaftstheoretischen und politischen Marxismus mit dem Empiriokritizismus, einer von E. Mach und R. Avenarius vertretenen positivistischen Erkenntnistheorie, zu verbinden suchten.

[6] Lenins Hauptargument ist die Unmöglichkeit einer Verbindung von Marxismus und Empiriokritizismus, die notwendige Identifizierung des Empiriokritizismus mit erkenntnistheoretischem Idealismus (Berkeley), Agnostizismus (Hume, Kant) und vor allem mit Theismus ('Fideismus'), also mit Theorien, die Marx' und Engels' Lehre widersprechen.

[7] Zuerst erschien in *Leninskij Sbornik* [Leninsche Sammlung], tom IX, pod red. V. V. Adoratskogo, V. M. Molotova, M.A. Savel'eva, Institut Lenina pri C.K.V.K.P.(B.), M.-L. 1929: (1) 'Zur Kritik der Hegelschen "Wissenschaft der Logik"' (geschrieben Bern 1914); und dann in tom XII, pod red. N. I. Bucharina, V. M. Molotova, M. A. Savel'eva, M.-L. 1930 folgende weitere Einzelstücke: (2) 'Konspekt des Buches von Marx und Engels "Die Heilige Familie"' (Berlin 1895); (3) 'Kritische Bemerkungen zu Feuerbachs Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion'; (4) 'Kritische Bemerkungen zu Feuerbachs "Leibniz"' (Bern 1914); (5) 'Zur Kritik der Vorlesungen Hegels über die Philosophie der Geschichte' (Bern 1914–15); (6) 'Zur Kritik der Vorlesungen Hegels über die Geschichte der Philosophie' (Bern 1915); (7) 'Über das Buch G. Noëls "La logique de Hegel"' (Genf 1915); (8) 'Plan der Dialektik (Logik) Hegels' (Bern 1915); (9) 'Zur Kritik des Lassalleschen Buches "Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunklen von Ephesos"' (Bern 1915 oder 1916); (10) 'Zur Frage der Dialektik' (Bern 1915 oder 1916); (11) 'Kritische Bemerkungen zur "Metaphysik" des Aristoteles' (Bern 1915 oder 1916); (12) 'Verschiedene Notizen und Auszüge zu Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft' (1904–1920); und (13) 'Auszüge und Bemerkungen zu dem Buch von Klausewitz "Über

Krieg und Kriegführung"'. – Im Folgenden wird mit Angabe der obigen Nummer in Klammern ( ) aus verschiedenen der Stücke zitiert. Dabei wird Bezug genommen auf *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij*, izd. V (im Weiteren zitiert als '*Soč. V*') tom 29, *Filosofskie tetradi* [Philosophische Hefte], Gt. M. 1963 und in eckigen Klammern [] auf W. I. Lenin, *Aus dem philosophischen Nachlass, Exzerpte und Randglossen*, 2. Aufl., Berlin 1954. Dieses Buch enthält die aufgezählten Texte ausser (2), (13) und (14) in deutscher Übersetzung. Der Wortlaut der Übersetzung wird bei Zitaten übernommen, so bereits bei den oben angegebenen Titeln.

[8] Siehe unten: Anmerkungen 9 ff., 25, 36.

[9] Marx und Engels "setzten an die Stelle von Träumereien die Wissenschaft" (V. I. Lenin, 'Fridrich Éngel's' [Friedrich Engels], 1895, in *Soč. V*, tom 2, str. 1–14, hier str. 6 [deutsch: W. I. Lenin, *Marx, Engels, Marxismus*, 2, Aufl., M. 1947 (im Weiteren: *Sammelband*), S. 40]). "Die Lehre von Marx ist allmächtig, weil sie richtig ist." "...der Materialismus als die einzige folgerichtige Philosophie, die allen Lehren der Naturwissenschaften treu bleibt, die dem Aberglauben, jeder Frömmelei usw. feind ist" (V. I. Lenin, 'Tri istočnika i tri sostavnych časti marksizma' [Drei Quellen und drei Bestandteile des Marxismus], 1913, in *Soč. V*, tom 23, str. 40–48, hier str. 43 [deutsch: *Sammelband*, S. 55]). – Objektivität der Wahrheit, Erkennbarkeit der Welt, Übereinstimmung mit der Naturwissenschaft und Ablehnung des Irrationalen sind das Hauptthema von *Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus*. – In den *Tetradi* spricht Lenin vom "dialektischen Weg der Erkenntnis der Wahrheit, der Erkenntnis der objektiven Realität" und sagt dann: "Der Materialist erhöht das Wissen" (gegenüber dem Glauben) (*Tetradi*, (1), str. 153 [deutsch: S. 90]).

[10] "Es kann keine feste sozialistische Partei geben, wenn es keine revolutionäre Theorie gibt, die alle Sozialisten vereinigt, aus der sie alle ihre Überzeugungen schöpfen, die sie in ihren Kampfmethoden und der Art ihrer Tätigkeit anwenden" (V. I. Lenin, 'Naša programma' [Unser Programm], 1899, in *Soč. V*, tom 4, str. 182–186, hier str. 183 [deutsch: *Sammelband*, S. 92]). – Ähnlich auch in *Čto delat'? Nabolevšie voprosy našego dviženija* [Was tun? Brennende Fragen unserer Bewegung], 1902, in *Soč. V*, tom 6, str. 1–192, hier: str. 24–25 [deutsch: *Sammelband*, S. 101].

[11] *Ibid.*, str. 30–31 [S. 105].

[12] So K. Korsch, 'Der gegenwärtige Stand des Problems "Marxismus und Philosophie"' (1930), abgedruckt neuerdings in K. Korsch, *Marxismus und Philosophie* (hrsg. u. eingel. v. E. Gerlach), Frankfurt-Wien, 1966, SS. 31–73, hier S. 55, Fn 22. Korschs Begründungen für die Behauptung überzeugen nicht.

[13] "Die unwiderstehliche Anziehungskraft, die diese Theorie auf die Sozialisten aller Länder ausübt, besteht gerade darin, dass sie (als das letzte Wort der Gesellschaftswissenschaft) strenge und höchste Wissenschaftlichkeit mit revolutionärem Geist vereint, und zwar nicht zufällig, ... dass sie diese in der Theorie selbst innerlich und unzertrennlich vereint. In der Tat, als Aufgabe der Theorie, als Ziel der Wissenschaft wird hier direkt die Unterstützung der Klasse der Unterdrückten ... aufgestellt" (V. I. Lenin, *Čto takoe "Druz'ja naroda" i kak oni vojujut protiv social-demokratov?'* [Wer sind die "Volksfreunde", und wie kämpfen sie gegen die Sozialdemokraten?], 1894, in *Soč. V*, str. 125–346, hier str. 341 [deutsch: *Sammelband*, S. 79]).

[14] In diesem Sinne: *ibid.*, str. 308 [S. 74]. Vgl. auch: 'O nekotorych osobennostjach istoričeskogo razvitija marksizma' [Über einige Besonderheiten der historischen Entwicklung des Marxismus], 1910, in *Soč. V*, str. 84–89 [deutsch: *Sammelband*, S. 219 ff].

[15] "Für Hegel ist das *Handeln*, die Praxis, ein *logischer 'Schluss'*, eine Figur der Logik. Und das ist wahr: Natürlich nicht in dem Sinne, dass die Figur der Logik ihr Anders-

sein in der Praxis des Menschen hätte [=absoluter Idealismus], sondern dass vice versa die Praxis des Menschen sich dadurch, dass sie sich Milliarden Male wiederholt, im Bewusstsein des Menschen als logische Figuren einprägt" (Hervorh. v. Lenin; *Tetradi*, (1), str. 198 [deutsch: S. 139]).

[16] Dieser Grundgedanke von der Aufhebung der Philosophie ist schon in den 'Anmerkungen zur Dissertation' vorbereitet. (K. Marx, *Frühe Schriften*, 1. Band, hrsg. H. J. Lieber u. P. Furth, Darmstadt 1962, hier: S. 71). Er wird entwickelt in der 'Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung' (*ibid.*, hier: SS. 495f, 498f, 504f), und seine Konsequenz ist in der berühmten 11. These über Feuerbach ausgedrückt (*MEW*, Bd. 3, S. 7).

[17] K. Marx, 'Anmerkungen zur Dissertation', *loc.cit.*; ders., 'Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung', *loc.cit.*, S. 495; ders., 'Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte', in *Frühe Schriften, loc.cit.*, S. 639; K. Marx, F. Engels, *Die Deutsche Ideologie, MEW*, Bd. 3, S. 27.

[18] In *M.i é.* wird nur die erkenntnistheoretisch verstandene (und keine geschichtsmetaphysische) 'Praxis' behandelt. Auch die allgemeinen Forderungen einer Einheit von Theorie und Praxis haben hier nur diesen Sinn, z.B. *M.i é.*, str. 199 [deutsch: S. 181]).

[19] Siehe unten: Abschnitt IV, SS. 283ff.

[20] Siehe den Abschnitt 'Partii v filosofii i filosofskie bezgolovcy' [Parteien in der Philosophie und philosophische Wirrköpfe] in *M. i é.*, *loc.cit.*, str. 356–367 [deutsch: SS. 326–337]. Professor Bocheński gibt eine Analyse der Parteilichkeitslehre der zeitgenössischen Sowjetphilosophie, der die Analyse der Leninschen Gedanken zum Teil folgen kann; siehe J. M. Bocheński, 'On Partijnost' in Philosophy, I' *SST* **5** (1965), 1–11, hier pp. 3f.

[21] *M.i é.*, id. Lenin spricht hier immer wieder von diesem Entweder–Oder und von der Unmöglichkeit einer 'Mitte'. Er versucht diesen Gedanken auch bei Marx und Engels nachzuweisen.

[22] *M.i é., loc.cit.*, str. 321 [deutsch: S. 293].

[23] "Der Fideismus holt sich... seine Beute" (*M.i é.*, str. 364 [deutsch: S. 334]).

[24] "Das Verhältnis zur Religion und das Verhältnis zur Naturwissenscaft illustriert trefflich, wie die bürgerliche Reaktion den Empiriokritizismus *tatsächlich* im Klasseninteresse ausnutzt" (Hervorh. v. Lenin; id. [deutsch: S. 335]).

[25] "In einer Gesellschaft der Lohnsklaverei eine unparteiische [*bespriastnoj*] Wissenschaft zu erwarten, wäre eine ebenso törichte Naivität, wie etwa von den Fabrikanten Unparteilichkeit zu erwarten in der Frage, ob man nicht den Arbeitern den Lohn erhöhen sollte, indem man den Profit des Kapitals herabsetzt" (V. I. Lenin, *Tri istočnika...*, *loc. cit.*, str. 40 [deutsch: S. 55]). "Auf dem Gebiete der Philosophie segelte der Revisionismus im Fahrwasser der bürgerlichen professoralen Wissenschaft" (ders., 'Marksizm i revizionizm' [Marxismus und Revisionismus], 1908, in *Soč. V*, tom 17, str. 15–26, hier str. 19 [deutsch: *Sammelband*, S. 186]). Lenin spricht vom "Zusammenhang zwischen den Klasseninteressen und der Klassenlage der Bourgeoisie, der Unterstützung, die sie jeder beliebigen Art von Religion angedeihen lässt, und dem Ideeninhalt der philosophischen Moderichtungen..." (ders., 'O značenie voinstvujuščego materializma' [Über die Bedeutung des streitbaren Materialismus], zuerst in *Pod znamenem marksizma*, No 3, 1922; hier nach V. I. Lenin, *Sočinenija*, Izd. IV (!), tom 33, Gt. M. 1955, str. 201–210, hier 202–203 [deutsch: *Sammelband*, SS. 405f]). In *M.i é.* wird die subjektive Parteilichkeit der Irrenden weniger betont, wohl weil hier Lenins wissenschaftliche Gegner seine politischen Verbündeten sind. Ja, Lenin denkt sich

sogar eine komplizierte Erklärung aus, wieso Lunačarskij in subjektiv '"guter" Absicht' so 'schändliche Dinge' mit unbestreitbar schlechter 'gesellschaftlicher Bedeutung' schreiben konnte (*M.i é.*, str. 366 [deutsch: SS. 336f]). In den *Tetradi* ist von Parteilichkeit überhaupt nicht die Rede.

[26] Siehe oben: (A) SS. 275f und Anmerkungen 9–11; dazu noch: "Das menschliche Denken ist also seiner Natur nach fähig, uns die absolute Wahrheit, die eine Summe von relativen Wahrheiten ist, zu geben, und gibt sie uns auch" (*M.i é.*, str. 137 [deutsch: S. 124]). "...der einzige Weg zu dieser Wahrheit" (der "einzigen, letzten, objektiven Wahrheit") ist "der Weg der auf dem materialistischen Standpunkt stehenden Wissenschaft" (*M.i é.*, str. 146 [deutsch: S. 132]).

[27] '*Verno*' z.B.: V. I. Lenin, *Tri istočnika...*, *loc.cit.*, str. 43 [deutsch: *Sammelband*, S. 55]. '*pravil'nost*'' z.B.: *M.i é.*, str. 142 [deutsch: 128].

[28] '*Peredovaja*' z.B.: V. I. Lenin, *Čto delat'?*, *loc.cit.*, str. 25 [deutsch: S. 101].

[29] *M.i é.*, str. 39 und 138 [deutsch: SS. 35 und 125]. *Tri istočnika...*, *loc. cit.*, str. 43–44 [deutsch: *Sammelband*, S. 55f].

[30] Id.

[31] Es wäre interessant, festzustellen, ob Lenin überhaupt irgendwo in seinen Schriften von einer Parteilichkeit der *fortschrittlichen* Erkenntnis spricht.

[32] D. Joravsky kritisiert mit Recht die Darstellung von Lenins Gegner N.V. Valentinov und von Lenins Schüler M. B. Mitin, derzufolge Lenins Lehre von der Parteilichkeit für die Unterwerfung der Philosophie unter die Parteipolitik verantwortlich wäre (D. Joravsky, *Soviet Marxism and Natural Science 1917–1932*, London 1961, p. 24f). Ein weiteres Beispiel für die übertrieben partei-pragmatistische Interpretation ist K. Korsch, *op. cit.* – Zur 'leninistischen' Theorie der Parteilichkeit in der neueren sowjetischen Philosophie vgl. I. M. Bocheński, *Der Sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus (Diamat)*, 2. Aufl., Bern 1956, SS. 107f; ders.: 'On Partijnost' in Philosophy, I', *SST* 5 (1965), 1–11; und G. A. Wetter, *Der dialektische Materialismus, Seine Geschichte und sein System in der Sowjetunion*, 5. Aufl., Wien 1960, SS. 313–319.

[33] In seinem Artikel über die Parteipresse von 1905 'Partijnaja organizacija i partijnaja literatura' [Die Parteiorganisation und die Parteiliteratur], *Soč. V*, tom 12, str. 99–105, vertrat Lenin eine energische Parteidisziplin. Seine hier gemachten Äusserungen wurden oft zitiert, um die Parteikontrolle der Philosophie zu rechtfertigen. Aber die nach Lenins Tod als 'Parteilichkeit der Philosophie' vertretene partei-pragmatische und emotionale Auffassung der Wahrheitserkenntnis ist auch in diesem Artikel nicht enthalten und erst recht nicht in den mehr philosophischen Untersuchungen von *M.i é.*

[34] I. Fetscher, der die Einstellung des jungen Marx und des älteren Engels zur Philosophie sehr treffend darstellt, scheint Lenin hier zu sehr mit seinen Jüngern, besonders mit Stalin, zu identifizieren, die die Philosophie Lenins zur Parteiphilosophie und Rechtfertigungsideologie ihrer Partei machten (I. Fetscher, 'Von der Philosophie des Proletariats zur proletarischen Weltanschauung', *loc.cit.*, S. 51f, und ders., 'Die Entstehung des dialektischen Materialismus als metaphysischer Weltanschauung', *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 1953, 50/2, SS. 184–207, hier: S. 187).

[35] Joravsky beschreibt anhand der Dokumente die ganze Entwicklung im Detail: Lenins Abkommen philosophischer Neutralität innerhalb seiner bolschewistischen Gruppe, nachdem Plechanov zu den Menschewisten übergegangen war; sein Versuch, die von seinen Gegnern behauptete Beziehung zwischen philosophischen Meinungsverschiedenheiten und politischer Spaltung zu ignorieren; seine Bemühungen, den Zusammenhang politischer und philosophischer Gruppen propagandistisch zu bekämpfen; schliesslich sein Entschluss, *M.i é.* zu schreiben und darin die philosophi-

schen Ansichten seiner politischen Anhänger anzugreifen, um diesen Zusammenhang zu widerlegen und den Menschewisten das Monopol der philosophischen Orthodoxie zu nehmen. Selbst hat er dies Monopol *nicht* beansprucht (D. Joravsky, *loc. cit.*, pp. 27–41). B. D. Wolfe, *Lenin, Trotzkij, Stalin, Drei die eine Revolution machten, Eine biographische Geschichte*, Frankfurt a.M. 1965, Übers. aus d. Engl., sieht in der Veröffentlichung von *M.i é.* einen innerparteilichen politischen Zweck (SS. 636ff). Joravsky widerlegt diese Auffassung (D. Joravsky, *loc. cit.*, pp 33f).

[36] V. I. Lenin, 'Ob otnošenii rabočej partii k religii' [Das Verhältnis der Arbeiterpartei zur Religion], 1909, in *Soč. V*, str. 415–426 [deutsch: *Sammelband*, 203ff].

[37] V. I. Lenin, 'Čto takoe "Druz'ja Naroda"...', *loc.cit.*, str. 308 [deutsch: *Sammelband*, S. 74]. *Tetradi*, (1), str. 195 [deutsch: S. 135]. Hierhin gehört auch der erwähnte Artikel über die Parteipresse von 1905 (siehe oben, Anmerkung 33).

[38] Lenin spricht in seinen Schriften passim von der 'Philosophie von Marx' u.ä., z.B. in *Tri istočnika...*, *loc. cit.*, str. 43 [deutsch: S. 55]. 1894/95, als er noch wenig Philosophie gelesen hatte (vgl. Anmerkung 4), schrieb er allerdings noch: "Von Marx' und Engels' Standpunkt aus gesehen hat die Philosophie überhaupt kein Recht auf eine gesonderte selbständige Existenz, und ihr Material wird unter verschiedene Zweige der positiven Wissenschaften aufgeteilt" (V. I. Lenin, 'Ékonomičeskoe soderžanie narodničestva i kritika ego v knige g. Struve' [Der ökonomische Inhalt des Narodničestvo und seine Kritik in dem Buch von Herrn Struve], 1894/5, in *Soč. V*, tom 1, str. 347–534, hier str. 438).

[39] Vgl. F. Engels, *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft*, genannt *Anti-Dühring* (1876–1878), hier nach 3. vermehrte Aufl., 1894, in *MEW*, Band 20, Berlin 1962, SS. 24, 34 und 129 – sowie ders., *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie* (1886), hier nach dem revidierten Sonderabdruck von 1888 in *MEW*, Band 21, Berlin 1962, SS. 306, 270ff und 291.

[40] Z.B. ders., *Dialektik der Natur* (Entwürfe und Fragmente aus den Jahren 1873–1883 mit Ergänzungen von 1885/86, zum erstenmal veröffentlicht Moskau–Leningrad 1925), hier nach *MEW*, Band 20, Berlin 1962, SS. 472 und 480 – sowie ders., *Anti-Dühring*, *loc. cit.*, SS. 11 und 19.

[41] So z.B. ders., *Dialektik der Natur*, *loc.cit.*, SS. 330 und 345f – und ähnlich ders., *Anti-Dühring*, *loc. cit.*, SS. 14 und 19.

[42] *Ibid.*, SS. 131f.

[43] Ders., *Dialektik der Natur*, *loc. cit.*, SS. 330ff (bes. 332) und 480 – sowie ders., *Anti-Dühring*, *loc. cit.*, S. 14, und ders., *Ludwig Feuerbach...*, SS. 294–296.

[44] "... *nur* die Naturwissenschaft allein, die die Aussenwelt in der menschlichen 'Erfahrung' abbildet", ist "fähig..., uns die objektive Wahrheit zu vermitteln" (*davat'*) (*M. i é.*, str. 127 [deutsch: S. 114]. Hervorh. v. mir, W.B.).

[45] "Der Materialismus... in vollem Einklang mit der Naturwissenschaft ..." (*ibid.*, str. 39 [S. 35]). Vgl. auch *ibid.*, str. 372–374 [SS. 342–344]. Schliesslich *ibid.*, str 332 [S. 304]: "Die moderne Physik ... ist dabei, den dialektischen Materialismus zu gebären."

[46] *Ibid.*, str. 265–266 [deutsch: S. 241f].

[47] *Ibid.*, str. 273–276 [deutsch: SS. 248ff].

[48] *Ibid.*, str. 363–364 [deutsch: 333f].

[49] Die einzigen expliziten Stellen über die Philosophie sind hier ganz unklar: *Tetradi*, (1), str. 103 und 108 [deutsch: SS. 30 und 36]. Es ist nicht verständlich, was die betreffenden Sätze bedeuten, und ob sie Hegels oder Lenins Meinung ausdrücken sollen.

[50] *Tetradi*, (10), str. 321 [deutsch: S. 288] und (6), str. 248 [deutsch: SS. 213f].

[51] V. I. Lenin, 'O značenie voinstvujuščego materializma', *loc. cit.*, str. 207 [deutsch: *Sammelband*, S. 410].
[52] Vgl. K. Ballestrem, *Die sowjetische Erkenntnismetaphysik und ihr Verhältnis zu Hegel*, Dordrecht 1968, hier: II, 'Lenin'.
[53] Alizerin: *M.i é.*, str. 100 [deutsch: S. 90]. Natur vor dem Menschen: *ibid.*, str. 71–84 und str. 239 [SS. 64ff und S. 217]. Denken mit dem Gehirn (auch von Engels): *ibid.*, str. 84–92 und str. 239 [SS. 75ff und S. 217].
[54] Definition der Materie als 'philosophische Kategorie': *ibid.*, str. 131 und str. 275–276 [SS. 118f und SS. 250f]. Empfindung: *ibid.*, str. 40–41 [SS. 35f]. Unendlichkeit und Unerschöpflichkeit: *ibid.*, str. 277 [SS. 252f]. Bewegung: *ibid.*, str. 281–290 [SS. 255ff].
[55] In den *Tetradi* wird ganz allgemein über die objektive Dialektik in einer ontologischen Art gehandelt, die sicher nicht von den Einzelwissenschaften absorbiert werden kann oder soll. Über die Dialektik von Erscheinung und Wesen, Relatum und Relation vgl. z.B. *Tetradi* (1), str. 190 [S. 129]. Weiterhin vgl. auch: *ibid.*, str. 98–100, 124, 126f, 131 [deutsch: SS. 26ff, 53, 57, 64] und *Tetradi* (6), str. 229 [S. 190].
[56] Siehe vor allem das Zitat in Anmerkung 58. Die wichtigste Kritik Lenins besteht in den Gedanken: (1) "Das letzte Wort des 'neuesten Positivismus' ist jene alte Formel des Fideismus" (*M.i é.*, str. 173 [deutsch: S. 157]) – ähnlich passim – und (2) Positivismus ist 'Halbheit', z.B. in den *Tetradi*: Lenin lobt G. Noël: "Wo der Verfasser den Positivismus als Agnostizismus kritisiert, schlägt er ihn manchmal nicht schlecht wegen seiner Halbheit – so z.B. wo er sagt, dass der Frage nach der Quelle der Gesetze oder 'Beständigkeit' in den Tatsachen... nicht auszuweichen sei" (*Tetradi*, (7), str. 295 [deutsch: S. 263]).
[57] Im Abschnitt über die 'Parteilichkeit' sagt Lenin: *Marx* "lehnt den Comteschen 'Positivismus' verächtlich ab" und "das bewusste Ignorieren der zwitterhaften Projekte zur Versöhnung von Materialismus und Idealismus" ist "das grösste Verdienst von Marx". Engels stellt "in all seinen philosophischen Arbeiten in *allen* Fragen kurz und bündig die materialistische der idealistischen Linie gegenüber, wobei er weder im Jahre 1878 noch 1888 noch 1892 die endlosen krampfhaften Bemühungen ernst nahm, die 'Einseitigkeit' von Materialismus und Idealismus zu 'überwinden', eine *neue* Linie, irgendeinen 'Positivismus', 'Realismus' oder anderen Professorenschwindel zu verkünden" (*M.i é.*, str. 358–359 [deutsch: SS. 328f]).
[58] "Der Marxismus verwirft nicht das, was den einen Positivisten von dem anderen unterscheidet, sondern das, was ihnen gemeinsam ist, was einen Philosophen zum Positivisten macht, zum Unterschied vom Materialisten." ... Das "Wesen der Sache besteht in dem radikalen Auseinandergehen des Materialismus mit dem ganzen breiten Strom des Positivismus, *innerhalb* dessen sich sowohl Auguste Comte und Herbert Spencer als auch Michailovski [= Bogdanov] und eine Reihe Neukantianer sowie Mach nebst Avenarius befinden" (*ibid.*, str. 214 [S. 195]). Vgl. auch: *ibid.*, str. 98–100, 124, 126–127, 131 [deutsch: SS. 26ff, 53, 57, 64] und *Tetradi* (6), str. 229 [S. 190].
[59] A. Pastore, *La Filosofia di Lenin*, Milano 1946, bestreitet Lenins wissenschaftliche und philosophische Kompetenz und nennt seine Lehre "una concezione generale della vita e del mondo" (p. 12).
[60] *M.i é.*, str. 120 [deutsch: S. 191] und öfter.
[61] Z.B. *ibid.*, str. 131 [SS. 118f].
[62] "Die 'naive' Überzeugung der Menschheit wird vom Materialismus *bewusst* zur Grundlage seiner Erkenntnistheorie gemacht" (*ibid.*, str. 66 [S. 59]. Hervorh. v. Lenin).
[63] Z.B. Hume: *ibid.*, str. 26–28 [SS. 23f].
[64] So identifiziert Lenin z.B. Bogdanovs erkenntnistheoretischen (subjektiven) Idea-

lismus, demzufolge die Natur vom Subjekt 'erzeugt' werde, mit dem 'objektiven Idealismus' der göttlichen Schöpfung der Natur. Diese Art der Argumentation lässt vermuten, dass er die eigentliche Problematik des erkenntnistheoretischen Subjektivismus einfach nicht sehen wollte (*M.i é.*, str. 240–241 [deutsch: SS. 218f]).

[65] Lenin beschuldigt Plechanov des "Wirrwarrs in der Terminologie", weil er tatsächlich vom 'Glauben' (in Anführungszeichen) an die Existenz der Aussenwelt und von 'salto vitale' spricht. Aber in der Sache ist er einverstanden, dass in der erkenntnistheoretischen Grundfrage ein 'Sprung' [in die 'Praxis'] nötig ist. Vgl. *M.i é.*, str. 144 [deutsch: S. 130]. Das Resultat eines solchen Glaubens ist eine petitio im angeblichen Beweis des Geglaubten, z.B.: "... es ist *selbstverständlich*, dass ein Abbild nicht ohne das Abgebildete existieren kann, das Abgebildete aber unabhängig von dem Abbildenden existiert" (*ibid.*, str. 66 [S. 59], Hervorh. v. mir, W.B.).

[66] Siehe oben, Anmerkung 53.

[67] "Dialektisch ist nicht nur der Übergang von der Materie zum Bewusstsein, sondern auch von der Erfahrung zum Denken [*mysl'*] etc." (*Tetradi* (6), str. 256 [deutsch: S. 220]). Aufzählung der Stufen: 'Eindrücke', 'Etwas', 'Qualität' und 'Quantität', 'Identität', 'Wesen', 'Kausalität'. "Alle diese Momente (Schritte, Stufen, Prozesse) der Erkenntnis bewegen sich in der Richtung vom Subjekt zum Objekt..." (*ibid.*, (8), str. 301 [deutsch: S. 248]). "Um zu begreifen, muss man... von der Empirie zum Allgemeinen aufsteigen" (*ibid.*, (1), str. 187 [deutsch: S. 126]). Vgl. über 'Begreifen' auch *ibid.*, (6), str. 231 [deutsch: S. 193].

[68] "Der Begriff (die Erkenntnis) enthüllt im Sein (in den unmittelbaren Erscheinungen) das Wesen (das Gesetz der Kausalität, die Identität, den Unterschied etc.) – dies ist wirklich der *allgemeine Gang* aller menschlichen Erkenntnis (aller Wissenschaft) überhaupt" (*ibid.*, (8), str. 298 [deutsch: S. 247]).

[69] Zu G. Noëls Satz: "Das Sinnliche ist das vorgeahnte Intelligible; das Intelligible ist das begriffene Sinnliche" bemerkt Lenin: "Nicht übel!" und "Sogar dir, du seichter Idealist, ist Hegel irgendwie zugute gekommen!" (*ibid.*, (7), str. 295 [deutsch: S. 261].

[70] "Das Herangehen des Verstandes (des Menschen) an das einzelne Ding, die Anfertigung eines Abdrucks [= eines Begriffs] von ihm, ist *kein* einfacher, unmittelbarer, spiegelartig toter, sondern ein komplizierter, zwiespältiger, zickzackartiger Akt..." (*ibid.*, (11), str. 330 [deutsch: S. 299]).

[71] Das Wort 'Praxis' wird im vorliegenden Abschnitt in Anführungszeichen geschrieben, wenn es für 'Lenins Begriff der Praxis' steht.

[72] "Dass die Menschen sich in ihrer Praxis gänzlich von der materialistischen Erkenntnistheorie leiten lassen" (*M.i é.*, str. 143 [deutsch: S. 129]). Vgl. auch *ibid.*, str. 103 [S. 92]. Hierzu zitiert Lenin ausführlich Engels' ähnliche Argumente wie: "ehe die Menschen argumentierten, handelten sie.... Und menschliche Tat hatte die Schwierigkeit schon gelöst, lange ehe menschliche Klugtuerei sie erfand. The proof of the pudding is in the eating" (*M.i é.*, str. 109, [deutsch: S. 98]; zitiert aus F. Engels, *Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft*).

[73] "Dass ... die Praxis des Menschen sich dadurch, dass sie sich Milliarden Male wiederholt, im Bewusstsein des Menschen als logische Figuren einprägt. Diese Figuren haben gerade (und nur) kraft dieser milliardenmaligen Wiederholung die Festigkeit eines Vorurteils und axiomatischen Charakter" (*Tetradi*, (1), str. 198 [deutsch: S. 139]. Vgl. oben, Anmerkung 15; siehe auch *ibid.*, str. 172 [S. 110]).

[74] Lenin stellt sie den "theoretischen Argumenten" und 'Syllogismen' gegenüber (*M.i é.*, str. 28 [deutsch: S. 25] sowie einer "Erkenntnistheorie, in der man mit Worten verzwickte 'Definitionen' austüfteln muss" (*ibid.*, str. 198 [S. 180]). Er spricht von der

"Praxis der astronomischen Beobachtungen, Entdeckungen usw." (*ibid.*, str. 143 [S. 129]). Vgl. die folgenden Anmerkungen, 75 und 76.

[75] "Die menschliche Erkenntnis spiegelt die absolute Wahrheit wieder ..., die menschliche Praxis macht die Probe auf die Richtigkeit unserer Vorstellungen und bestätigt in ihnen das, was der absoluten Wahrheit entspricht" (*M.i é.*, str. 106 [deutsch: S. 95]). Vgl. auch *ibid.*, str. 109–110 [S. 99] und str. 142 [SS. 128f]. In den *Tetradi* ist der Gedanke voll entwickelt: "Vom lebendigen Anschauen zum abstrakten Denken *und von diesem zur Praxis* – das ist der dialektische Weg der Erkenntnis der *Wahrheit*, der Erkenntnis der objektiven Realität" (*Tetradi*, (1), str. 152–153 [deutsch: S. 89], Hervorh. v. Lenin). "...dass der Mensch durch seine *Praxis* die objektive Richtigkeit seiner Ideen, Begriffe, Kenntnisse, seiner Wissenschaft beweist" (n.b. das Wort 'beweist', *ibid.*, str. 173 [S. 111], Hervorh. v. Lenin). "bei Hegel die Praxis als Kettenglied in der Analyse des Prozesses der Erkenntnis" (*ibid.*, str. 193 [S. 133]). Vgl. auch noch *ibid.*, str. 184 [S. 122] und *ibid.*, (8), str. 302 [S. 250]).

[76] "Daher hat A. Lévy im Wesentlichen recht, wenn er meint, dass für Marx der 'phänomenalen Tätigkeit' der Menschheit eine 'Tätigkeit der Dinge' entspricht, d.h. die menschliche Praxis hat nicht nur eine phänomenale (im Humeschen und Kantschen Sinne des Wortes) sondern auch eine objektiv-reale Bedeutung" (*M.i é.*, str. 106 [deutsch: S. 95]). "die objektive, d.h. die vom Menschen und von der Menschheit unabhängige Bedeutung des Kriteriums der Praxis" (*ibid.*, str. 317 [S. 289]). "Die Praxis ... hat nicht nur die Würde des Allgemeinen, sondern auch der unmittelbaren Wirklichkeit" (*Tetradi*, (1), str. 195 [deutsch: S. 135]). "Von der subjektiven Idee gelangt der Mensch zur objektiven Wahrheit *durch* [*čerez*] die 'Praxis' (und die Technik)" (*ibid.*, str. 183 [S. 121]; Hervorh. v. Lenin; vielleicht nur Doxographie von Hegel?). "Die Bewegung der Erkenntnis *zum* Objekt kann stets nur dialektisch vor sich gehen... Knotenpunkt = die Praxis des Menschen und der Menschheit" (*ibid.*, (6), str. 252, [S. 216]; Hervorh. v. Lenin). Vgl. auch *ibid.*, (1), str. 200 [S. 141]).

[77] "Die ganze lebendige menschliche Praxis" (*M.i é.*, str. 198 [deutsch: S. 180]). Vgl. auch *ibid.*, str. 145 [S. 131]. "der Gedanke, das *Leben* in die Logik einzubeziehen, ist verständlich und genial" (*Tetradi*, (1), str. 184 [S. 122]). "Die Abbildung der Bewegung durch das Denken ist immer eine Vergröberung, eine Ertötung, und zwar nicht nur durch das Denken, sondern auch durch die Empfindung, und nicht nur der Bewegung, sondern auch *jedweden* Begriffes" (*ibid.*, (6), str. 233 [S. 195]; Hervorh. v. Lenin).

[78] Als Lenin endlich einmal eine erkenntniskritische Frage klar stellt: "Wie kann der Mensch... *Kenntnis haben* von der Erkenntnis dessen was er *nicht kennt*?" d.h. des Dinges-an-sich, da antwortet er: "Die Entwicklung des Bewusstseins bei jedem einzelnen menschlichen Individuum und die Entwicklung der kollektiven Kenntnisse der gesamten Menschheit zeigen uns auf Schritt und Tritt die Verwandlung des nicht erkannten 'Dinges an sich' in ein erkanntes 'Ding für uns'" (*M.i é.*, str. 197 [deutsch: S. 179]). In diesem Sinne interpretiert Lenin Engels' Alizerin-Argument *ibid.*, str. 102 [SS. 91f]. Vgl. auch: "Die Herrschaft über die Natur, die sich in der Praxis des Menschen äussert, ist das Resultat der objektiv richtigen Wiederspiegelung... der Beweis dafür, dass diese Wiederspiegelung (in den Grenzen dessen, was uns die Praxis zeigt) objektive, absolute, ewige Wahrheit ist" (*ibid.*, str. 198 [S. 180]).

[79] "Notwendig ist die *Vereinigung der Erkenntnis mit der Praxis*" (*Tetradi*, (1), str. 198 [deutsch: S. 138]). Vgl. auch *ibid.*, str. 200 [S. 142].

HOMER HOGAN

THE BASIC PERSPECTIVE OF MARXISM-LENINISM

Both Marxists and non-Marxists would agree that Marxism-Leninism could not be sound as philosophy if its theory of knowledge were untenable, and that its theory of knowledge could not be accepted if its 'theory of reflection' were mistaken. For a systematic discussion of Marxism-Leninism between advocates and questioners, its theory of reflection should therefore provide a useful starting-point.

The classic formulation of that theory is in Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (hereafter abbreviated as MEC), published in 1908 as a refutation of certain Russian Marxists who thought that Marxism could be combined with the epistemology of Ernst Mach. Essentially, the theory is Lenin's restatement of two simple assertions he holds to be basic in the thought of Marx and Engels: (1) a world exists 'independent' of and 'external' to consciousness, and (2) knowledge consists of approximately faithful 'reflections' of that world in consciousness. In his later *Philosophical Notebooks*, Lenin expands these assertions considerably by adapting Hegel's logic to them, but at least until 1960, Soviet epistemology has regarded MEC as the principal statement of the theory of reflection and has proceeded as a development of the 'line' laid down by that statement, specifically, through application of the theory to criticism of contemporary 'positivism'.

The purpose of the present study is to clear a way for a sympathetic understanding of the Leninist theory of reflection and its potential cogency insofar as the theory is developed in MEC. By 'sympathetic understanding', we mean an understanding of the doctrine not merely as it stands, but as it would be conceptualized today by a consistent Marxist-Leninist, and by 'potential cogency', we mean to imply that we would seek to establish not the truth but only the plausibility of the theory of reflection so that we can see why intelligent Marxist-Leninists subscribe to it. In practical terms, our objective is to assist non-Marxists who wish to enter a fruitful dialogue with contemporary Soviet philosophers. We assume that non-Marxists cannot do this unless they imagine for a

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moment what it would be like to share the fundamental Marxist-Leninist 'outlook' upon the world, and we argue that Lenin's theory of reflection is the formal expression of that perspective.

Within the scope of this paper it is of course impossible to elucidate adequately this perspective and its expression. To do so requires lengthy analytic and historical studies of the ways the theory of reflection has been used to criticise non-Marxist epistemologies and to derive solutions for particular questions of logic, semantics, scientific methodology, and philosophy[1]; for in Marxism-Leninism, both the significance and meaning of the theory depend more on its functions than on the designation of its highly general terms. Furthermore, even extensive historical and logical analysis is not enough to induce the act of sympathy required for sharing the Marxist perspective. Friedrich Waismann points out that

> ... logic *constrains* us while philosophy leaves us free: in a philosophic discussion we are led, step by step, to change our angle of vision, e.g., to pass from one way of putting a question to another, and this with our spontaneous agreement – a thing profoundly different from deducing theorems from a given set of premises.[2]

But how can we secure this 'spontaneous agreement' when the vision we are asked to share leads to a philosophy whose adherents are disfavored or condemned in our culture?

In view of these difficulties, we can only hope to do some preparatory work and so we shall limit ourselves to clearing away some of the first obstacles that prevent us from tentatively assuming the 'vision' expressed in the Leninist theory of reflection. The greatest of these obstacles we can do nothing about – except, perhaps, to recognise it for what it is, namely, the fact that we naturally approach any theory from the standpoint of non-Marxist traditions in Western philosophy, specifically, those which connect with Descartes' decision to use consciousness instead of nature as the ultimate starting-place for philosophic inquiry. Marx, Engels, and Lenin have made precisely the opposite decision. It is therefore extremely difficult for us to share their epistemological view sympathetically and especially not to regard its basic simplicity as merely simple-mindedness. There is another barrier, however, that we can and should remove: that erected by the mistaken or one-sided readings of MEC promulgated by some leading non-Marxist commentators on Soviet philosophy.

Making the second obstacle our initial concern, we may take as a case

in point the voluminous work *Philosophy and Ideology* by Z.A. Jordan, published in 1963 under the direction of J.M. Bocheński's Institute of East-European Studies at the University of Fribourg. This seemingly authoritative though explicitly anti-Marxist account of the struggle between Marxism and non-Marxism in Poland devotes considerable space to an exposition and refutation of Lenin's theory of knowledge as expressed in MEC. We shall not review here Jordan's full treatment of Lenin, but we will note the basis for Jordan's rejecting the central thesis of Lenin's theory of reflection, namely, that sensations and ideas approximately reflect objective reality. In brief, what Jordan does is to interpret Lenin's term 'reflection' as meaning 'mirror-reflection' and then to argue that we could never know if our ideas and sensations are ever mirror-images of things outside us. This is a common approach of critics of Lenin.[3] We will first establish the fact that Jordan does indeed make this interpretation of Lenin and then we shall show that though it applies to isolated passages in MEC, there are other passages and positions in MEC which present a very different view of 'reflection'.

In discussing Jordan's interpretation of Lenin's intentions, we should first note that it is often difficult to tell whether Jordan is reporting what Lenin actually intended to say or what Lenin said 'in effect'. Examples are Jordan's declarations that "a Marxist-Leninist materialist has to reject any limitations on the likeness or similarity or coincidence of knowledge and reality"[4], and that according to Lenin's 'naive realistic view' of epistemology, "the bits and pieces of matter given us in sensation comprise the sensed colours, smells, flavours, and so forth, as their qualities".[5] Probably these interpretations are Jordan's attempts to reduce to absurdity Lenin's basic thesis that consciousness reflects objective reality, but they also might be read as stating positions actually derived by Lenin from his conceiving ideas and sensations to be 'mirror-reflections'. There is no doubt, however, that at least Jordan ascribes this conception of 'mirror-reflections' to Lenin. He cites Lenin's own words to describe sensations and concepts, viz., "copies, photographs, images, mirror-reflections of things"[6]; he repeatedly refers to "sensations conceived as mirror-like reflections of objects"[7]; and he treats Adam Schaff's metaphorical interpretation of 'reflection' as a 'revision' of Lenin's "original theory of perception".[8] But the strongest evidence that Jordan regards Lenin's use of the words 'image', 'photograph', and 'mirror-reflection'

literally rather than metaphorically, is his previously noted argument that if Lenin's "copy theory is right, we perceive only images or copies of things and never the things themselves" and are therefore in no position to determine whether the copies are faithful to their originals.[9]

What justification is there for this interpretation of Lenin? Does he indeed always mean by the 'reflection' of an object in perception something closely analogous to the reflection of an object in a mirror? And if on occasions he did use 'reflection' in this way, is understanding that usage the key to understanding and judging Lenin's theory of reflection as a whole? Certainly there are many passages in MEC which appear to justify Jordan's interpretation, if not the importance Jordan places upon it. As Jordan pointed out, a Soviet-approved English translation of MEC has Lenin explicitly referring to perceptions as 'mirror-reflections of things' and as 'photographs'.[10] These references, however, do not decide the question. In the first place, Jordan is simply wrong in regarding the translated expression 'mirror-reflections' as a term Lenin always intended to be taken literally. In the passage where it occurs, Lenin is reporting Engels' words, and early in the book, Lenin criticises Chernov for making that very translation and interpretation of Engels' term *Spiegelbild*:

> Mr. V. Chernov translates the word *Spiegelbild* literally (a mirror reflection), accusing Plekhanov of presenting the theory of Engels "*in a very weakened form*" by speaking in Russian simply of a 'reflection' instead of a 'mirror reflection'. This is mere cavilling. *Spiegelbild* in German is also used simply in the sense of Abbild.[11]

Lenin adds this footnote as a justification for translating *Spiegelbild* merely as 'reflection' in quoting Engels' formulation of the 'basic philosophical question', namely, "Are we able in our ideas and notions of the real world, to produce a correct reflection of reality?"[12] The most we can conclude, therefore, from the occurrence of 'mirror-reflection' in the passage cited by Jordan is that Lenin nodded; a more likely explanation is that ambiguities obscured the translating of German through Russian into English.

The previously cited footnote clearly indicates that Lenin does not intend us to interpret 'reflection' literally whenever he uses the term – and that restriction would seem also to apply to appositives for this term such as 'photograph', 'copy', and 'image'. Elsewhere he declares explicitly that 'it is beyond doubt that an image cannot wholly resemble the model'[13],

and in his descriptions of how natural science explains the sensations of colours, he has a practical awareness of the difference between them and the 'ether vibrations' he says they 'reflect'.[14] He also declares his agreement with Feuerbach's argument that sensations cannot constitute the objects sensed since there are sensations caused by objects, which sensations do not correspond to objective properties, the taste of saltiness, for example, not being an objective property of salt.[15] As applied to sensations, the words 'reflection', 'image', etc., are thus not performing here as they do when applied to mirrors and cameras.

But if we have difficulty thinking of sensations as light reflections, how much more difficult it is to think in this way of ideas, theories, and the mind in general! Yet Lenin says materialism holds that "sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man generally, is regarded as an image of objective reality"[16]; he declares that "the recognition of theory as a copy, as an approximate copy of objective reality, is materialism"[17]; and these propositions are repeated throughout MEC. Furthermore, in Marxist literature generally, one finds the word 'reflect' used to express social, economic, and technological relations of the profoundest generality which for Marxists are so far from being explicable in terms of cameras and mirrors, that if one were to attempt such explication he would be immediately censured by the Marxists for 'mechanical materialism'.

Not only, however, does Lenin not in fact always intend the literal meaning of 'reflection' Jordan imputes to him; he is forbidden from using the word in that way by the very nature of materialism. What would follow, for example, from arguing that man's ideas of purpose, law, and order reflect closely corresponding counter-parts in nature? This would concede a crucial premise in the argument from design and thus prepare the way for fideism, the mortal enemy of materialism. To prevent that possibility, Lenin quotes Feuerbach who, in *Essence of Religion*, argues that

> ... nature may be conceived only through nature itself, that its necessity is neither human nor logical, neither metaphysical nor mathematical, that nature alone is the being to which it is impossible to apply any human measure, although we compare and give names to its phenomena, in order to make them comprehensible to us, and in general apply human expressions and conceptions to them, as for example: order, purpose, law; and are obliged to do so because of the character of our language.

In defending this passage against a critic, Feuerbach, again supported by Lenin, explains that he is not asserting "that there is actually nothing in nature corresponding to the words or ideas of order, purpose, law"; these words have 'objective content', but "a distinction must be made between the original and the translation. Order, purpose, law in the human sense express something arbitrary', and applied to nature in this human sense enable the theists to make their case for a divine creator.[18]

The doctrine of historical materialism would also be threatened by a literal interpretation of 'reflection'. As Lenin points out, an axiom of this doctrine is Marx's teaching that "social consciousness reflects social being". But if 'reflects' is interpreted to mean 'strictly corresponds to' then a Marxist would obviously have grave difficulties in identifying social ideas that economic-technological conditions require to be changed (such ideas would have to be forms of non-consciousness). The Marxist-Machian Bogdanov advanced just such an interpretation in its strongest form, viz.: "*Social being and social consciousness are, in the exact meaning of these terms, identical.*"[19] Lenin strongly objects:

> A reflection may be an approximately true copy of the reflected, but to speak of identity is absurd. Consciousness in general *reflects* being – that is a general principle of *all* materialism. It is impossible not to see its direct and *inseparable* connection with the principle of historical materialism: social consciousness *reflects* social being.[20]

Lenin further points out that a similar thesis provides the basis for the 'reactionary' immanentist Schubert-Soldern's attempts to refute Marx.[21]

Indeed, the whole basis of materialist epistemology is denied when one asserts the equivalence of perception and thing perceived. In fact, a central purpose of MEC is to make Russian Machian-Marxists who were asserting that equivalence, aware of just this consequence. Lenin repeatedly declares that Bazarov's formula, "sense perception *is* the reality outside us", leads to subjective idealism and impotency in the face of fideism and political reaction.[22]

We might record here a further set of limitations on the degree of correspondence suggested by the term 'reflection' in Lenin's system. For Marx, Engels, and Lenin – as indeed, also for Kant – the character of objective reality is such that man's organs of sensation and thought are able to apprehend it only partially and knowledge of it advances by degree of disclosure rather than by accumulation of fixed, absolute truths. At

stake here is the question of the dialectical relations between 'absolute' and 'relative' knowledge, and consideration of this subtle issue is best left for a later study. We should note, however, two particular comments of Lenin relevant to the problem of the limits of human understanding. Summarizing Engels' views on causality, Lenin says that "the human conception of cause and effect always somewhat simplifies the objective connection of the phenomena of nature, reflecting it only approximately, artificially isolating one or another aspect of a single world process".[23] Lenin also stresses the inadequacy of man's cognitive faculties in this description of dialectical materialism:

> But dialectical materialism insists on the approximate, relative character of every scientific theory of the structure of matter and its properties; it insists on the absence of absolute boundaries in nature, on the transformation of moving matter from one state into another, which is to us apparently irreconcilable with it, and so forth.

However 'strange', 'bizarre', 'extraordinary' the new discoveries of science may sound to us, "all this is but another *corroboration* of dialectical materialism".[24] How far we are now from the notion of consciousness as a 'mirror-reflection' of being! Here he is clearly suggesting that there is not a mechanical correspondence between consciousness and being, but what Marxists would call a 'contradiction'. And consider the terms used to describe Marxist dialectics or the 'laws of thought': 'unity of opposites' and 'contradiction' normally signify what the mind cannot accept as truth, but Marxist-Hegelian dialectics deliberately shocks our normal expectations by using these terms to describe what we *must* accept as truth. At the deeper levels of Marxist thought, the paradigm of the relation held to exist between consciousness and being is obviously much more like a paradox than a mirror-reflection; if we insist on the latter, then we must think of a mirror which somehow opposes, 'contradicts', or even conflicts with its object; which gives non-visual as well as visual pictures that are effects qualitatively distinct from its causes; and which nevertheless in principle provide 'approximately' faithful reproductions, though the mirror knows it can never do a perfect job. The comparison is obviously absurd. Using it, Jordan has no trouble dispensing with Lenin, but he is hardly doing justice to Lenin's intentions.

Here Jordan might reply that he could not do justice to Lenin's theory of reflection because the theory simply cannot be made intelligible by way

of any literal or analogical interpretation of its leading terms. Assuming that this is the situation, what does it mean? It could signify, of course, that the theory is nonsense. But just as syntax can create meaning out of words which individually are extremely vague and ambiguous, so a theory can create meaning out of terms and statements which in isolation are impossible to translate with fixed senses. Similarly, the meaning of the theory itself may not emerge until we see its relations with other theoretical positions and assumptions. Thus, before we give up Lenin's epistemology as a hopeless botch, we should try to see whether Lenin has provided a context which makes sense of his theory of reflection and hence of its terms. As we indicated earlier, the total context of the theory of reflection can be constructed only after we understand the uses to which the theory has been put in deriving solutions to philosophical problems and especially in criticising 'positivism'. There is one position, however, that is logically prior to all the other principles of Marxism-Leninism; that one can come to understand without becoming involved in the ever-widening circularity of dialectical thought; and that directly opens the basic Marxist perspective expressed in the theory of reflection. This is Lenin's statement that "materialism deliberately makes the 'naive' belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge"[25], 'naive belief' being characterized by Lenin as "the instinctive, unconscious materialist standpoint adopted by humanity, which regards the external world as existing independently of our minds".[26]

How shall we open a way to grasp what Lenin is designating here? Immediately there is a difficulty: if the belief is 'instinctive' and 'unconscious', how can we experience it 'consciously' as such? Yet this would seem what we have to do in considering it philosophically. The difficulty suggests an important distinction: in exhibiting 'naive belief', we can talk (1) *as* naive believers, or (2) *about* them. The difference is epistemologically crucial. The sentence, 'I see a table there', when spoken from standpoint (1), implies 'A table *is* there'; and that makes it pointless to ask whether a table *is* there. On the other hand, the sentence 'I see a table there', when examined from standpoint (2), can be questioned in many ways, including the questioning of the implication that the table exists. Thus when taking standpoint (1), we would say that in speaking this sentence we are asserting, not questioning the existence of a table; that our experience is not *of* an 'experience', but is rather a revelation of

something *there*; that we are not sensing an 'image' or a 'sensation', but a *table*, etc. When assuming standpoint (2), we cannot take these protests made from standpoint (1) seriously if we are to pursue the questions that give standpoint (2) its significance. The tendency of these two standpoints to vitiate each other's questions and claims might be characterized in Marxist-Hegelian terms as a basic 'contradiction' in the cognitive process.

The remainder of this study will be limited to a consideration of Lenin's attempts to exhibit naive belief from the standpoint of the believer, i.e., from standpoint (1). The statements he makes from standpoint (2) include his descriptions of 'image', 'matter', 'object', and 'necessity'; his doctrine of 'practice' as the criterion of true belief; his criticism of idealism; and the exposition of the 'laws' of thought or 'dialectics'. Space demands that we avoid these matters. We cannot, however, altogether isolate ourselves from the statements Lenin makes from standpoint (2) for he nearly always exhibits naive belief by talking *about* it, even though what he has in mind is naive belief as it is experienced by the believer. This is perhaps excusable. To exhibit naive belief as a naive believer precludes critical examination of that belief as a cognitive process, but in discussing the 'theory of knowledge', Lenin obviously must undertake such examination. The result, however, is that Lenin naturally tends to present statements which are sound when made from standpoint (1) in the language appropriate for statements made from standpoint (2), and so involves his presentations in the tendency described above for these standpoints to vitiate each other's claims. Another excuse for Lenin, of course, is that the careful use of language required to control this tendency would be out of place in MEC which is primarily a rhetorical work.

Recognizing then the possibly distorting effect of Lenin's reflective, theory-oriented language, we turn to his attempts to exhibit naive belief as it is experienced by the naive believer. These we find, naturally enough, in his discussion of 'experience'.

None of the basic controversies in philosophy can be settled, declares Lenin, through appeal to the ambiguous term, 'experience'. That was obvious to Engels who "*was well aware* that the idealist Berkeley, the agnostic Hume and the materialist Diderot all had recourse to experience".[27] Lenin tries to show how the Machians have exploited the ambiguities of the word by invoking its materialist connotations when the idealist and agnostic (sceptical) positions they derive from its subjective

connotations lead to solipsism and absurdity. To be a decisive criterion, experience must be characterized, but then we find that "the various definitions' of this concept are only expressions of those two fundamental lines in philosophy [idealism and materialism] which were so strikingly revealed by Engels".[28]

Lenin cites Norman Smith's analysis of a particularly significant Machian equivocation on the word 'experience'. Avenarius uses the term one time to mean 'experiencing' and another to mean 'the experienced', and by concealing the difference, he is able to argue that since 'experience' is the basis of knowledge, there must be an "'indissoluble' connection between subject and object", and hence that we can have no knowledge of an objective reality which is independent of the mind.[29] Smith points out that this is "the time-worn argument of subjective idealism, that thought and reality are inseparable, because reality can only be conceived in thought, and thought involves the presence of the thinker".[30] Smith and Lenin thus recognize that there is a crucial distinction to be made when we ask what a man experiences: if we ask *him*, he will refer to 'the experienced', i.e., an object; if we ask someone *contemplating* him, the answer may be that the man experiences 'experiencing', e.g., having sensation, entertaining images, 'thinking' that he sees something, etc. The answer to the first question made from the standpoint of the experiencer or the naive believer constitutes for Lenin the essential characteristic of experience as the source of existential knowledge. This is what he calls the 'human sense of the term' as opposed to the 'Machian sense'. To it he attributes not only "the conviction that *independently* of us there exist other people, and not mere complexes of my sensations of high, short, yellow, hard, etc.", but also "the conviction that things, the world, the environment exist independently of us".[31] And conviction is taken here as a sign of realization, not merely a subjective state such as a feeling of certainty.

The first sort of 'conviction' referred to, Lenin probably would specifically ascribe to sense-experience. Lenin reserves the word 'given' to indicate the manner in which through sensation objects are revealed to men as being there, at hand, ready for use, etc. Whenever he speaks of objects as 'given' in sensation, he is always asserting their unquestionable external existence, trying to speak, as we have previously stated, *as* a naive believer (though usually in language more appropriate to standpoint (2)).

When he speaks of objects as 'reflected' in sensation, he is also asserting their existence but the assertion is frequently an *answer*, i.e., a result of having entertained for a moment the questionability of that existence. The use of 'given', in other words, always indicates that Lenin is trying to designate what sensation means to the naive believer; the use of 'reflect' indicates that Lenin is either assuming standpoint (2) and talking *about* naive belief, and/or describing what a man experiences *as* a naive believer, especially when Lenin refers to concepts derived from sensation and therefore 'reflecting' reality, as for example in the phrase "objective reality is given to us in our sensation and reflected in our theories".[32]

The second sort of 'conviction' mentioned by Lenin would have to refer, of course, not to sense-experience but to the experience of conceptual thinking just alluded to, i.e., that of a naive believer using concepts derived from sensation – 'given' things and therefore known as representing (though not pointing to) external reality. Exactly how the naive believer moves from the sensation – awareness of particular, external objects to the awareness of an independent 'world' and 'environment' is not considered directly by Lenin. In his treatment of space and time, however, he suggests that the independent reality of space and time is part of the very meaning of existence, that we cannot say, for example, 'a table is there now' without admitting these general continua.[33] In a similar fashion, Lenin might have argued that we know the existence of 'world' or 'environment' simply as that in which particular objects are 'given' to sensation; this would avoid the difficulties of justifying as an inductive generalization the thesis that the world exists.

The few specific characterizations of experience Lenin offers mainly concern sensation. It is experience as sensation that he has in mind when he approvingly cites the French positivist Rey as follows:

> ... experience is that over which our mind has no command, that which our desires, our volition, cannot control, that which is given and which is not of our own making. Experience is the object that faces the subject.

Lenin restates and underlines Rey's expression, "*Experience is the object*".[34] Lenin also tries to clarify what he means by 'immediately given' or 'factually given' in experience by sorting out the ambiguities of these expressions as follows:

> For the materialist the 'factually given' is the outer world, the image of which is our sensations. For the idealist the 'factually given' is sensation, and the outer

world is declared to be 'a complex of sensations'. For the agnostic the 'immediately given' is also sensation, but the agnostic does not go on either to the materialist recognition of the outer world, or to the idealist recognition of the world as our sensation.[35]

There also may be agreement even between the subjective idealist and the materialist that "the first premise of the theory of knowledge undoubtedly is that the sole source of our knowledge is sensation". But once again differences of interpretation create the division of philosophical 'lines':

Starting from sensations, one may follow the line of subjectivism, which leads to solipsism ('bodies are complexes or combinations of sensations'), or the line of objectivism, which leads to materialism (sensations are images of objects, of the external world). For the first point of view, i.e., agnosticism, or, pushed a little further, subjective idealism, there can be no objective truth. For the second point of view, i.e., materialism, the recognition of objective truth is essential.[36]

In making such characterizations, Lenin at times confuses the reader as to his actual intentions. The confusion is largely due to the difficulty we noted of maintaining the distinction between statements made from the standpoint of the naive believer and those made from the standpoint of one who discusses the naive believer. The next sentence of the passage just quoted, for example, refers to materialism as one of "the two possible deductions from the premises of empiricism and sensationalism"; this suggests that men arrive at their belief in the existence of an external world through inference, but that is precisely the thesis Lenin must deny if he is to make the 'naive belief of mankind' the 'foundation' of his theory of knowledge. Materialism as a 'deduction' in Lenin's system can only consistently refer to doctrines which use the naive believer's basic convictions as axioms. A similar confusion occurs in Lenin's statement that "the transformation of the energy of external excitation into a state of consciousness ... has been, and is, observed by each of us a million times on every hand".[37] No one, of course, has ever seen any such thing; but this statement may be a true *interpretation* of what we frequently see; i.e., the statement may be true from the standpoint of someone talking about experiencers rather than as an experiencer. The most serious confusion on this score, however, arises from Lenin's use of the term 'image'. He will frequently imply that men see 'images' when he means 'objects'.

Indeed, there are passages in MEC which are so badly confused by this implication that Jordan's criticisms can be applied to them with full justice; whether they can also be applied to Lenin's theory of reflection as a whole, however, is quite another matter.[38]

Finally, we may note that Lenin's characterizations of sensation are nearly always presented in contrast to those typical of idealist or agnostic trends. The specific reason for this is Lenin's need to 'straighten out' some of his comrades who have been attempting to incorporate Machism into Marxism. Marxist-Leninists, however, tend to develop any philosophical issue within the context of polemical dialectics and one of the strongest arguments for a position they offer is that its denial supports the historical development or tendency of idealism – or the half-way house to idealism, 'agnosticism'. For someone who simply wants to understand the nature of the 'correct' position, the problem, then, is often to proceed from an understanding of what is described as the opposing, idealist-oriented position. Such is the case presented in the following statement:

> The sophism of idealist philosophy consists in the fact that it regards sensation as being not the connection between consciousness and the external world, but as a fence, a wall, separating consciousness from the external world – not as an image of the external phenomenon corresponding to the sensation, but as the 'sole entity'.[39]

Analysis of this sentence shows it would be a mistake to ask here whether the 'connection' provided by sensation denotes literally or metaphorically a physical linkage, a sequence of cause and effect, a mirror medium, etc. For here, the main function of 'connection' is not to *denote* anything, but to *deny* the idealist thesis that sensation separates consciousness from the external world in such a way that consciousness becomes the only being or existent that can be known – a thesis which can lead, of course, to fideism, a threat to the whole Marxist program.

An example of how criticism of idealism indirectly affords insight into Lenin's concept of sensation as experience is a passage from Feuerbach cited with strong approval by Lenin. Considering it, we gain sharper appreciation of the standpoint of the naive believer in which experience is experienced not as reaction *to* but revelation *of* external objects. Feuerbach's passage is directed against the idealist Fichte. Feuerbach declares that Fichte displays "the fundamental defect of idealism: it asks and answers the question of objectivity and subjectivity, of the reality or

unreality of the world, only from the standpoint of theory", and the 'standpoint of theory' of course would include what earlier we termed 'standpoint (2)', i.e., the standpoint from which one talks *about* naive belief. Materialism, says Feuerbach, approaches epistemology from the standpoint of practice; it "makes the sum-total of human practice the basis of the theory of knowledge". This sum-total is the full range of what Lenin called 'experience' in the 'human sense', in which 'objective reality is given in sensation and reflected in theories." Feuerbach's concept of the 'standpoint of practice' characterizes the standpoint of the naive believer (what we termed 'standpoint (1)'). 'Practice' emphasizes the fact that the naive believer *lives* in the external world he perceives; Feuerbach declares that the idealists, in refusing to "recognize the reality of the *I* and *Thou* in practical life," maintain "speculation which contradicts life, which makes the standpoint of death, of a soul separated from the body, the standpoint of truth". Feuerbach gives a vivid illustration of the difference: for a consistent idealist, no distinction could be made between his sensations of orgasm in intercourse and orgasm in masturbation, for to identify subjective sensation with the objective world "is to identify pollution with procreation".[40]

Throughout all these characterizations of experience as it is experienced, i.e., as naive belief, we see that the emphasis is always on its existential reference. And the existence referred to is always external, independent of desires and perceptions, setting the conditions for life and action. An interesting example of how Lenin uses this interpretation of 'experience' is found in his argument against Avenarius' attempt to explain the fact that the earth existed before man. Committed to the thesis that an object cannot exist independently of our consciousness, Avenarius declares, according to Lenin, that we nevertheless apprehend the prior existence of the world by 'mentally projecting' ourselves as spectators looking upon an earth devoid of mankind.[41] Lenin replies as follows:

> If we 'mentally project' ourselves, our presence will be *imaginary* – but the existence of the earth prior to man is *real*. Man *could not* in practice be an observer, for instance, of the earth in an incandescent state, and to 'imagine' his being present at the time is *obscurantism*, exactly as though I were to endeavour to prove the existence of hell by the argument that if I 'mentally projected' myself thither as an observer I could observe hell.[42]

Here the main point is that observation does not confirm statements of

the form '*p* is real' if observation is conceived only in its subjective aspect, i.e., as free of dependence on an externally existing world. Proof of this point is that its denial makes possible the absurd assertion that hell is real. The argument as a whole also suggests that (1) the critical characteristic of 'real' is reference to existence which is entirely independent of mind, (2) knowledge that the world existed *before* man cannot be explained if one holds that we cannot know objects as existing independently of the mind, and (3) the existential reference of knowledge about pre-human history is explicable only as an extension of the existential reference of naive belief.

In concluding our remarks on Lenin's characterizations of direct experience, we may ask whether Lenin offers any evidence for saying that in this experience is revealed an external, independently existing environment. The answer is that he does not. He insists on this fact as an absolute beginning point. He declares that "it is this sole categorical, this sole unconditional recognition of nature's *existence* outside the mind and perceptions of man that distinguishes dialectical materialism from relativist agnosticism and idealism".[43] Since the distinguishing mark of dialectical materialism is this 'unconditional recognition,' it is not surprising, then, that Leninists would not think it 'bad' philosophy to argue 'for' dialectical materialism simply by asserting it against rival tendencies, for it is absurd to give reasons to prove what must be accepted without reasons, i.e., unconditionally. And Lenin makes it quite clear that reasoning is not applicable to the issue of whether objects independent of the mind are given in experience. He says that "no proofs, syllogisms, or definitions are capable of refuting the solipsist if he consistently adheres to his view".[44] Referring to Diderot's treatment of this issue, he remarks that Diderot "came very close to the standpoint of contemporary materialism (that arguments and syllogisms alone do not suffice to refute idealism, and that here it is not a question for theoretical argument)".[45] And Lenin cites Engels' answer to Hume's sceptical argument:

> Now, this line of reasoning seems undoubtedly hard to beat by mere argumentation. But before there was argumentation there was action. *Im Anfang war die Tat.* And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it.[46]

Such a position may of course be called 'dogmatic'. If 'dogma' connotes a proposition or propositions held to be unquestionably true, then here

the term is correctly applied. But what is the source of the unquestionability Engels and Lenin ascribe to the propositions that there is an external world, that it exists independently of man's will, etc.? It is a standpoint or perspective, specifically the standpoint of the naive believer. Upon taking that view, we clearly would say that those propositions are unquestionable; or if one argues that we would not do so, he would still have to appeal ultimately to some other empirical principles held 'dogmatically'. The only alternative would seem to be to question whether we *should* take the view of the naive believer, and appeal to 'dogma' is not necessary here since one may find it unnecessary or even impossible to settle that question on the basis of propositions or evidence. The possibility of this alternative suggests the real issue: what is at stake is the choice of an action, namely, the action of taking a certain perspective, and this choice, not being a proposition or a statement, cannot be derived from propositions or statements. It would therefore seem more accurate to say that Lenin's fundamental absolutism is due to what Santayana would call an act of faith (in the most general sense of 'faith') rather than to simple acceptance of dogma. One significant difference between the two is that an act of faith, though not derivable from inductive or deductive reason, can be shown to be highly reasonable or practical, whereas dogma cannot. Finally, we might note here that Lenin at one point comes very close to recognizing the key role of active faith in his epistemology. Stating the epistemological premises on which Engels bases his views on freedom as control of necessity, Lenin closes his comments by noting that Engels develops these views by using "the *salto vitale* method in philosophy"; i.e., "he makes a *leap* from theory to practice". Lenin declares sarcastically that this would be "disgraceful for a devotee of 'pure science'"; for professional philosophers who think that "the theory of knowledge ... demands the cunning concoction of definitions", and that 'practice' is another thing altogether.[47]

Here a further comment on Jordan is in order. Jordan reads Lenin's treatment of perception as if it were an attempt to justify a theory. He recognizes that in formulating the copy 'theory' of perception, Lenin is primarily concerned with defending materialist 'metaphysics' from phenomenalist criticism and with 'the refutation of idealist theories of knowledge', but Jordan does not add that the audience to be persuaded consists of contemporary Russian Marxists and that consequently the sort of

arguments Lenin requires are not at all like those needed to convince the general public.[48] One reason for Jordan's interpretation may be that he thought Lenin *should* have offered generally acceptable justifications for his position. "The chief aim of the materialist theory of knowledge", says Jordan, "is to provide a rational justification of the belief in the existence of the external world," and Jordan's analysis is designed to test whether Lenin and his followers have achieved this aim.[49] Arguing that the 'existence of material objects' cannot be derived as 'a logically valid conclusion' from the premises supplied by the copy theory of perception, Jordan concludes that "the basic statement of the materialist theory of knowledge that the 'human mind reflects an objectively real external world' cannot be considered as satisfactorily proven beyond any reasonable doubt."[50] Lenin fails, says Jordan, because he "did not provide any new arguments that would either logically justify the elimination of the transcendence problem or strengthen the validity of the step that bridges the gap between sense-data and objects".[51] These criticisms may or may not be sound. But the impression they convey of Lenin's intentions is that he is in fact trying to make a logical case for an epistemological theory. As we see, that impression is seriously misleading. At times, Jordan makes this interpretation explicit. For example, he says:

> From Lenin's viewpoint the evidence of our senses could not provide a convincing argument to demonstrate the existence of material objects and Lenin was determined to show that the existence of material objects is a demonstrable truth, open to no doubt whatsoever.

Consequently, Jordan continues, Lenin supplemented the copy theory with the "causal theory of perception ... to supply the missing link between mental images and the external world".[52] In concluding his analysis of Lenin's MEC, Jordan says that "if no logical justification is produced, the belief in the existence of physical things is no theory of knowledge but an epistemological dogma", and that "neither the causal nor the copy theory of perception provide the required justification".[53] Again Jordan makes it appear that Lenin was trying to offer 'logical justification'. We see now, however, that the most fundamental Leninist position is that acceptance of objective reality is not an application of logic but the *ground* of it.[54]

Other critics of Marxism who interpret Lenin's theory of reflection as an attempted 'proof' or demonstration would no doubt agree with Jor-

dan's dismissal of Lenin's concept of reflection. Regarding the theory in this fashion, they would apply to it the usual tests for a formally logical argument and quickly find that the possible definitions of its key terms make the argument hopelessly circular and uninformative. On the other hand, if we regard the theory as an expression of the perspective of the naive believer, then we not only do justice to Lenin's better intentions, but we also gain access to the way of seeing, of looking out upon the world which determines how intelligent Marxist-Leninists form and develop their concepts. This access is essential even for those who only wish to show Marxist-Leninists the error of their ways, for though semantic and logical analysis of Marxist philosophy may score easy victories in debate, it will not affect Marxists unless combined with an apprehension of what Marxist statements are expressing, not just logically designating.[55]

We may best conclude this study by suggesting some further work that might be done to clear a way for dialogue with Marxist-Leninist philosophers. The next step would be to clarify the possible significance of the naive perspective both for humanity in general and for Marxist-Leninist philosophy. It should not be difficult to argue its significance for mankind in a Marxist fashion, namely, that the standpoint of naive realism is not only essential for life, but also for the development of science and the sophistication of criteria, the historical possibility of both depending on the ability of naive experience to recognize its contradictions and to adjust itself accordingly. Marxist philosophy could then be interpreted as a formal expression of this significance.[56] Considered as statements about naive belief made by naive believers, the key doctrines of Marxist-Leninist epistemology would consequently have an intelligible content, in contrast to the way they are now represented as philosophical vagaries by non-Marxists trying to reduce them to logical propositions or observation reports. The Marxist-Leninist notion of 'necessity', for example, could be seen not as designating some physical or logical 'connection', but rather as expressing the ordinary man's knowledge that he *must* do something other than wish if he is to make things for his use; and when Marxist-Leninists add that this necessity is 'objective', we could interpret them to mean that the 'must', the 'either do this or fail', is imposed on us not by our minds but by what we find out there, in the world antedating and determining our existence – again a perfectly clear expression of naive experience.

Study of contemporary Soviet philosophy could also suggest the explanatory power of a naive realism conceptualized as a self-correcting, self-developing dialectical process. The work of V.S. Tiukhtin, for example, provides rigorous cybernetic interpretations for some uses of 'reflection' and shows that cybernetics would have been impossible if Lenin's theory of reflection had not been sound.[57] Distinguishing and interrelating various 'levels' of 'reflection', D.P. Gorski effectively traces the constants of formal logic back to ordinary language and thence to the naive experience of objective reality which that language expresses;[58] and I.S. Narskii, also employing 'reflection' as a dialectical concept, offers attractive solutions for paradoxes involving the concepts of 'existence' and 'truth' in modern logical analysis.[59] One might also predict that the increasing concern of Marxists with morality and alienation will lead them to see that what generates Marxist epistemology – the acceptance and development of the standpoint of the naive believer – could also provide the basic commitment for a systematic Marxist ethics. Marxism-Leninism might then be represented as a highly integrated, rational elaboration of faith in and of the common people.

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[3] Cf. G.A. Paul, 'Lenin's Theory of Perception', in *Philosophy and Analysis* ed. by Margaret Macdonald), New York, 1954.

[4] Z. Jordan, *Philosophy and Ideology*, Dordrecht 1963, p. 229.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 328.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 326.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 330.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 331.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 327, 330, 333.

[10] V.I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, New York 1927, p. 237.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 96 (footnote).

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 240.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 311–12, 48.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 116.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 274.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 272.
[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 153–55.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 334.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 335.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 335–36.
[22] *Ibid.*
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 156.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 268.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 63.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 54.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 110.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 150.
[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 64–66.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 63.
[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 312–13.
[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 176–79.
[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 302–03.
[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 108–09.
[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 124–25.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 44.
[38] The sharpest examples of statements in MEC that assert cognition to be a mechanical mirroring of 'objects' in 'images' occur in the 'Supplement' to the fourth chapter. There Lenin roundly declares that "the forms of our sense-perception do resemble the forms of the actual – i.e., objectively-real – existence of objects", that "objects ... *really* exist and are *fully* knowable to us, knowable in their existence, their qualities and the real relations between them", and that "the laws of thought reflect the forms of actual existence of objects, fully resemble, and do not differ from, these forms" (*Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, pp. 372–374). Though not mentioned by Jordan, these passages are certainly fair game for his objections. These theses are sharply criticised by the Soviet philosopher Arnost Kolman in 'Considerations about the Certainty of Knowledge', *Occasional Papers*, No. 2, American Institute of Marxist Studies, New York, 1965, pp. 10–11.
[39] *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, p. 44.
[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 141–42.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 71.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 72.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 269.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 274.
[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 106.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 192.
[48] Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 326.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 321.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 332.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 333.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 335.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 339.
[54] See the genetic accounts of formal logic offered by the contemporary Soviet philosophers P.V. Tavanets, 'Formal Logic and Philosophy', *Soviet Studies in Philosophy*, II (Summer-Fall, 1963), 3–9; and D.P. Gorskii, 'Formal Logic and Language', *ibid.*, 49–68.
[55] In current Soviet writing, the expression 'naive realism' signifies the Machian, neopositivist trends that identify objects with sense-data; as we use the term, of course, 'naive realism' would imply that objects are only approximately reflected in sense-data. See G. Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, London 1958, p. 315, fn. 5.
[56] Following are examples of interpretations which deal only summarily or negatively with the perspective of naive belief that is the beginning point of Marxism-Leninism: Thomas J. Blakeley, *Soviet Theory of Knowledge*, Dordrecht 1964 [Lenin's view of 'naive belief' as the 'foundation' of Marxism is not even mentioned here]; Gustav A. Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, London 1958, pp. 515–516; and J.M. Bocheński, *Soviet Russian Dialectical Materialism*, Dordrecht 1963, pp. 69–74, 80, 108–117.
[57] 'On the Process of Reflecting Reality in Cognition', *Soviet Studies in Philosophy*, I (Fall, 1962), 45–53; and 'How Reality Can Be Reflected in Cognition: Reflection as a Property of All Matter', *SSP*, III (Summer, 1964), 3–12.
[58] 'Formal Logic and Language', *SSP*, II (Summer-Fall, 1963), 49–68.
[59] 'Formal Logic: Logical Positivism and the Concept of "Existence"', *SSP*, II (Summer-Fall, 1963), 30–48; and 'On the Conception of Truth', *Mind*, LXXIV (October 1965), 530–39.

JOSEPH SCHIEBEL

CHANGING THE UNCHANGEABLE

Historical Materialism and Six Versions of Eternal Laws of Historical Development

I. THE LAWS OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM

Marxist philosophy as formulated in the Soviet-Union appears to claim that it is correct and that all other philosophies are false because its ideas, having been derived from practice, reflect reality and because its premises, having been confirmed by practice, constitute objective truth.[1]

A number of dogmatic statements make it clear that historical materialism is considered an integral and necessary element of Soviet philosophy[2], however reluctant one may be to accept historiographic and sociological generalizations as appropriate subjects for philosophical inquiry. According to Soviet philosophy, matter is a philosophical category which stands for the objective reality which exists independent of man.[3] Matter is in motion since there can be neither matter without movement nor movement without matter.[4] Human society is a part of the material world in which the laws and categories of dialectical materialism are valid.[5] In addition to having stated that the world is a whole in which the individual parts, processes and phenomena are mutually connected[6], Soviet philosophy maintains that there are laws which determine the necessary relationship between things, phenomena, and processes.[7]

Historical materialism, it is maintained, resulted from the laws of the development of society and of scientific and philosophic thought[8], the laws of social development being objective laws.[9] Both the statement that the development of matter and of society proceeds according to objective laws, and that these laws represent the objective truth (because they are based on scientifically verified knowledge of the past[10]) belong to the class of absolutely true statements which are said to exist in every field of scientific cognition, and which cannot be nullified by the further course of science and practice.[11] This is made quite clear in the statement

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which rejects the notion that human knowledge is in possession of only a very few absolute truths which are confined to trivialities and asserts that "in actual fact, human knowledge contains a profusion of extremely important, absolutely true propositions which the further progress of scientific investigation will not modify".[12] One such proposition is the dogmatic assertion that "the development of society is a process governed by laws", and that "a law determines the general direction of movement necessarily ensuing from other objective conditions".[13] Another is the proposition that mankind as a whole has passed through four successive formations – primitive communal, slave, feudal, and capitalist – and is now living in the epoch of the transition to the next formation, the Communist formation, the first phase of which is called socialism.[14] It is this kind of absolute truth which enables the Marxist-Leninist to apply the collective scientific labor of mankind to the continuous study of relative, i.e. incomplete, truths with the certain prospect of eventually making concrete all absolute truth, a prospect which is accepted *a priori* as a reality.

Since Soviet philosophy bases itself on the dogmatic assertion of certain absolutely true propositions regarding the historical development of human society, and since it dogmatically asserts that the basic propositions of philosophy, dialectical materialism, and historical materialism are necessarily interrelated, the question arises of what the effect must be on Soviet philosophy as a system of thought if even one of the absolutely true laws of historical development which serve as premises for scientific philosophical investigation is proven to be false.

Against this philosophical background, I propose to show that the proposition that all human society has developed in a generally progressive direction through four objective formations is false, and that it has been shown to be false by Marxist scholars themselves. I propose also to show that the proposition, now advanced as absolutely true, that objective laws determine the historical development of human society is at best a relative truth, lacking final scientific confirmation, by documenting the fact that there are presently on the Marxist books several relative and mutually exclusive variants of supposedly unchangeable and absolute propositions. Inasmuch as the dogmatic basic propositions of Soviet philosophy serve as premises for conclusions in every field of scientific investigation, I propose to submit for consideration the implication for the

system as a whole of the fact that at least two of these premises are demonstrably false.

II. THE VULGAR MARXIST VERSION OF THE UNILINEAR HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN SOCIETY

When Marx and Engels first proclaimed the theory of historical materialism from 1845–46 to the spring of 1853 (the period which includes the Communist Manifesto), their scheme resembled the version which has been propounded in official formulations since the early 1830's, and constitutes the official statement as of 1963 (not officially repudiated by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism or the functionaries of the appropriate institute of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences by 1967). This version is the familiar, unilinear (or escalator) scheme of the five basic formations through which all human societies must develop in a necessary and inevitable progression from the lowest to the highest forms.[15]



Fig. 1.

From this proposition are derived the predictions that Communism is the inevitable result of all social development everywhere, the claim that the leadership of the proletariat in all socio-political processes is necessary and justified and the assertion that Marxist philosophy is an exclusive and reliable guide for all thought and action. The establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the October-November Revolution, and

the continued existence of a social system described as socialist are advanced as that supreme test of practice which proves the knowledge obtained by Marxists of the historical process to be absolutely true.[16] That the factual basis for this image of the historical process contradicts this and that the argument for it is neither convincing nor consistent is said to be due to the fact that the concrete knowledge is relative truth because it either reflects the as yet incomplete knowledge of historical events[17] or 'economic laws' which are eternal but historical[18], although the laws themselves are basic propositions (Marx' theory of social formation is the cornerstone of histomat[19]) and as such represent absolute truth.

III. MARX' AND ENGELS' MULTILINEAR SCHEME OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

In the much quoted passage in Marx' 1859 preface to his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*[20], six social formations are mentioned, adding the Asiatic Mode of Production to the familiar five. While at that point Marx merely submitted these as so many progressive epochs, he and Engels had extensively detailed since 1853 the Asiatic mode as a stagnant, non-developmental formation which had its origin not in the class contradictions of a previous social order, but in the ecological need for the large-scale management of irrigation and flood-control works in the great river civilizations of North Africa and Asia. The isolated village structure and the domination of an atomized society by a single ruler supported by a service bureaucracy prevented, in Marx' view, the formation of new powers of production and thus the economic and social classes which alone account for historical movement. Marx believed that only breakdown from without, by capitalist forces, could end this stagnant condition, and would bring these societies into the general line of development.[21]

Marx and Engels, on several occasions, advanced the conclusion that the class antagonisms of slave-holding antiquity did not produce a higher order but that it regressed as a social form, while feudal society emerged from primitive Germanic and Celtic tribal formations.[22]

The full scheme of Marx and Engels then allows for several lines of development among six basic formations, two of which (Asiatic and antique slavery) are non-developmental, while a third (primitive and

communal) allows of three distinct lines of evolution. Only two of the six formations, primitive communal and socialist-communist, are universal, since feudalism is by-passed by the Asiatic societies, antiquity is



Fig. 2.

not experienced by either Asiatic or feudal society, and the bourgeois-capitalist stage can be avoided by those Asiatic societies which respond to conquest and colonization by capitalist states by generating an anti-despotic revolution against their own system of power which, if it triggers a socialist revolution in a capitalist state, will permit them to import socialism directly from the West.[23]

IV. THE PRE-1917 MULTILINEAR SCHEME OF LENIN AND THE RUSSIAN MARXISTS, AND THE PROSPECT AND REALITY OF THE ASIATIC RESTORATION

Marx and Engels, from 1853 on, had identified Russia as a 'semi-Asiatic' society, dominated by an Oriental despotism.[24] This interpretation of Russia's institutional nature was accepted by some populists before 1883[25], and by most Marxists afterwards.[26] Until 1906, Plekhanov and Lenin expressed the conviction of their followers that Russia's institutional order was Asiatic, that Russia's protofeudal institutions had been destroyed through Mongol occupation, Byzantine influence and the development of a bureaucratic-despotic state, that capitalist institutions

were beginning to appear, and that a general anti-autocratic revolution would first remove the institutional checks against full bourgeois-capitalist development, then stimulate socialist revolutions in the West, and finally, enable the Russian proletariat to wage a political struggle which would lead to the eventual socialist revolution when objective conditions were ripe.

From 1905 on, Lenin drew on suggestions advanced by Parvus (Alexander Helphand) and Trotsky that reliance on the Russian bourgeoisie to develop an advanced capitalist order was futile, since its 'Asiatic' background had not prepared it for this role. Instead, a concept of a permanent revolution was advanced according to which the anti-autocratic revolution was immediately to be converted into a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants; power was to be established ahead of bourgeois and socialist transformation.[27]

Lenin proposed to accomplish this coup for power by advocating the nationalization of land and its subsequent use by the tillers, creating the impression that the land would in fact be distributed to the peasants.[28] The political results of this would be an alliance between the weak proletariat and the potentially powerful peasantry or, in more objective terms, the mobilization of mass support for the Bolshevik dictatorship through a fraudulent land-reform program. In 1906, George Plexanov acknowledged that this strategy was feasible but pointed out that a dictatorship of a minority over a population, most of which lived on land owned by the state, would resemble the old Asiatic order in which precisely this factor accounted for the conditions of economic serfdom and political slavery and their perpetuation by the ruling bureaucracy. The executors of this strategy then would gain power, but the consequences would be a reversal of the development toward the separation of a growing 'democratic' society from a disintegrating 'Asiatic' state, and a restoration of the old Asiatic, despotic order.[29] Lenin admitted that objective conditions would necessarily result in a restoration, and advanced two conditions against it. The relative guarantee of a radical democracy (no bureaucracy and no standing army) to keep the new regime responsive to the masses suggested political measures. The absolute guarantee against restoration offered by Lenin consisted of the statement that the Russian anti-autocratic revolution would necessarily trigger a socialist revolution in the West with a socialist state in the West in turn assuring that the new regime

would become socialist in character; and represented a new developmental law. The projected sequence of historical development upheld by Lenin then is shown in Figure 3.



* Revolutions in Russia:
(1) Anti-autocratic revolution establishes dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry;
(2) Anti-autocratic revolution triggers socialist revolution in the West;
(3) Western socialist regime enables the dictatorship in Russia to advance toward Socialism.

Fig. 3.

After the Bolshevik seizure of power, neither the relative nor the absolute guarantees were observed, and the conclusion is at hand that, according to the 'laws' propounded by Lenin, accepted by the movement, and sanctioned by earlier formulations of Marx, a restoration did take place. The new regime, however, not only returned Russia to a social structure resembling the old bureaucratic despotism, but also incorporated features and techniques of dictatorship which grew on West-European political soil and based its claim to unlimited power on a total futuristic commitment to radical transformation derived from enlightened and rationalist assumptions. Thus we deal in the order which emerged from the Bolshevik revolution (and the Communist revolution in China) with a new and different system of total power or, as Professor Wittfogel has

argued, a seventh type of social formation. It must be included in the Marxist-Leninist scheme because Lenin predicted its necessary and lawful appearance in the event that his strategy failed. (See Figure 4.)



Fig. 4.

V. THE 1931 REDUCTION AND THE 1962 RENEWAL. ASIATIC MODE GENERAL AND UNIVERSAL, DEVELOPMENT MULTILINEAR

At a Leningrad Conference on the Asiatic mode of production in 1931[30], an effort was launched to eliminate the concept of Asiatic society from discussion because its implications for the character of the Soviet regime were highly embarrassing, and because the work of advancing the revolution in the so-called backward areas was believed to be enhanced by a return to the unilinear, vulgar scheme of development under which a universal claim to leadership of social revolution everywhere could be made. The reduction of the Marxist-Leninist multilinear scheme was accomplished when, in the 1938 edition of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Marx' 'famous' preface to his *Critique of Political Economy* was reproduced without the sentence listing the Asiatic mode of production, an omission that is maintained in the most recent editions of both the *Osnovy Marksistskoj Filosofii* (1963) and the *Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma* (1959; English translation, 1963). The elimination

of the Asiatic concept itself was reported to have been accomplished by 1950.[31]

From the spring of 1962, there has been a renewal of the discussion of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production, as the Soviet scholars put it[32], or a great debate on this concept, as Western Marxists prefer to describe it.[33] In general, the Western Marxists have tended to postulate Asiatic society as a specific and universal formation, while Soviet scholars have been reluctant to concede it a place in the developmental sequence, though acknowledging its uses as a concrete description of certain variants of a more general formation.

Many inquiries and investigations have been undertaken by the Marxists with respect to such questions as whether or not Asiatic society represents a full social formation, whether or not it is a universal formation, where it belongs in the general sequence of development, and what that sequence of development now is, and many different answers have been and are being advanced by them. There have been some brave attempts to somehow categorize all this enormous confusion and divergence of opinion as investigations to obtain more concrete knowledge (make specific truths less relative) within the general laws (or absolute truths). The renewed discussion has made it quite evident that the unchangeable laws of historical materialism have been found wanting in reliability and that the universality of social development, of its direction and its sequence can simply not be accepted as certain, and cannot serve as fixed premises for a philosophical system.

One of the more ingenious rearrangements of hitherto unchangeable laws has been advanced by the French Marxist M. Godelier, who submits this quasi-progression of seven societies: Primitive communism – Asiatic – Ancient – Slave-holding – German – Feudal – Capitalist. Claiming to have derived this sequence from Marx and Engels, he ascribes to them, in the words of a Soviet commentator on his work, an understanding of Asiatic society as apparently based on great waterworks, as relatively stagnant and unchangeable (a reference no more conclusive than one to a young lady as relatively pregnant), and as a necessary stage between communal society and class society which can be found in a number of specific places.[34] This, of course, is not a very precise description and betrays a considerable lack of confidence in the universal laws maintained by histomat as essential premises of Soviet philosophy. This

uncertainty is also reflected in the discovery, belatedly by the Marxists, that slave societies are so rare that slave-holding antiquity as a primary social formation accounts for too little chronological or geographic territory to be meaningful.

From the multitude of Marxist speculations and formulations, a number of interpretations appear to converge sufficiently to allow the construction of two tentative schedules of developmental laws for the 1960's.

The three most troublesome problems for the Soviet leadership which the weakness of the existing formulations of histomat have posed have to do with the fact that scholarly knowledge of the early history of Europe as well as Asia and Africa renders Marxist definitions of Asiatic, ancient, and even feudal society intellectually ludicrous, that Russia must not be mentioned for fear of exposing, through Marxist criteria, the present regime as a bureaucratic despotism unfit for revolutionary leadership, and that more credible prophecies for the development of present society toward Socialism are needed to retain the continued adherence of the intelligentsia of the so-called backward world caught up in the national liberation wave.

To solve the first problem, the scheme of development from primitive communal to advanced commodity production societies is being reformulated primarily by the Western Marxists to provide additional stages which would better accommodate what is known of early history. This is accomplished by stating that what Marx and Engels *really* meant by Asiatic society was not a typologically different and historically distinct social formation, but a general and universal stage of development from primitive communal to class society which *then* followed a number of alternative pre-capitalist routes. Soviet commentators represent Godelier's scheme somewhat like the form of Figure 5.[35]

VI. VITKIN'S MODEL, REFLECTING POST-MORTEM MARX AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION STRATEGY

From the beginning, Soviet scholars have tended to express reservations about this and similar formulations, while acknowledging the need to discuss them.[36] Their initial point of divergence was the observation that the designation of some or all early societies as typologically Asiatic was problematical in that it often appeared at variance with the facts in one



Fig. 5.

concrete instance or another[37], that a transitional phase, however long, cannot be considered a social formation[38], that Marx had in mind a universal societal category when he spoke of capitalist, feudal and slave-holding modes of production, but that when he spoke of the Asiatic mode of production, he meant merely to describe concretely the workings of different Asiatic and Germanic communes[39], that there was confusion with regard to whether social structure, the mode of production, ownership of property or some other criterion were employed to determine the general character of any social formation.

A number of Soviet scholars thus argue that the concept of Asiatic society simply designates features of a social system which as yet defy classification, and describes either slave-holding societies without the special features of classical antiquity or underdeveloped feudal institutions, insisting that the teachings of Marx on social systems are universal, with only the distinctive peculiarities remaining to be observed within firmly established general regularities.[40]

It was M.A. Vitkin who, after some vacillations in which he appeared to seek a place for Asiatic society in the general social evolution[41], combined the effort to eliminate the Asiatic concept from serious consideration with the establishment of a new scheme of societal development. Vitkin argues that, had Marx lived beyond 1883, what he learned in the last years of his life would have caused him to believe that pre-antiquity

social formations are absolutely determined by personal relations, whereas from antiquity onward, commodity-production relations are decisive, and that the earlier stage is called the primary or archaic stage, which includes tribal society and, in Vitkin's opinion, Asiatic society as the final of several different phases, while the next stage is the secondary formation, comprising a number of pre-bourgeois societies based on slavery and serfdom. This construction rests, according to Vitkin, on the logic of the development of Marx' and Engels' teaching, on scientific data which were at Marx' and Engels' disposal at the end of the 1870's, on the assumption that Marx postulated the prevalence of personal relations in the primary social formation and on some references by Marx to archaic forms which Vitkin thinks are identical to the term Asiatic mode of production. Vitkin believes that this permits him (and us) to postulate a new periodization of the world-wide historical process. This, he claims, makes it possible to explain the characteristic trait of the Asiatic mode of production as the last phase in the archaic or primary formation.[42] This, I submit, makes it possible to defuse the Asiatic concept of its troublesome implications of stagnation and bureaucratic despotism, and to reclaim the unilinear 'faith' in universal laws of progressive social development. Its one major weakness is the fact that it represents a change of that which must be unchangeable to support the authority of Soviet philosophy.

Before constructing a tentative model of the most recent formulation, a word about the two remaining major problems of the Soviet leadership in this area.

The need to keep Russia and the problem of restoration out of the discussion is met, for the time being, by silence. The remaining issue, that of a more credible approach to the revolutionary intelligentsia of the so-called backward nations has been attacked by conceding that vast areas of the contemporary world are in fact characterized by conditions of the Asiatic mode of production and that the Communists, because of Marx' concept of Asiatic society, had the correct approach to its problems of social and political development. Because a socialist power exists in the Soviet-Union, and as long as Soviet leadership is accepted, the backward countries can by-pass the feudal and capitalist experiences and reach socialism along the non-capitalist path and in connection with the world-wide struggle (varying in form from movement to war) of national liberation.[43] Of course, if the Asiatic concept is once again obscured, that

ideological weapon is lost, but if, on the other hand, the full implications of the Marxist concept of Asiatic society for the Bolshevik revolution and its results are realized, the ideological authority of the Soviet system is undermined at least among those who think as Marxists do.

Our problem here, however, is with the authority of the Soviet philosophical system, and the effect to that authority of the invalidation of major premises supporting its statements and demands for universal validity.

Adding Vitkin's 1967 scholarly construction to the political formulations accepted in Soviet thought, the following 'latest' variant of eternally true stages of the historical process emerges. (See Figure 6.)



Fig. 6.

A number of other problems remain with respect to the brittle nature of fundamental premises of Soviet philosophy. One of these is the question of the effect on the dogmatic premise of development as the result of the operation of the law of the unity and struggle of opposites, of continuous negation[44], when it is stated that the historical process consists of the mere replacement of one socio-economic order by another, without reference to the process itself.[45] Another concerns the presumable abolition of the law of the progressive nature of development[46] by the postulation of the regressive or stagnant character of certain social formations.

One Soviet scholar maintains that all the recent investigations have

proven Marx' basic theory to be true and his propositions to be universal.[47] Another acknowledges that the new discussion has placed into doubt the notion of a regular succession of five socio-economic systems.[48] L.V. Danilova questions the belief that the acceptance of the model of class society passing through consecutive and successive stages was an integral part of the materialist conception of history, and asserts that "nothing in Marxist theory forbids the addition of another or several additional systems of society".[49]

Against the actual formulations of historical materialism and Soviet philosophy which proclaim the essential identity of the social and the natural dialectical process of development and the absolute dependence of Marxist philosophical thought on the objective reality of necessary social development for both its ideas and for proof of its statements, it is difficult to see how the rejection of basic premises can be permitted by a system which has once proclaimed them as having been proven by scientific investigation to be unchangeable.

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[1] *Osnovy Marksistskoj Filosofii*, 2nd ed., Moscow 1964 [hereafter referred to as *OMF*], pp. 299–304; *Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma*, 2nd ed., Moscow 1962 [hereafter referred to as *OML*], pp. 108–110.
[2] *OMF*, pp. 9, 309, 314.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 70.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 83.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 307.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 109, 116.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 168.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 315.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 325.
[10] *OML*, p. 125.
[11] *OMF*, p. 298.
[12] *OML*, p. 104.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 135.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 125.
[15] *Ibid.*
[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 109f.
[17] *OMF*, p. 271.
[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 323ff. Actually, the definition of some laws as historical laws is ambiguous here. While it is maintained that some laws are effective only in specific historical contexts, these laws are still considered general laws because they are laws, whether they are in effect or not.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 311.

[20] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, vol. 13, Berlin 1961, pp. 8–9.
[21] I refrain from extensive documentation of this argument and refer to Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*, Yale University Press 1957, ch. 9; and 'The Marxist View of Russian Society and Revolution', *World Politics* **12** (July 1960) 487–508, which do so fully.
[22] *Ibid.*, vol. 21, Berlin 1962, pp. 149f; cf. *Ibid.*, vol. 3, Berlin 1958, pp. 22f.
[23] Cf. Karl Marx, 'Die Revolution in China und in Europa', *Werke*, vol. 9, Berlin 1960, pp. 97f; Friedrich Engels, Letter to Kautsky, *Werke*, vol. 35, Berlin 1967, pp. 357f.
[24] Karl A. Wittfogel, 'The Marxist View of Russian Society and Revolution', *loc. cit.*
[25] Cf. *Literatura Social'no-Revoljucionnoj Partij "Narodnoj Voli"*, Tipografija Partij Socialistov-Revoljucionnerov, Geneva, 1905.
[26] Full documentation for this statement is contained in a forthcoming publication by the author.
[27] L. Trotsky, 'Three Concepts of the Russian Revolution', in *Stalin*, University Library, n.d., pp. 429f.
[28] V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 4th ed., Moscow 1964, vol. 25, pp. 280ff, 316.
[29] *Protokoly Ob"edinitel'nago S"ezda Rossijskoj Social'-Demokratičeskoj Raboči Parti*, Moscow 1907, p. 116.
[30] *Diskussija ob Aziatskom Sposobe proizvodstva*, Moscow-Leningrad 1931, see especially p. 182.
[31] Cf. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*, p. 411.
[32] L.V. Danilova, 'Diskussija po vaznoj probleme', *VF*, 1965,12, 149.
[33] *La Pensée*, April 1964.
[34] Ja.A. Lencman, 'Neskol'ko predvaritel'nyx zamečanii', *Vestnik Drevnei Istorii*, 1965,3, 78ff.
[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 78f. This summary by a Soviet scholar does not do justice to Godelier's full position.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 80.
[37] A.I. Pavlovskaja, 'Po povodu diskussii ob Aziatskom sposobe proizvodstva na stranicax žurnalov "La Pensée" i "Eirene"', *Vestnik Drevnei Istorii*, 1965,3,96. In the same publication, see also N.V. Pigulevskaja, 'K voprosu ob Aziatskom sposobe proizvodstva'.
[38] Pigulevskaja, p. 88.
[39] Pavlovskaja, pp. 93f; cf. also Lencman, pp. 81f.
[40] Pigulevskaja, p. 89.
[41] M.A. Vitkin and N.B. Ter-Akopjan, 'Po stranicam žurnala 'Pensée!', *VF*, 1965,3,175.
[42] M.A. Vitkin, 'Pervičnaja obščestvennaja formatsija v trudax K. Marksa', *VF*, 1967, 5, 40–49.
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[44] *OML*, p. 81.
[45] Danilova, *op. cit.*, p. 155. Cf. also *OMF*, p. 311.
[46] *OML*, p. 82.
[47] Pigulevskaja, p. 89.
[48] Pavlovskaja, p. 93.
[49] Danilova, p. 7.

THOMAS J. BLAKELEY

CURRENT SOVIET VIEWS ON EXISTENTIALISM

In line with the general evolution of contemporary Soviet philosophers into what they used to disdainfully call 'bourgeois objectivism' some of the more recent Soviet writings on existentialism take a remarkably honest and objective approach. What is more, these recent Soviet works show that the Soviets are well acquainted with the works of the philosophers they are criticising. In fact, in many instances we find less a criticism than a reasonably objective reporting on what is going on in existentialism.

This does not mean that the Soviets have dropped their militant approach or their claim to a monopoly on philosophical truth. Evidence thereto is to be found in I.S. Narski's 'The Crisis of Bourgeois Philosophy in the Present Stage of History and the Problems of Criticising it'.[1] Narski admits that some good work is being done in contemporary bourgeois philosophy but he measures progress by the proximity of bourgeois philosophers to dialectical materialism. Narski also takes cognizance of the fact that more and more bourgeois philosophers are interested in dialogue with Marxism. However, he interprets this interest in two rather peculiar directions. On the one hand, he finds that some bourgeois philosophers are studying Marxism-Leninism only in order to be better able to attack it. On the other hand, he accuses all bourgeois philosophers – citing existentialists, positivists and Thomists by name – of desiring dialogue for the sake of 'converting' the Marxist-Leninists. What is poignant is that Narski turns right around and calls on contemporary Soviet philosophers with precisely the same goal in mind; i.e., to convert bourgeois philosophers to Marxism-Leninism. Ultimately, however, Narski's article does show some progress in the matter since he invites Soviet philosophers to pay less attention to broad doctrinal issues and more attention to dealing with specific problems.

One of the most interesting of recent articles on existentialism is V.V. Lazarev's 'The Existentialist Conception of Man in the U.S.A.'.[2] Lazarev begins by affirming that existentialism is not just another

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philosophical fad in the U.S. Existentialism is the appropriate philosophy for the decadent U.S.A. American existentialists are interested mainly in the anthropological question. One would wonder where Lazarev would hope to find a non-anthropological existentialism!

Lazarev's article is in essence a review-article dealing with five figures on the existentialist scene in contemporary America. Lazarev reviews, in order: W.A. Luijpen's *Existential Phenomenology* (Pittsburgh 1963), C.J. Glicksberg's *The Self in Modern Literature* (Penn. U.P. 1963), Winkler's *Man: Bridge Between two Worlds* (no bibliographical data provided), F.H. Parker's 'The Temporal Being of Western Man' (*Review of Metaphysics* **18** (1965) 629–646), and L. Dupré's 'The Philosophical Stages of Self-Discovery' (*Thought* **39** (1964), No. 154, 411–428).

All of these are presented in a substantially accurate manner. Lazarev takes issue with the authors only when he senses that they are touching points which are or could be dangerous for Marxism-Leninism. For example, Lazarev has little objection to Luijpen's description of the dialectic between man and the world. However, Lazarev cannot allow that this enables one to abandon the standard Marxist-Leninist dichotomy of materialism and idealism. Lazarev is also quick to object to Luijpen's indictment of Marx' definition of man as a 'working animal'. It is somewhat difficult to see exactly what is at issue in Lazarev's response to Luijpen. According to Lazarev, Luijpen himself holds that man 'realizes' himself in active work but that there are forms of work which are 'objectifying' rather than 'humanizing'. Stated in this way, it is hard to see how this conflicts with Marxism-Leninism's notion of work under capitalism. Lazarev goes on to say that Luijpen makes the same mistake as other existentialists: he does not see that the heart of the matter in reference to alienation is man's relationship to his work: he sees the elimination of alienation not in the restructuring of work in society but in will-acts and self-discipline. Again, it is hard to see the essential difference between this and 'socialist work-discipline' which is so highly recommended in the context of Soviet scientific socialism.

Lazarev is much kinder in dealing with Glicksberg. One has the impression that Lazarev feels a bit sorry for this errant author who has put his finger on the problem but shows no signs of even coming close to the answer. As Lazarev sees it, Glicksberg has pertinently exposed the dilemma of the individual in contemporary bourgeois society: he is

unable to communicate with others and must, therefore, solve all in terms of his own personal interiority. Glicksberg's answer is literature: to see it is – for Lazarev – to see how inadequate it is as a solution.

In dealing with Winkler's book Lazarev is content to outline its main themes. This may be due to the fact that Lazarev does not have any real argument with the author. However, he does point out that Winkler belabors science for leaving the soul out of its domain of study, on the one hand, and maintains that science is not competent to deal with the problem, on the other.

The articles by Parker and Dupré are introduced by Lazarev to show that American existentialism is not completely locked into step with its European forebears who dwell on alienation, suicide, pure subjectivity, etc. Parker's article presents a novel approach to the history of Western philosophy: there has been a triadic development, the thesis of which was ancient concentration on nature, the antithesis mediaeval concentration on God, and the synthesis yet to come out of the present transition, where neither nature nor God but only man can serve to justify man's existence. There is very little in this which conflicts to any serious extent with Marxism-Leninism's view. Similarly, Lazarev goes out of his way to stress Dupré's kindly evaluation of Marx' philosophy: nor does he have any too serious objections to Dupré's evaluation of the increasing importance of the subject in the course of the history of philosophy. Tolerance on the latter point may be due to the fact that Dupré stresses that, after Hegel, the subject–object dialectic can no longer be exorcised from Western philosophy. This is a basic tenet of Marxist-Leninist epistemology.

The conclusion of Lazarev's article is worth quoting in full: "The idealistic and even religious tendencies in the philosophy of American existentialists – as well as their sometimes unkindly attacks on Marxism – should not be allowed to hide the fact that they ask some important and vital questions which should be taken by Soviet Marxists not just as subjects of polemics but also as matters of serious philosophical concern." Those who are familiar with the usual Soviet affirmations on contemporary bourgeois philosophy will immediately notice the anomaly. Instead of "incorrigibly idealistic and slavishly [to Wall Street and the Vatican] religious", we find an almost off-hand reference to "idealistic and religious tendencies". Instead of "their slanderous and viciously false attacks on Marxism", we find that they are merely "unkindly attacks". Stunning is

the admission that contemporary bourgeois philosophers are bringing up important and vital questions. Hitherto, all that bourgeois philosophers could do was to turn in circles of decadent despair, impotent to remedy their own sorry plight. Finally, one is amazed to hear a Soviet philosopher suggest that Soviet philosophers in general treat with bourgeois philosophy on the level of problems, i.e., in total or relative abstraction from the ideological class-conflict.

We see an almost contrary point of view in a pair of articles, both entitled 'Existentialism'[3], by E.Ju. Solov'ev. This is not to say that Solov'ev reverts to the old Soviet trick of pasting labels, shouting slogans, and paying no attention to the real content of the philosophy being discussed. He sticks to old conceptual models in a much more sophisticated way. In fact, he tries to do what has to be done if the basic principles of Soviet historiography of philosophy are ever to be verified or disproved. Solov'ev tries to show the tight interdependence between existentialism as a philosophy and the social-historical milieu which both contributed to the birth of existentialism and is sustained, in its turn, by this doctrine.

Solov'ev's main thesis is that existentialism came to be when the general catastrophe of World War I showed the baselessness of the optimistic models of history which had dominated the previous century. Existentialism, in essence, is stoical anti-historicism, in which the individual has no one but himself and is, consequently, incapable of dealing with history in any form whatsoever.

With this general description as his point of departure, Solov'ev sets out to show that existentialism contributed to and fed on a series of historical situations, the inevitability of which can be shown to be a pseudo-inevitability engendered precisely by the pessimistic and ahistorical nature of existentialism.

Thus, Jaspers was able in 1931 to point out how fascism would eventually dominate. This was far-sighted on his part. However, what his subjectivism and lack of historical perspective prevent him from seeing is that in 1931, when he had his premonitions, this domination was not historically inevitable: those who then fought against this tide were not hopeless adventurers. History has proved that pessimists like Jaspers were the real adventurers, utterly failing to see historical reality.

By 1941 the center of the existentialist movement had shifted to oc-

cupied France. There the Nazi occupation seemed to have created the epitome of the 'limit situation' so central to existentialism. All tended to prove that Nazism was historically inevitable and that capitulation and collaboration were historically ordained fates. Sartre's *Being and Nothing* represents the philosophical expression of the refusal to capitulate to this inhuman fate. Solov'ev takes Sartre to task, however, for inspiring the French Resistance not with the historically necessary mission of resisting the ahistorical phenomenon of Nazism but with that spontaneous 'action without hope of success' which was both the glory and the tragedy of the Resistance. This took its toll in the post-war world.

The post-war world was marked by new stresses and strains. Gone was the hopelessness of the occupation: gone was the existentialist's peculiar privilege of being the only one to have a coherent theory of tragedy and absurdity. According to Solov'ev the post-war existentialists went shopping for a new 'total menace' to take the place of the perfect 'limit situation' which the Allied victory had destroyed. They found it in Communism and promptly became anti-Communists.

Solov'ev holds that the myth of the Communist menace was destroyed when the XXth Congress of the CPSU showed that there was a new mode for the peaceful solution of international conflicts. This even brought Sartre around somewhat. But – complains Solov'ev – it is difficult to criticise Sartre because he has come up with the right answer to the question of values, but has done this for the wrong reasons. In his *Critique of Dialectical Reason* Sartre comes up with Marxism as the answer: however, he is here taking Marxism as the means of satisfying existentialism's need for a new myth. This, for Solov'ev, is not genuine Marxism.

There is no denying that Solov'ev's attempt to correlate existentialism with the social-economic milieu in which it was born and on which it fed is interesting. And, as we mentioned above, this is a work that has to be done if Marxist-Leninist historiography is to become meaningful. However, it is quite clear that Solov'ev had better back up and try again or leave the work to someone else. When one is dealing with a philosophy as history-conscious as existentialism, one can hardly expect to establish that the major figures in this school are almost totally unconscious of the real historical position that they themselves occupy. In other words, either Sartre is saying something meaningful and he himself is aware of its relevance as a social-historically conditioned phenomenon, or Sartre is a bab-

bler, unworthy of being mentioned. What Solov'ev seems to forget is that a denial of historical relevance is itself necessarily historically relevant.

A less interesting and quite contradictory attempt at explaining existentialism through the milieu is to be found in B.V. Pospelov's 'Existentialism and the Problem of Alienation in Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy in Japan'.[4] Perhaps it is less interesting precisely because it seems so confused and contradictory. After having bluntly stated that existentialism in Japan is not at all original, that the Japanese limit themselves to copying and commenting on European existentialists, Pospelov goes on to describe the ideas of Tasuku Hara in some detail. Hara's notions may not be completely original but they are far enough away from the usual European existentialism to be recognised as something *sui generis*. Although Pospelov is fairly objective in his presentation of contemporary existentialism in Japan, it is evident that he cannot come to grips with the basic fact that existentialism is on the increase in both the Middle East and the Far East. And this is where a peculiarly Soviet-style contradiction comes to light. For Pospelov, the fact that existentialism is spreading in Lebanon, Egypt, etc., just as in Japan, has no effect on the fact that existentialism is a philosophy of decadence which is currently in the middle of a serious crisis.

V.A. Karpušin's 'Albert Camus' Conception of the Person'[5] is the most agreeable and least philosophical of the recent Soviet works on existentialism. Karpušin spends little time on ideological considerations. He merely indicates that bourgeois consciousness' refusal to accept the laws governing contemporary society has forced it to regard absurdity as the basic philosophical category. Otherwise, Karpušin's article is a rather pleasant excursion into the absurd world of Albert Camus. In Karpušin's eyes, Camus failed because, being untrained in philosophy, he operated with a faulty epistemology. Camus thought that all that falls outside the confines of formal logic is irrational: Camus was familiar neither with dialectical logic nor with the epistemological function of practice. However, there is more than this faulty epistemology plaguing Camus. Camus takes individualism as his basic postulate. But, of course, this is in flagrant contradiction with contemporary reality, where socialism is the required mode. This is why Camus arrives at the conclusion that alienation is invincible. It is invincible as long as one tries to force individualism in a non-individualistic social structure.

Camus' answer to all problems is revolt. This is too bad, since he merely needed a clear view of history to show him how alienation can be overcome through historical materialism.

Ultimately, Camus' faulty epistemology and errant individualism made his views so unstable that he was able to convert from anti-fascism to anti-Communism.

Karpušin is critical but not nasty. Like Lazarev, he is being broad-minded about the whole matter. This is both surprising and heartening. It is surprising since it marks a clear de-escalation of *partijnost'*. It is heartening because, if this state of affairs lasts and spreads, the chances for fruitful East-West dialogue will be enormously improved.

Other recent Soviet works on existentialism will have to be examined to see if this relaxation of *partijnost'* is a generalized phenomenon. And recent Marxist-Leninist writings on other contemporary bourgeois philosophies should be examined from the same point of view.

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[3] 'Ekzistencializm', *VF* 1966,12, 76–88; and 1967,1, 126–139.
[4] 'Ekzistencializm i problema otčuždenija v sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii Japonii', *FN* 1967,2, 88–97.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

REPLY TO MR. HOGAN

The Editor of *Studies in Soviet Thought* asked me to comment on Homer Hogan's article 'The Basic Perspective of Marxism-Leninism' published in the current issue of this journal.

In my book *Philosophy and Ideology* (Chaps. 16 and 17, pp. 322–340) I tried to establish the following three propositions:

(1) Lenin's theory of knowledge in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*[1] is a variety of naive realism (external objects are what they seem – the sky is blue, the fire is hot, and the stone is hard), which is supported by the copy and causal theories of perception.

(2) By the copy theory of perception as formulated but not invented by Lenin (it goes back to Democritus and Epicurus and was occasionally held in modern times) should be understood the view that sensations are reflections, mirror-reflections, images, photographs, copies, true or approximately true copies of the external objects. All these words are not my invention and are not put by me into Lenin's mouth. They are used by Lenin, constantly and consistently, throughout *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.*[2] According to Lenin, sensation is not a mere "conventional sign, symbol, hieroglyph, and so on", for this would result, as he emphasised, in the renunciation of materialism. "An image is one thing, a symbol, a conventional sign, another." Since "signs or symbols may quite possibly indicate imaginary objects", Lenin concluded that sensation should be conceived as a subjective image which not only represents but corresponds to and resembles the outside object of which it is the image, without being identical with it.[3] Sensations, as he put it, are "copies, photographs, images, mirror-reflections of things".[4]

(3) When analysed in detail, the copy theory of perception appears to be for various reasons untenable. In particular, it does not demonstrate conclusively the existence of material objects and Lenin assigned it the task of establishing their existence as a demonstrable truth (this was the

main objective of writing *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*). If the "metaphor of the sensation being a mirror-reflection of the outside world" were true, we could never know it to be true, that is, be able to give sufficient reasons for accepting it, for we could never pierce the veil of the mirror-reflections, be in direct contact with any object of the outside world, and thus ascertain the fact that sensations are 'true copies' of the perceived objects (*Philosophy and Ideology*, p. 327). These difficulties are not peculiar to Lenin's theory of knowledge alone; they are common to other kinds of representative theories of perception and are, therefore, sometimes referred to as Locke's predicament.

In his article Hogan says that in my book *Philosophy and Ideology*, "seemingly authoritative though explicitly anti-Marxist", I am guilty of "the mistaken or one-sided readings of *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*". If I understand him rightly, Hogan rejects my account for the following two main reasons:

(1) If the terms 'reflection', 'mirror-reflection', 'image', 'photograph', 'copy' or 'true copy' are interpreted literally, Lenin's theory of perception is absurd.

(2) The literal interpretation has to be rejected because Lenin recognised the fact that some images or reflections are not like the objects which they represent at all.

Let us consider the second argument first. I emphasised in my book that occasionally Lenin contradicted his copy theory of perception. For instance, on two occasions, he conceded the fact that "an image can never wholly compare with the model" and that consequently our sensations, e.g. of light or sound, may not 'wholly' resemble the objects which are the prime cause of our experience of sound and light.[5] But on these two occasions when Lenin seemed to understand that our perceptions can be sometimes accurate and sometimes inaccurate copies ("approximate copies", as Lenin put it) of objects, he was considering the causal, and not the copy theory of perception, the second pillar of his theory of knowledge. Now, the causal theory of perception supports naive realism in the sense that it implies the existence of material objects when they are not perceived and accounts for the appearance of their images or reflections in our consciousness. But the causal theory of perception raises serious doubts as to whether these images or reflections are 'true' or 'approximately true copies' of the perceived objects. The incompatibility

between Lenin's various statements results from the partial inconsistency of the two theories in question. There is no evidence, however, that Lenin drew the appropriate conclusions from this fact and revised his copy theory in the light of his causal theory of perception. He used them in turn, according to his requirements, thus avoiding the problem of reconciling their partially inconsistent claims.

I fully accept Hogan's first point, which merely summarises the results of my analysis, namely that "Lenin's theory of reflection ... simply cannot be made intelligible by way of any literal or analogical interpretation of its leading terms". But while for Hogan this is the starting-point for trying to find out what Lenin 'really meant', for myself this is the final conclusion, to be accepted as it stands. I do not approve of such procedures which reject what a writer says explicitly, repeatedly and emphatically, and substitutes for it what he allegedly meant, although what he allegedly meant has no support in what he actually said.

It is, of course, true to say that the term 'mirror-reflection' is a metaphorical expression, and I never denied it, either explicitly or implicitly. What I did deny is quite a different statement, namely, that Lenin himself used it as a metaphor. There is no evidence whatsoever that Lenin had any doubts about the literal truth of this expression. Hogan did not produce a shred of evidence that I am wrong but just feels and asserts that I am wrong.[6]

Ultimately, the difference between Hogan and myself can be reduced to the difference of the task which we have set ourselves. Hogan wishes to understand the theory of reflection "not merely as it stands but as it would be conceptualised today by a consistent Marxist-Leninist" or even "to induce the act of sympathy required for sharing the Marxist perspective". I wanted to describe and analyse Lenin's theory of knowledge as stated in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and in this task I followed Lenin wherever his arguments led me. I did not try to save him by additional assumptions, for which Lenin's works provide no support and which are arbitrary in this sense, because this is not the purpose of a philosophical or historical analysis as I understand it.

I do not deal with the constructive part of Hogan's article, because personally I do not think that it raises any point of philosophical interest.

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[1] In this rejoinder I always refer to *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* as published in V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, Moscow 1962.
[2] "Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world" (p. 69); "Sensations, i.e. the images of the external world, exist within us" (p. 90); "For the materialist, our sensations are images of the sole and ultimate objective reality" (p. 129); "For the materialist the 'factually given' is the outer world, the image of which is our sensations" (p. 111); "If our sensations give us an objectively true image of the external world..." (p. 182); "The mastery of nature manifested in human practice is a result of an objectively correct reflection within the human head of the phenomena and processes of nature, and is proof of the fact that this reflection ... is objective, absolute, eternal truth"; and *passim*. – "They do not regard sensations as a true copy of this objective reality, thereby coming into direct conflict with natural science and throwing the door open for fideism" (p. 129); "Matter is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them" (p. 130); "Engels speaks ... of copies, photographs, images, mirror-reflections of things" (p. 232); and *passim*.
[3] *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, pp. 114, 119, 232, 234–5.
[4] *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, p. 232
[5] *Philosophy and Ideology*, pp. 339, 422, note 57; *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, pp. 235, 301–2.
[6] I am afraid that Hogan's reference to *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, p. 100, footnote, is entirely irrelevant. Lenin deals there with the question as to how *Spiegelbild* should be translated and simply states that *Spiegelbild* means either *mirror-reflection* or just *reflection* (*Abbild*), dismissing the distinction between the meanings of the two words as a trivial and frivolous matter, a "mere cavilling". Lenin raised this point only to defend Plekhanov from the accusation of having mistranslated Engels, but himself rendered Engels's *Spiegelbild* (*Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, in K. Marx–F. Engels, *Werke*, B. 21, Berlin 1962, p. 275) as *mirror-reflection* and not just as *reflection* (p. 232). I have not the slightest idea how this footnote, concerned with a question of translation, could provide evidence, and especially conclusive evidence, that Lenin did not "intend us to interpret 'reflection' literally whenever he uses the term – and that restriction would seem also to apply to appositives for this term such as 'photograph', 'copy', and 'image'".

CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECREE ON THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

The September issue of *Voprosy Filosofii* contains the text of a lengthy decree by the Central Committee, 'On Measures for the Future Development of the Social Sciences and the Increase of Their Role in the Construction of Communism'. Besides indicating the deficiencies of the present state of Soviet social sciences and demanding greater profundity, thoroughness, efficiency, organization, etc. in these areas, the decree singles out, for each social science, several topics which are to be given priority. In

the domain of philosophy, the following items are listed: further elaboration of the materialist dialectic, logic and theory of knowledge, and of the methodological problems of the social, natural and technical sciences; study of the dialectics of socialist society, the contradictions of contemporary capitalism, the correlation of objective and subjective factors in social development; development of historical materialism as a general sociological theory and development of concrete social researches; elaboration of the problems of the social structure of society and of the perfection of socialist social relations and their transformation into communist social relations; working out the methodology of scientifically predicting the development of social processes; investigation of the laws of social consciousness; theoretical elaboration of the problems of the person and the collective, the society and the state, socialist humanism, ethics and esthetics; investigation of the problems of the organization, logic and psychology of scientific creation.

J. O'R.

REVIEWS

I. V. Stalin, *Sočinenija*, Volumes 1 [XVI] – 3 [XVI] (ed. by Robert H. McNeal), The Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif., 1967.

In his lifetime he was hailed as the "teacher and leader of labouring humanity, the pride and banner of progressive science"; his works were proclaimed as being "without equal in the history of progressive science"; he was revered as one who "poses and creatively solves the most vital problems of Marxist-Leninist theory". One might, therefore, have expected that his works would have been carefully collected and lovingly preserved after his death; but until the publication this year of the last three volumes of his *Collected Works*, no complete edition of Stalin's works existed. The complete collection of his works decreed in 1946 by the Central Committee of the Party was to have comprised 16 volumes in all, but at the time of his death in 1953 only 13 volumes had appeared. Indeed, on January 12th, 1956, shortly before Krushchev's 'secret speech' at the XXth Party Congress, cataloguing Stalin's crimes, the *Literaturnaja Gazeta* announced the forthcoming publication of Volume XIV of the *Sočinenija*. In the light of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin's crimes at the Party Congress in February of that year, it is not surprising that Volume XIV never saw the light of day. In fact, since 1956 the tendency has been to subtract from Stalin's already modest literary achievements. In 1956 the famous *Istorija VKP (b). Kratkij kurs*, first published in 1938 but not attributed to Stalin until 1946, was officially declared to have been written by other hands than his.

However much one may welcome the de-Stalinisation campaign initiated by Khrushchev and the liberalisation of Soviet life and science which it ushered in, students of the Soviet-Union cannot but regret that Stalin's successors have attempted to bury the works with the man. Distaste for the man who for so many years ruled the Communist world with a heavy hand and embarrassment at the Byzantine reverence which Stalin received in his lifetime may well explain thereluctance to continue the publication of his works. But such an attitude does a serious disservice to history. Stalin is undoubtedly one of the major figures of the present century. His formative influence on the development of the Soviet-Union is second only to that of Lenin. Consequently, his writings are important historical documents and indispensable sources for the study of the Soviet-Union.

The publication of the last three volumes of Stalin's *Collected Works* by the Hoover Institute represents an important contribution to science and will be welcomed by all students of Soviet affairs. The formidable task of compiling

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and editing Stalin's later works has been undertaken by Dr. Robert H. McNeal. Some impression of the enormity of the task involved can be gathered from a comparison with N. Gradoboyev's account of the difficulties encountered by the original Soviet editors of the *Sočinenija* (cf. *Ost-Probleme* 3, no. 32, 982–984). Certainly, the task of the Soviet editors was made more difficult by the effort to keep Stalin's *Collected Works* from looking insignificant beside the 43-volume Lenin *Sočinenija*; but the Committee – under the presidency of Molotov – charged with editing Stalin's works was given unlimited facilities and could draw on the extensive resources of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow. Without these facilities Dr. McNeal has contrived to take up the task where the original editors left off and to bring the collection up to date.

The volumes edited by Dr. McNeal cover the period 1934–1953. The vast majority of contents is made up of speeches and addresses made by Stalin during this period. The material will obviously be of most interest to the historian and the political scientist, but the essay 'O dialektičeskom i istoričeskom materializme' reproduced in Volume 1 [XIV] and the articles on linguistics contained in Volume 3 [XVI] are important for the study of Soviet philosophy. These important documents have been difficult to obtain in the last ten years.

The three volumes are clearly printed and solidly bound, but are grettable defect is the large number of irritating typographical errors, particularly in the first volume. The six-page Introduction contains no less than six misprints and the table of contents erroneously gives the date of Stalin's 'Vystuplenie na prieme metallurgov' as 1914 instead of 1934. These, certainly, are small defects in this valuable work, but they might easily have been eliminated by more careful proofreading.

T. R. Payne

L.A. Volovik and E.M. Drozdova, *Istina v marksistskoj i domarksovoj filosofii* M., Mysl', 1965. 223 str.

This book is divided into two main parts: the first endeavours to present a quasi-historical-cum-systematic and critical account of the problem of truth in pre-Marxist philosophy; the second part, which is by far the longer (144 pages out of 223), is exclusively devoted to a detailed exposition of the Marxist-Leninist theory of truth and presents an up-to-date account of contemporary Marxist and non-Marxist treatments of the problem.

Generally speaking, the book has many interesting and positive features, which, in the past, have only too often been missing from Soviet publications. There are, for example, many quotations from non-Marxist philosophers, including those who, like Bertrand Russell and Gustav Wetter, are highly critical of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Besides, there is some discussion of non-Marxist-Leninist theories. On pp. 10 and 11, for example, the authors attempt (however inadequately) to compare the theory of truth of Aquinas with that of Aristotle and Lenin. Contemporary non-Soviet Marxist-Leninist philosophers like Adam Schaff and Roger Garaudy are also included in this study. The former is criticised for saying in his work on truth that dialectical materialism takes into consideration and develops the classical Aristotelian definition of truth. Volovik and Drozdova are of the opinion that nowhere in classical Marxism can one find justification for such statements. The particularly adequate treatment of N.G. Černyševskij's views, together with Lenin's comments on them, deserves special mention. Finally, by assembling in one volume almost all the important texts relevant to the problem of truth, from both the 'Classics' and from pre-Revolutionary Russian philosophy, the authors have provided us with a valuable tool for research.

The work, however, has several serious defects. In the first place, there is neither a name-index nor a subject-index and not even a bibliography. Secondly, the treatment of pre-Marxist theories of truth is clearly inadequate. To attempt, in a work of this kind, to deal with the whole course of philosophical thought on the problem of truth within the limited space of one chapter is obviously one-sided. One would at least expect that the authors give the essential points of each position examined; but this has not been done. In dealing with Aquinas, the authors accuse him of falsifying Aristotle's teaching on truth, but, strangely enough, there is not a single quotation from *De Veritate* – the *locus classicus* for Aquinas' teaching on the nature of truth! Moreover, there is only a single quotation from the *Summa Contra Gentiles*! These defects would hardly lead the reader to believe that the authors have more than a cursory acquaintance with the writings of Aquinas.

Secondly, in dealing with G.A. Wetter's criticisms of the Marxist-Leninist theory of truth, one would have expected closely reasoned arguments rather than the banal repetition of such well-known *argumenta ad hominem* as "This can be explained by his [Wetter's] class-interests as an apologete of imperialism"

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(p. 95). Moreover, no attempt has been made to answer Wetter's basic criticism of the Marxist-Leninist definition of the 'basic question of all philosophy' and the consequent division of philosophers into two camps – materialists and idealists. However, one should not perhaps be too surprised at this since the first sentence of the book reads "bor'boj dvux linij v filosofii – materializma i idealizma" (p. 3).

Thirdly, in discussing Lenin's treatment of the problem of truth, the authors merely recite the former's doctrine and make no attempt to develop, still less to criticise, any of his propositions.

In short, the entire work is intended as a determined defence of the theory of truth found in the 'Classics' of Marxism-Leninism. The opinions of non-Marxist philosophers are either inadequately presented and unfavourably compared with the Marxist-Leninist view, or are arbitrarily dismissed as false and unscientific.

Francis Selvadoray

Helmut Fleischer, *Umrisse einer 'Philosophie des Menschen'* (Hochschulinformationen der Zentralstelle für Gesamtdeutsche Hochschulfragen, Nr. 2), Berlin 1967, 66 S.

It is now well known that the anthropological concerns of continental European philosophy have penetrated the Eastern bloc nations. Adam Schaff and the *Praxis* group have, for some years, presented the West with clear indications of a new 'humanist' trend in Marxist-Leninist philosophy, one which takes its inspiration from the young Marx and seeks to work out a socialist philosophy of man. However, not all East-European countries witnessed a similar development; and the Soviet-Union was, in the opinion of many, the most conspicuous laggard. This fact received easy explanation from the Western view of Soviet philosophy as naturalistic and historicist: the frequent uncomplimentary references to the Soviets' absolutization of material nature, society and history at the expense of the individual person served as convincing supports of the naturalness of this deficiency. However, recent developments in Soviet philosophy demand a reappraisal of the situation: basic problems of philosophical anthropology are now being seriously debated, and the initial attempts have yielded results likely to surprise Western critics.

Dr. Fleischer's booklet provides ample evidence of this new pre-occupation of Soviet philosophy. There are two main sections: 'The Anthropological Positions of Historical Materialism' and 'New Reflections of Marxist-Leninist Philosophers on the "Problem of Man"'. The first section presents a compact survey of certain basic anthropological concepts, principally as found in the writings of Marx himself and with an emphasis on the *Frühschriften*. What emerges is a rather favorable picture of Marxist philosophical anthropology as personalist, non-deterministic and, in many areas, more moderate and differentiated than it has previously been conceived.

It is the second and larger section of the book which merits special attention. Dr. Fleischer admirably sketches some of the new lines of Marxist-Leninist thought pertaining to philosophical anthropology, drawing primarily upon Soviet and East-German sources. And the reader immediately perceives that the recent developments do not represent a new 'metaphysics of praxis' or some Marxist brand of existentialist thought, but rather a clarification and development of certain basic concepts, within the framework of a rationalist ontology. In this sense, the orientation is Marxist-Leninist rather than purely Marxian. The discussions to which Dr. Fleischer refers touch on the following topics: human happiness, the nature of the person, the dignity and value of man, man as a product of society, human freedom, the autonomy of the individual, alienation, etc. And, happily, these discussions are increasing not only in frequency but also in their level of competence. V. P. Tugarinov – the author most frequently quoted – proposes a distinction between the absolute and relative value of man; while the latter is a function of man's social usefulness, the former is due him simply "because he is a man" (36). It is interesting that

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Tugarinov refers, in this context, to the (Kantian) principle which asserts that man must be recognized both as a means and as an end in himself (36–37). T. I. Ojzerman brands the definition of freedom as "recognized necessity" as completely unsatisfactory, and offers, as do several others, a more adequate definition to take its place (44–49). And G. S. Batiščev severely criticizes the idea that man is a 'product' and presents an astute analysis of human activity, especially in its creative relation to the agent and his external conditions (38).

Thus, Marxism-Leninism is now engaged in clarifying precisely those concepts for which Western critics have most frequently taken it to task. For bringing this to our attention in an information-packed and interesting little book, we must be grateful to the author.

James J. O'Rourke

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CHRONOLOGY

1966:

Sept. 4–10 Sixth World Congress of Sociology, in Evian, France. P.N. Fedoseev and F.V. Konstantinov led the 83-member Soviet delegation, the largest group from a Socialist country. Poland and Bulgaria also sent sizeable delegations (37 and 32 respectively) (*VF* 1967,8, 121–132).

Sept. 4–11 Sixth International Hegel Congress, in Prague, under the sponsorship of the International Hegel Society. Representatives from 32 countries discussed 'The Hegelian Philosophy of Right and the Present Day'. Of the 60 main papers 10 were presented by Soviet scholars, whose delegation was led by M.F. Ovsjannikov (*FN* 1967,3, 170–173).

Oct. 4–6 Fourth meeting of the editors of philosophical and sociological journals published in socialist countries. Assembled in Budapest were editors of leading journals from Bulgaria, Hungary, East-Germany, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the Soviet-Union, and Italy. Two themes were discussed: (1) the problem of man in Marxist philosophy, and (2) the role of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and sociology in the development of social consciousness. Among the speakers were T.I. Ojzerman, P. Vranicki, M.B. Mitin, M.T. Iovčuk, and I. Sigeti (*FN* 1967,1, 167–172).

Oct. 26–29 Symposium in Moscow on 'Dialectics and Contemporary Science'. Three hundred philosophers and scientists from East-European countries discussed: (1) general problems of dialectics and the logic of contemporary science, (2) philosophical problems of contemporary physics and astronomy, and (3) philosophical problems of cyber-

netics. In the keynote speech, P.N. Fedoseev emphasized that in a developing dialectical materialism, dogmatism has no place; one must recognize the relative nature of many actual philosophical positions, develop and revise them. Participating in the work of the conferences were P.V. Kopnin, B.M. Kedrov, P.V. Tavanec, I.S. Narskij, V.A. Fok, M.É. Omel'janovskij, and V.M. Gluškov (*VF* 1967,5, 138–151; *FN* 1967,3, 160–169).

Nov. All-Union symposium on 'Problems of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of Population', at MGU (*VF* 1967,6, 140–144; *FN* 1967,3, 174–179).

Symposium on the sociology of art, sponsored by the Scientific Council for the History of World Culture (AN) and by LGU. Some 200 philosophers and art critics participated (*VF* 1967,7, 140–151).

Nov. 24 Meeting of the Student Scientific Society of the MGU faculty of psychology, to discuss the works of the Soviet physiologist and psychologist N.A. Bernštejn. Several talks were given by leading Soviet psychologists (*VF* 1967,6, 144–149).

Dec. 6–9 Second International Colloquium of Socialist Countries on the Sociology of Religion, in Prague. Representatives from most of the East-European countries, including the Soviet-Union, considered the theme 'The Structure of Religiousness (*Religiosität*)' (*Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 1967,6, 715–722).

Dec. Conference in Warsaw on 'Marxism and the Basic Trends of Meta-Ethics', organized by the department of ethics at Warsaw University. Papers were delivered by the following Soviet and Polish philosophers: A.F. Šiškin, K.A. Švarcman and M.I. Petrosjan, from the Soviet-Union; M. Fricxand and G. Jankovskij from Poland (*VF* 1967,8, 132–136).

Symposium in Moscow devoted to the ideology of the present national-liberation movement in Africa and Asia, organized by the Section for Social Sciences of the Presidium of the AN (*VF* 1967,8, 139).

1967:

Feb. 27–Mar. 1 All-Union Symposium on the Present Problems of the History of Philosophy and Its Leninist Stage of Development. Meeting in Moscow were 280 philosophers and historians from the Soviet-Union and other East-European countries. In addition to the plenary sessions, there were discussion sections which treated the following themes: (1) problems of the history of Marxist philosophy and the Leninist stage of its development (leader – M.T. Iovčuk), (2) methodological problems of the history of philosophy (leader – T.I. Ojzerman), (3) basic problems of the history of dialectics (leader – M.A. Dynnik), (4) problems of the history of philosophy of the peoples of the SU (leader – V.E. Evgrafov), (5) problems of the history and critique of contemporary bourgeois philosophy (leader – A.S. Bogomolov) (*FN* 1967,4, 178–194). Following the symposium there was a meeting of the editors of *VF* with several attending philosophers from socialist countries (*VF* 1967,6, 152–153).

April 4 Meeting of about 120 members of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research with the editors of *VF*, in Dubno (*VF* 1967,8, 136–139).

REPORT FROM THE INSTITUTE

Personnel: Professor J. M. Bocheński is at present lecturing in the United States and will be absent from the Institute until the end of December. Mr. Ervin Laszlo, formerly managing editor of *Studies in Soviet Thought*, has left the Institute to take up a teaching post at the University of Akron. Mr. J. Dousse has joined the Institute as lecturer in Russian language.

Students: During the Summer Semester, 1967, 57 students attended courses at the Institute, while at the beginning of the Winter Semester, 1967/68, 74 students were enrolled in the Institute.

Publications: A collection of articles from the *Studies in Soviet Thought* has just been published in book form. This collection which has been edited by Mr. Ervin Laszlo, is entitled *Philosophy in the Soviet Union. A Survey in the Mid-Sixties.* Two further volumes have been published in the 'Sovietica' series. The first, *The Categories of Dialectical Materialism*, is a translation by T. J. Blakeley of Guy Planty-Bonjour's *Les Catégories du Matérialisme Dialectique.* The second is a new monograph by Friedrich Rapp entitled *Gesetz und Determination in der Sowjetphilosophie.*

Teaching Programme: The following lectures and seminars are being offered by the Institute during the Winter-Semester 1967/68:

Bocheński: Histoire de la philosophie contemporaine: le Marxisme;

Bocheński: Séminaire de philosophie contemporaine: Textes soviétiques;

Bocheński: Die Sowjetische Philosophie der Logik;

Bocheński: Discussion Group on Current Soviet Philosophy;

Kemball: History of Russia;

Kemball: History of Russian Thought in the 19th Century;

Kemball: Russian Language for Beginners;

Dousse: Langue Russe pour débutants;

Dousse: Langue Russe pour avancés;

Payne: Proseminar in General Sovietology;

Payne: Idéologie Communiste;

Payne: General Introduction to Communism;

Revesz: Geschichte und Organisation der Kommunistischen Partei;

Revesz: Sowjetische Rechtsphilosophie;

Erni: Quaestiones selectae Ecclesias Orientales earumque theologiam spectantes.

An intensive course in Russian language for beginners is again being offered this year. This course, which was initiated successfully last year, is intended to enable students beginning Soviet studies to acquire a working knowledge of Russian in a short space of time. Some 20 students have enrolled for this course which is to continue until Christmas.

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